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The Bill of Attainder Doctrine: A
Survey of the Decisional Law
By MICHAEL P. LEHMANN*
Introduction
The purpose of this article is to examine the bill of attainder doc-
trine as it has been developed by various state and federal court deci-
sions during the past century.' Part I of this essay will consider briefly
both the origin of attainders in English common law and the justifica-
tions offered for the two major provisions of the United States Consti-
tution that expressly proscribe the enactment of such legislation.2 In
* A.B., 1974, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1977, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law. Member, California bar.
1. Although there is considerable confusion on this subject, for the purposes of this
article, a "bill of attainder" is defined to consist of four separate elements: (1) a legislative
act (2) imposing punishment (3) upon a designated person or class of persons (4) without
benefit of judicial trial. The United States Supreme Court has adopted this quadripartite
definition. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946), citedin United States v. Brown,
381 U.S. 437, 448-49 (1965).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3: "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed" (a restriction applying only to Congress; see Smith v. State, 227 Ind. 672, 675, 87
N.E.2d 881, 882 (1949)); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance or Confederation; grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal; coin Money, emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold
and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post
Facto Law or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of
Nobility.
(Emphasis added).
Throughout this article, the author will assume that the nature and scope of the bill of
attainder doctrine are identical, regardless of which of these two constitutional prohibitions
is being discussed. The United States Supreme Court has indicated that such an assumption
is permissible. Thus, Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867), a case dealing
with article one, section ten, has been followed or distinguished in decisions involving article
one, section nine. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1965); United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946); Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1867). Simi-
larly, Ex pare Garland has been cited and differentiated in cases concerning article one,
section ten. See Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 723 (1951); Dent v. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889). Accord, Davis, United States v. Lovett and the Attainder
Bogey in Modem Legislation, 1950 WASH. U.L.Q. 13, 16 [hereinafter cited as Davis].
The Constitution also prohibits the courts from imposing attainders of treason which
work "Corruption of Blood or Forfeiture." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. That provision will
not be discussed in this article; for an analysis of its meaning, see Wallick v. Van Riswick,
92 U.S. 202, 210 (1875).
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Part II, the author will analyze Cummings v. Missouri3 and Exparte
Garland,4 the two watershed decisions of the United States Supreme
Court that form the basis for all modem considerations of the bill of
attainder doctrine. Part III of this article will consider the definition of
an attainder, component by component, and will scrutinize the hold-
ings of state and federal courts rendered between 1865 and 1964 with
respect to each component. Particular attention will be accorded to the
problematic aspects of each definitional element and the various tech-
niques which the courts have relied upon to resolve those problems. In
Part IV, the author will analyze United States v. Brown,' the 1965 deci-
sion of the United States Supreme Court that completely revitalized the
bill of attainder doctrine. Part V will essentially repeat the step-by-step
procedure undertaken in Part III, but will focus on the decisions of
lower federal and state courts rendered between 1965 and 1976 in an
effort to determine whether those courts have attempted to implement
the expansive mandate of Brown. Finally, in Part V-I the author will
scrutinize the rulings of the United States Supreme Court on the bill of
attainder doctrine in the decade since Brown, culminating in the recent
case of Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.'
I. The Historical Background of the Bill of Attainder
Doctrine
A. In English Common Law
A bill of attainder is generally described as a legislative act that
imposes a punitive sanction upon either named individuals and groups
or a sufficiently well-described but unnamed person or group of per-
sons, without any of the procedural safeguards commonly associated
with a complete judicial trial.7 In English common law, a "bill of at-
tainder" technically referred to an enactment exacting the punishment
3. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
4. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
5. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
6. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
7. See note 1 supra. See generally Z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF 1787, 90-161 (1956) [hereinafter cited as CHAFEE]; T. COKE, FOURTH INSTITUTE
14, 36-39 (1809); 1 T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 536-37 (8th
ed. W. Carrington 1927); T. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 311 (3d ed. A. McLaughlin 1898) [hereinafter cited as
COOLEY]; J. POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 319-21 (4th ed. 1879); 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1344
(5th ed. M. Bigelow 1891) [hereinafter cited as STORY]; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 484-501 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE].
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of death; lesser, non-capital punishments, such as imprisonment,8 con-
fiscation of property by the Crown,9 banishment from the realm10 or
disenfranchisement" were imposed through the medium of a "bill of
8. See, e.g., 9 Geo. 1, c. 15; 5 STATS. U.K. 448 (1722), reprinted in full in Blair v.
Ridgely, 41 Mo. 40, 60-61 (1867): "and be it enacted ... that the said John Plunket shall be
detained and kept in close and safe custody, without bail or mainprize, during the pleasure
of his majesty, his heirs and successors, in any gaol or prison within the Kingdom of Great
Britain. . . ."; 10 & 11 Will. 3, c. 13; 4 STATS. U.K. 13 (1669): "An Act for continuing the
imprisonment of Counter and others, for the late horrid conspiracy to assassinate the person
of his sacred Majesty."
9. See, e.g., 9 Geo. 1, c. 15; 5 STATS. U.K. 448 (1722), reprinted in Blair v. Ridgely, 41
Mo. 40, 60-61 (1867): "and be it enacted. . . that the said John Plunket shall forfeit to his
majesty all his lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods and chattels whatsoever"; 13 Car. 2,
c. 15; 3 STATS. U.K. 212-13 (1661): imposing "Pains, Penalties and Forfeitures" upon the
"Manors, Lands and Hereditaments, Chattels Real and other Things" of specified parties;,
12 Car. 2, c. 30; 3 STATS. U.K. 201, 202 (1660):
And that all and every the Manors, Messuages, Lands, Tenements, Rents, Rever-
sions, Remainders, Possessions, Rights, Conditions, Interests, Offices, Fees, Annui-
ties and all other hereditaments, Leases for Years, Chattels Real and other Things
of that Nature, whatsoever they be, of them the said [Oliver Cromwell and fifty
other named persons]. . . shall stand and be forfeited to your Majesty;
29 Hen. 6, c. 1; 1 STATs. U.K. 623 (1450): forfeiting to the King the lands of all those previ-
ously attainted.
10. See, e.g., 9 Geo. 1, c. 17; 5 STATS. U.K. 449-50 (1722), reprinted in Blair v. Ridgely,
41 Mo/40, 59-60 (1867):
and be it enacted. . . that the said Francis, Lord Bishop of Rochester. . .shall
and do suffer perpetual exile, and be forever banished this realm and all other his
majesty's dominions, and shall depart out of the same on or before the five and
twentieth day of June, in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and
twenty-three . .. .;
19 Car. 2, c. 10; 3 STATS. U.K. 314 (1667), reprinted in Clarendon's Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 291,
391 (1667): "be it enacted. . . that the said Edward, Earl of Clarendon, shall and do suffer
perpetual exile, and be forever banished this realm and all other his Majesty's Dominions
."; 27 Eliz., c. 2, § 2; 2 STATS. U.K. 633 (1585):
be it ordained, established and enacted. . .That all and every Jesuits, .. shall
within Forty Days next after the End of this present Session of Parliament depart
out of the Realm of England, and out of all other her Highness Realms and Do-
minions, if the Wind, Weather and Passage shall serve for the same, or else so soon
after the End of the said forty Days, as the Wind, Weather and Passage shall so
serve.
11. See, e.g., 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 47; 26 STATS. U.K. 358 (1821):
Whereas there was most notorious Bribery and Corruption previous to the Election
of Burgesses to serve in the last Parliament for the Borough of Grampound, in the
county of Cornwall ... that it may be enacted . .. That the Borough of
Grampound. . .shall cease to elect and return Burgesses to serve in the High
Court of Parliament;
22 Geo. 3, c. 31, § 1; 14 STATS. U.K. 188 (1782):
Whereas there was most notorious and general Bribery and Corruption at the last
Election of Burgesses to serve in Parliament for the Borough of Crickdale in the
County of Wilts. . .be it enacted. . .That from henceforth it shall be and may
be lawful to and for every Freeholder being above the Age of twenty-one Years,
who shall have, within the Hundreds or Divisions of Highworth, Crickdale, Staple,
Kingsbridge and Malmsbury... a Freehold of the clear Yearly value of forty
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pains and penalties." 2 This distinction in terminology is no longer rec-
ognized in the United States.
1 3
While there is little consensus on the subject, 4 the formats of most
bills of attainder passed by Parliament disclose a common stylistic and
structural pattern. Most such legislation evinces five separate charac-
Shillings, to give his Vote at every Election of a Burgess or Burgesses to serve in
Parliament for the said Borough of Crickdale;
11 Geo. 3, c. 55, § 1; 11 STATS. U.K. 314 (1771):
Whereas a wicked and corrupt society, calling itself the Christian Society, hath for
several Years subsisted in the Borough of New Shoreham, in the County of
Sussex,. . . [a]nd whereas it appears that the chief End of the Institution of the
said Society was for the Purpose of selling, from time to time, the Seat or Seats in
Parliament for the said Borough. . . That the said [named members of the Soci-
ety] shall be, and by virtue of this Act, are henceforth incapacitated and disabled
from giving any Vote at any Election for the chusing of a Member or Members to
serve in Parliament.
Section two of this same act imposed a disability upon the electorate of New Shoreham
similar to that imposed by the bill of pains and penalties against the borough of Crickdale,
quoted supra.
12. For discussions of the distinction between bills of attainder and bills of pains and
penalties, see, e.g., STORY, supra note 7, at § 1344; Davis, supra note 2, at 14; Wormuth,
Legislative Disqualifications as Bills of Attainder, 4 VAND. L. REv. 603, 605 (1951) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Wormuth]; Comment, The Supreme Court's Bill ofAttainder Doctrine: A Need/or
Clarfication, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 212, 214 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Needfor Clarfication];
Comment, The Constitutional Prohibition ofBills ofAttainder: A Wanin(' Guaranty of Judicial
Trial, 63 YALE L.J. 844, 847 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Waning Guaranty].
13. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 473-74 (1977);
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 447 (1965); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317
n.6 (1946); Drehman v. Stifle, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 595, 601 (1870); Cummings v. Missouri, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1867); In re Yung Sing Hee, 36 F. 437,439 (C.C.D. Ore. 1888); In re
Shorter, 22 F. Cas. 16, 19 (D. Ala. 1865) (No. 12,811); Exparte Law, 15 F. Cas. 3, 10 (S.D.
Ga. 1866) (No. 8,126). This principle seems to have originated in the following erroneous
dictum of Chief Justice Marshall: "A bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual, or
may confiscate his property, or may do both." Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138
(1810).
14. Commentators disagree as to the essentials of a bill of attainder under English law.
Justice Miller found four essential elements: (1) corruption of blood, (2) legislative convic-
tion and sentencing, (3) a punishment determined by no previously fixed rule and (4) the
absence of the usual procedural safeguards. Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 388
(1867) (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Chase, C.J., and Swayne & Da% is, JJ.). On the other
hand, Justice Frankfurter believed the "distinguishing characteristic" of a bill of attainder to
be "the substitution of legislative determination of guilt and legislative imposition of punish-
ment for judicial finding of fact." United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321-22 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring, joined by Reed, J.). Thus, for him, a classical bill of attainder
would have to contain a declaration of guilt and a retributive infliction of punishment. See
id. at 325. For a criticism of this thesis, see text accompanying notes 373-392 infra. Another
commentator has concluded that a typical bill of attainder at English common law had only
three key features: (1) identified subjects; (2) a penal intent on the part of the legislature,
which is apparent from the document itself and (3) imposition of a capital or non-capital
burden. See Comment, Punishment: Its Meaning in Relation to Separation ofPower and Sub-
stantive Constitutional Restrictions and Its Use in the Lovett, Trop, Perez and Speiser Cases,
34 IND. L.. 231, 238-39 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Punishment].
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teristics: (1) the designation of a certain person or group of persons, (2)
the recital of their crimes, (3) the pronouncement of their guilt, (4) the
judgment of the legislature upon them and (5) a summary of the pun-
ishment imposed against them. 5 The attainder of the Duke of Mon-
mouth, enacted in 1685, offers a concise illustration of this schema:
WHEREAS James duke of Monmouth has in an hostile
manner invaded this kingdom, and is now in open rebellion, lev-
ying war against the King, contrary to the Duty of his Allegiance;
Be it enacted by the King's most excellent majesty, by and with
the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and
commons in this Parliament assembled, and by the authority of
the same, that the said James duke of Monmouth stand and be
convicted and attainted of high treason, and that he suffer pains
of death and incur all forfeitures as a traitor convicted and at-
tainted of high treason.6
In this manner, Parliament singled out the Duke of Monmouth by
name, stipulated his crime of rebellion, declared him guilty of high
treason, judged him to "be convicted and attainted" of that offense and
imposed the punishments of death and forfeiture upon him. Not only
did the statute inflict a penalty usually attendant upon a conviction of
treason without affording the adjudged traitor the benefits of a judicial
trial, but it also exacted the additional, barbaric punishment implicit in
the word "attainder": the punishment of "corruption of blood." Justice
Miller, in his dissent in the case of Exparte Garland,17 explained suc-
cinctly the consequences inherent in that phrase:
The word attainder is derived, by Sir Thomas Tomlins, in his law
dictionary, from the words attinc/a and attinctura, and is defted
to be "the stain or corruption of the blood of a criminal capitally
condemned; the immediate inseparable consequence of the com-
mon law, on the pronouncing the sentence of death." The effect
of this corruption of the blood was, that the party attainted lost
all inheritable quality, and could neither receive nor transmit any
property or other rights by inheritance.18
The obvious intent behind such a practice was to ensure that the de-
scendants of the condemned man would also be compelled to pay for
his crime. Imposition of such an unjust relic of feudal times by a judge
15. This schema was first developed in Davis, supra note 2, at 14-15. Cf. Needfor Clari-
fication, supra note 12, at 214 (same, except it omits element (4)).
16. 1 Jac. 2, c. 2; 3 STATS. U.K. 403 (1685), quotedin Nixon v. Administrator of Gen.
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 473 n.35 (1977).
17. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
18. Id. at 387 (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Chase, C.J., and Swayne & Davis, JJ.).
See also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND * 380 (3d ed. T.
Cooley 1884).
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after a fully adversary trial was regrettable enough;19 its imposition by
legislative fiat without any hearing whatsoever explains why the bill of
attainder was an especially intolerable component of the English legal
system. °
The origins of the bill of attainder are unclear. Most commenta-
tors suggest that such legislation first appeared during the fourteenth or
fifteenth century, primarily as a device for escheating the estates of
dead rebels.2 ' In fact, the first Parliamentary act possessing most of the
traditional attributes of an attainder was a statute passed in 1392, dur-
ing the reign of Richard II, for the purpose of preserving the Crown
from ecclesiastical incursions committed by members of the Roman
Catholic Church.22 The subject matter of this bill presaged one use sub-
sequent regents made of bills of attainder and bills of pains and penal-
ties; they were favored devices for consolidating the establishment of
Protestantism in England.23 But such legislation was primarily utilized
by English kings and queens as a convenient method of political re-
19. Attainder as a consequence of judicial conviction for treason has since been abol-
ished in England. Forfeiture Act of 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 23; 5 L. REP. 197-205 (1870). The
United States Constitution has a similar prohibition. See note 2 supra.
20. A cautionary aside is necessary regarding the use of the verb "was." As several
commentators have noted, Parliament to this day retains the power to enact a bill of attain-
der, it has merely refrained from exercising that power for the past two centuries. See 21 H.
HALSBURY, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 727 (1912); Needfor Clarification, supra note 12, at
215-16. See also Somervell, Acts ofAttainder, 67 L.Q. REv. 306, 311-13 (1951) [hereinafter
cited as Somervell].
21. See CHAFEE, supra note 7, at 102; Davis, supra note 2, at 14; Somervell, supra note
20, at 306-07; Needfor Clarfication, supra note 12, at 214. Seegeneral/i G. ADAMS, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 228-30 (1st ed. 1921); J. BELLAMY, THE LAW OF TREASON
IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES 177-205 (1970) [hereinafter cited as BELLAMY]; H. POTTER,
OUTLINE OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 100 (5th ed. 1958); Pound, JusticeAccording to Law,
14 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-12 (1914).
22. 26 Ric. 2, c. 5; I STATS. U.K. 406, 407-08 (1392):
That if any purchase or pursue or cause to be purchased or pursued in the Court of
Rome, or elsewhere, by any such Translations, Processes, and Sentences of Excom-
munications, Bulls, Instruments, or any other Things whatsoever which touch the
King, against him, his Crown, and his Regality, or his Realm. . . that they, their
Notaries, Procurators, Maintainers, Abettors, Fautors, and Counsellors, shall be
put out of the King's Protection. . . and their Lands and Tenements, Goods and
Chattels, Forfeit to our Lord the King.. . and that they be attached by their
Bodies, if they may be found, and brought before the King and his council, there to
answer... or that Process be made against them by Praemunire Facias ....
23. See, e.g., 3 Jac. 1, c. 2, § 1; 3 STATS. U.K. 38 (1605): in confirming the convictions of
specified parties, their crimes were recited as follows,
That whereas Arthur Creswel Jesuit . . . Oswald Tesmond Jesuit and Thomas
Winter. . . did traitorously and against the Duty of their Allegiance, move and
incite Philo, then and yet King of Spain. . . with force to invade this Kingdom of
England, and to join with the Papists and discontented Persons within this Realm
of England, to depose and overthrow the same late Queen of and from her Crown
.. . and to restore the superstitious, Romish Religion within the same, and to
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pression.24 As Justice Story once stated:
Bills of this sort have been most usually passed in England in
times of rebellion or gross subserviency to the Crown, or of vio-
lent political excitements; periods in which all nations are most
liable (as well the free as the enslaved) to forget their duties and
to trample upon the rights and liberties of others."
While it is true that bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties
were employed most often to harass religious and political minorities,
several examples suggest that they might also have been used as a
means of punishing former26 or deterring potential27 lawbreakers who
bring this ancient, famous and most renowned Kingdom to utter Ruin and misera-
ble Captivity .... ;
27 Eliz. c. 2, § 3; 2 STATS. U.K. 633 (1585): "And be it further enacted. . . That it shall not
be lawful to or for any Jesuit. . . to come into, be or remain in any part of this Realm, or
any other her Highness Dominions, after the End of. . . forty Days. . . and if he do, that
then every such offence shall be taken and adjudged to be High Treason. ; 5 Eliz., c.1,
§ 2; 2 STATS. U.K. 531-32 (1558):
Be it therefore enacted . . . That if any Person or Persons . . . shall by writing,
Cyphering, Printing, Preaching or Teaching, Deed or Act, advisedly and wittingly
hold or stand with, to extol, set forth, maintain or defend the Authority, Jurisdic-
tion or Power of the Bishop of Rome. . . That then every such Person. . . being
therof lawfully indicted or presented within one Year next after any such offences
by him. . . and being lawfully convicted or attainted at any Time after, according
to the Laws of this Realm, for every such Default and Offence, shall incur unto the
Dangers, Penalties, Pains and Forfeitures ordained and provided by the Statute of
Provision and Praemunire, made in the Sixteenth Year of the Reign of King
Richard the Second.
24. See, e.g., 13 Will. 3, c. 3, § 1; 4 STATS. U.K. 81 (1701):
Whereas the pretended Prince of WALES hath. . . openly and traitorously, with
Design to dethrone your Majesty, assumed the Name and Title of JAMES the Third
. . . That the said pretended Prince of WALES stand and be convicted and attainted
of High Treason, and that he suffer Pains of Death, and incur all Forfeitures, as a
Traitor convicted and attainted of High Treason;
I Jac. 2, c. 3; 3 STATs. U.K. 403 (1685), see text accompanying note 16 supra; 12 Car. 2, c.
30; 3 STATS. U.K. 201, 202 (1660):
and be it enacted by the Authority of this present Parliament, That the said Oliver
Cromwell deceased, Henry Ireton deceased, John Bradshaw deceased and Thomas
Pride deceased, shall by Virtue of this Act, be adjudged and be convicted and
attainted of High Treason to all Intents and Purposes, as if every of them respec-
tively, had been attainted in their lives .... ;
16 Car. 1, c. 37; 3 STATs. U.K. 144 (1640): an act passed to reduce the number of rebels in
Ireland; 24 Eliz., c. 1; 2 STATS. U.K. 633 (1585):
Four and twenty Persons. . . by the Queen's Commission shall examine the Of-
fences of such as shall make any open Invasion or Rebellion within this Realm
who after judgment given and published by Proclamation, shall be disabled to
have or pretend Title to the Crown: And thereupon every Person shall be pursued
to Death by all the Queen's Subjects ....
25. STORY, supra note 7, at § 1338.
26. For examples, see the statutes quoted in note 11 supra. In all those instances, the
crimes complained of and cited were simple bribery and corruption, not rebellion or treason.
27. The statutes quoted in note 11 supra arguably were intended to have a subsidiary
deterrent effect. The severity of the punishment imposed would seem to be designed to cause
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were not members of dissident factions. At any rate, most commenta-
tors concur that the use of bills of attainder died out in the seventeenth
century, citing the attainder of John Fenwick in 1696 as the last exam-
ple.2" Although later instances of attainder exist,29 the utilization of
such enactments certainly did not persist beyond the eighteenth cen-
tury. By contrast, the last efforts to legislate a bill of pains and penal-
ties occurred as late as the 1820's.30
A few comments should be offered about the scope of attainders in
English common law, particularly with respect to how their victims
were designated, what conduct served as the basis for punishment and
what procedures were followed in enacting them. With respect to
designation of victims, the legislation most commonly identified the
persons affected by name.3 ' But there are many instances in which the
potential lawbreakers to refrain from engaging in criminal conduct. Also, see, e.g., 28 Hen.
8, c. 18; 2 STATS. U.K. 261 (1539):
It shall be High Treason for any Man to espouse, marry or take to his Wife, any of
the King's Children being lawfully born, or otherwise commonly reputed for his
children, or any of the King's Sisters, or Aunts of the Part of the Father, or any of
the lawful Children of the King's Brethren or Sisters, or to contract Matrimony
with any of them, without the King's License first had under the Great Seal, or to
deflower any of them being unmarried: And the Woman so offending shall incur
the like Danger.
28. See CHAFEE, supra note 7, at 103-04; Wormuth, supra note 12, at 605; Need For
Clarification, supra note 12, at 215.
29. An example of a present, absolute attainder would be 13 Will. 3, c. 3, § 1; 4 STATS.
U.K. 81 (1701), quoted in note 24 supra. For examples of conditional attainders, see, e.g., 9
Geo. 1, c. 17; 5 STATS. U.K. 449-50 (1722), reprinted in Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 40, 60
(1867):
and that if the said Francis, Lord Bishop of Rochester, shall return into or be found
in this realm. . . he, the said Francis, Lord Bishop of Rochester, being thereof
lawfully convicted, shall be adjudged guilty of felony, and shall suffer and forfeit
as in cases of felony without benefit of clergy, and shall be utterly incapable of any
pardon from his majesty, his heirs or successors;
9 Geo. 1, c. 15; 5 STATS. U.K. 448 (1722), reprinted in Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. at 60-61:
be it Further enacted. . . that if the said John Plunket shall break such gaol...
that then the said John Plunket, and all and every person and persons whatsoever
who shall be aiding or assisting the said John Plunket in breaking such gaol or
prison, or in making such escape as aforesaid, or who shall by force take or rescue
the said John Plunket out of such custody, gaol or prison, during the continuance
of his imprisonment by virtue of this act, being thereof lawfully convicted, shall be
adjudged guilty of felony, and shall suffer death, as in case of felony, without bene-
fit of clergy.
30. See Davis, supra note 2, at 15; Needfor Clarification, supra note 12, at 215. In 1820,
Parliament unsuccessfully sought to pass a bill punishing Queen Caroline, wife of King
George IV. For an account of those proceedings, see CHAFEE, supra note 7, at 136-37. The
commentators cited above claim that this was the last effort to enact a bill of penalties. But
at least one successful attempt occurred a year later. See 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 47; 26 STATS. U.K.
358 (1821), quoted in note 11 supra.
31. See, e.g., 13 Will. 3, c. 3, § 1; 4 STATS. U.K. 81 (1701), quotedin note 24 supra; 1
Jac. 2, c. 2; 3 STATS. U.K. 403 (1685), see text accompanying note 16 rupra; 19 Car. 2, c. 10;
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victims consisted of a class of unnamed persons, each of whom could
only be identified by recourse to the general description given the
class.32 In such cases, the number of individuals constituting the class
could be fixed33 or variable.34 With respect to the type of conduct that
could serve as a cause for punishment, a tripartite typology can be
identified. Most commonly, bills of attainder or bills of pains and pen-
alties imposed present disabilities arising from past conduct. But
often such legislation imposed future disabilities stemming from past
conduct.36 In these instances, the punishment would be conditional and
the potential victim could avoid it by the commission of a future act
that was the subject of the condition. Finally, in a few cases, punish-
ment would be imposed exclusively for future conduct, ie., a penalty
would attach only if a potential victim undertook a specific course of
conduct at some time in the future.37 With respect to the type of proce-
dure involved in a legislative hearing to enact a bill of attainder, the
3 STATS. U.K. 314 (1667), quoted in note 10 supra; 13 Car. 2, c. 15; 3 STATS. U.K. 212-13
(1661), quotedin note 9 supra; 12 Car. 2, c. 30; 3 STATS. U.K. 201,202 (1660), quotedin note
9 supra; 3 Jac. I, c. 2, §§ 1, 2; 3 STATS. U.K. 38 (1605), quoted in note 23 supra.
32. See, e.g., 2 Geo. 4, c. 47; 26 STATS. U.K. 358 (1821), quoted in note 11 supra; 22
Geo. 3, c. 31, § 1; 14 STATS. U.K. 188 (1782), quoted in note 11 supra; 27 Eliz., c. 2, § 2; 2
STATS. U.K. 633 (1585), quotedin note 10 supra; 5 Eliz., c. 1, § 2; 2 STATS. U.K. 531-32
(1558), quotedin note 23 supra; 28 Hen. 8, c. 18; 2 STATS. U.K. 261 (1539), quotedin note 27
supra.
33. See, e.g., 27 Eliz., c. 2, § 2; 2 STATs. U.K. 633 (1585), quotedin note 10 supra; 24
Eliz., c. 1, § 2, IR. STAT. AT LARGE 391 (1582), reprinted in Exparte Law, 15 F. Cas. 3, 9
- (S.D. Ga. 1866) (No. 8,126):
That as well the said James [Eustace, late Viscount Baltinglas], and all others the
said offenders and persons before named, as such others who by actual rebellion,
and other traitorous practices have committed said abominable and detestable
treason and rebellion, and have died and been slain in their said actual rebellion
and treasons... shall be... convicted and attainted of high treason;
26 Hen. 8, c. 25, § 2; 3 STATS. OF THE REALM 529 (1534): "that all such persons which be or
heretofore have been comforters, partakers, abettors, confederates and adherents unto the
said [Thomas Fitzgerald, earl of Kildare] in his false and traitorous acts and purposes, shall
in likewise stand and be attainted, adjudged and convicted of high treason."
34. See, e.g., 22 Geo. 3, c. 31, §1; 14 STATS. U.K. 188 (1782), quotedin note 11 supra; 11
Geo. 3, c. 55, § 2; 11 STATS. U.K. 314 (1771), see note I Isupra; 5 Eliz., c. 1, § 2; 2 STATS.
U.K.633 (1585), quotedin note 23 supra; 26 Ric. 2, c. 5; 1 STATS. U.K. 406, 407-08 (1392),
quoted in note 22 supra.
35. See the examples cited in note 31 supra.
36. See, e.g., 9 Geo. 1, c. 15; 5 STATS. U.K. 488 (1722), quotedin note 29 supra; 17 Car.
2, c. 5, § 1; 3 STATs. U.K. 297 (1665) (an act attainting Thomas Doleman, Joseph Bampfield
and Thomas Scot of treason "if they render not themselves by a Day"); 27 Eliz., c. 2, § 3; 2
STATS. U.K. 633 (1585), quotedin note 23 supra; 28 Hen. 8, c. 18; 2 STATS. U.K. 261 (1536)
quoted in note 27 supra.
37. See, e.g., 13 Will. 3, c. 3, § 2; 4 STATS. U.K. 81-82 (1701):
That if any of the subjects of the Crown of England, from and after the first Day of
March, one thousand seven hundred and one, shall, within this Realm or without,
hold, entertain, or keep any intelligence or correspondence. . . with the said pre-
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best adjective available to describe what might transpire is "chaotic."
Parliament might grant one threatened with attainder a full hearing but
it was not obliged to do so.38 The circuslike quality of the debates pre-
ceding the attainder of John Fenwick has been described vividly by
Macaulay:
The arbiters of the prisoner's fate came in and went out as
they chose. They heard a fragment here and there of what was
said against him, and a fragment here and there of what was said
in his favour. During the progress of the bill they were exposed
to every species of influence. One member was threatened by
the electors of his borough with the loss of his seat. . . .In the
debates arts were practised and passions excited which are un-
known to well constituted tribunals, but from which no great
popular assembly divided into parties ever was or ever will be
free. The rhetoric of one orator called forth loud cries of "Hear
him." Another was coughed and scraped down. A third spoke
against time in order that his friends who were supping might
come in to divide. If the life of the most worthless man could be
sported with thus, was the life of the most virtuous man secure?
39
Another critic, describing these same debates, noted that the legislators
admitted "the testimony of a single witness, not upon oath, by allowing
written evidence not competent in ordinary trials, and by hearing proof
of what had been sworn, where Sir John Fenwick was not a party, nor
present, and of things transacted by his wife, which could not legally
exculpate or convict her husband."' It was this legacy that the found-
tended Prince of WALES. . .such person so offending... shall be taken deemed
and adjudged to be guilty of High Treason. .... ;
9 Geo. 1, c. 15; 5 STATS. U.K. 448 (1722), quoted in note 29 supra; 17 Car. 2, c. 5, § 2; 3
STATS. U.K. 297 (1665), quoted in Davis, supra note 2, at 15:
And be it further enacted. . .That all subjects who from and after the first day of
February next ensuing shall at any time during the continuance of the said War
serve the States of the United Provinces. . . .shall be and are hereby attainted of
High Treason and shall suffer and forfeit to all intents and purposes as persons
attainted of High Treason ought to do;
27 Eliz., c. 2, § 4; 2 STATS. U.K. 633 (1585):
And every Person which after the End of the same forty Days, and after such Time
of Departure as is before limited and appointed, shall wittingly and willingly re-
ceive, relieve, comfort, aid or maintain any such Jesuit. . .knowing him to be a
Jesuit ...shall also for such offence be adjudged a Felon, 'ithout Benefit of
Clergy, and suffer Death, lose and Forfeit, as in case of one attainted of Felony;
26 Ric. 2, c. 5; 1 STATS. U.K. 406, 407-08 (1392) quotedin note 22 su ra. One commentator
has argued that attainders at common law were never exclusively prospective in form. See
Punishment, supra note 14, at 241-42. As the examples cited suggest, this assertion is inaccu-
rate. See notes 373-91 and accompanying text infra.
38. COOLEY, supra note 7, at 311.
39. 5 T. MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 198 (1886).
40. 2 R. WOODDESON, VINERIAN LECTURES, No. 41 at 636 (1792). See also CHAFEE,
supra note 7, at 133-35.
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ing fathers confronted when they convened to draft the Constitution in
1787.
B. In the Constitution
Those assembled at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia
adopted the two prohibitions against bills of attainder contained in ar-
ticle one, sections nine and ten41 without debate.42 This suggests that
they were aware of and consciously chose to avoid the evils of the En-
glish system.43 Even if they were unaware of Parliament's excesses, they
probably knew that many of the state legislatures had enacted bills of
attainder or bills of pains and penalties in order to punish loyalists dur-
ing the American Revolution.'
In order to understand why these two prohibitions are present in
the Constitution, two different but related justifications may be ad-
vanced: one is based on the theory of separation of powers; the other
has its source in the concept of procedural due process. The first justifi-
cation may be summarized as follows. The structure of American gov-
ernment, as set forth in the first three articles of the Constitution, is an
embodiment of the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers. Not
only are the legislative, executive and judicial branches independent
(and interdependent) components of this nation's political system, but
each branch also serves (and was intended to serve) as a check and
balance on the potential hegemony of the others .4 When a legislature
enacts a bill of attainder, it disturbs this delicate equilibrium by arro-
gating to itself the power to try and convict-a power that is properly
vested solely in the judiciary. Such a legislative act not only violates the
abstract principle of separation of powers endorsed by the Constitution,
but it also, as a practical matter, saps the authority of the other coordi-
41. See note 2 supra.
42. See J. MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 586, 727-28 (J. Scott ed.
1893).
43. See Davis, supra note 2, at 13 n.4; Wormuth, supra note 12, at 605; Needfor Clarifi-
cation, supra note 12, at 216 n.30.
44. See, e.g., 5 MASS. AcTs 912 (1778); 4 S.C. AcTs 450 (1838); 9 VA. STAT. 463-64
(Hening 1821). See generally C. VAN TYNE, THE LOYALISTS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION Apps. B & C (1902); Dolan, Evolution of the Bill ofAttainder in the United States, 2
CATH. U. OF AMERCA L. REv. 27, 28-29 (1951-52); Reppy, The Spectre ofAttainder in New
York, 23 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 1, 19-32 (1948); Thompson, 4nti-Loyalist Legislation During the
4merican Revolution, 3 ILL. L. REv. 81, 147 (1948).
45. For informative discussions of the concept of separation of powers in the context of
considerations of the bill of attainder doctrine, see Wormuth, supra note 12, at 603-05;
Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specficatioxn A Suggested Approach to the Bill of At-
tainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 343-48 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Bounds of
Specification].
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nate branches of government. The result of such a diminution of au-
thority could be legislative tyranny. To foreclose that possibility, the
Founding Fathers inserted dual prohibitions against the enactment of
bills of attainder, limiting the power of both the state and federal legis-
latures to encroach upon those areas of responsibility accorded to the
judicial branch of government. This justification was well-expressed by
two of the three authors of The Federalist Papers in their efforts to
convince the legislatures of the former colonies to ratify the Constitu-
tion. As James Madison asserted:
Bills of Attainder, ex postfacto laws, and laws impairing
obligations of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the
social compact and to every principle of sound legislation. The
two former are expressly prohibited by the declarations prefixed
to some of the State Constitutions, and all of them are prohibited
by the spirit and scope of these fundamental charters. Our own
experience has taught us, nevertheless, that additional fences
against these dangers ought not to be omitted. Very properly,
therefore, have the convention added this constitutional bulwark
in favor of personal security and private rights; and I am much
deceived if they have not, in so doing, as faithfully consulted the
genuine sentiments and the undoubted interests of their constitu-
ents. The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating
policy which has directed the public councils. They have seen
with regret and indignation that sudden changes and legislative
interferences, in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in
the hands of enterprising and influential speculators, and snares
to the more industrious and less informed part of the community.
They have seen, too, that one legislative interference is but the
first link in a long chain of repetitions, every subsequent interfer-
ence being naturally produced by the effects of the preceding.46
Similarly, Alexander Hamilton stated:
The complete independence of the courts of justice is partic-
ularly essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitu-
tion, I understand one which contains certain specified
exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it
shall pass no bills of attainder, no expostfacto laws and the like.
Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other
way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it
must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the
Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular
rights or privileges would amount to nothing.47
46. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 279 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (J. Madison) [hereinafter cited
as THE FEDERALIST]. But see United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 473 (1965) (White, .,
dissenting).
47. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 46, No. 78, at 484-85 (A. Hamilton).
[Vol. 5
BILL OF ATTAINDER DOCTRINE
These two quotations illustrate the basic doctrine: the power to try,
convict and then punish is a judicial power that the legislative branch
may not attempt to exercise.48
The second justification for the constitutional proscriptions against
enactment of bills of attainder has its origins in the concept of procedu-,
ral due process. The thesis may be presented as follows. When a legisla-
ture tries, condemns and punishes a person or a class of persons, it is
imposing a sanction in a manner similar to that of a court of law. But a
trial in a court of law affords the accused certain distinct procedural
benefits, such as the right to be fully apprised of the charge against
him, the right to have counsel present, the right to appear and intro-
duce evidence in his own behalf, the right to confront and cross-ex-
amine those who give adverse testimony and the right to have an
impartial jury hear the case. Trial by legislature offers no such safe-
guards. The person being condemned may never be informed of the
crime he is alleged to have committed; he may not be permitted to have
his attorney attend the proceedings, he may not himself be allowed to
appear or present exculpatory evidence; he may be convicted on the
basis of rumor and hearsay and he may have his guilt determined by a
biased group of legislators yielding to the current prejudices of the elec-
torate.4 9 As Justice Story, the most forceful proponent of the thesis,
stated:
In [cases involving bills of attainder], the legislature assumes ju-
dicial magistracy, pronouncing on the guilt of the party without
any of the common forms and guards of trial, and satisfying itself
with proofs, when such proofs are within its reach, whether they
are comformable to the rules of evidence or not. In short, in all
such cases, the legislature exercises the highest powers of sover-
eignty, and what may be properly deemed an irresponsible des-
potic discretion, being governed solely by what it deems political
necessity or expediency, and too often under the influence of un-
reasonable fears or unfounded suspicions.
50
In sum, the constitutional prohibitions of article one, sections nine
and ten were a reaction to four centuries of Parliamentary abuse. They
were adopted both in order to further the principle of separation of
48. For discussions by the United States Supreme Court on the subject of separation of
powers in the context of rulings on the attainder doctrine, see Nixon v. Administrator of
Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 469 (1977); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442-44 (1965).
49. See notes 39-40 and accompanying text supra. For discussions by the United States
Supreme Court on the subject of procedural due process in the context of rulings on the
attainder doctrine, see United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 445-46 (1965); United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316-38 (1946); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,322 (1867)
(quoting Fletcher v. Peck 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137 (1810)).
50. STORY, supra note 7, § 1344 at 216. See notes 68, 75 infra.
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powers and to protect personal rights against governmental incur-
sions.' It was this legacy which the United States Supreme Court dealt
with in its interpretations of those two provisions in the cases of Cum-
mings v. Missouri 52 and Exparte Garland.
II. Two Watershed Decisions
A. Cummings v. Missouri54
In June of 1865, the voters of Missouri ratified the adoption of a
new state constitution. Article two, section three of that charter set
forth lengthy and complex categories of acts, the commission of which
precluded any future individual exercise of the franchise." Section six
51. A third justification for the prohibitions, in article one, sections nine and ten, one
which has its basis in realpolitik rather than any abstract principles of political or legal
philosophy, has been advanced by Professor Chafee. He suggested that the proscriptions
against bills of attainder were inserted in the Constitution in order to protect the property of
loyalists and thus further one of the chief aims of the Treaty of Versailles, concluded be-
tween the United States and Great Britain in 1783. See CHAFEE, supra note 7, at 97-98.
52. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
53. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
54. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
55. Because it may be usefully compared with later examples of test oaths that were not
found to come within the prohibitions of the bill of attainder clauses, and because it is
enlightening to consider the broad scope of this oath, the relevant portions of article two,
section three of the Missouri Constitution will be quoted in full:
At any election held by the people under this Constitution, or in pursuance of any
law of this State. . . no person shall be deemed a qualified voter, who has ever
been in armed hostility to the United States, or to the lawful authorities thereof, or to
the government of this State; or has ever given aid, comfort, countenance, or sup-
port to persons engaged in any such hostility; or has ever, in any manner, adhered
to the enemies, foreign or domestic, of the United States, either by contributing to
them, or by unlawfully sending within their lines, money, goods. letters, or infor-
mation, or has ever disloyally held communication with such enemies; or has ever
advised or aided any person to enter the service of such enemies, or has ever, by act
or word, manifested his adherence to the cause of such enemies, or his desirefor their
triumph over the arms of the United States, or his sympathy with those engaged in
exciting or carrying on rebellion against the United States; or has ever, except
under overpowering compulsion, submitted to the authority, or been in the service
of the so-called "Confederate States of America;" or has ever left this State and
gone within the lines of the armies of the so-called "Confederate States of
America," with the purpose of adhering to said States or armies; or has ever been a
member of, or connected with, any order, society or organization inimical to the
government of the United States, or to the government of this State; or has ever
engaged in guerrilla warfare against loyal inhabitants of the United States, or in
that description of marauding commonly known as "bushwacking;" or has ever
knowingly and willingly harbored, aided, or countenanced anyperson so engaged; or
has ever come into or le/t this State, for thepurpose of avoiding enrollment/or or draft
into the military service of the United States; or has ever, with a view to avoid enroll-
ment in the militia of this State, or to escape theperformance of dury therein, or for
any other purpose, enrolled himself, or authorized himself to be enrolled, by or
before any officer, as disloyal, or a southern sympathizer, or in any other terms
indicating his disaffection to the Government of the United States in its contest with
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specified an expurgatory oath that incorporated by reference the cate-
gories of conduct set out in section three.5 6 In general, this test oath
required a denial that one had ever served the Confederacy or evinced,
either by word or act, disaffection with the Union; it also exacted a
promise to support the state and federal constitutions. Persons who fell
within any of the classifications designated in section three were sum-
marily denied the opportunity to hold any public or corporate office, to
teach, or to hold property in trust for any religious denomination.1
7
Section seven of the state constitution required present governmental
officers to subscribe to the oath set forth in section six within sixty days
or suffer automatic forfeiture of their positions, while section nine im-
posed the same requirement upon attorneys and upon ministers who
wished to preach, teach or solemnize marriages within the state of Mis-
souri.58 Pursuant to section fourteen, failure to execute the oath ren-
dered a person liable for a fine of five hundred dollars or six months in
prison or both. Swearing falsely was an offense punishable as perjury,
conviction of which entailed a term of two years or more in the state
penitentiary.59
the rebellion, or his sympathy with those engaged in such rebellion; or, having ever
voted at any election by the people in this State, or in any other of the United
States, or in any of their Territories, or under the United States, shall thereafter
have sought or received, under claim of alienage, the protection of any Foreign
government, through any consul or other officer thereof, in order to secure exemp-
tion from military duty in the militia of this State, or in the army of the United
States: nor shall any such person be capable of holding in this State any office of
honor, trust, or profit under its authority, or of being an offcer, councilman, director,
trustee, or other manager of any corporation, public orprivate, now existing or hereaf-
ter established by its authority; or of acting as a professor or teacher in any educa-
tional institution, or in any common or other school; or of holding any real estate or
other property in trust/or the use of any church, religious society or congregation.
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 279-80 (emphases in original).
56. The specific language of the oath was as follows:
I, A.B., do solemnly swear that I am well acquainted with the terms of the third
section of the second article of the Constitution of the State of Missouri ... and
have carefully considered the same; that I have never, directly or indirectly, done
any of the acts in said section specified; that I have always been truly and loyally
on the side of the United States against all enemies thereof, foreign and domestic;
that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the United States, and any law or ordi-
nance of any State to the contrary notwithstanding; that I will, to the best of my
ability, protect and defend the Union of the United States, and not allow the same
to be broken up and dissolved, or the government thereof to be destroyed or over-
thrown, under any circumstances, if in my power to prevent it; that I will support
the Constitution of the State of Missouri; and that I will make this oath without
any mental reservation or evasion, and hold it to be binding on me.
Id. at 280-81.
57. See note 55 supra.
58. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 281.
59. Id.
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In September of 1865, Father Cummings, a duly ordained Roman
Catholic Priest, was convicted in the circuit court of Pike County, Mis-
souri, for preaching without first having executed the required expur-
gatory oath. He was assessed the prescribed fine plus court costs, but
because he was unable to pay, he was promptly jailed. His conviction
was upheld by the Supreme Court of Missouri. But on appeal on a
writ of error, the United States Supreme Court overturned Father
Cummings' conviction.60 Justice Field, in his opinion for a five-mem-
ber majority,61 found the cited sections of the Missouri constitution vio-
lative of both the prohibition against bills of attainder and that against
ex post facto laws contained in article one, section ten of the United
States Constitution.62
The majority opinion initially noted that the test oath in question
had three general characteristics. First, it was retrospective because it
imposed present disabilities for past conduct; second, it penalized both
overt acts of disloyalty and the mere expression of sentiments evincing
disaffection with the Union; third, it failed to differentiate between
those who harbored treasonous motives and those who did not.63 Jus-
tice Field conceded that the State of Missouri had the right to establish
qualifications for admission into a profession, but indicated that it
could not utilize this right as a pretext for penalizing previously non-
60. See id. at 284-82.
61. Justice Field was joined by Justices Fuller, Clifford, Grier and Nelson. Justice
Miller, joined by Chief Justice Chase and Justices Swayne and Davis, wrote a vigorous
dissent in the Garland case that applied with equal force to the majority's ruling in Cum-
mings. See Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 382-99 (1867) (Miller, J., dissenting,
joined by Chase, C.J., and Swayne & Davis, JJ.); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
277, 332 (1867) (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Chase, C.J., and Swayne & Davis, JJ.). For a
summary and discussion of Justice Miller's dissent, see notes 82-91 and accompanying text
infra.
62. The discussion of the ex post facto violation may be found in Cummings v. Mis-
souri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 325-32, and will not be discussed in this article. It should be noted
at this juncture that at least three state courts ruled on challenges to statutorily-created ex-
purgatory oaths prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Cummings. In each case, the enact-
ments were upheld as constitutional. See Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293, 321, 329 (1863)
(statute exacted oath of allegiance upon attorneys and litigants seeking to appear in Califor-
nia courts; no direct discussion of the bill of attainder doctrine); Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md.
531, 624-25 (1865) (statute required voters to execute test oath; held that the definition of a
bill of attainder should not be so expansively construed as to curtail the powers reserved to
the state); Exparte Stratton, 1 W. Va. 304, 306 (1866) (statute imposed oath of loyalty as a
condition to the retention of public office; found no ex post facto violation). However, at
least the Supreme Court of Minnesota had previously held that an enactment disabling
rebels from suing or defending in that state's courts violated the ex post facto prohibition
contained in the state constitution. See Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 1, 5 (1862).
63. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 318.
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punishable conduct.' The restrictions imposed by the loyalty oath
were said not to be legitimate qualifications because they were irrele-
vant to a person's fitness to hold a designated office or to practice a
specified profession. Thus, the fact that Father Cummings may have
at one time left Missouri to avoid conscription was deemed to bear no
relationship to his general ability to disseminate the doctrines of Ca-
tholicism or to administer the sacraments. Therefore, Justice Field
concluded that the oath in question was exacted not because the state
sought to limit access to particular professions so that only the most
qualified would be able to practice, " but because it was thought that
the several acts deserved punishment, and that for many of them there
was no way to inflict punishment except by depriving the parties, who
had committed them, of some of the rights and privileges of the
citizen.""5
Relying on a brief survey of French and English law, the majority
opinion asserted that:
[T]he deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously en-
joyed may be punishment, the circumstances attending and the
causes of the deprivation determining this fact. Disqualification
from office may be punishment, as in cases of conviction upon
impeachment. Disqualification from the pursuits of a lawful avo-
cation, or from positions of trust, or from the privilege of appear-
ing in the courts, or acting as an executor, administrator, or
guardian, may also, and often has been, imposed as
punishment. 6
Having thus preliminarily defined the concept of punishment, Justice
Field then examined article one, section ten of the Constitution. A bill
of attainder was accordingly defined as "a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without a judicial triar 67 and, at least in American law,
encompassed a bill of pains and penalties 8 After noting that such a
64. Id. at 319.
65. Id. at 320.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 323. It should be noted that Justice Field omits that portion of the defimition
of a bill of attainder which requires the presence of named or sufficiently well-designated
victims. See note I supra. One commentator has suggested that this component was implicit
in the definition actually advanced. See Needfor Clarification, supra note 12, at 218 n.46.
But in light of the rather broad language used by the majority, see text accompanying note
70 infra, it seems fairer to say that the specificity component of the usual defimition of a bill
of attainder was added by later decisions and was not required by Cummings. See note I
supra.
68. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 323. For the origins of this thesis, see note 13 supra. It should be
noted that Justice Field also emphasized at this juncture the lack of due process afforded the
victim of a bill of attainder. Id. His language copies, almost word for word, that of Justice
Story, cited earlier. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
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bill can inflict punishment absolutely or conditionally,69 Justice Field
concluded that the challenged provisions of the Missouri constitution
did indeed establish a presumption of culpability and impose condi-
tional penalties, thereby attainting Father Cummings as effectively as if
he had been specifically named and pronounced guilty. Thus,
The deprivation is effected with equal certainty in the one
case as it would be in the other, but not with equal directness.
The purpose of the lawmaker in the case supposed would be
openly avowed; in the case existing it is only disguised. The legal
result must be the same, for what cannot be done directly cannot
be done indirectly. The Constitution deals with substance, not
shadows. Its inhibition was leveled at the thing, not the name. It
intended that the rights of the citizen should be secure against
deprivation for past conduct by legislative enactment, under any
form, however disguised. If the inhibition can be evaded by the
form of the enactment, its insertion in the fundamental law was a
vain and futile proceeding.7"
With these broad strokes, Justice Field sketched the outlines of the
modem bill of attainder doctrine.
B. Exparte Garland
On the same day that the Court decided Cummings v. Missouri, it
also handed down a decision in the case of Exparte Garland.71 On July
2, 1862, Congress passed a statute setting forth an expurgatory oath to
which all persons thereafter serving in the civilian and military depart-
ments of the federal government (other than the President) were com-
pelled to subscribe.72 This oath exacted both an affirmation of
allegiance to the Constitution and a denial from the one executing it
that he had ever aided, served or supported any authority inimical to
the United States.73 If the individual swore falsely, he was subject to a
69. Id. at 324. For a discussion of Cummings and conditional attainders, see notes 373-
382 and accompanying text infra.
70. Id. at 325. See also United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 327 (1946) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
71. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
72. Act of July 2, 1862, ch. 128, 12 Stat. 502.
73. The specific language of the oath was as follows:
I, A.B., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have never voluntarily borne arms
against the United States since I have been a citizen thereof; that I have voluntarily
given no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in armed
hostility thereto, that I have neither sought nor accepted, nor attempted to exercise
the functions of any office whatever, under any authority or pretended authority in
hostility to the United States; that I have not yielded a voluntary support to any
pretended government, authority, power or constitution within the United States,
hostile or inimical thereto. And I do further swear (or affirm) that, to the best of
my knowledge and ability, I will support and defend the Constitution of the United
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conviction for perjury; once convicted, he would be precluded from en-
joying governmental employment in the future.74 On January 24, 1865,
Congress enacted a law prescribing that no person could appear as an
attorney in federal court without first executing the oath stipulated in
the prior statute."
A. H. Garland had been admitted to practice in federal court in
December of 1860. From May, 1861 through January, 1865, he served
as a representative for Arkansas in the Congress of Confederate States.
In July of 1865, Garland received a presidential pardon contingent
upon his subscription to an oath set forth in an executive proclamation
dated May 29, 1865. That oath required only an affirmation of support
for the state and federal constitutions and all federal laws relating to
manumission of slaves. He duly executed that oath and then brought
suit in federal court to have the congressional act of January 24, 1865,
declared unconstitutional.76
Justice Field, speaking on behalf of the same five-member major-
ity that had prevailed in Cummings, found the act to be invalid. As in
Cummings, he noted that the act of Congress penalized past conduct,
including conduct other than overt acts, and that it applied not only to
those who gave "cordial and active support" to the Confederacy, but
also to those who "yielded a reluctant obedience to the existing order,
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and
allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reser-
vation or purpose of evasion, and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties
of the office on which I am about to enter, so help me God ....
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 334-35 (emphases in original).
74. Id.
75. Act of January 24, 1865, ch. 20, 13 Stat. 424. Prior to the Court's ruling in Garland,
several lower federal courts had found this statute to be unconstitutional. See In re Shorter,
22 F. Cas. 16, 19 (D. Ala. 1865) (No. 12,811); Exparte Law, 15 F. Cas. 3, 10 (S.D. Ga. 1866)
(No. 8,126); In re Baxter, 2 F. Cas. 1043, 1044 (E.D. Tenn. 1866) (No. 1,118). See generally
W. ROBINSON, JUSTICE IN GREY 596-98 (1941). The ruling in Baxter was based on the ex
post facto prohibition, but Shorter and Law both found the statute to be a bill of attainder.
Law, in particular, offers this useful statement:
I cannot regard the retrospective part of the oath otherwise than as a bill of pains
and penalties. . . .In the arbitrary, technical sense, it may not be so called; but
when it is so plainly observable that by its own inherent force it effectuates the
destruction of the rights of a large order of persons, and is substantially and in
effect a bill of pains and penalties, I know no other term in our language adequate
to express it. By operation of the legislative will alone, the petitioner is already
adjudged-adjudged without due process of law; and although forthcoming, not
called to trial, according to the general laws of the land; the statute affecting his
person as directly and accurately as though he were named in its
body,--disenabling him from appearing or being heard as an attorney or coun-
selor, at the bar of this court, and thereby depriving him of the right to acquire and
own property, by his professional skill and labor.
76. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 335-37.
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established without their co-operation."77 Since the statute effected
punishment in that it mandated, as a practical matter, a perpetual ex-
clusion from the right to practice an ordinary avocation, it was deemed
to be subject to the prohibition against bills of attainder contained in
article one, section nine of the Constitution.78
The majority continued by stating that because an attorney is an
officer of the court, he is properly subject only to judicial, not legisla-
tive, discipline.7 9 It admitted that "[t]he legislature may undoubtedly
prescribe qualifications for the office, to which he must conform, as it
may, where it has exclusive jurisdiction, prescribe qualifications for the
pursuit of any of the ordinary avocations of life."8 But that power was
said to be limited by the same constitutional constraints imposed upon
the state of Missouri in Cummings.81 Consequently, the Court abro-
gated the act of January 24, 1865.
C. Some General Observations
At this juncture, it is useful to offer a few preliminary generaliza-
tions about the Cummings and Garland cases. First of all, it is neces-
sary to realize that the Cummings decision utterly revolutionized the
bill of attainder doctrine. This is borne out by a careful consideration
of Justice Miller's dissent in Exparte Garland.2 After reviewing the
classical definition of a bill of attainder at English common law, 3 Jus-
tice Miller painstakingly enumerated the reasons why the act of Con-
gress involved in Garland and the provisions of the Missouri
constitution challenged in Cummings did not fit within that definition.
As he noted, these legislative acts did not work corruption of blood,
which was a traditional consequence of an attainder.84 Nor, he argued,
did they sufficiently designate the persons attained. Thus the act of
Congress in Garland
only required [an oath] of those who propose to accept an office
or to practice law; and as a prerequisite to the exercise of the
77. Id. at 376-77.
78. Id. at 377.
79. Id. at 378-79.
80. Id. at 379.
81. Id. at 380. The Court also noted that, as applied in the case at bar, the congressional
act had the effect of attempting to countermand an unconditional executive pardon; such an
attempt, said Justice Field, was beyond the powers of Congress. Id. at 381.
82. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 382-90 (1867) (Miller, J., dissenting, joined by Chase, C.J.,
and Swayne & Davis, JJ.)
83. Id. at 388. See note 14 supra, for a summary of Justice Miller's discussion.
84. Id. at 389. See note 18 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of this
concept.
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functions of a lawyer, or the officer, it is demanded of all persons
alike. It is said to be directed, as a class, to those who were en-
gaged in the Rebellion; but this is manifestly incorrect, as the
oath is exacted alike from the loyal and disloyal, under the same
circumstances, and none are compelled to take it."5
Moreover, claimed Justice Miller, the challenged legislation declared
no conviction, pronounced no sentence and inflicted no punishment.
86
An examination of Justice Miller's critique of the majority opinion
yields mixed conclusions. The two statutes in question essentially de-
prived persons of the ability to practice their professions. Although this
was not one of the usual penalties imposed at common law,87 it is ar-
85. Id. at 389-90 (emphasis in original).
86. Id. at 390. It should be noted that the division within the United States Supreme
Court was mirrored by the various decisions regarding the validity of test oaths rendered by
state courts during the succeeding quarter century. A number of state courts invalidated
such legislation. See, e.g., Burkett v. McCarty, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 758, 761 (1874) (expurga-
tory oath exacted from voters); Commonwealth v. Jones, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 725, 740 (1874)
(anti-duelling oath required of public officials); State ex rel Pittman v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570,
587 (1869) (act requiring dismissal of curators of private college who failed to execute a test
oath); State v. Heighland, 41 Mo. 388, 389 (1867) (expurgatory oath imposed upon teachers);
Murphy & Glover Test Oath Cases, 41 Mo. 340, 387-88 (1867) (test oath exacted from minis-
ters); Green v. Shumway, 39 N.Y. 418, 425 (1868) (expurgatory oath required of voters);
Lynch v. Hoffman, 7 W. Va. 553, 557 (1874) (test oath imposed upon litigants); Ross v.
Jenkins, 7 W. Va. 284, 287 (1874) (challenge to same statute involved in Lynch); Pierce v.
Carskadon, 6 W. Va. 383, 386 (1873) (same); Kyle v. Jenkins, 6 W. Va. 371, 375-76 (1873)
(expurgatory oath imposed upon suitors). But other decisions upheld the validity of various
types of test oaths. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Grimmett, 3 Ida. 403, 411, 31 P. 793, 796 (1892)
(anti-Mormon test oath required of voters); Wooley v. Watkins, 2 Ida. 590, 602-03, 22. P.
102, 106 (1889) (same); Boyd v. Mills, 53 Kan. 594, 604, 37 P. 16, 18 (1894) (expurgatory
oath exacted from voters); State exrel. Wingate v. Woodson, 41 Mo. 227, 230 (1867) (same);
Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 40, 124 (1867) (same); Ridley v. Sherbrook, 43 Tenn. (3 Coldwell)
569, 577-78 (1867) (same); Exparte Quarrier & Fitzhugh, 4 W. Va. 210, 222 (1870) (test oath
imposed upon attorneys); Randolph v. Good, 3 W. Va. 551, 553-54 (1869) (expurgatory oath
exacted from voters); Exparte Hunter, 2 W. Va. 122, 151, 166 (1867) (test oath imposed
upon all attorneys seeking to practice in state courts).
87. But see 9 Geo. I, c. 17; 5 STATS. U.K. 449-50 (1722), reprintedin Blair v. Ridgely, 41
Mo. 40, 60-61 (1867): "and that the said Francis, Lord Bishop of Rochester, shall from
thenceforth forever be disabled, and be incapable of and from taking, holding or enjoying
any office, dignity, promotion, benefice or employment within this realm... ."; 19 Car. 2,
c. 10; 3 STATS. U.K. 314 (1667), reprinted in Clarendon's Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 291, 391
(1667): "and [Edward, Earl of Clarendon] shall be forever disabled from having, holding or
enjoying any office or place of public trust, or any other employment whatsoever"; 21 Ric. 2,
c. 6; 1 STATS. U.K. 418 (1397): excluding the sons of certain named persons from ever serv-
ing in Parliament. These examples are distinguishable from the statutes involved in
Cummings and Garland on several grounds. First, at least with respect to the bills against
the Bishop of Rochester and the Earl of Clarendon, the denials of the right to hold office
were part and parcel of general forfeitures of all property. The same is not true of the legisla-
tion in Cummings and Garland. Second, the Missouri Constitution (except with respect to
the voting provisions and employment provisions of article two, section three) and the act of
Congress imposed conditional deprivations, while these English bills exacted absolute depri-
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guably just as serious a deprivation for the individual as forfeiture of
property or disenfranchisement.88 It is true that the challenged legisla-
tion did not work corruption of blood, but corruption of blood at com-
mon law was only the consequence of the imposition of a sentence of
death and, by definition, a bill of pains and penalties (as these enact-
ments were) does not impose a capital sanction.89 It is equally true that
the class affected by the statute was not just that class which served or
sympathized with the Confederacy, but included those who sought to
retain or attain public office or practice a certain profession; the former
was a subclass of the latter. But that latter class of persons, though not
presently fixed, was not too indefinite to serve as the subject of an at-
tainder; variable classes of persons had been attainted at common
law.90 Nevertheless, it is true that the enactments in question neither
stated a legislative conviction nor pronounced a sentence of guilt; in
those respects, they failed to meet the traditional criteria for a bill of
attainder.9' Yet the net effect of Justice Field's opinion was to sweep
away those traditional criteria and to replace them with a simplified,
streamlined definition that required no particularly precise format.
Thus, Justice Field's opinion marked a new departure and perhaps it
was the novelty of the direction taken by the majority to which Justice
Miller took exception. At any rate, it is accurate to say that the modem
doctrine of bills of attainder dates from the Cummings decision.
Second, it is important to note that the Cummings decision does
permit the states to impose qualifications and, by extension, disqualifi-
cations, upon an entrant to a profession. The problem is how to deter-
mine which types of qualifications or disqualifications are
constitutionally justifiable. In Cummings, the Court concerned itself
with whether acts constituting a disqualification were rationally related
vations. Third, these English bills created disabilities directed against a fixed class of persons
while the legislation in Cummings and Garland imposed potential deprivations upon a vari-
able class (Ze., anyone declining to execute the oath required, regardless of his motive for
failing to do so).
88. In fact, it may be argued that the denial of the right to practice one's profession
works an indirect forfeiture. See note 75 supra.
89. Justice Miller's objection makes sense only if one assumes that he, unlike Justice
Field, did not believe that the term "bill of attainder" encompassed what were called "bills
of pains and penalties" at common law. Accord, Davis, supra note 2, at 21 n.29. For a
discussion of the distinctions between these two terms, see notes 8-12 and accompanying
text supra. A literal acceptance of Justice Miller's thesis would be self-defeating. Since even
a capital sentence did not work "corruption of blood" in American law, it would seem that a
strict insistence upon such a requirement would yield the result that no legislative act could
be properly labelled as a bill of attainder.
90. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
91. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
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to the issue of an entrant's fitness to practice his intended profession.92
One commentator has suggested that the same standard was not ap-
plied in Garland because an oath disavowing participation in rebellion
is relevant to an individual's fitness to practice law.93 But, in point of
fact, the opposite is true, at least with respect to the specific facts in-
volved in each case. Whether or not one served in or supported the
Confederacy would seem to have as little connection with his ability
adequately to represent a client in federal court as it would with respect
to his ability to preach Catholicism. As the Court stated in dictum in a
case decided twelve years later, the rule of relevancy developed in
Cummings also applied in Garland.94 The implications arising from the
judicial adoption of a relevancy standard are manifold. Nevertheless,
the key implication would seem to be that courts confronting bill of
attainder challenges cannot rely on fixed principles; instead, they must
in each instance scrutinize the subject matter of the state law together
with the basis upon which it imposes a disability and then determine
whether such a disability is a legitimate device for effectuating the
state's regulatory purpose.
Finally, it should be emphasized that both Cummings and
Garland proffer an expansive notion of the bill of attainder doctrine. In
Cummings, the majority stated that deprivation of some right or privi-
lege to which a citizen is normally entitled may be classifiable as a
punishment, depending upon the attendant circumstances. 95 This defi-
nition may well be the broadest construction the United States
92. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 319-20 (1867). One commentator
has characterized this discussion of relevancy as a "gratuitous" observation; he suggests that
the gravamen of the decision was that the enactments in question were deemed by the Court
to be little more than disguised punitive measures. Waning Guaranty, supra note 12, at 850
n.44. This is an inaccurate conclusion. It is true that the Court struck down the challenged
provisions of the Missouri constitution because they imposed punishment and were there-
fore bills of attainder, but these enactments were said to be punitive because they imposed
disabilities on the basis of acts that were irrelevant to one's fitness to practice one's chosen
profession. See 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 320. Thus, the relevancy discussion was a crucial ele-
ment of the Court's punishment analysis, which in turn was the basis for its conclusion that
the challenged legislation did in fact constitute a bill of attainder. A dozen years after
Cummings and Garland, Justice Field, speaking for the majority in another case, empha-
sized this point very clearly: "The constitution of Missouri and the act of Congress in ques-
tion in [ Cummings and Garland, respectively] were designed to deprive parties of their right
to continue in their professions for past acts or past expressions of desires and sympathies,
many of which had no bearing upon their fitness to continue in their professions." Dent v.
West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 129 (1889).
93. See Wormuth, supra note 12, at 606. See notes 579-89 and accompanying text
infra.
94. See note 92 supra.
95. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 320.
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Supreme Court has ever given the term "punishment." "6 Although the
phrase "depending upon the attendant circumstances" is a significant
caveat, it seems fair to say that a literal adherence to the language of
Cummings might have enabled the Court to avoid some of the concep-
tual difficulties it later encountered regarding the subject of punish-
ment.97 More importantly, however, the Court in Cummings explicitly
indicated that in dealing with the bill of attainder doctrine, it would
concern itself with substance, not form; it would look at the nature and
effect of the disability imposed, regardless of how the legislature chose
to characterize that disability.
One could reasonably have expected that as a consequence of
Cummings and Garland, much federal and state legislation directed
against political, religious, or other social minorities might succumb to
bill of attainder challenges. In fact, the reverse is true. In the one hun-
dred and ten years since Cummings was decided, only twenty-two deci-
sions have invalidated legislation on bill of attainder grounds.98 Thus,
the discussion in the remainder of this article will serve a dual purpose.
It will analyze how the courts have interpreted the doctrines of
Cummings and Garland and, more importantly, it will focus upon the
stratagems devised by succeeding courts to avoid finding bills of
attainder.
I1. Development of the Bill of Attainder Doctrine: Pre-Brown
As was noted earlier,99 the modem definition of a bill of attainder
has four distinct components: it is (1) a legislative act (2) imposing pun-
ishment (3) upon a designated person or class of persons (4) without
96. For alternative formulations offered by the Court, see notes 503, 506, and 515 and
accompanying text infra.
97. See notes 516-524 and accompanying text in/na.
98. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 440 (1965); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S.
303, 315 (1946); Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234, 239 (1872); Putty v. United
States, 220 F.2d 473, 478 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 821 (1955); Davis v. Berry, 216 F.
413,419 (S.D. Iowa 1914), rev'don other grounds, 242 U.S. 468 (1917); In re Yung Sing Hee,
36 F. 437, 439 (C.C.D. Ore. 1888); Blawis v. Bolin, 358 F. Supp. 349, 354 (D. Ariz. 1973);
Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26, 34 (D. Ariz. 1969); Steinberg v. United States, 163 F.
Supp. 590, 592 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Jones v. Slick, 56 So. 2d 459, 461 (Fla. 1953); McNealy v.
Gregory, 13 Fla. 417, 450 (1870); Burkett v. McCarty, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 758, 761 (1874);
Commonwealth v. Jones, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 725, 740 (1874); State ex rel Pittman v. Adams,
44 Mo. 570, 589 (1869); State v. Heighland, 41 Mo. 254, 255 (1867); Green v. Shumway, 39
N.Y. 418, 425 (1868); Thompson v. Wallin, 196 Misc. 686, 696-97, 93 N.Y.S. 2d 274, 285
(1949), rev'd, 301 N.Y. 476, 95 N.E.2d 806 (1950); Opinion to the House of Representatives,
80 R.I. 281, 285-86, 96 A.2d 623, 626 (1953); Lynch v. Hoffman, 7 W. Va. 553, 557 (1874);
Ross v. Jenkins, 7 W. Va. 284, 287 (1874); Kyle v. Jenkins, 6 W. Va. 371, 375-76 (1873).
99. See note I supra.
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benefit of judicial trial. This section of the article will analyze the fur-
ther development of the bill of attainder doctrine by both state and
federal courts; the discussion will be confimed generally, but not exclu-
sively, to decisions rendered between 1867 and 1965.100 To accomplish
this purpose, each component of a bill of attainder will be analyzed in a
separate section.
A. "A Legislative Act"
Superficially, this first component of the definition of a bill of at-
tainder would seem to present few difficulties, but its simplicity is de-
ceptive. Two facets of the concept of "legislative act" will be explored
in this section of the article. The first problem is the formulation of
guidelines for determining when a legislature is acting in a legislative
capacity. The other issue is the proposed extension of the principles
underlying the bill of attainder doctrine to acts of the executive branch
of government.
L Criteriafor Determining Legislative Capacity
The initial problem can be stated succinctly: how does a court de-
cide whether a particular act of the legislature is an exercise of its legis-
lative functions and thus is potentially subject to the proscription
against bills of attainder? A possible approach may be found by refer-
ring to English history. A bill of attainder at common law always
originated as a proposed law which Parliament debated and then voted
upon; once passed, it was codified as part of the statutes of the realm. °10
Although some objections may be raised to such a formalistic interpre-
tation of the phrase "acting in its legislative capacity,""0 2 in ninety-nine
100. The structure of this article reflects the author's conviction that the decision in
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), is second in importance only to Cummings
itself and thus merits separate discussion. In some areas of the bill of attainder doctrine (e.g.,
the scope of the term "legislative act"), however, the Brown decision had no impact. With
respect to those substantive areas, the author will scrutiniie both pre- and post-Brown rul-
ings. But with respect to those substantive areas dealt with in Brown, post-1965 cases will be
analyzed in Part V of this article. See notes 805,-1061 and accompanying text infra.
101. See the sources cited in note 21 supra.
102. This formulation would not encompass certain suggested extensions of the bill of
attainder doctrine to such matters as legislative contempt citations or the efforts of congres-
sional investigative committees to punish persons subpoenaed to testify before them by ex-
posing such persons to undesirable publicity. The former extension has been proposed by
several justices of the United States Supreme Court. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109, 154-62 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J.); Up-
haus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 108 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.). The
latter theory has been most prominently advanced by two commentators. See CrrAFEE,
supra note 7, at 159-60; Punishment, supra note 14, at 249 n.91. Under the definition cited in
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of one hundred cases, this rather obvious definition will suffice. Thus,
the major decisions of the United States Supreme Court invalidating
statutes as bills of attainder mentioned (and needed to mention) the
legislative act requirement cursorily because the petitioners in those
cases were challenging directly the constitutionality of specific laws.103
But there are a few borderline cases arising from atypical factual
situations in which the courts have been compelled to grapple with the
meaning of the words "legislative act." Thus, in French v. Senate of
California,'° the petitioner, a duly elected state senator, had been
charged with taking a bribe in return for casting a favorable vote on a
piece of proposed legislation. In February of 1905, he was expelled
from his seat by a resolution of the senate in accordance with the ple-
nary power to discipline its own members vested in that assembly by a
provision of the California constitution.10 5 Among the challenges
raised by French before the state supreme court was the contention that
the resolution amounted to a bill of attainder. The court disagreed,
finding that the act of the senate lacked the "force of law." 106 The ra-
tionale offered in support of this assertion was that whereas a true bill
of attainder extinguished "civil and political rights and capacities," the
resolution of expulsion merely deprived French of his right to occupy
his seat in the senate. 107
In AcNea/y v. Gregory, °0 a new constitution for the state of Flor-
ida was adopted by a convention of elected delegates in 1868. One pro-
vision of that charter required the state courts to find a failure of
consideration in all cases involving promissory notes, deeds or bills of
sale given in exchange for slaves; no suits could be based on such deeds
or notes executed after January 10, 1861.109 The Florida Supreme
the text, neither situation would present the possibility of a viable bill of attainder challenge,
because neither situation would involve the enactment of a law.
103. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441, 447-48 (1965); United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1867).
104. 146 Cal. 604, 80 P. 1031 (1905).
105. Id. at 605, 80 P. at 1032. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 5,formerly art. IV, § 9.
106. 146 Cal. at 611, 80 P. at 1034. Cf Faxon v. School Comm., 331 Mass. 531, 538, 120
N.E.2d 772, 776 (1954) (said the committee, in dismissing a teacher who failed to cooperate
with a legislative committee investigating Communism, was not making a "rule or regula-
tion of a legislative nature").
107. 146 Cal. at 611, 80 P. at 1034. Cf. Bond v. Floyd, 251 F. Supp. 333, 345 (N.D. Ga.
1966), rev'don other grounds, 385 U.S. 116 (1967) (said action of Georgia House of Repre-
sentatives denying plaintiff his seat had a "rational basis"). The holding in French may be
simply a variant way of expressing the conclusion that the case presented a nonjusticiable
controversy. For a federal view of the justiciability issue on somewhat similar facts, see
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548-49 (1969).
108. 13 Fla. 417 (1870).
109. Id. at 419-20. See FLA. CONST. OF 1868 art. XVI, § 26.
[Vol. 5
Court found this provision to be unconstitutional.110 Before arriving at
that conclusion, however, it had to decide whether the action of the
convention in adopting such a provision was a legislative or a judicial
act. The court delineated certain differences between the two. First, leg-
islative acts prescribed rules to control others, while judicial acts essen-
tially adhered to pre-existing rules; second, unlike legislative acts,
judicial acts "follow notice."' Based on these distinctions, the Florida
Supreme Court offered two possible characterizations of the adoption
of the constitutional provision in question: either the act of the conven-
tion was wholly legislative because the delegates had laid down a rule
applicable to a class of judgments rather than one judgment in particu-
lar and because the deliberations of the delegates were not accompa-
nied by notice to and a hearing for the affected parties,"12 or the act of
the convention was partly legislative and partly judicial because it de-
clared a legal doctrine applicable to a set of common factual situations
and because it prescribed a prospective rule for the state's courts to
follow." 3 Under either interpretation, the state supreme court found
the challenged provision to be a bill of attainder because it denied
those being deprived of their bargained-for contractual rights the safe-
guards inherent in a full-fledged judicial trial."I4
Dodge v. Nakai"5 involved a suit to enjoin enforcement of an or-
der by the Navajo Tribal Council excluding one Mitchell, a director of
the Dineheiina Nahiilna Be Agaditahe, Inc., a non-profit corporation,
and others from the tribe's Arizona reservation lands. The order arose
from an incident that had occurred during a meeting of the Navajo
Tribal Council Advisory Committee. Mitchell was alleged to have en-
gaged in contemptuous laughter, which provoked a scuffle with a com-
mittee member. ' 6 After noting that Indian tribes exercising powers of
self-government are prohibited from enacting bills of attainder,' 1 7 the
federal district court confronted a difficult problem since the tribal
council is vested with both legislative and judicial powers by the provi-
110. 13 Fla. at 450.
111. Id. at439.
112. Id. at440.
113. Id. at 441.
114. Id. at 442-43, 450. The court also noted that in its view the electorate had not
delegated the capacity to exercise judicial powers. Id. at 444-46. Thus, that part of the opin-
ion discussing the possibility that the act of the convention might be characterized as partly
legislative and partly judicial is dictum.
115. 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969).
116. Id. at 31.
117. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(9) (1970).
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sions of the Navajo Tribal Code,'18 it was necessary to decide whether
the council's act was judicial or legislative in nature. The court pointed
out that a specific section of the tribal code listed certain grounds for
exclusion from reservation lands and Mitchell's act did not fall within
any of the enumerated categories.'1 9 Since no rule of general applica-
tion subjected non-Navajos to possible exclusion for engaging in the
kind of conduct Mitchell was accused of committing, the council could
not be said to have acted in a judicial capacity, which the court defined
as "a role characterized by the interpretation and individual applica-
tion of existing rules of general application."' 20 If the council was not
exercising its judicial powers, then its act had to be a legislative one
and, in light of the penalty imposed, constituted a bill of attainder.''
These cases illustrate the various ways in which courts define the
term "legislative act." French stands for the proposition that the gov-
erning criterion is whether the legislature's resolution has the "force of
law."' 22 This purported reason for distinguishing the state senate's ac-
tion from a bill of attainder is conclusory in nature; the court never
explicitly indicates what the phrase "force of law" signifies. Arguably,
from the perspective of French, a senatorial resolution denying him the
privilege of occupying the office to which he was duly elected had an
impact equal to that which would have resulted had both houses of the
California legislature enacted, with the approval of the governor, a bill
specifying that "Senator French is hereafter denied the right to serve
out the remainder of his term of office." The California Supreme Court
embellished its conclusory statement with references to the nature of
the penalty exacted; thus, a legislative act is one which apparently must
result in the deprivation of certain nebulous "civil and political rights
and capacities."' 23 This assertion may be challenged on three grounds:
118. See 298 F. Supp. at 33. The court cited Navajo Tribal Code, tit. 17, §§ 1781-1786.
119. 298 F. Supp. at 34. See Navajo Tribal Code, tit. 17, § 1782.
120. 298 F. Supp. at 34.
121. Id.; the court cited the case of Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. 372 U.S. 144, 168-
69 (1963), in support of its assertion that exclusion from reservation lands amounted to pun-
ishment. See note 515 and accompanying text infra.
122. See note 106 and accompanying text supra. The California Supreme Court's use of
this phrase is not unique. More recently, the United States Supreme Court has stated that
when a legislative body delegates rulemaking powers to an administrative agency, that
agency's exercise of the delegated power yields rules having the force or status of law. See,
e.g., Abbot Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 151-52 (1967); Paul v. United States, 371 U.S.
245, 255 (1963); Public Util. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 542 (1958). It is impor-
tant to note that the United States Supreme Court utilizes the phrase only to describe the
effect of a specific type of delegation, whereas the California Supreme Court utilizes it to
distnguish the senatorial resolution involved in French from a truly legislative act.
123. See note 107 and accompanying text supra.
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First, the unexplained reference to rights and capacities is hopelessly
vague; second, the court erroneously made the element of punishment
(the second component of the definition of a bill of attainder) the pri-
mary basis for determining whether the senate acted in a legislative
capacity, thereby inextricably confusing two quite separate factors; fi-
nally, the court invoked English history but conveniently neglected to
mention that some bills of pains and penalties at common law did im-
pose the penalty of loss of the right to hold an existing office.' 24
McNeal also presents some difficulties. The Florida Supreme
Court stated initially that a legislative act fixes a prospective rule,
whereas a judicial act applies an existing rule.12 5 While this is a com-
mon formulation,'26 McNea y makes an uncommon use of it. The
court concluded that the bill of attainder doctrine applies both to legis-
lative acts and to partly legislative and partly judicial acts.127 The con-
fusing nature of the court's opinion arises from the fact that it
combined the fourth component of the definition of a bill of attainder
("without the safeguards of a judicial trial") with the first component
("a legislative act"). The result is an example of circular logic; it is re-
dundant to make the absence of trial-type safeguards a criterion for
defining the words "legislative act" when the sole purpose of even at-
tempting such a definition is to ascertain if the prohibition against bills
of attainder is applicable. A bill of attainder, by definition, applies only
to those legislative acts unaccompanied by the procedural protections
inherent in a full judicial trial. While the consideration of procedural
due process is relevant to any analysis of the bill of attainder doc-
trine, 28 it is not a useful referent for determining whether a particular
act of the legislature was an exercise of its legislative functions. Thus,
the prohibition of article one, section ten applies to legislative acts
124. See note 87 supra.
125. See note 111 and accompanying text supra.
126. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908) (Holmes, J., for
the Court):
A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on
present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose
and end. Legislation on the other hand, looks to the future and changes existing
conditions by making a new rule, to be applied thereafter to all or some part of
those subject to its power,
J. DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES 21 (1927): "What distinguishes legislation from adjudication is that the former af-
fects the rights of individuals in the abstract and must be applied in a further proceeding
before the legal position of any particular individual will be definitely touched by it; while
adjudication operates concretely upon individuals in their individual capacity."
127. See notes 112-113 and accompanying text supra.
128. See notes 49-50 and accompanying text supra.
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usurping judicial functions, not mixed legislative and judicial acts car-
ried out without notice and a hearing. The latter may constitute a de-
nial of due process but they are not readily classifiable as bills of
attainder f the assembly so acting is vested with both legislative and
judicial authority.'29 Of course, it should be noted that the discussion of
quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative acts in McNealy is dictum as the
court believed that the act of the Florida constitutional convention was
wholly legislative in nature because it prescribed a prospective rule and
did not follow notice. 130 The notice aspect of this definition has been
dealt with earlier, but the first aspect also provides no help because
legislatures are constitutionally permitted to enact retroactive rules so
long as the retroactive features of the enactment are reasonable 13' and
often such retroactive legislation is challenged unsuccessfully as a bill
of attainder. 32 In sum, the McNealy decision creates more difficulties
129. One reason why the ultimate holding of McNealy is not objectionable is that the
court concluded that the state constitutional convention was not vested with both types of
authority. See note 114 supra.
130. 13 Fla. at 440.
131. See, e.g., Massey Motors v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 102 (1960) (allowed retro-
active application of 1956 treasury regulation defining depreciation to taxable years of 1950
and 1951); FHA v. Darlington, 358 U.S. 84, 91-92 (1958) (sustained application of 1954
amendment prohibiting use of housing constructed under FHA-insured mortgages as tran-
sient hotel to premises built in 1949), Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 788-89 (1948)
(allowed application of Renegotiation Act permitting the government to recover excess prof-
its realized by wartime contractors to contracts entered into before April, 1942, the date the
act went into effect); Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 316 (1945) (permitted
Minnesota to apply a statute of limitations for securities fraud cases enacted in 1941 to a suit
lodged in 1937); Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 151 (1938) (allowed Wisconsin legislature to
tax corporate dividends earned in 1933 at a rate set by a statute passed in 1935); Mahler v.
Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) (upheld 1920 law providing for deportation of aliens who com-
mitted certain classes of acts as it was applied to persons who fell within the coverage of the
statute only because of 1918 convictions). See generally, Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on
Retroactive Civil Legislation, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 540, 550-66 (1956); Hochman, The Supreme
Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARv. L. Rlv. 692, 697-726
(1960); Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48
CALIF. L. Rlv. 216, 235-51 (1960); Weinberg & Simon, The Constitutionality ofthe Portal-to-
Portal Act of 1947 in the light of decisions Affecting Retroactive Legislation in the Supreme
Court, 22 TEMP. L.Q. 369, 371-90 (1948). For a recent consideration by the Supreme Court
of the general permissibility of retroactive civil legislation, see Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 14-20 (1976).
132. See, e.g., Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 723 (1951) (loyalty oath
requiring disavowal of membership in subversive organization for the preceding five years);
Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898) (statute disqualifying convicted felons from
practicing medicine applied to one who was convicted before the statute was enacted);
Drehman v. Stifle, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 595, 601 (1870) (postwar Missouri statute provided
immunity from suit for acts done during the Civil War on behalf of the military govern-
ment); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1050 (1976) (anti-racketeering statute applying to acts committed before it took effect); Mac-
Kay v. McAlexander, 268 F.2d 35, 37 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied. 362 U.S. 61 (1960)
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than it solves.
Contrast McNealy and Nakai, which does offer a workable defmi-
tion of a legislative act. Nakai describes a legislative act in a negative
fashion rather than attempting to formulate an all-encompassing defi-
nition. With regard to a judicial act, Nakai offers the following tripar-
tite typology: such an act involves (1) an individual application of (2)
existing rules of (3) general application. 133 If any of these three ele-
ments is missing, the act is, Opsofacto, deemed to be legislative in na-
ture. This approach has a great deal of merit. It is not overly
expansive, 134 but by requiring the conjunction of three independent
factors before a specific act can be removed from the "legislative" cate-
gory, it offers a reasonably reliable means of identifying the wide vari-
ety of acts that can be characterized as legislative in nature.
1 35
2. Pseudo-Bills of Attainder
The traditional definition of a bill of attainder refers to legislative
acts that punish specified persons or groups without the safeguards of a
judicial trial. Despite some contrary indications,136 no attempt had
(statute ordering deportation for one joining the Communist Party even if one did so prior to
its enactment); Putty v. United States, 220 F.2d 473, 478 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 821
(1955) (amendment to the Organic Act of the Trust Territory of Guam retroactively validat-
ing prosecutions based on informations); Butcher v. Maybury, 8 F.2d 155, 158 (W.D. Wash.
1925) (statute revoking existing permits for naturopaths and setting up a new licensing pro-
cedure); State v. Fourchy, 106 La. 743,751, 31 So. 325, 329 (1901) (claimed retroactive appli-
cation of statute specifying grounds for disbarment of attorneys). Of all these cases, only
Putty found merit in the bill of attainder challenge.
133. See note 120 and accompanying text supra. It should be noted that some of these
same determinants were discussed in McNeay. See 13 Fla. at 440; but the Florida court
adopted a quite different definition.
134. Thus, the proposed extensions involving contempt citations and smear tactics by
investigative committees discussed in note 102 supra would not fit within this definition; the
former would be deemed judicial in nature while the latter would be deemed outside the
scope of this definition altogether. For a consideration of legislative contempt citations and
the bill of attainder doctrine, see notes 811-864 and accompanying text infra.
135. Applying the definition set forth in Nakai, it can be seen that the act of the consti-
tutional convention in McNeaiy was legislative in nature because it applied a newly-created
rule of less than general application, while the senatorial resolution in French was probably
judicial in nature, presuming the senate had a rule that members charged with bribery
should be expelled.
136. See In re De Giacomo, 7 F. Cas. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 3, 747). That case
involved a challenge to an Italo-American convention providing for the mutual extradition
of fugitives charged with felonies. The authorities of Naples had issued an arrest warrant for
the crime of murder against the petitioner. He was taken into custody in New York City. Id.
at 366. The court reviewed the meaning of the bill of attainder clause of article one, section
nine and concluded that the convention in question did nothing prohibited by that clause.
Id. at 370. The underlying implication was that if such a convention was sufficiently ex-
treme, it might be invalidated as a bill of attainder. In at least one other case, however, a
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been made to extend the restrictions implicit in the bill of attainder
doctrine to other branches of government until Justice Black's path-
breaking concurrence in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath.137 That case arose from a challenge to official action under-
taken pursuant to President Truman's Executive Order No. 9835,38
which authorized the United States Attorney General to compile a list
of totalitarian, fascist, communist and subversive organizations to be
used by the loyalty review board in assessing whether or not to disbar
allegedly untrustworthy individual employees of the executive depart-
ments of the federal government. 139 Organizations were included on
the list without any hearing or notice; some of these entities challenged
the executive order as violative of the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Of the eight justices participating, five found the methods
used by the Attorney General in compiling the list to be constitution-
ally impermissible; but the views of these five justices were expressed in
the course of five separate opinions."4° Justice Black, in his concur-
rence, argued that the Attorney General's list was the equivalent of a
bill of attainder:
Moreover, officially prepared and proclaimed governmental
blacklists possess almost every quality of bills of attainder, the
use of which was from the beginning forbidden to both national
and state governments. . . . It is true that the classic bill of at-
tainder was a condemnation by the legislature following investi-
gation by that body, . . . while in the present case the Attorney
General performed the official tasks. But I cannot believe that
court offered a narrow construction of the bill of attainder doctrine; when a plaintiff sought
to challenge an executive order setting up a Loyalty Review Board as being in violation of
article one, section nine of the Constitution, the district court for the District of Columbia
responded by distinguishing precedent, United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), on the
theory that the case at bar involved an executive, not a legislative, act. See Washington v.
Clark, 84 F. Supp. 964, 966-67 (D.D.C. 1949), afj'd without considering thepoint sub. nom.
Washington v. McGrath, 182 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
137. 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
138. 3 C.F.R. §§ 129-131 (1947 Supp.).
139. 341 U.S. at 124-35.
140. Justice Burton, joined by Justice Douglas found Attorney General McGrath's act
"patently arbitrary." Id. at 138. Justice Douglas, in a separate concurring opinion, also
found a denial of a fair trial. Id. at 183 (Douglas, J., concurring). After a careful analysis,
Justice Frankfurter concluded that the way the list was compiled yielded a valid claim of
denial of due process. Id. at 173-74 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Jackson, in a sepa-
rate concurrence, arrived at the same conclusion expressed by Justice Frankfurter. Id. at 187
(Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Black's views are developed in the text. See note 141 and
accompanying text infra. Justice Reed, joined by Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Minton,
dissented. After reviewing various constitutional objections, they claimed the Attorney Gen-
eral's act was permissible. See id. at 187-213 (Reed. J., dissenting, joined by Vinson, CJ.,
and Minton, J.).
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the authors of the Constitution, who outlawed the bill of attain-
der, inadvertently endowed the executive with power to engage in
the same tyrannical practices that had made the bill such an odi-
ous institution.
41
One supporting citation but no precedential case authority was of-
fered for this startling assertion. 142 Justice Black's theory has never
commanded the allegiance of more than two members of the Supreme
Court 43 and at least one lower federal court decision has repudiated
it.44 But dicta in a number of cases suggest that a few courts may be
willing to adopt Justice Black's thesis, even though none of them refer
specifically to his concurring opinion.
In Bauer v. Acheson, 145 the plaintiff was an American citizen who
had been employed in occupied Germany by the Civil Censorship Di-
vision of the Military Government until 1948. In 1951, while sojourn-
ing in France, she learned her passport had been revoked by the State
Department on the grounds that "her activities [were] contrary to the
best interests of the United States."' 46 She was told that her passport
would be revalidated only if she chose to make a one-way return trip to
the United States.'4 7 The relevant statute simply authorized the Secre-
tary of State to grant passports on whatever terms the President might
designate; 41 in Executive Order No. 7856, the President instructed the
Secretary to develop his own procedures and substantive rules regard-
141. Id. at 143-44 (Black. J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
142. Justice Black cited a statement by James Madison claiming that a vote in favor or a
resolution against certain "Democratic societies" by the members of Congress would be a
vote for attainder. Id. at 144 n.l (citing 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 934 (1794)). Of course, this
citation has nothing whatsoever to do with executive acts, so its germaneness is unapparent.
143. See Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 108 (1959) (Black. J., dissenting, joined by
Douglas, J.) (case involving contempt order issued against a recalcitrant witness subpoenaed
to testify before an investigative committee chaired by the New Hampshire Attorney Gen-
eral); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 352 (1955) (Douglas, ., concurring) (case involving a
three-year disbarment by the Civil Service Loyalty Review Commission); Barsky v. Board
of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 459-61 (1954) (Black. J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.) (case
involving a six month suspension of a doctor's license for failure to testify before a congres-
sional investigative committee).
144. Marshall v. Sawyer, 365 F.2d 105, 111 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006
(1967) (challenge to a "black book" containing the names of undesirable persons that was
compiled by the Nevada Gaming Commission; as a result of his name being included in the
book, plaintiff was denied entry into a number of Las Vegas casinos). See also American
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 374, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (challenge to FCC
order regulating television lottery programs. Attainder objection dismissed as inapplicable,
without citing McGrath).
145. 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952).
146. Id. at 447-48.
147. Id. at 448.
148. 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1926). See 106 F. Supp. at 448.
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ing the issuance and revocation of passports.149 Thus, plaintiffs objec-
tion was really directed at regulations unilaterally promulgated by an
executive department. In dismissing the attainder challenge, the district
court for the District of Columbia noted:
It is possible that by arbitrary administration the statute and reg-
ulation here attacked might be made to partake of the nature of a
bill of attainder or ex post facto law, but such application is not
inherent. Since they are susceptible of a constitutional interpreta-
tion, the court must construe the statute and regulations as
constitutional.
150
In Sentner v. Colare/li,15 ' the plaintiff was a resident alien. An or-
der of deportation had been entered against her on April 8, 1953. On
October 9, 1953, the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an
Order of Supervision. 5 Its authority for doing so was section 242(d) of
the Immigration and Naturalization Act, which provides that if a final
deportation order has been outstanding against an alien for over six
months, the Attorney General may, pending deportation, issue an or-
der requiring the alien to report to local immigration offices, submit to
medical and psychological examinations, give information under oath
as to his activities and associations and "conform to such reasonable
written restrictions on his conduct or activities as are prescribed by the
Attorney General in his case."' 153 The terms of the supervisory order
required, inter alia, that the plaintiff disassociate herself from the Com-
munist Party or its affiliates and refrain from associating with persons
she knew or believed to be members of the Party. 54 Again, the consti-
tutional challenge was raised primarily against the content of the de-
partmental order, not against the statute itself. The district court for the
eastern district of Mississippi noted in dictum: "[T]he ad hoc nature of
these restrictions, applying only to a specific named individual, would
appear to raise substantial questions under the due process and bill of
attainder clauses of the Constitution. . . . One implication of this
149. 106 F. Supp. at 448-49. See 22 C.F.R. § 51.77 (1949).
150. 106 F. Supp. at 450. The district court, however, did hold that it was a denial of
due process to revoke a passport without first granting a hearing. Id. at 452-53. This view
was later adopted by the United States Supreme Court. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125
(1958). See 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.80-51.105 (1977).
151. 145 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Mo. 1956), affid without considering the point sub non
Barton v. Sentner, 353 U.S. 963 (1957).
152. 145 F. Supp. at 572.
153. Id See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (d) (1970). In a later, unrelated case, this statute was held
not to be a bill of attainder. Dymytryshyn v. Esperdy, 285 F. Supp. 507, 510 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
154. 145 F. Supp. at 573.
155. Id. at 578.
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statement is that in another case the court might have relied solely on
the prescription against attainders to invalidate an order of supervision.
In DeRieux v. Five Smiths, Inc.,156 the owners of the Atlanta Fal-
cons, a professional football team, were accused of charging admission
prices that violated the ninety-day wage and price freeze implemented
by Executive Order No. 11615, promulgated by President Nixon in
1971.157 The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 authorized the Presi-
dent "to issue such orders and regulations as he may deem appropriate
to stabilize prices, rents, wages and salaries" at specified levels.158 The
Emergency Court of Appeals dismissed the bill of attainder challenge,
not because the subject of the challenge was an executive order, but
because the government was seeking the civil remedies of an injunction
and restitution rather than pursuing a criminal prosecution and be-
cause the substantive offense with which the plaintiffs were charged
was not itself criminal in nature. 159 The implication in these statements
is that if a criminal prosecution had been instituted, the court might
have seriously entertained a challenge based on article one, section
nine of the Constitution.
The argument could be advanced that in each of these cases Con-
gress had delegated rulemaking authority to the executive branch and
that therefore the passport regulations, the order of supervision and the
wage and price controls were a species of legislative act. 160 Such a con-
156. 499 F.2d 1321 (Emer. Ct. App. 1974).
157. See 36 Fed. Reg. 15727 (1971).
158. See Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 796 (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1970)).
159. 499 F.2d at 1335.
160. It is certainly true that all three cases are instances of validly delegated rulemaking
power. Such a delegation usually requires only an "intelligible standard." Sunshine Coal
Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940), United States v. Rock Royal Co-op Inc., 307 U.S.
533, 577 (1939); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). See
Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation ofLegislative Power, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 359, 561, 567 (1947).
But even delegations bereft of standards (such as, possibly, the passport statute, see note 148
and accompanying text supra) have been upheld. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250
(1947); St. Louis I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 287 (1908). But acts done by an
executive department pursuant to a valid delegation do not, ipsofacto, become "legislative
acts." The adjective "legislative" does not mean "rulemaking" in this context. It signifies "of
or concerning a legislature" and executive departments are not legislatures.
One other case is worth mentioning in this context. It involved a suit brought by five
members of the Blue Ridge Lodge no. 816 of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen alleg-
ing that an amended collective bargaining agreement between their union and the Clinch-
field Railroad Company providing for the compulsory retirement of employees covered by
the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1970), who reached the age of seventy consti-
tuted a bill of attainder. Instead of holding that the constitutional proscription against at-
tainders could not apply to an agreement between a union and a private employer, even
though they act pursuant to statutory guidelines, the court dismissed the challenge because it
Summer 1978]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
tention ignores reality, however. In each case, the regulations were for-
mulated, disseminated and enforced by an office of the executive
branch, either through the medium of an executive order or of an in-
tradepartmental regulation. The restrictions challenged in these suits
can only logically be characterized as executive acts.
But even that counter-argument cannot be applied to the case of
Hoffa v. Saxbe.16' That suit was based on a constitutional challenge to
the terms of a Presidential commutation. James R. Hoffa, former presi-
dent of the Teamsters Union, had begun serving on March 7, 1967 an
aggregate thirteen-year sentence arising from convictions on two counts
of jury tampering and four counts of mail and wire fraud. The plaintiff
would have been eligible for early release on November 28, 1975, but
instead his sentence was .commuted by President Nixon on December
23, 1971.162 The commutation provided that Hoffa could "not engage
in direct or indirect management of any labor organization prior to
March sixth, 1980," the date when his original thirteen-year sentence
would have expired. 163 The plaintiff challenged this condition as a bill
of attainder.'" The United States district court for the District of Co-
lumbia responded by citing the decision in DeVeau v. Braisted,165 in
which the United States Supreme Court had upheld a statute disquali-
fying convicted felons from serving on the New York Waterfront Com-
mission on the theory that the statute did not constitute a legislative
determination of guilt because the legislature had merely relied on the
recorded evidence of a prior conviction. 166 Admitting DeVeau was dis-
tinguishable because it considered a legislative rather than an executive
act, 167 the court stated:
Just as the restriction in DeVeau was promulgated pursuant to
proper legislative authority, we have found that the condition at-
found that the plaintiffs derived no property right to continued employment from the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. See Goodin v. Clinchfield R.R. Co., 125 F. Supp. 441,449 (E.D.
Tenn. 1954), aft'd, 229 F.2d 578 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 953 (1956).
161. 378 F. Supp. 1221 (D.D.C. 1974).
162. Id. at 1223.
163. Id. at 1224-25.
164. Id. at 1238. He did not cite article one, section nine of the Constitution in support
of his argument, but rather relied on the Fifth Amendment. One wa to interpret this is to
say that he used the term "bill of attainder" as a label for describing the manner in which he
was allegedly denied due process of law. The factor militating against this interpretation is
the district court's reference to De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960), see note 168 and
accompanying text infra, which discusses the term "bill of attainder" as it has been defined
in the context of article one, section ten of the Constitution.
165. 363 U.S. 144 (1960). See notes 658-661 and accompanying text infra.
166. Id. at 160.
167. 378 F. Supp. at 1239.
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tached to Hoffa's commutation emanated from the President's
explicit grant of power under Article II, Section 2, Clause One of
the Constitution. To say that the President is "legislating" when
he attaches a condition such as the one at issue here is simply to
beg the question; if the President's power includes the authority
to attach conditions to pardons or commutations, the fact that the
resulting condition is similar to legislatively-imposed restrictions
does not make the condition a legislative act. The separation of
powers doctrine has not been so stringently applied. We con-
clude, therefore, that the constitutional principles sustaining the
regulation in DeVeau equally apply to the condition under
challenge. 168
The Hoffa decision is an anomaly. On the one hand, the court admits
that a Presidential commutation is not a legislative act; on the other
hand, it states that the interpretation given to the proscriptions against
bills of attainder in the Constitution in a case involving a legislative act
does apply to such a commutation. The couirt in Hoffa, then, seems to
accept and apply the theory of pseudo-attainders devised by Justice
Black, although the result of such an application was to sustain the
constitutionality of the official act in question.
All these cases quite understandably fail to consider the larger
question of whether a theory of pseudo-bills of attainder is justifiable.
One critic has remarked scornfully that:
The fact that the Constitution prohibits bills of attainder and that
the prohibition is contained in that section of the constitution
which places specific restrictions on congressional action seems
clearly to refute any pseudo-bill of attainder concept. The effect
of such efforts to invoke the bill of attainder clause where it is not
applicable is to obscure even further the meaning of that consti-
tutional protection. 169
How one approaches the issue depends upon how one interprets Justice
Black's original statement. If he meant to find the constitutional pro-
scription against bills of attainder applicable to executive acts, he was
ignoring history. It may be that Parliament was initially a pliant tool of
168. Id Compare Hoffa with Huffman v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1976). There,
the petitioner charged that the act of the governor of Texas in commuting his death sentence
to a term of ninety-nine years in prison constituted a bill of attainder. The Fifth Circuit
simply remarked that this allegation had no merit. Id. at 1107.
169. Need/or Clarification, supra note 12, at 233 (emphasis in original). But see TRIBE,
supra note 7, at 499-501. Professor Tribe accepts Justice Black's thesis that the attainder
doctrine should be extended to executive acts, both because such an extension is desirable in
light of the current tendency of instutitional fractionalization of power and because it makes
little sense to permit agents of the executive, but not legislators, to try and punish individuals
without any procedural safeguards.
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the king and subserviently enacted attainders at his slightest whim,
70
but that does not negate the fact that a bill of attainder in English law
was a legislative enactment.171 Although the justifications underlying
the bill of attainder doctrine-separation of powers and procedural due
process 172- - are equally important limits on the authority of the execu-
tive branch, the doctrine itself was clearly intended to curb legislative,
not executive, tyranny. 1
Nevertheless, there is another possible interpretation of Justice
Black's language. Perhaps he meant that the restrictions on legislative
power embodied in the proscriptions against bills of attainder should
be applied, mutatis mu/andis, to executive acts. Such an application
170. One commentator has said that because "of [the king's] ability from 1461 to domi-
nate completely the lords and the commons in parliament, his control over attainder was
virtually complete." BELLAMY, supra note 21, at 211-12. Accord, R. BERGER, IMPEACH-
MENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 29 (1973); Davis, sufpra note 2, at 14; Needfor
Clarjication, supra note 12, at 214.
171. See sources cited in note 21 supra.
172. See notes 45-51 and accompanying text supra.
173. See notes 46, 47 and 50 and accompanying texts supra. Accord, United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442-46 (1965). To date, no court or commentator h.as suggested that
the bill of attainder doctrine should apply to the judicial branch. There is authority to the
effect that it does not. Groppi v. Froehlich, 311 F. Supp. 765, 771 (W.D. Wis.), af/d without
considering the point sub nom. Groppi v. Leslie, 436 F.2d 326 (7th Cir. 1970), vacated on
other grounds, 404 U.S. 496 (1972). This would seem to be consistent with the decisions
holding that the ex post facto prohibitions of the Constitution do not bind the judiciary.
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 344 (1915); Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150, 161 (1913);
United States ex rel Almeida v. Rundle, 255 F. Supp. 936, 944 (E.D. Pa. 1966), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 863 (1968); United States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989, 1004 (S.D.N.Y.
1948). But cf Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 195 (1977); Bouie v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1964); United States v. Jacobs, 513 F.2d 564. 566 (9th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Sherpix, Inc., 512 F.2d 1361, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Was-
serman, 504 F.2d 1012, 1015-16 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. B & H Dist. Corp., 375 F.
Supp. 136, 141-42 n.5 (W.D. Wis. 1974). These latter decisions indicate that due process
considerations impose substantially the same restraints upon courts as the ex post facto
clauses impose upon legislatures. See Lehmann & Eklund, Constitutional Review: Supreme
Court, 1976-77 Term, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 61, 164-79 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Leh-
mann & Eklund]. Perhaps an analogous argument can be made about the restraints imposed
by the bill of attainder clauses in the Constitution. One other indication that a court may be
willing to extend the bill of attainder doctrine should be noted. In Banks v. Banks, 98 So. 2d
337 (Fla. 1957), a husband claimed that a divorce decree giving his wife a lifetime right to
receive the rents and income accruing from his properties was a bill of attainder. The court
replied.
The decree in this cause did not divest the defendant of his interest in the real
property and, as we view it, left him the absolute owner of the personal property in
his home, subject to the use thereof by the plaintiff for her natural lifetime. The
portion of the decree relating to the property does not constitute a taking of the
defendant's property. It does not amount to a bill of attainder.
Id. at 339. Implicit in this language is the suggestion that a divorce decree effectuating a
taking of property might "amount to" a bill of attainder.
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would not be an attempt to extend article one, sections nine and ten of
the Constitution, but would rather serve as a specific technique for as-
suring the constitutional guarantees of procedural due process. Given
the relative reluctance of courts to invalidate legislation as a bill of at-
tainder, however, 174 it might be wiser to rely on the due process clause
of the Fifth (or, by analogy, the Fourteenth) Amendment, as did the
other four justices in McGrath.175 Thus, the most telling objection to
the pseudo-bill of attainder theory may be grounded not upon its ahis-
toricism but rather upon its superfluousness.
B. "Inflicting Punishment"
The second component of the definition of a bill of attainder is by
far the most controversial and troublesome aspect of the subject with
which courts have had to contend. 176 In this portion of the article, the
author will consider three broad topics. The first deals with problems
of methodology, i e., how the determination that an enactment is puni-
tive may be made. Under this heading, the author will discuss the
troublesome problem of whether courts may rely on the motives of leg-
islators as a basis for concluding that a challenged law is penal in char-
acter. The second major topic to be discussed concerns the various
techniques by which courts avoid classifying legislation as punitive in
nature. In particular, the author will show how courts have (1) asserted
that the term "punishment" encompasses only the imposition of "crimi-
nal," not "civil" sanctions, (2) defined punishment to include only re-
tributive rather than prospective exactions, (3) defined punishment in
reliance on the putative distinction between "rights" and "privileges"
and (4) found that certain types of deprivations are intrinsically nonpe-
nal. The final major topic to be discussed concerns the key distinction
174. See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
175. See note 140 supra. The same approach was taken by the three-judge district court
in Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952). See note 150 supra.
176. The key decisions of the United States Supreme Court on the subject of bills of
attainder indicate that the Court's concern over the issue of punishment often takes prece-
dence over consideration of the other definitional elements of this subject. See Nixon v.
Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 473-83 (1977); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S.
437,456-60 (1965); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 86-88
(1961); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612-20 (1960); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works,
341 U.S. 716, 722-23 (1951); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 413-
15 (1950); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 307-14, 316 (1946); Hawker v. New York,
170 U.S. 189, 191-200 (1898); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889); Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 318-22, 324-25 (1867). This imbalance has led some com-
mentators to conclude that the Court should not focus on the issue of punishment to such a
great degree. See Needfor Clarification, supra note 12, at 242; Waning Guaran y, supra note
12, at 860.
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which courts have relied on in circumscribing the scope of the bill of
attainder doctrine, namely, the distinction between regulation and
punishment.
- Legislative Motive
Two interrelated questions will be considered in this subsection.
The first is whether courts confronting attainder claims may inquire
into the possible existence of a punitive motive on the part of the legis-
lature in enacting the challenged bill.177 If analysis of motive is pre-
sumed to be a permissible judicial technique, the second question is
whether courts may scrutinize extrinsic evidence in order to determine
the absence or presence of punitive motive.
In Cummings v. Missouri,178 the Court mentioned the concept of
legislative "purpose" in the course of its analysis of bills of attainder, 1
79
but it did so cursorily and its brief comment furnished no guidelines on
which subsequent decisions could rely. The decision establishing that
legislative motive is a legitimate subject of judicial inquiry (at least in
the context of suits involving bill of attainder challenges) is United
States v. Lovett, 8 ' decided by the United States Supreme Court in
1946. That case arose from the enactment of the Urgent Deficiency Ap-
propriations Act of 1943,181 section 304 of which provided that the allo-
cations made available by the act could not be used to pay the salaries
of three named federal employees- Goodwin B. Watson, William E.
Dodd, Jr., and Robert M. Lovett-after November 15, 1943, unless
those persons were appointed to governmental positions with the ad-
177. At the outset, it is necessary to distinguish "motive" and "intent." When a court
examines legislative intent, it seeks to establish what the legislators meant when they enacted
particular language into law; when a court examines legislative motive, it seeks to establish
why (i.e., for what purpose) a certain law was enacted. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762, 782-83 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Starkweather v. Blair, 245 Minn. 371, 380, 71
N.W.2d 869, 876 (1955). This distinction is necessary because often commentators and
courts forget it. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 478 (1977);
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 615 (1960); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 414 (1950); Punishment, supra note 14, at 244. The problem is exacerbated
because, as many commentators have noted, imprecise discussion on the part of theorists
(and courts) has historically blurred the obvious distinction between legislative intent and
legislative purpose or motive. See Bruncken, Interpretation of the Written Law, 25 YALE L.J.
129, 134 (1915) [hereinafter cited as Bruncken]; Davis, supra note 2, at 33; Lehmann &
Eklund, supra note 173, at 96-97; MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754, 754 n.3
(1966); Willis, Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell, 16 CAN. BAR Rnv. 1, 3-4 (1938).
178. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
179. Id. at 325. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
180. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
181. 57 Stat. 431 (1943).
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vice and consent of the Senate. 8 2 The government continued to retain
Lovett and his colleagues in their administrative jobs. To recover wages
earned after November 15, 1943, the three individuals lodged a joint
lawsuit in the Court of Claims. The five judges in that court agreed that
the plaintiffs were entitled to compensation, although they did so for
various reasons.'8 3 Consequently, the government appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. Six of the eight justices participating in
the decision upheld the ruling of the Court of Claims.1
8 4
In holding that the challenged rider to the Urgent Deficiency Ap-
propriations Act was a bill of attainder, the majority stated that any
182. Id. at 450. Section 304 provides:
No part of any appropriation, allocation, or fund (1) which is made available
under or pursuant to this Act, or (2) which is now, or which is hereafter made,
available under or pursuant to any other Act, to any department, agency, or instru-
mentality of the United States, shall be used, after November 15, 1943, to pay any
part of the salary, or other compensation for the personal services, of Goodwin B.
Watson, William E. Dodd, Junior, and Robert Morss Lovett, unless prior to such
date such person has been appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate: Provided, That this section shall not operate to deprive any
such person of payment for leaves of absence or salary, or of any refund or reim-
bursement, which have accrued prior to November 15, 1943: Providedfurther, That
this section shall not operate to deprive any such person of payment for services
performed as a member of ajury or as a member of the armed forces of the United
States nor any benefit, pension, or emolument resulting therefrom.
Goodwin Watson was a chief analyst for the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. He had
written tracts in favor of the U.S.S.R. and Loyalist Spain and, when questioned by a con-
gressional subcommittee, claimed he was a member of the "right wing" of the American
Labor Party. William Dodd, Jr., was an assistant news editor at the Federal Communica-
tions Commission. He had been a member of the American League for Peace and Democ-
racy (an acknowledged Communist front organization) and the Washington Bookshop
(included on the Justice Department's subversive list); he had also been a prominent
contributor to the Harry Bridges Defense Fund. As for Robert Lovett, at the time he was
government secretary to the Virgin Islands and had a long history of involvement in so-
called "radical causes." He also had affiliations with the American League for Peace and
Democracy (and its predecessor, the American League Against War and Fascism) and the
American People's Mobilization (and its predecessor, the American Peace Mobilization, also
a Communist Front organization). See W. GOODMAN, THE COMMITTEE: THE EXTRAORDI-
NARY CAREER OF THE HousE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN AcrvITES 14546 (1969 ed.)
[hereinafter cited as GOODMAN].
183. See Lovett v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 142, 14748 (Ct. Cl. 1945) (Whaley, C.J.,
joined by Littleton, J.) (held that the rider effected a "mere stoppage of disbursing routine"
that did not extinguish the government's obligation to pay for services rendered); id. at 148
(Whitaker, J., concurring) (held that the rider was a bill of attainder); id. at 150 (Jones, J.,
concurring) (held that Congress exceeded its delegated powers in enacting the rider); id. at
151 (Madden, J., concurring) (held that the enactment violated both article one, section nine
and the Fifth Amendment).
184. Justice Black was joined by Chief Justice Stone and Justices Burton, Douglas,
Murphy and Rutledge. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Reed, wrote a separate concur-
rence. 328 U.S. at 318-30 (Frankfurter, J., concurring, joined by Reed, J.). See notes 193-196
and accompanying text infra. Justice Jackson, who at the time was serving as the chief
American prosecutor in the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, did not participate.
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analysis of this constitutional challenge "require[d] an interpretation of
the meaning and purpose of the section, which in turn require[d] an
understanding of the circumstances leading to its passage."'1 5 In the
five succeeding pages, the majority considered the legislative history
underlying section 304. The genesis of the section was a peroration de-
livered by the chairman of the House Un-American Activities Commit-
tee, Congressman Martin Dies, on February 1, 1943. In that speech, he
named thirty-nine government employees whom he characterized as
"radical bureaucrats" and affiliates of "Communist front organiza-
tions."' 8 6 He urged Congress to cut off their salaries. As a consequence,
a rider was offered to the Treasury-Post Office Appropriations Bill
designed to do precisely what Congressman Dies had suggested. A
caustic debate ensued; some congressmen said that the speech of Feb-
ruary 1st was itself sufficient proof of guilt, while others branded the
rider as "legislative lynching."' 87 Finally, it was agreed to defer a vote
on the rider until a special subcommittee of the Appropriations Com-
mittee could investigate the thirty-nine persons in question so that
"each man would have his day in court."'88 The theory underlying the
creation of a special subcommittee was that "if [the thirty-nine named
persons] are guilty, then the quicker the Government removes them the
sooner and the more certainly will we protect the Nation against sabo-
tage and fifth-column activity."'8 9 The subcommittee gave each ac-
cused employee a chance to testify on his own behalf, but relied
primarily on dossiers furnished by the House Un-American Activities
Committee and the F.B.I. The final report found Watson, Dodd and
Lovett to be affiliated with subversive organizations and thus unfit to
hold positions of public trust. The House voted for the rider but the
Senate later deleted it. After five House-Senate conferences, it was re-
inserted and eventually adopted by the Senate. The President signed
the bill under protest.190
Based on these facts, Justice Black, speaking for the majority, con-
cluded that the purpose of the rider was to bar Watson, Dodd and
Lovett from further governmental service: "[a]ny other interpretation
185. 328 U.S. at 307. For other accounts of the stormy history of section 304, see GOOD-
MAN, supra note 182, at 139-52; Schuman, Bill of4ttainder in the 78th Congress, 37 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 819 (1943).
186. 328 U.S. at 308-09 (quoting 89 CONG. REc. 474 (1943) (remarks of Rep. Dies)).
187. Id. at 309 (quoting 89 CONG. REc. 651 (1943) (remarks of Rep. Tarver)).
188. Id. at 309-10 (quoting 89 CONG. REc. 711 (1943) (remarks of Rep. Cannon)).
189. Id. at 310 (quoting 89 CONG. REc. 741 (1943) (remarks of Rep. Cannon)).
190. Id. at 313. Actually, this was not the first effort by the House of Representatives to
cut off the salaries of persons suspected of being subversive, and in at least one prior case it
had been temporarily successful. See GOODMAN, supra note 182, at 141.
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of the section would completely frustrate the purpose of all who spon-
sored § 304, which clearly was to 'purge' the then existing and all future
lists of government employees of those whom Congress deemed guilty
of 'subversive activities' and therefore 'unfit' to hold a federal job." 19'
Consequently, the majority claimed the rider operated as a bill of at-
tainder because it punished named individuals without judicial trial
and thus fell within that class of legislation prohibited by article one,
section nine of the Constitution.19 z Justice Frankfurter's concurrence,
in which Justice Reed joined, essentially adopted the view expounded
by two judges on the court of claims' 93 that the rider merely curtailed
the disbursing routine, but did not relieve the government of its obliga-
tion to pay for services rendered.1 94 He concluded that the rider was
not a bill of attainder because it specified no offense and pronounced
no judgment of condemnation. 19 As Justice Frankfurter read the legis-
lative history:
The Senate five times rejected the substance of § 304. It finally
prevailed, not because the Senate joined in an unexpressed decla-
ration of guilt and retribution for it, but because the provision
was included in an important appropriation bill. The stiffest in-
terpretation that can be placed upon the Senate's action is that it
agreed to remove the respondents from office (still assuming the
Court's interpretation of § 304) without passing any judgment on
their past conduct or present views.
Section 304 became law by the President's signature. His
motive in allowing it to become law is free from doubt. He reject-
ed the notion that the respondents were "subversive," and explic-
itly stated that he wished to retain them in the service of the
government. ... But to hold that a measure which did not ex-
press a judgment of condemnation by the Senate and carried an
affirmative disavowal of such condemnation by the President
constitutes a bill of attainder, disregards the historic tests for de-
termining what is a bill of attainder.
19 6
191. 328 U.S. at 314.
192. Id. at 315-16. For Justice Black's views on that component of the definition of a
bill of attainder involving the safeguards of a judicial trial, see note 627 and accompanying
text infra.
193. See note 183 supra.
194. 328 U.S. at 330 (Frankfurther, J., joined by Reed, J., concurring).
195. Id. at 323-24. See note 14 supra. For a discussion of Justice Frankfurter's views on
prospectivity and bills of attainder, see notes 341-346 and accompanying text infra.
196. Id. at 325. Other commentators agreed that section 304 was not an attainder be-
cause it specified no punishment. See, eg., Davis, supra note 2, at 28; Norville, Bill ofAt-
tainder-A Rediscovered Weapon Against Discriminatory Legislation 26 O0n. L. Rnv. 78,
107-09 (1946).
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Thus, Lovett clearly stands for the proposition that judicial determina-
tion of legislative motive is a legitimate device for ascertaining whether
a challenged enactment imposes punishment. 197 Subsequent decisions
of the United States Supreme Court have relied on Lovett to reach an
identical conclusion.19 8 But the state courts have been considerably
more reluctant to adopt such a technique. A few examples are
instructive.
Thompson v. Wallin 199 involved a challenge to New York's notori-
197. Two commentators have suggested that the portion of Justice Black's majority
opinion reciting the legislative history of section 304 was included solel, in order to point
out that the purpose of the rider was to effect removals from office rather than to curtail
payment of wages. Davis, supra note 2, at 29; Waning Guaran y, supra note 12, at 849 n.36.
Both authors, however, mistakenly ignore Justice Black's clear statement that his review of
legislative history was inserted in order to show why the rider amounted to a bill of attain-
der. See 328 U.S. at 307. Accord, United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 307, 383-84 n.30 (1968).
198. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 478 (1977), Communist Party
v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 83-86 (1961); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.
603, 615-20 (1960); DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960); American Communica-
tions Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 387-89, 413 (1950). Accord, Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169-184 (1963); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94-97 (1958). These last
two cases do not involve bills of attainder but do offer extensive discussions of the nature of
punishment in a constitutional sense. See notes 497-515 and accompanying text infra.
199. 196 Misc. 686, 93 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1949), rey'dsub. no. L'Hommedieu v. Board of
Regents, 276 App. Div. 494, 95 N.Y.S.2d 443 (3d Dep't), aj'd, 301 N.Y. 476, 95 N.E.2d 806
(1950), affdsub. nom. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952). The history of this set
of lawsuits is somewhat complex because the New York Court of Appeals actually ruled on
three different cases consolidated under the label of Thompson v. Wailin. Two of the cases,
involving Thompson and L'Hommedieu, were jointly decided by Judge Schirick in 1949; he
found the challenged enactment to be a bill of attainder. Thompson v. Wallin, 196 Misc.
686, 696-97, 93 N.Y.S.2d 274, 285 (1949). See notes 206-208 and accompanying text infra.
The Appellate Division reversed, specifically disagreeing with Judge Schirick on this point.
L'Hommedieu v. Board of Regents, 276 App. Div. 494, 507, 95 N.Y.S.2d 443, 455 (3d Dep't
1950). The third case was Lederman v. Board ofEducation. In that suit, the trial court, in an
opinion authored by Judge Hearn, held that the Feinberg Law, see notes 203-204 and ac-
companying text infra, embodied the concept of guilt by association and thus violated the
due process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Lederman v. Board of
Educ., 196 Misc. 873, 884-85, 95 N.Y.S.2d 114, 124-25 (1949). The Appellate Division also
reversed this ruling. Lederman v. Board of Educ., 276 App. Div. 527, 530, 96 N.Y.S.2d 466,
471 (2d Dep't 1950). The New York Court of Appeals affirmed both rulings of the Appellate
Division and specifically found that the Feinberg Law was not a bill of attainder. Thompson
v. Wallin, 301 N.Y. 476, 493, 95 N.E.2d 806, 814 (1950). Lederman was eventually appealed
to the United States Supreme Court, which held, by a six to three margin, that the enactment
was constitutional on the theories that an individual's associations are a factor in determin-
ing his loyalties and that because public employment is a privilege, no right is infringed
when conditions are imposed upon its obtainment or retention. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342
U.S. 485, 492-93 (1952). In light of the conclusions reached in Adler, the Court dismissed an
appeal in Thompson. Thompson v. Wallin, 342 U.S. 801 (1952). The story of this case does
not end there, however. Fourteen years later, a three-judge district court again upheld the
constitutionality of the Feinberg Law, it relied on Thompson in concluding that the enact-
ment was not a bill of attainder. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 255 F. Supp. 981, 988-89
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ous Feinberg Law.2°" In 1917, the New York legislature passed a stat-
ute providing that any employee in the state public school system who
uttered seditious statements could be summarily dismissed. 01 In 1939,
a second law was passed stating that no person could be hired or could
retain a position as a civil servant in the state government if he or she
espoused, published and issued written material that advocated or
joined an organization that advocated overthrow of the government by
unlawful means.t 02 Finally, in 1949, the Feinberg Law was passed. Sec-
tion one of that statute recited the legislature's conclusion that mem-
bers of subversive organizations, particularly the Communist Party,
were infiltrating the ranks of the New York public school system's em-
ployees and exercising a baneful influence upon schoolchildren.
20 3
Consequently, section three required the board of regents to adopt reg-
(W.D.N.Y. 1966). On appeal, however, the United States Supreme Court invalidated the
challenged provisions, stating that although the purpose of the statute was legitimate, the
means that had been used to accomplish that purpose were overbroad. Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967).
200. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3022 (McKinney 1973).
201. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3021 (McKinney 1973).
202. N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 105(1), (2) (McKinney 1973), formerl, N.Y. CIv. SERV.
LAW § 12(a) (McKinney 1940).
203. 1949 N.Y. Laws, ch. 360, § 1:
The legislature hereby finds and declares that there is common report that mem-
bers of subversive groups, and particularly of the communistparty and certain of its
afiliated organizations, have infiltrated into public employment in the public
schools of this state. This has occurred despite the existence of statutes designed to
prevent the appointment to or the retention in employment in public office and
particularly in the public schools of the state of members of any organization
which teaches or advocates that the government of the United States or of any state
or of any political subdivision thereof shall be overthrown by force or violence or
by any unlawful means. The consequence of any such infiltration into the public
schools is that subversive propaganda can be disseminated among children of
tender years by those who teach them and to whom the children look for guidance,
authority and leadership. The legislature finds that members of such groups fre-
quently use their office or position to advocate and teach subversive doctrines. The
legislature finds that members of such groups are frequently bound by oath, agree-
ment, pledge or understanding to follow, advocate and teach a prescribed party
line or group dogma or doctrine without regard to truth or free inquiry. The legis-
lature finds that such dissemination of propaganda may be and frequently is suffi-
ciently subtle to escape detection in the classroom. It is difficult, therefore, to
measure the menace of such infiltration in the schools by conduct in the classroom.
The legislature further finds and declares that in order to protect the children in
our state from such subversive influence it is essential that the laws prohibiting
persons who are members of subversive groups, such as the communistpary and its
affiliated organizations, from obtaining or retaining employment in the public
schools, be rigorously enforced. The legislature deplores the failure heretofore to
prevent such infiltration which threatens dangerously to become a commonplace in
our schools. To this end, the board of regents, which is charged primarily with the
responsibility of supervising the public school systems in the state, should be ad-
monished and directed to take affirmative action to meet this grave menace and to
report thereon regularly to the state legislature.
(Emphasis added).
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ulations for the removal of persons violating the provisions of the stat-
utes adopted in 1917 and 1939; to facilitate its rulemaking functions,
the board was also directed to compile a list of subversive organiza-
tions.2" Among others, Robert Thompson, chairman of the New York
branch of the Communist Party, sought a declaratory judgment that
the Feinberg Law was unconstitutional. 20 5 The trial court, in an opin-
ion authored by Judge Schirick, pointed out that section one of the
challenged act specifically named the Communist Party, adjudged it to
be a menace and charged the board of regents with taking affirmative
measures to combat this perceived threat.2"c The court concluded that
the board was, in effect, directed to include the Communist Party on its
list of subversive organizations and then utilize that list to disqualify
persons from public employment.20 7 Since there was no proof that
Party membership bore "any logical relation" to one's fitness to teach,
the statute was found to be a bill of attainder.20 8 The Appellate Divi-
sion reversed Judge Schirick.209 The New York Court of Appeals af-
firmed and held that section one of the Feinberg Law was merely a
preamble declaring a legislative purpose and not part of the substantive
portion of the statute itself.210 Thus, it could not be relied upon to in-
204. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3022 (1), (2) (McKinney 1973). Subdivision two defined a
subversive organization as one which "advocate[s], advise[s], teach[es] or embrace[s] the
doctrine that the government of the United States or of any state or of any political subdivi-
sion thereof shall be-overthrown or overturned by force, violence or any unlawful means, or
• . . advocate[s], advise[s], teach[es] or embrace[s] the duty, necessity or propriety of adopt-
ing any such doctrine. .. "
205. Thompson v. Wallin, 196 Misc. 686, 692, 93 N.Y.S.2d 274, 280 (1949).
206. Id. at 696, 93 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
207. Id. at 697, 93 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
208. Id.
209. L'Hommedieu v. Board of Regents, 276 App. Div. 494, 507, 95 N.Y.S.2d 443, 455
(3d Dep't 1950). See note 199 supra.
210. Thompson v. Wallin, 301 N.Y. 476, 493, 95 N.E.2d 806, 814 (1950). Accord, on
similar facts, Hammond v. Frankfeld, 194 Md. 487, 491, 71 A.2d 482, 483 (1950). This state-
ment is, at best, a half-truth. The language of a preamble may be deemed to be part of a
statute when that language explicates or clarifies a term located in the substantive portion of
the statute itself. See H. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
OF THE LAWS 176-81 (1896); 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 4804 at 348 (F. Horack ed. 1943); Note, The Legal Effect ofPreambles--Statutes, 41 CoR-
NELL L.Q. 134, 136 (1955). The United States Supreme Court has also adopted this view.
Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Thomas, 132 U.S. 174, 188 (1889). In the case of the Feinberg Law,
section one refers to the Communist Party as an example of a subversive organization. See
note 203 supra. Arguably, this reference was meant to clarify the defmition of a "subversive
organization" in section three by providing the board of regents with an example of the type
of organization with which the legislature was concerned. If this is so. then Judge Schirick
was quite accurate when he said that section three should be read in pari materia with sec-
tion one. There is also an argument that section one should not be construed merely as a
preamble unrelated to the operating provisions of the act itself. See note 288 infra.
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validate the remainder of the challenged legislation. The court also
noted that any judgment by the board that an organization was subver-
sive could be attacked in an administrative hearing and that no punish-
ment was inflicted on the organization itself.2 1
In Starkweather v. Blair,212 the plaintiff was an employee of the
Game and Fish Division of the Minnesota Department of Conserva-
tion. On December 3, 1946, he was made the assistant director of that
division; that posting was certified as permanent on March 24, 1949. In
its 1953 appropriations bill, the Minnesota legislature stipulated specif-
ically that no funds were to be allocated as salary for anyone holding
the position of assistant director of the Game and Fish Division.21 3 Ac-
cordingly, the defendant Blair, plaintiffs immediate supervisor, noti-
fied him that his position was being discontinued and that he would be
laid off.214 After losing his job, the plaintiff challenged the appropria-
tions act as a bill of attainder. Admitting that Lovett endorsed judicial
inquiries into legislative motive, 15 the Minnesota Supreme Court
nonetheless concluded such an inquiry was unwise:
As long as the legislature does not transcend the limitations
placed upon it by the constitution, its motives in passing legisla-
tion are not the subject of proper judicial inquiry. That does not
mean that the legislature may use a constitutional power to ac-
complish an unconstitutional result, but, before it can be held
that the latter has been done, it must appear that the end result of
the act accomplished some purpose proscribed by the
constitution.21 6
Moreover, the court pointed out a practical obstacle to any proposed
scrutiny of motive: the debates (either on the floor or in committee) of
the Minnesota legislature were not recorded, except for those excerpts
printed in the house and senate journals; furthermore, the court de-
clined to ascertain legislative purpose "by resort to extraneous evidence
which was not part of the journal entry." '217 In fact, the only evidence
presented to the court was the testimony of Blair and of Starkweather
during trial.218 Based on such an unsubstantial record, the court found
no punitive motive on the part of the legislature. Neither did it find
211. Thompson v. Wallin, 301 N.Y. 476, 493, 95 N.E.2d 806, 814 (1950).
212. 245 Minn. 371, 71 N.W.2d 869 (1955).
213. Id. at 373-74, 71 N.W.2d at 872.
214. Id. at 374, 71 N.W.2d at 872-73.
215. Id. at 379, 71 N.W.2d at 875.
216. Id. at 380, 71 N.W.2d at 876.
217. Id See also Eliot, The Lawyer andLeg/s/ation, 26 ROCKY MT. L. REv.359, 362-63
(1954).
218. 245 Minn. at 381-83, 71 N.W.2d at 876-77.
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that the plaintiff had committed any act meriting punishment.2 19 As for
Lovett, the Minnesota Supreme Court pointed out that the legislation
in that case had, in effect, banned three persons from further federal
service, whereas the appropriations bill in the case at bar did not fore-
close the possibility that the plaintiff could hold other governmental
positions.220 Thus, the state court concluded that the bill of attainder
challenge was without merit.221
In California State Employees Association v. Flournoy222 it was al-
leged on behalf of employees of the University of California and the
California State Colleges that item 247 of the legislature's 1970 budget
constituted a bill of attainder. The Board of Regents of the University
of California had voted to give university employees a 7.2% salary in-
crease; the trustees of the California State Colleges had approved a
similar 7% raise for their employees. 23 In formulating the 1970 budget,
however, the legislature deleted the raises in item 247 and instead
granted all state employees a flat 5% pay raise.224 Because the legisla-
ture allegedly took this action in retaliation for "political and social
conditions" on Californian campuses, 225 it was argued that this imper-
missible motive rendered the challenged budgetary item violative of
the proscription against bills of attainder contained in both the state
and federal constitutions.2 2 6 The district court of appeals disagreed. It
distinguished Lovett, on the grounds that that case involved both a de-
nial of wages and a concerted effort to foreclose named persons from
further federal service.2 27 By contrast, the budgetary item under attack
was not tantamount to a ban on continuing state employment.28 Thus,
the court concluded that legislation withholding salary increases from a
class of public employees could not approach "in penal character" the
statute invalidated in Lovett."2 9 With respect to the contention that the
legislature harbored a retaliatory motive, the court stated it was bound
by state law to consider only the language of the enactment itself and
219. Id. at 385, 71 N.W.2d at 878.
220. Id. at 386, 71 N.W.2d at 879.
221. Id.
222. 32 Cal. App. 3d 219, 108 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1973).
223. Id. at 223, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 223-24, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
226. Id See CAL. CONST. art. Ij § 16.
227. 32 Cal. App. 3d at 226, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 229, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
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that language disclosed no impermissible purpose. 30
These decisions exemplify the independent stances adopted by
some state courts with respect to judicial recognition of legislative mo-
tive. The New York Court of Appeals chose to ignore a legislative pur-
pose stated within the text of the enactment itself. While the Minnesota
Supreme Court evinced an innate distrust of any invitation to scruti-
nize legislative motive, it did recognize that the paucity of recorded
legislative debates made such an interpretative technique difficult to
apply. Yet the California district court of appeal refused to even con-
sider examining legislative motive, believing such a heuristic approach
to be outside the proper role of the state judiciary. These decisions by
no means represent a majority position; many state courts do take into
account legislative purpose, although they often do so in a very con-
clusory fashion.23'
Thus, as suggested, Lovett has not been adopted wholeheartedly
by the state courts. Indeed, for a time there existed genuine doubt as to
whether that case even bound federal courts. This doubt arose because
of dicta in Justice Black's majority opinion in Palmer v. Thompson,
232
decided in 1971. In that case, a lower federal court had held that the
practice of maintaining "separate but equal" recreational facilities in
the city of Jackson, Mississippi, violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution.233 The city council responded by
completely closing down five municipal swimming pools that it either
owned or leased. A group of blacks filed suit to compel the city to re-
open the pools and operate them on a desegregated basis; the district
court declined to grant their request and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding no violation of the equal
protection clause because the council's action affected all races
230. Id. at 228, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 258. See Stevenson v. Colgan, 91 Cal. 649, 652-53, 27
P. 1089, 1090 (1891).
231. See, e.g., Department of Social Welfare v. Gardiner, 94 Cal. App. 2d 431,433,210
P.2d 855, 856 (1949); People v. Casa Co., 35 Cal. App. 194, 199-200, 169 P. 454, 457 (1917);
Smith v. City of Gainesville, 93 So. 2d 105, 106-07 (Fla. 1957); State v. Fourchy, 106 La. 743,
751, 31 So. 325, 329 (1901); Sheridan v. Gardner, 347 Mass. 8, 14, 196 N.E.2d 303, 308
(1964); State ex rel Wilcox v. Gilbert, 126 Minn. 95, 103, 147 N.W. 953, 956 (1914); In re
Claim of Albertson, 8 N.Y.2d 77, 84-85, 168 N.E.2d 242, 244, 202 N.Y.S. 2d 5, 9 (1960);
Skinner v. State ex rel. Williamson, 189 Okla. 235, 237, 115 P.2d 123, 126 (1941), rev'd on
other ground sub nom. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). As can be seen from
some of the foregoing citations, the positions of the courts in California, Minnesota and New
York are not entirely consistent on this issue.
232. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
233. Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. Supp. 539, 543 (S.D. Miss. 1962), aft'd, 313 F.2d 637
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
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equally. 34 The United States Supreme Court, in a five-to-four deci-
sion, upheld the ruling of the Fifth Circuit.235 With respect to the con-
tention that the city council's decision to close the pools was motivated
by a desire to avoid racial integration, Justice Black distinguished prior
equal protection cases involving scrutiny of legislative motivep 6 and
concluded that such a technique was inadvisable for two reasons. First,
it would be extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the dominant
motive underlying the passage of a given law; second, it would be futile
to invalidate a statute due to the fact it was enacted with bad motives
because a legislature could simply re-enact it for legitimate reasons.27
Justice Black's opinion in Palmer contrasts starkly with his earlier
views in Lovett. While it is true that the discussion of motive in the
former case was in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment,z 8 the
majority opinion cited supporting case authority involving situations
unrelated to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.2 39 Thus, it
seemed that the opinion in Palmer seriously undercut the precedential
value of Lovett; but in fact, the former decision probably has no effect
on the latter because the Court appears to regard scrutiny of a possible
punitive motive on the part of a legislature as an exception to the broad
234. Palmer v. Thompson, 419 F.2d 1222, 1227-28 (5th Cir. 1969).
235. 403 U.S. at 219 (Black. J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Harlan, Stewart & Black-
mun, JJ.).
236. Id. at 225. See Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S.
218, 231 (1964) (Court considered segregationist motives underlying the closing of county
schools); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960) (Court looked at the purpose
behind a gerrymandering bill enacted by the Alabama legislature). Justice Black distin-
guished Griffin by saying that in that case the state was financing private schools that ex-
cluded blacks; he pointed out that in Gomillion the effect of the gerrymander was to remove
all blacks from the voting rolls of the city of Tuskegee. Justice Black, however, ignored other
cases in which the Court quite consciously looked at motive. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkan-
sas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968) (Court considered legislature's motive in enacting a statute
prohibiting the teaching of Darwinism in public schools); Abingdon School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (Court struck down Bible-reading program by scrutiniz-
ing its "purpose and primary effect.") See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242-44
(1976) (official action does not violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment unless
a plaintiff can show racially disproportionate impact and racially discriminatory intent or
purpose); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (Court found de jure segre-
gation is distinguishable from de facto segregation by reference to the presence of a discrimi-
natory purpose).There does not appear to be any sound reason to conclude that the term
"legislative purpose" signifies something other than what is referred to by the term "legisla-
tive motive." Thus, Justice Black's curt dismissal of precedent tends to gloss over a rather
complex body of case law.
237. 403 U.S. at 225. Accord, Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 461-62
(1972). But see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 n.l 1 (1976).
238. See 403 U.S. at 225-26.
239. Id. at 224 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 3S3 (1968); Fletcher v.
Peck 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130 (1810)).
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rule promulgated in Palmer. This thesis was advanced in Chief Justice
Warren's opinion for the Court in United States v. O'Brien,24 decided
three years before Palmer. In that case, the majority stated in a foot-
note that the Court would permit analysis of motive "in a very limited
and well-defined class of cases where the very nature of the constitu-
tional question requires an inquiry into legislative purpose."241 Suits
involving bill of attainder challenges were listed as the chief exemplar
of this "very limited" class.24 2 Similarly, in Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services,243 decided in 1977, Justice Brennan and five of his
colleagues244 agreed that one determinant of punishment for the pur-
pose of analyzing a bill of attainder claim was an inquiry "whether the
legislative record evinces a congressional intent to punish."24 5 The deci-
sion in Palmer was never even mentioned. Thus, at least in the federal
courts, judicial scrutiny of legislative motive is a permissible method
for determining the punitive nature of a challenged enactment.
The foregoing discussion raises the more fundamental question
whether such scrutiny is a legitimate analytical tool. Justice Black's
opinion in Lovett fails to consider this question. He simply relates the
legislative history of the rider to the Urgent Deficiency Appropriations
Act of 1943 and then states that the rider operated as a bill of attainder
in light of that history. Nevertheless, there are some convincing reasons
favoring judicial scrutiny of legislative motive. First, an examination of
the text of a modem statute may not reveal whether its legislative pur-
pose was punitive. 46 If a court is required to characterize a challenged
enactment solely on the basis of its text, few laws will be struck down as
bills of attainder for the simple reason that no legislature is likely to
provide courts with obvious justifications for abrogating its handiwork.
In Justice Frankfurter's opinion, however, such a restriction on judicial
review is not undesirable because other provisions of the Constitution
adequately protect the civil liberties of individuals.24 7 Of course, judi-
240. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
241. Id. at 383 n.30.
242. Id.
243. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
244. He was joined by Justices Blackmun, Marshall, Powell, Stevens and Stewart. Id. at
428. Justice White concurred only in the result. See id. at 487 (White, J., concurring in the
judgment).
245. Id. at 478. The use of the word "intent" is misleading and, hopefully, inadvertent.
See note 177 supra.
246. This state of affairs is to be contrasted with bills of attainder at common law, which
were easily identifiable because they contained legislative determinations of guilt. See note
15 and accompanying text supra.
247. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 326 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Ac-
cord, Punishment, supra note 14, at 268-69.
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cial adoption of that approach would lead to the evisceration of the
safeguards afforded by the bill of attainder clauses. As Professor
Zachariah Chafee has theorized:
It is hardly conceivable that Congress would ever pass an old-
fashioned bill of attainder. Hence it is futile to stop with nullify-
ing such statutes. The real danger will come from new kinds of
legislative determinations of guilt and legislative impositions of
punishment upon individuals. Consequently, the Court in the
Lovett case did much for freedom when it was willing to regard
the attainder clause as directed generally against attempts by
Congress or state legislatures to take into their own hands the
conviction and sentencing of private citizens and officials, with-
out the safeguards of trial in a courtroom.248
If it is desirable to ensure that the proscriptions against bills of
attainder will continue to serve as viable bulwarks against legislative
tyranny, the Lovett approach is a legitimate means of achieving that
goal. The text of the rider to the Urgent Deficiency Appropriations Act
at issue in that case appeared relatively innocuous. 24 9 It merely de-
prived named persons of wages unless they were appointed and con-
firmed before a certain date. Nor was this condition inherently
unreasonable. The executive departments could easily have complied
with it; they chose not to do so in order that they might have a test case
to litigate in the courts.25 Thus, the only way a bill of attainder chal-
lenge could have prevailed in Lovett was for the Court to engage in
scrutiny of the underlying record in order to ascertain why the rider
was enacted. In an indirect way, Cummings v. Missouri251 also supports
such a judicial technique. Justice Field warned that the Constitution
was concerned with substance, not shadows, and that too stringent an
adherence to formalistic details would unfairly allow the legislature to
evade an explicit constitutional limit on its powers. 2 Arguably, the
majority opinion in Lovett implements Justice Field's directive2 53 by
considering the challenged enactment in context before attempting to
characterize it. Thus the methodology adopted by Justice Black in
Lovett is not the breach of tradition one might initially assume. More
importantly, this methodology adapts the proscriptions against bills of
248. CHAFEE, supra note 7, at 155.
249. See note 182 supra for the text of the rider. Some critics contended that section 304
was no more than a law prescribing qualifications for office. See note 196 supra.
250. GOODMAN, supra note 182, at 151.
251. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
252. Id. at 325. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
253. Even one of the most stringent critics of Lovett has admitted as much. Davis, supra
note 2, at 19 n.23.
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attainder to changing times and to the increased sophistication of legis-
lative draftsmen.
The second argument for scrutinizing legislative motive in bill of
attainder cases was made by Chief Justice Warren in United States v.
O'Brien.254 He claimed that in such cases the constitutional issue in-
volved necessarily mandates judicial consideration of legislative pur-
pose.255 It is easy to see why this is so. One component of the definition
of a bill of attainder is punishment, but the mere fact that a law im-
poses a sanction does not necessarily mean that it is punitive. Thus, a
rule regulating the qualifications of professional engineers,256 a statute
revoking the license of any commodities trading firm that files for
bankruptcy and wins court approval of a reorganization plan,257 an en-
actment authorizing administrators to enter and inspect places of em-
ployment in order to determine whether they comply with health and
safety codes258 and an ordinance restricting a person's ability to main-
tain cowpens and stables within city limits2 59 all may infringe individ-
ual freedoms but they do so for regulatory, not punitive, purposes. The
legislatures were concerned with the skills of engineers, the solvency of
licensed commodity merchants, the welfare of employees and the
health of urban residents, not with punishing a person or a class of
persons. Where the statute explicitly evinces a purpose of punishing (as
did English bills of attainder), reliance on the text of the law alone is
sufficient. But where the statute imposes a sanction without explana-
tion and where the reason for doing so may either be regulatory or
punitive, the very nature of the inquiry requires a scrutiny of legislative
motive. For this reason, bill of attainder cases inherently necessitate the
type of inquiry engaged in by the Court in Lovett. Failure to conduct
such an inquiry is tantamount to an abdication of a court's responsibil-
ity to provide meaningful judicial review of allegedly unconstitutional
legislative adjudications.
A third and more generic justification for scrutiny of legislative
254. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
255. See notes 241-242 and accompanying text supra.
256. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6700-6799 (West 1975). See Smith v. California, 336
F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1964).
257. 7 U.S.C. § 499h(b) (1976). See Zwick v. Freeman, 373 F.2d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835 (1968). Accord, George Steinberg & Son, Inc. v. Butz, 491 F.2d
988, 994 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1975).
258. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1970). See Stockwell Mfg. Co. v. Usery, 536 F.2d 1306, 1310
n.9 (10th Cir. 1976).
259. See Davis v. Mayor of Savannah, 147 Ga. 605, 606, 95 S.E. 6, 7 (1918) (ordinance
issued by the city of Savannah).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
motive has been offered by Professor Brest.26 ° His argument may be
stated as follows. As a basic legal premise, the government is constitu-
tionally prohibited from pursuing certain illicit objectives. When a
decisionmaker takes an illicit objective into account, that act may de-
termine the outcome of his decision, even though his desire to imple-
ment the illicit objective may not be a "dominant" motive. Objection to
such a decision on the ground that it was made for an illicit purpose is
legitimate. If a court concludes a decisionmaker gave weight to an il-
licit objective, it is constitutionally required to invalidate the decision
he reached. Under this analysis, a court is required to examine legisla-
tive motive if the plaintiff demonstrates that a desire to achieve an il-
licit objective played a significant, though not necessarily decisive, role
in the decisionmaking process. A suspect motive will trigger strict scru-
tiny; an illicit motive will cause the challenged decision to be invali-
dated. Should the decisionmaker re-adopt the previously invalidated
rule, the burden shifts to him to show that it was re-adopted for entirely
legitimate purposes. 61 Professor Brest's theory has implications for
cases other than those involving issues of punishment. It is a general
justification for considering motives of legislators and is based on an
260. Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of UnconsttutionalLegisla-
tive Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95, 116-18 [hereinafter cited as Brest].
261. Id. at 130-31. One commentator has objected that the type of decision involved in
Palmer is beyond the "purview" of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, as mediated by the principle of anti-discrimination. Fiss, Group.;andtheEqualProtec-
tion Clause in EQUALITY AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 118 (M. Cohen, T. Nagel & T.
Scanlon ed. 1977). But another has proposed a model of judicial inquiry into legislative
motive involving a methodology similar to that utilized in equal protection analysis. Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
Professor Ely concludes that inquiry into motive is permissible only where the deci-
sionmaker has made either a random or a discretionary choice. Id. at 1261-75, 1281-84. If
the making of a random decision involved the use of non-random criteria, the deci-
sionmaker must defend his action, usually by advancing a rational justification. Id. at 1269-
71. However, if those affected by his decision suffer an infringement of a fundamental inter-
est, the burden of justification imposed upon the decisionmaker will become correlatively
more stringent. Id. at 1269. Where the decisionmaker is making a discretionary choice (Ze.,
one that is inherently non-rational or one in which the relationship between the choice made
and the goal sought can be satisfied by merely making a choice) similar rules apply. The
administrator need only bring forth a rational justification unless a fundamental interest is
affected, in which case an extraordinary justification must be presented. Id. This model
posits a less activist role for the judiciary than that proposed by Professor Brest. Not only
does it severely limit the areas in which scrutiny of motives will be allowed, but the evalua-
tive criteria to be used embody a great deference to the judgment of the decisionmaker. The
"two-tier" scrutiny advocated by Professor Ely is essentially an extension of the methodol-
ogy (developed for other purposes) that is used in equal protection cases. See Forum: Equal
Protection and the Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645, 646-47 (1975). For an analy-
sis of Professor Ely's discussion of motivation in legislating, see Note, Legislative Purpose,
Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 141-46 (1972).
[Vol. 5
BILL OF ATTAINDER DOCTRINE
activist interpretation of the role ofjudicial review in this nation's polit-
ical system. This theory indicates that judicial inquiry into legislative
motive may be not only a pragmatic interpretative technique, but also a
device whereby courts can fulfill their constitutional duties.
Four arguments have been made in opposition to judicial scrutiny
of legislative motive. First, it has been suggested that inquiry into mo-
tive is improper both because it invites unwarranted intrusion by the
judiciary into legislative processes 262 and because it evinces disrespect
for governmental policymaking bodies.2 63 This argument has its basis
in the self-limiting concept of judicial restraint advanced by Justice
Frankfurter in Lovett.2" A corollary argument is the belief that it is
beyond the province of the courts to determine whether a law is "good"
or "bad," "wise" or "unwise. '265 As Professor Brest correctly points
out, however, scrutiny of legislative purpose involves an evaluation of
the goodness or badness of the motives of legislators, not the end prod-
uct of their decisionimaking deliberations.266
A third counter-argument, one to which both Chief Justice War-
ren267and Justice Black268 have subscribed, is that examining legislative
motive is futile because the legislature can simply re-enact for ostensi-
bly legitimate reasons legislation that the courts have held invalid be-
cause of the improper motive of the lawmakers. Indeed, this would
seem to be the lesson taught by Lovett. The net result of the approach
taken in that case is to compel legislators to conceal their bad motives
in an effort to thwart the courts. Thus, if the legislature wishes to have
its enactment pass judicial scrutiny, its members need only dissemble
about their motives for endorsing it. This criticism is a serious one.
Professor Brest suggests that where a legislature re-adopts a statute pre-
viously abrogated by the courts because of improper motive, the courts
should presume that those same impermissible motives underlie the
second enactment unless the legislature can convincingly demonstrate
otherwise. 269 But this suggestion is difficult to implement; not only does
262. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 215 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
BICKEL]. See Brest, supra note 260, at 128.
263. BICKEL, supra note 262, at 214; Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,
82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1093 (1969). See Brest, supra note 260, at 128.
264. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 326-27, 329-30 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring, joined by Reed, J.).
265. See Brest, supra note 260, at 127. See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
384 (1968).
266. Brest, supra note 260, at 128.
267. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968).
268. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971).
269. See note 261 and accompanying text supra.
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it require a presumption that legislators will invariably prevaricate
about their motives for re-enactment, but it also does not account for
the more troublesome problem raised by the legislature's dissembling
about its motives for passing a piece of legislation in the first instance.
If the supporters of the rider to the Urgent Deficiency Appropriations
Act involved in Lovett had said that they endorsed this amendment not
because they believed Watson, Dodd and Lovett to be guilty of subver-
sion, but because they wanted to delete unnecessary administrative ex-
penditures, should the Court have presumed such a rationale was
patently unbelievable and was only meant to disguise their true, imper-
missible motives? The difficulties arising from such an approach are
sufficiently disturbing to suggest, at the very least, that the technique
used in Lovett may only be helpful in similar types of situations in
which purportedly bad motives are apparent from the record.
The most telling objection to scrutiny of legislative motive, how-
ever, is that such a motive is simply unascertainable; the Court in both
Palmer v. Thompson'7 ° and United States v. O'Brien2 71 advanced this
objection. The best statement of this argument appeared in a seminal
article written by Professor Radin in 1930.272 Although he discusses the
concept of legislative intent, his criticism would apply equally well to
the concept of legislative motive.273
A legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connection
with words which some two or three men drafted, which a con-
siderable number rejected, and in regard to which many of the
approving majority might have had, and often demonstrably did
have, different ideas and beliefs.
That the intention of the legislature is undiscoverable in any
real sense is almost an immediate inference from a statement of
the proposition. The chances that of several hundred men each
will have exactly the same determinate situations in mind as pos-
sible reductions of a given determinable, are infinitesimally
small. The chance is still smaller that a given determinate, the
litigated issue, will not only be within the minds of all these men
but will be certain to be selected by all of them as the present
limit to which the determinable should be narrowed. In an ex-
treme case, it might be that we could learn all that was in the
mind of the draftsman, or of a committee of half a dozen men
270. 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971).
271. 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968).
272. Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 863 (1930) [hereinafter cited as
Radin].
273. As suggested earlier, the concepts of "intent" and "motive" should be carefully
distinguished. See note 177 supra. But Professor Radin's critique is one that is applicable to
any effort to divine the collective state of mind of a decisionmaking group.
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who completely approved of every word. But when this draft is
submitted to the legislature and at once accepted without a dis-
sentient voice and without debate, what have we then learned of
the intentions of the four or five hundred approvers? Even if the
contents of the minds of the legislators were uniform, we have no
means of knowing that content except by external utterances or
behavior of these hundreds of men, and in almost every case the
only external act is the extremely ambiguous one of acquiescence,
which may be motivated in literally hundreds of ways, and which
by itself indicates little or nothing of the pictures which the statu-
tory descriptions imply. It is not impossible that this knowledge
could be obtained. But how probable it is, even venturesome
mathematicians will scarcely undertake to compute.274
The lessons implicit in these two paragraphs may be amplified by a
consideration of Lovell. Initially, there exists the fallacy of reifying the
concept of motive, as if it were something that is tangible or quantifi-
able. The reason a legislator votes for a bill may depend on a congeries
of purposes or motives, many of which may conflict with one another.
So it is deceptive to say a legislator had a particular motive for casting
his vote in the way he did. Those who voted for the rider to the appro-
priations bill may have been motivated by a belief that Watson, Dodd
and Lovett were subversives, or they may have been trying to retaliate
against President Roosevelt and his policies,275 or they may have be-
lieved wartime security necessitated the removal of the three persons
named, or they may have sought more congressional control over Presi-
dential appointments276 or, as Justice Frankfurter suggested,277 they
may have been more interested in getting a vital appropriations bill
enacted into law. More likely, individual legislators might have har-
bored a combination of several of these motives. The moral is that con-
sideration of legislative motive as a unitary concept is erroneous.
274. Radin, supra note 272, at 870-71. Accord, Bruncken, supra note 177, at 130; Corry,
The Use of Legislative History in the Interpretation of Statutes, 32 CAN. BAR REV. 624, 637
(1954) [hereinafter cited as Corry]; de Sloovbre, Preliminary Questions in Statutory
Interpretation, 9 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 407, 415 (1932). Justice Cardozo criticized judicial inquiry
into legislative motive by bemoaning the fact that, with such an approach, "psychoanalysis
has spread to unaccustomed fields." United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 299 (1935)
(Cardozo, J., dissenting). But see Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARv. L.
RaV. 886, 892 (1930) [hereinafter cited as Landis]: "To ignore legislative processes and legis-
lative history in the processes of interpretation, is to turn one's back on whatever history
may reveal as to the direction of the political and economic forces of our time." For an
overview of the various approaches to this general area of the law, see Witherspoon, Admin-
istrative Discretion to Determine Statutory Mfeaning: "The Middle Road" 1, 40 TEx. L. Rv.
751, 753-71 (1962).
275. See GOODMAN, supra note 182, at 139-40.
276. See id. at 149-50.
277. See note 196 and accompanying text supra.
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This fallacy is compounded when one speaks in terms of the mo-
tive of the House of Representatives or the Senate. Justice Black in
Lovett cited statements of those opposing the rider,2"' those who said
Watson, Dodd and Lovett were on trial279 and those expressing the
conclusions of the subcommittee.28 ° Common sense alone should dic-
tate that the first class of statements was irrelevant. Even presuming the
other two classes of statements indicated that the speakers had tried
and convicted Watson, Dodd and Lovett in their own minds, how can
these sentiments be imputed to the House as a whole? To maintain that
such statements were representative of the opinions of the 318 men who
voted for the Urgent Deficiency Appropriations Act is unconscionable
because it posits an assumption based on insufficient evidence. Even
assuming those in the House who voted for the rider meant to find
Watson, Dodd and Lovett guilty of subversion, Justice Frankfurter
points out that bills become law after being passed by the House and
the Senate and then being signed by the President.28" ' In the case of the
Urgent Deficiency Appropriations Act, President Roosevelt did not be-
lieve that Watson, Dodd and Lovett were guilty of anything.282 More-
over, the Senate rejected the rider at first283 and although senators
participating in the joint congressional conferences did eventually yield
to the demands of the House on the grounds of expediency,284 they
managed to insert a compromise escapability clause into the text of the
rider allowing for Presidential appointment coupled with senatorial
confirmation before November 15, 1943.285 Justice Black never ex-
amined the motives of the members of the Senate, even though without
its vote the enactment could never have become law. Noting this omis-
sion, Justice Frankfurter implicitly raised a rather disturbing question:
278. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 309 (1946). See note 187 and accompa-
nying text supra. In quoting and apparently relying on the statements of members of the
opposition in Congress, Justice Black may have acted erroneously. A series of cases have
often repeated the view that opposition statements may not be utilized in order to determine
legislative intent or purpose. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 204 n.24
(1976); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964); Mastro Plas-
tics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 288 (1956); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,
341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951).
279. See 328 U.S. at 309-10. See notes 188-189 and accompanying text supra.
280. See id. at 311-12.
281. See note 196 and accompanying text supra.
282. Justice Black acknowledged this. 328 U.S. at 313.
283. See id. at 312-13.
284. Senator McKellar said: "The Senate conferees have most reluctantly felt obliged to
yield to this unjust provision in order to get the appropriation bill out of Congress and
enacted into law." 89 CONG. REc. 6407 (1943) (remarks of Sen. McKellar), quotedin GOOD-
MAN, supra note 182, at 149.
285. GOODMAN, supra note 182, at 149. For the text of the statute, see note 182 supra.
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if the approval of three institutions (the House, the Senate and the Pres-
idency) is necessary to enact legislation and only one of those institu-
tions (the House) is said to harbor a collective illicit motive, can the
enactment be invalidated because of that bad motive, without any
showing of the culpability of the other two institutions? Lovet indi-
cates the answer is in the affirmative; thus, it establishes a very ques-
tionable principle.
One conclusion to be derived from the discussion of these four
objections to judicial scrutiny of legislative motive (intrusion into plus
disrespect for the decisionmaking processes of a coordinate branch of
government, improper exaltation of judicial notions about the wisdom
or worth of a particular law, futility and unascertainability) is that
courts should simply cease attempting to accomplish the impossible
and should eschew further efforts to ascertain the purposes underlying
legislative enactments. But such a draconian conclusion ignores the fact
that if courts are foreclosed from scrutinizing motive, they will have
great difficulty resolving bill of attainder challenges to statutes impos-
ing sanctions but omitting recitals of purpose. The net effect of such a
foreclosure might well be the undermining of the bill of attainder
doctrine.
Is there a way to reconcile the need for judicial scrutiny of legisla-
tive motive in bill of attainder cases and the objections against such a
technique? Of these objections, the first two-intrusion plus disrespect
and improper exaltation-are essentially expressions of a policy
founded upon a theory of judicial self-restraint; whether or not a given
court will accede to such objections depends upon the juristic philoso-
phies of its members. The criticism of futility is, on closer examination,
an irrelevant criticism. To refuse to invalidate a statute enacted for il-
licit motives because it may later be re-enacted for permissible pur-
poses requires courts to predict future legislative responses and to
dispose of a case on the basis of those predictions. One response to such
an approach is: decide only one case at a time. A court has no business
concerning itself with what a legislature might do if it renders an ad-
verse decree; rather, it should restrict its considerations to the law cur-
rently being challenged. Nevertheless, this response neglects a more
fundamental problem. What if the legislature "falsifies" the record so
that a law appears to be enacted for ostensibly legitimate purposes
when, in fact, those who vote for it harbor illicit motives? The obvious
response to this is that if extrinsic evidence discloses only permissible
motives, the court's duty is to uphold the challenged law, which is to
say that a plaintiff who has a legitimate objection may not prevail in
BILL OF ATTAINDER DOCTRINESummer 19781
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
some instances. The alternative, however, is for courts to embroil them-
selves in the chimerical task of attempting to ascertain the motives that
the members of the legislature really harbored, rather than those that
they merely claimed to harbor. The evidentiary obstacles entailed in
showing that persons are misrepresenting their own states of mind
would, quite frankly, be insurmountable. Moreover, it should be noted
that it is highly unlikely that all the members of a legislature will (or
even can) act in concert to disguise their ulterior motives; to even posit
such a situation is to presume a level of intramural cooperation and
unanimity of which few, if any, legislative bodies are capable. This
leaves the final objection: unascertainability. A close examination of
this objection suggests it is not really directed so much at scrutiny of
motive per se as at the manner in which such scrutiny is conducted.
Professor Radin's categorical critique is really an attack on the way in
which courts derive conclusions about collective purposes. Thus, the
objection of unascertainability can be met if the Court is willing to do
that which it failed to do in Lovett and subsequent cases: promulgate
guidelines with respect to the types of evidence it will consider in exam-
ining legislative purpose. This is not a simple task, by any means. But
even a casual consideration of the subject suggests that certain classes
of evidence are either so inherently unreliable, e.g., the characteriza-
tion of a proposed piece of legislation offered by its opponents, or so
collateral in nature, e.g., the statements of legislators regarding what
they hope their preliminary investigations will accomplish, that they
should not be taken into account, whereas other classes of evidence,
e.g., the statements of a committee's members regarding their purposes
for drafting a proposed bill, are relevant, at least so long as a court does
not attempt to derive too much from them, e.g., deducing the collective
motive of the legislature from the statements of the committee mem-
bers. Unless the United States Supreme Court attempts to devise gen-
eral criteria governing its inquiry into motive in bill of attainder cases,
it simply exposes itself to justifiable criticisms like those of Professor
Corry, who believes that "[a]ll that reference to legislative history can
do is to help mask the judge's law-making." ' 6
Assuming judicial consideration of legislative purpose is a valid
tool, however, should extrinsic evidence (e.g., records of debates, com-
mittee reports, testimony of witnesses, etc.) be relied upon? Lovett indi-
cates the answer is in the affirmative.287 Although Justice Black failed
286. Corry, supra note 274, at 637.
287. The Supreme Court has consistently stated that it is impermissible to rely on the
statements of individual lawmakers made during the course of debates on a bill for the
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to so state, the primary rationale is again one of necessity. The need to
conduct an independent inquiry into the subject of legislative motive
exists only where the purpose of the law being challenged is not ex-
pressed in the text of the enactment itself. 88 In such cases, the courts
have no choice but to rely on legislative history found in extrinsic
records, providing such records exist. Reliance on extrinsic evidence by
courts is not tolerated in England, 8 9 but as Justice Frankfurter once
noted, the English rule is far too simplistic because it may exclude evi-
dence that is logically probative of some disputed issue in a case. 290 To
purpose of determining legislative intent. See, e.g., McCaugbn v. Hershey Chocolate Co.,
283 U.S. 488, 493-94 (1931); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 474-75
(1921); Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 90 (1914); Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486, 495
(1904); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897); Aldridge v.
Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9,24 (1845). But the Court has often relied on reports made by a
committee member in charge of the passage of a bill. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering, 254 U.S. at 475; United States v. St. Paul, Minn. & Manitoba Ry., 247 U.S. 310,
318 (1918); United States v. Coca Cola Co., 241 U.S. 265, 281 (1916); Pennsylvania R.R. v.
International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184, 198-99 (1913); Binns v. United States, 194 U.S.
at 495. Indeed, the Court almost always utilizes legislative history as an aid in construing a
statute; for an exhaustive list of Supreme Court cases using such evidence for the decade
between 1938 and 1948, see Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 687-89 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
288. For this reason, the Feinberg Law, see notes 203-204 and accompanying text
supra, can be construed as a bill of attainder. Section one of that enactment, which the New
York Court of Appeals labelled a "preamble," see note 210 and accompanying text supra,
resembles that portion of a classical English bill of attainder which recites crimes, pro-
nounces guilt and declares a judgment. See note 15 and accompanying text supra. Thus,
section one (1) names the Communist Party, (2) declares the dissemination of its tenets to be
a menace, (3) finds that such dissemination is taking place in the New York public school
system and (4) charges the board of regents to take specific action, as specified in section
three. It is true section one is not an operative part of the statute but, by definition, a recital
of offenses and a censorial pronouncement are descriptive, not prescriptive. The only pre-
scriptive portion of an English bill of attainder was that portion which imposed punishment,
but that does not mean that the other portions of such a bill were surplusage. Rather, those
other portions comprised the rationale for both imposing a sanction and selecting how grave
a sanction to impose. On this theory, sections one and three of the Feinberg Law, construed
as a unit, conform to the classical defimition of a bill of attainder at common law. One would
have expected that, in light of United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), the United States
Supreme Court, on being given the opportunity to reevaluate the Feinberg Law, would have
invalidated it as a bill of attainder. But, as noted, the Court chose to overturn the enactment
on the theory of overbreadth. See note 199 supra. For possible reasons why the Court used
an overbreadth rather than an attainder analysis to invalidate this legislation, see note 985
in/ra.
289. See Viscountess Rhondda's Claim, [1922] 2 A.C. 339, 383; Rex v. Board of Educ.,
[1909] 2 K.B. 1045, 1057, 1072; Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2332 (1769). See also 1 H.
HALSBURY, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 141 (1907).
290. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. Rnv. 527,
541 (1947). Cf. Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 3 KAN. L.
Rnv.1, 16-17 (1954) (suggests such extrinsic evidence is valuable as a source of ideas, but
should not be deemed to be binding authority); Landis, supra note 274, at 892.
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simultaneously endorse a policy of judicial review of legislative motive
in bill of attainder cases but deny the judiciary the right to examine
legislative history contained in extrinsic records is contradictory: ac-
ceptance of the former technique necessarily implies utilization of and
reliance on the latter type of evidence.
2. Methods For Finding That a Sanction is Nonpenal
As suggested earlier,2 9 1 a history of the bill of attainder doctrine in
this country entails a chronicle of the various means by which state and
federal courts have sought to avoid invalidating legislation as a bill of
attainder. This subsection and the three succeeding it will deal with
spurious distinctions or definitions utilized by courts in order to arrive
at the conclusion that a challenged enactment does not fit within the
prohibitions of article one, sections nine and ten of the Constitution.
a. Civil v. Criminal Penalties and Procedures
The first such distinction focuses on whether or not the statute be-
ing attacked may be characterized as civil or criminal in nature. This
approach consists of two different but related branches of thought. One
is based on the fallacious proposition that the proscriptions against bills
of attainder apply only in criminal, not civil, proceedings; 292 the other
is founded on the erroneous theory that these proscriptions apply only
where the statutory penalty sought to be imposed may be designated as
criminal rather than civil in nature.
The first branch of this apocryphal dichotomy has its modem ori-
gins in the case of United States v. Distillery,293 decided by a federal
district court in Delaware in 1870. That suit involved a libel of infor-
mation instituted by federal tax assessors against a distillery located in
Wilmington. The owners of the premises had failed to pay a specified
tax assessed against them pursuant to federal legislation enacted in
1868.294 As a consequence of this default, revenue agents seized the
property in question and then lodged a suit to have a federal court
declare the seized premises forfeited to the government.295 As part of
their defense, the property owners alleged that the statute imposing the
291. See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
292. An alternative way of stating this contention is that the prohibition against bills of
attainder applies only to punishment for a crime, which, of course, can only be imposed
after a full criminal trial or trialtype hearing.
293. 25 F. Cas. 866 (D. Dela. 1870) (No. 14,965).
294. Act of July 20, 1868, Pub. L. No. 186, § 42, 15 Stat. 142. The act imposed a tax on
the manufacture of distilled spirits.
295. 25 F. Cas. at 866.
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tax amounted "in practical effect" to a bill of attainder.296 The district
court judge disagreed:
In answer, it is obvious to remark, that these clauses [article one,
section nine, clause three and article three, section three, clause
two] of the constitution of the United States have respect to high
crimes, and punishment of them, restraining rigor, and guarding
against arbitrarily enacting guilt. The case before the court is a
civil suit in rem, against the thing, to ratify the seizure of it, and
the provision of the act of congress under which it is alleged to be
forfeited, and therefore was seized, is a regulation of civil policy
framed to secure to the United States fair payment of taxes im-
posed for the support of the government, a regulation of civil pol-
icy to accomplish a purpose vital to government; for without
revenue the government cannot exist; and what measures may be
requisite to enforce the collection of a tax, it is for Congress, in
the exercise of its legislative power, to determine.2 97
This thesis has been reiterated by a number of other courts in varying
contexts,298 and was advanced most recently by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in a case involving a challenge to cer-
tain inspection provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act.
299
296. Id. at 867. See Cole v. Cardoza, 441 F.2d 1337, 1341 (6th Cir. 1971) (in suit alleg-
ing that statute imposing special tax on the occupation of wagering was a bill of attainder,
held the assessment of a tax is not punishment).
297. 25 F. Cas. at 867. But cf. Doe ex dem. Gaines v. Buford, 31 Ky. (1 Dana) 481, 509-
10 (1833) (opinion of Nicholas, J.) (holding forfeiture enforced in a civil proceeding, either
inpersonam or in rem, may serve as the punishment component of a bill of attainder). The
Delaware district court judge's assertions about article three, section three are accurate. See
note 2 supra. But that section of the Constitution refers only to the high crime of treason,
whereas bills of attainder (or, more accurately, bills of pains and penalties) at common law
were applied not only to treason but also to lesser offenses, such as voting fraud. See notes
23-24, 27 and accompanying text supra.
298. See De Rieux v. Five Smiths, Inc., 499 F.2d 1321, 1335 (Emer. Ct. App. 1974)
(found attainder claim inapplicable where the government sought to enforce wage and price
controls by means of a suit requesting an injunction and restitution, rather than a criminal
prosecution); Moffett v. Commerce Trust Co., 354 Mo. 1098, 1104, 193 S.W.2d 588, 592
(1946), appeal dismissed, 329 U.S. 669 (1946) (found attainder challenge to a statute exacting
treble costs from one who files three successive defective pleadings was meritless because the
law was one of civil procedure); Skinner v. State exrel. Williamson, 189 Okla. 235, 237, 115
P.2d 123, 125 (1941), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (held Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act was not susceptible to an attain-
der challenge because the legislature was said not to have intended a criminal prosecution);
State ex rel. Carroll v. Simmons, 61 Wash. 2d 146, 152, 377 P.2d 421, 424 (1962), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963) (held statute depriving incumbent official of his office upon
conviction of a felony was no attainder because "unrelated to . . . rights in a criminal
proceeding.")
299. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1970). See Stockwell Mfg. Co. v. Usery, 536 F.2d 1306, 1310
n.9 (10th Cir. 1976) (found bill of attainder and ex post facto clauses apply only to criminal
acts and have no relevance to a civil suit). The Tenth Circuit cited Johannessen v. United
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The second branch of the dichotomy is concerned with whether
the sanction being imposed by the challenged enactment is civil or
criminal in nature. A paradigmatic case in this respect is State ex rel
Wilcox v. Ryder.3 °" That suit involved a Minnesota statute providing
for the abatement of bawdy houses. Section one of the challenged en-
actment declared that any building erected, maintained or used "for
lewdness" was a public nuisance; section two authorized any county
attorney or private citizen to bring an action in equity on behalf of the
state to enjoin such a nuisance.30 1 The trial court was empowered to
issue an exparte temporary injunction and the property owners were
allowed only three days in which to file an answer. After trial and upon
sufficient proof of the existence* of a nuisance, section five of the chal-
lenged statute authorized the court to issue orders that the premises in
question be shut down completely for one year and that all the person-
alty therein be seized and sold.30 2 Any unauthorized use of the prem-
ises during the one-year period constituted contempt of court and was
punishable by a fine of one thousand dollars or three to six months in
prison or both.30 3 In addition, section eight of the act authorized the
imposition of a "penalty of three hundred dollars" against the property
holder; this sum was to be entered in the county auditor's rolls as a "tax
upon the property" in question.3"
The defendants claimed that since the provisions of the act were
penal in nature, they were entitled to a trial by jury.30 5 The Minnesota
Supreme Court responded that the purpose of the statute was to sup-
press immoral uses of property rather than to punish the property own-
ers themselves, unless, of course, their conduct constituted contempt of
court.30 6 But the three hundred dollar penalty imposed by section eight
of the act both required and received extensive analysis. The court
noted that although this assessment was designated to be a penalty by
the text of the act itself, it was to be "imposed, treated and collected as
a tax;"'307 moreover, there was no punishment prescribed for failure to
pay this amount.30 8 Therefore, the court concluded that this assessment
States, 225 U.S. 227, 242 (1912), in support of its thesis; but that case refers only to ex post
facto laws. See note 314 and accompanying text infra.
300. 126 Minn. 95, 147 N.W. 953 (1914).
301. Id. at 98, 147 N.W. at 954. See 1913 Minn. Laws ch. 562, §§ 8717-8726.
302. 126 Minn. at 99, 147 N.W. at 955.
303. Id. at 100, 147 N.W. at 955.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 102, 147 N.W. at 956.
306. Id. at 103, 147 N.W. at 956.
307. Id. at 105, 147 N.W. at 957.
308. Id.
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and the act as a whole were nonpenal, which disposed of the defend-
ants' points "based upon the constitutional provisions relating to...
bills of attainder, and ex post facto laws."309 Again, several courts in
various contexts have arrived at similar conclusions based upon an
identical theory. 10
A consideration of Cummings v. Missouri,311Ex parte Garland
3 2
and United States v. Lovett313 will show why this purported distinction
is, in fact, false. The first branch of the distinction relies on the civil
nature of the underlying proceeding for support. While it is true that
the prohibitions in the Constitution against ex post facto laws apply
309. Id. at 106, 147 N.W. at 957.
310. See Westmoreland v. Chapman, 268 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5, 74 Cal. Rptr. 363, 366
(1968) (in the case of attainder challenge to a law requiring revocation of the driver's license
of one who is arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated and refuses to submit to
chemical test, held that the challenge was meritless because revocation of a license is not a
criminal penalty); Department of Social Welfare v. Gardiner, 94 Cal. App. 2d 431, 433, 210
P.2d 855, 856 (1949) (stated that law requiring remuneration from the estate of one who
improperly requested and received welfare benefits was not an attainder by distinguishing
between penalties imposed upon wrongdoers and recoupments from debtors and between
laws that merely seek to ensure compliance with conditions and laws obtaining money for
the state); People v. Casa Co., 35 Cal. App. 194, 199-200, 169 P. 454, 457 (1917) (stated that
nuisance statute was no attainder because one-year shutdown provision was only intended
as a means of abatement, not punishment); Moore v. Commonwealth, 293 Ky. 55, 57, 168
S.W.2d 342, 343 (1943) (quoting House and Lot v. State ex rel Patterson, 204 Ala. 108, 109,
85 So. 382, 382 (1920)) (held law providing for forfeiture of property used in connection with
the sale or manufacture of liquor in dry territory was valid because bills of attainder "have
nothing to do with the case, for they relate to legislative punishment. . . of criminal or
supposed criminal offenses, whereas that part of the statute to which we have referred is
justified on the ground that it is a provision for the abatement of nuisances"; only Moore
referred to the prohibition in the Federal Constitution); Daly v. State, 296 Minn. 238, 239,
207 N.W.2d 541, 543 (1973) (held motorist's implied consent law not an attainder because it
imposed no criminal punishment, but only the revocation of a driver's license); Moffett v.
Commerce Trust Co., 354 Mo. 1098, 1104, 193 S.W.2d 588, 592 (1946), appealdismissed, 329
U.S. 669 (1946) (held law imposing treble costs upon one filing three successive defective
pleadings was no attainder because it authorized neither fine nor imprisonment, but only a
money judgment); Lanza v. Wagner, 30 Misc. 2d 212, 214, 220 N.Y.S. 2d 477, 481 (1961),
affdpercuriam, 15 App. Div. 2d 552, 222 N.Y.S. 2d 1019 (2d Dep't 1961), af'd, 11 N.Y.2d
317, 324-25, 183 N.E.2d 670, 674, 229 N.Y.S. 2d 380, 385-86 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
901 (1963) (held by trial court that law dismissing incumbent members of the state's board of
education because of generalized corruption in the state's educational administrative system
was no attainder because it lacked three prerequisites: the citation for a crime, the taking of
property and the meting out of punishment); Skinner v. State ex rel. Williamson, 189 Okla.
235, 237, 115 P.2d 123, 126 (1941), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (stated with respect to attainder challenge to Oklahoma Habitual Crimi-
nal Sterilization Act that such a challenge did not apply where the law in question imposed
no punishment for crime).
311. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867). See notes 54-70 and accompanying text supra.
312. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867). See notes 71-81 and accompanying text supra.
313. 328 U.S. 303 (1946). See notes 180-198 and accompanying text supra.
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only to criminal proceedings,31 4 the same rule does not apply with re-
spect to the prohibitions against bills of attainder. Although Cummings
involved an appeal from a criminal conviction for preaching in the
state of Missouri without first having executed a prescribed expurga-
tory oath,3 5 both Garland and Lovell involved civil suits. In Garland,
the petitioner had not been convicted of any crime; instead, he was the
one seeking a declaratory judgment that a specific act of Congress was
unconstitutional.31 6 This was unquestionably a civil proceeding; no
statutory violation had yet been committed. In Lovett, the three peti-
tioners instituted a civil suit in the Court of Claims to recover back
wages; 317 on an appeal by the government of an award in their favor,
the United States Supreme Court dealt with the issue of whether the
statute denying them their salaries constituted a bill of attainder,3 8 and
concluded that it did.319 It might be argued that in Lovett and
Cummings the victims of the legislature were challenging the validity
of its enactment, whereas in United States v. Distillery' the govern-
ment had lodged a suit to enforce a statutory provision. In fact, how-
ever, the Delaware district court in the latter case seems to offer a
broad-based generalization distinguishing civil and criminal suits.321
Although the court does add some remarks about the government's
need to enforce revenue-raising provisions,322 later cases make no dis-
tinction as to whether the underlying lawsuit was instituted to chal-
lenge or enforce a law.323 Nor does language in any Supreme Court
opinion endorse such a dichotomy. In fact, Justice Black in Lovett
314. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924);
Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913); Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227,
242 (1912); Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 456,463 (1855); Watson v. Mercer,
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 88, 110 (1834); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 385, 390 (1798). This proposi-
tion has been scathingly criticized by Justice William Johnson. See Satterlee v. Matthewson,
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 681-87 (1829) (appendix by Johnson, J.); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 213, 286-87 (1827) (Johnson, J., dissenting). Moreover, the Court has eroded this
proposition by ruling that state legislatures cannot evade the proscription against ex post
facto laws by giving a civil form to essentially criminal statutes. Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S.
(7 Otto) 381, 385 (1878); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 327 (1867).
315. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
316. See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
317. See note 183 and accompanying text supra.
318. This issue was discussed by only two judges in the lower court. See note 183 and
accompanying text supra.
319. See note 192 and accompanying text supra.
320. 25 F. Cas. 866 (D. Dela. 1870) (No. 14,965). See notes 293-297 and accompanying
text supra.
321. Id. at 867. See note 297 and accompanying text supra.
322. See id.
323. See note 298 supra.
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stated with respect to the rider to the Urgent Deficiency Appropriations
Act of 1943 that, "[t]he fact that the punishment is inflicted through the
instrumentality of an Act specifically cutting off the pay of certain
named individuals. . . makes it no less galling or effective than if it
had been done by an Act which designated the conduct as criminal.
'324
This statement, though it does not refer to the nature of the underlying
lawsuit, suggests that a facile approach which declines to recognize bill
of attainder challenges in civil suits is improper because the labels
"civil" and "criminal" cannot be used to undercut a constitutional
guarantee. This is not to say that the case of United States v. Distillery
and subsequent, similar decisions do not implicitly involve a valid dis-
tinction; it can be contended that the statutes involved in those cases
are simply regulatory rather than punitive in nature. But the decisions
in question fail to rely on such a legitimate analysis, depending instead
on the false civil/criminal distinction. That distinction, at least in the
context of bill of attainder claims, was and is spurious.
The second branch of this false distinction, which hinges on
whether the statutory sanction being imposed is civil or criminal in na-
ture, initially seems difficult to refute. Exactions imposed by English
bills of attainder or bills of pains and penalties were always sanctions
imposed upon those Parliament adjudged to be guilty of crimes and
thus, in that sense, were criminal sanctions.325 Even in Lovett, Justice
Black was careful to point out that denial of future employment was a
sanction "only invoked for special types of odious and dangerous
crimes." 3" On closer inspection, however, this putative distinction col-
lapses. The very nature of a bill of attainder involves a legislative inflic-
tion of punishment and, as indicated, when a legislature exacts a
punitive sanction it does so because it has adjudged its victim to be
guilty of an offense meriting punishment, ie., guilty of a crime. This
crime may not necessarily be found on existing statute books.327 Thus,
in Lovett, while advocacy of the cause of Loyalist Spain, or participa-
tion in the Harry Bridges Defense Fund, or affiliation with the Wash-
ington Bookshop were not prohibited by law, the House of
Representatives, or at least a number of its members, apparently con-
324. 328 U.S. at 316. This language would also seem to dispose of the alternative way of
stating this first branch of the civil/criminal distinction. See note 292 supra.
325. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
326. 328 U.S. at 316.
327. Cf. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 323 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring,
joined by Reed J.), in which Justice Frankfurter points out that a bill of attainder may also
be an ex post facto law. This was true in Cummings and Garland, for example. See Exparte
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377-78 (1867); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,
325, 328 (1867).
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sidered those acts, when committed by one or more of the three persons
named in the rider to the appropriations bill, to be criminal acts merit-
ing punishment. 28 In this sense, any sanction imposed by a bill of at-
tainder is, by definition, a criminal sanction. For a court to ask whether
a statute imposes a criminal or civil sanction is, therefore, to posit the
wrong question. The proper question is whether the statute is punitive
or regulatory in nature.329
Apart from this argument, the second branch of the dichotomy
may be assailed on other grounds. In particular, there is the trouble-
some question of what criteria a court should utilize when determining
whether a sanction is criminal or civil. The United States Supreme
Court has stated that the severity of the penalty imposed is not a deci-
sive consideration in ascertaining whether or not a particular exaction
is punitive,33 ° so distinguishing between criminal and civil sanctions on
that basis is impermissible.331 Wilcox seems to suggest that if the chal-
328. See note 182 supra.
329. Cf. Punishment, supra note 14, at 244-46. The author of that commentary suggests
that in all bill of attainder cases the focus of a court should be on the legislature's purported
"intent to punish," not on the nature of the burden actually imposed.
330. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 616 n.9 (1960); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
96 n.18 (1958). But see French v. Senate of California, 146 Cal. 604, 611, 80 P. 1031, 1034
(1905) (no attainder if no "extinction of civil and political rights and capacities"); Hirsch-
man v. County of Los Angeles, 231 P.2d 140, 143 (App. Div. Super. Ct. 1951), aff'don other
grounds, 39 Cal. 2d 698, 249 P.2d 287 (1952) (stated that bill of attainder at common law
"did not merely cause a slight unpleasantness or inconvenience but m ithout a conviction by
a jury or a court, without indictment or accusation, without any legal evidence the property
of men and women were [sic] confiscated, they were driven from their homes, their furniture
was burned and their food destroyed. Sometimes they were permitted to live, scorned by
their fellows, driven to the forest or sent beyond the seas. It was a common occurrence that a
man who had incurred the hatred of the King or his henchmen wxould without trial be
hanged or quartered and drawn."); Moffett v. Commerce Trust Co., 354 Mo. 1098, 1104, 193
S.W.2d 588, 594 (1946), appeal dismissed, 329 U.S. 669 (1946) (said that statute involved
imposed only a money judgment, not a fine or imprisonment); State v. Graves, 352 Mo.
1102, 1114, 182 S.W.2d 46, 54 (1944) (with respect to attainder challenge to a statute provid-
ing that a defendant on trial in a criminal prosecution who testifies on his own behalf could
be impeached by proof of a prior conviction, stated that there was a "vast difference" be-
tween the severity of the statute in question and the one involved in Cummings). All these
decisions ignore the fact that bills of pains and penalties at common law imposed a wide
array of punishments, some quite stringent and some less so. See notes 8-11, 87 and accom-
panying text supra.
331. Other suggestions for distinguishing civil from criminal penalties are also un-
helpful. The United States Supreme Court has indicated that the label (or description) pro-
vided by the legislature in the text of the enactment itself is not decisive. United States v.
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294 (1935); United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931).
Other theorists have argued that if the statute contains two types of burdens, then one must
be civil, H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 50 (1945), or that if the statute
enriches no one person, it must be criminal, J. TURNER, KENNY's OLTTLINES OF CRIMINAL
LAW 538 (16th ed. 1952). Yet other attempts to draw distinctions have been embodied in
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lenged enactment imposes a sanction that may possibly be deemed civil
in nature, a bill of attainder challenge cannot prevail. The court in that
case concluded that because the $300 exaction in the Minnesota nui-
sance statute could be labelled a tax rather than a fine, no punishment
was involved.332 Similarly, in other cases it has been held that a statute
exacting treble costs for filing three successive defective pleadings333 or
a law revoking driving licenses for refusal to submit to chemical tests
after arrest on suspicion of driving while intoxicated 334 cannot be bills
of attainder because no criminal sanction is being imposed. While one
might not wish to argue with the results of these decisions,335 one can
take issue with the contentions advanced by these courts. The distinc-
tions they draw are simply irrelevant. Cummings teaches that the pro-
scriptions against bills of attainder cannot be avoided by drafting a
statute in any particular form.336 Justice Field noted that punishment
implied more than mere deprivations of life, liberty and property-the
types of sanctions that counsel for the state of Missouri contended were
associated traditionally with retribution for crimes.3 37 Punishment, he
said, could include disqualification from the pursuits of a lawful avoca-
tion or from a position of trust.338 In the context of the bill of attainder
doctrine, punishment is a very flexible concept encompassing a variety
of exactions. To permit the state to avoid the proscriptions against bills
of attainder by labelling a statutory sanction as civil rather than crimi-
nal is to permit what Justice Field condemned: the exaltation of form
over substance in order to evade a constitutional mandate.
b. Prospectivity and Retrospectivity
The second spurious distinction espoused by various state and fed-
eral courts is based on the proposition that bills of attainder can only be
overbroad maxims such as "criminal sanctions punish, civil sanctions compensate" or "if the
sanction is narrow-gauge, it's civil; if broad-gauge, it's criminal." As one commentator has
persuasively argued, all these formulations are simply inadequate. See Punishment, supra
note 14, at 275-81.
332. See note 307 and accompanying text supra.
333. Moffett v. Commerce Trust Co., 354 Mo. 1098, 1104, 193 S.W.2d 588, 594 (1946),
appeal dismissed, 329 U.S. 669 (1946).
334. Westmoreland v. Chapman, 268 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5, 74 Cal. Rptr. 363, 366 (1968).
335. It could be argued that the purpose of these statutes is regulatory, not punitive. For
a discussion of this distinction, see notes 525-590 and accompanying text infra.
336. See 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 325. See note 70 and accompanying text supra See also
Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445, 450 (D.D.C. 1952) (said constitutional prohibitions
against bills of attainder apply to both criminal and civil penalties, as long as they are im-
posed by enactments that meet all the other definitional requirements).
337. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 320.
338. Id. at 320-21.
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retrospective in nature. The modem origins of this distinction are usu-
ally traced339 to certain statements made by Justice Frankfurter in his
concurrence in United States v. Lovett.340 The operative language is as
follows:
All bills of attainder specify the offense for which the at-
tainted person was deemed guilty and for which the punishment
was imposed. There was always a declaration of guilt either of
the individual or the class to which he belonged. The offense
might be a pre-existing crime or an act made punishable expost
facto. Frequently a bill of attainder was thus doubly objectiona-
ble because of its expostfacto features. This is the historic expla-
nation for uniting the two mischiefs in one clause---"No Bill of
Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed." No one claims
that § 304 is an expostfacto law. If it is in substance a punish-
ment for acts deemed "subversive" (the statute, of course, makes
no such charge) for which no punishment had previously been
provided, it would clearly be expostfacto. Therefore if § 304 is a
bill of attainder it is also an expostfacto law. But if it is not an
expostfacto law, the reasons that establish that it is not are per-
suasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder. No offense is sped-
fled and no declaration of guilt is made.341
On the basis of these remarks, several commentators have credited Jus-
tice Frankfurter with developing the doctrine that deprivations im-
posed by bills of attainder can apply only to past acts.342 This
characterization of his beliefs is accurate but requires some amplifica-
tion.3 4 3 Justice Frankfurter based his analysis in Lovett on the premise
that the term "bill of attainder" was precisely defined at common
law.3 " Two elements of the definition he used were the recital of a
crime and the pronouncement of guilt;345 implicit in his formulation is
the assumption that at some prior point in time the victim of an attain-
der committed an act that the legislature found to be objectionable, to
which guilt was said to attach and for which a punishment was pre-
339. Wormuth, supra note 12, at 607; Needfor Clarfication, supra note 12, at 223; Wan-
ing Guarany, supra note 12, at 851.
340. 328 U.S. 303 (1946). See notes 180-198 and accompanying text supra.
341. Id. at 322-23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring, joined by Reed, J.).
342. See sources cited in note 339 supra.
343. It is accurate to say that he believed that bills of attainder were retrospective in
nature; but his remarks were confined to the facts of a single case. Thus, the doctrine of
retrospectivity was really developed by a later decision. See notes 349-355 and accompany-
ing text infra.
344. This is not exactly correct. Commentators disagree about the essential characteris-
tics of a bill of attainder at common law. See notes 14-15 and accompanying text supra.
345. See note 14 supra. For Justice Frankfurter's discussion of the essential characteris-
tics of a bill of attainder in the context of the legislative history of the rider involved in
Lovet, see note 196 and accompanying text supra.
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scribed. Thus, in Justice Frankfurter's view, a bill of attainder would,
as a practical matter, only be enacted in order to inflict penalties upon
a person for prior conduct which the legislating authority deemed pun-
ishable. The foregoing analysis is implicit in the language of the Lovett
concurrence; but it is a theory that must be extrapolated from remarks
that are carefully confined to the case at bar. Justice Frankfurter noted
that if the rider to the appropriations bill involved in Lovett were a bill
of attainder, then it must necessarily be ex post facto in nature, because
it would be criminalizing (ie., defining as punishable) previously non-
criminal conduct. His argument was that because no conduct was de-
clared to be a punishable offense, there was no ex post facto problem;
and if no offense was designated, then there must have been no prior
conduct to which guilt attached and for which sanctions could be im-
posed. Thus, in Justice Frankfurter's view, the petitioners were relying
on the wrong provision of the Constitution.3 6 The key feature of his
remarks is that the implied conclusion that bills of attainder apply only
to past conduct is dictated by his initial premises, premises that are
themselves based upon a precise schematization of the elements of a
bill of attainder at common law.
This rather rigorous logicality347 was not emulated by Chief Jus-
tice Vinson, who, at least in the context of analyzing the scope of the
constitutional proscriptions against bills of attainder, became Justice
Frankfurter's epigone.341 Four years after Lovett, the United States
Supreme Court was confronted with the case of American Communica-
tions Association v. Doud. 3 4 9 This suit350 involved a challenge to sub-
346. 328 U.S. at 326. See note 247 and accompanying text supra.
347. Justice Frankfurter's logic was rigorous. Nonetheless, it was also based on a false
premise concerning bills of attainder at common law. See notes 383-391 and accompanying
text infra.
348. See Wormuth, supra note 12, at 607; Needfor Clarification, supra note 12, at 223;
Waning Guaranty, supra note 12, at 851-52.
349. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
350. More accurately, two suits. The first, involving the American Communications As-
sociation, arose from a suit seeking to enjoin the National Labor Relations Board from
holding a representation election without permitting the association's name to appear on the
ballot, because of its noncompliance with section 9(h). A three-judge district court upheld
the constitutionality of the act. Douds v. American Communications Ass'n, 79 F. Supp. 563,
565 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). That court relied on a decision by another three-judge tribunal in
Washington D.C., which had held that section 9(h) inflicted no punishment, but merely
withheld a privilege "from one who cannot or will not meet the valid conditions on which it
is offered." National Maritime Union v. Herzog, 78 F. Supp. 146, 164 (D.D.C. 1948). The
second suit involved in Douds arose from an action by the National Labor Relations Board
postponing the effective date of a compulsory bargaining order pending union compliance
with section 9(h). Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1, 16 (1947). On appeal, two judges of a
three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that section 9(h) was
Summer 1978]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
section (h) of section nine of the Labor-Management and Relations Act
of 1947,351 which stipulated that no union was entitled to claim the
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board in mediating labor
disputes unless each officer of the union had filed or was filing with the
Board an affidavit stating "that he is not a member of the Communist
Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in, and
is not a member of or supports any organization that believes in or
teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by
any illegal or unconstitutional methods. 352 Congress had apparently
enacted this provision in order to prevent "political strikes" like the one
that had occurred at the Milwaukee facility of the Allis-Chalmers Man-
ufacturing Co. in 1941. Witnesses had testified that certain union of-
ficers who were also members of the Communist Party had instigated
that strike in the hope of starting a snowballing effect that would crip-
ple the national defense program.353
One of the objections raised against this provision of the Labor
Management Relations Act was that it constituted a bill of attainder in
violation of article one, section nine of the Constitution. Chief Justice
Vinson, speaking for a plurality of three,354 distinguished the Court's
not a bill of attainder. Inland Steel Co. v. N.L.R.B., 170 F.2d 247, 267 (7th Cir. 1948) (Ker-
ner, J., joined by Minton, J.). The third judge concluded that section 9(h) was void for
vagueness. Id. at 263 (Major, J., dissenting in part). After the decision in Douds, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the Herzog decision in a per curiam ruling. National Mari-
time Union v. Herzog, 334 U.S. 854 (1948).
351. 61 Stat. 146, 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (1947), replaced by 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1970). That
latter statute was held to be unconstitutional in United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
As a result, many judges have assumed that Brown overruled Doud., sub silentio. See note
920 and accompanying text infra.
352. 339 U.S. at 386. A false execution of the affidavit subjected a person to a criminal
prosecution under the federal criminal code. The affidavit in question bears some similarity
to a few of the provisions incorporated by reference in the oath involved in Cummings,
especially those provisions relating to membership in any organization "inimical to the gov-
ernment." See note 55 supra. The major difference is that the oath in the Missouri Constitu-
tion refers to the commission of stated acts in the past tense, while section 9(h) refers to the
commission of stated acts in the present tense. See note 56 supra. That distinction proved to
be decisive in the opinion of Chief Justice Vinson. See note 355 and accompanying text
infra.
353. 339 U.S. at 388. But see Wormuth, supra note 12, at 615 n.58.
354. Chief Justice Vinson was joined by Justices Reed and Burton. Justices Douglas,
Clark and Minton did not participate in this case. Of the remaining three justices, only one
dissented categorically. See id. at 445-53 (Black, J., dissenting). The other two dissented in
part. See id. at 415-22 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); id. at 422-
45 (Jackson, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Justice Black held that section
9(h) violated the First Amendment. -d. at 446. He did not really discuss the attainder issue.
Interestingly enough, Justice Frankfurter disagreed with the Chief Justice's attainder analy-
sis; but rather than discussing that subject, he indicated that some of the avowals contained
in the affidavit were phrased too broadly to be constitutional. Id. at 420-21. As for Justice
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prior rulings in Lovel, Cummings and Garland as follows:
the individuals involved were in fact being punished for past
actions, whereas in this case they are subject to possible loss of
position only because there is substantial ground for the congres-
sional judgment that their beliefs and loyalties will be trans-
formed into future conduct. Of course, the history of the past
conduct is the foundation for the judgment as to what the future
conduct is likely to be; but that does not alter the conclusion that
§ 9(h) is intended to prevent future action rather than to punish
past action.
This distinction is emphasized by the fact that members of
those groups identified in § 9(h) are free to serve as union officers
if at any time they renounce the allegiances which constituted a
bar to signing in the past. Past conduct, actual or threatened by
their previous adherence to affiliations and beliefs mentioned in
§ 9(h), is not a bar to resumption of the position. In the cases
relied upon by the unions on the other hand, this Court has em-
phasized that, since the basis of disqualification was past action
or loyalty, nothing that those persons proscribed by its terms
could ever do would change the result. . . . Here the intention is
to forestall future dangerous acts; there is no one who may not,
by a voluntary alteration of the loyalties which impel him to ac-
tion, become eligible to sign the affidavit. We cannot conclude
that this section is a bill of attainder.3"
Chief Justice Vinson's statements present a sharp contrast to those
of Justice Frankfurter in Lovett." 6 Unlike Justice Frankfurter, Chief
Justice Vinson presented no theoretical foundation upon which his ob-
servations may be based; it is not clear how he would define the term
"bill of attainder." In fact, his statements are assertions unsupported by
any citations to controlling case authority.357 More importantly, how-
ever, Chief Justice Vinson managed to obfuscate the true nature of sec-
tion 9(h). While the ultimate purpose of Congress in enacting this
provision may have been to prevent political strikes, the enactment ac-
complished that purpose by an indirect method. That method involved
an effective prohibition against Communists serving as union officers.
The statute thus is directed primarily at a course of action begun at
some point in the past and continued in the present.358 While Congress
Jackson, he claimed that Congress had the right to compel disclosure of membership in
subversive organizations. Id. at 435. But he said that the oath required by section 9(h) was
partially unconstitutional because it proscribed mere belief without more. Id. at 441-42. See
also Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 75 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by
Black, J.).
355. 339 U.S. at 413-14 (emphases in original).
356. See note 341 and accompanying text supra.
357. He did not even cite Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Lovett.
358. Of course, section 9(h) would also reach a course of action begun entirely in the
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may have deemed such a course of action to be a harbinger of future
conduct, this does not negate the fact that the statute is concerned with
continuing affiliations and advocacy insofar as it imposes deprivations
upon persons because of patterns of activity or belief begun before but
still continuing when they incurred a duty to file an affidavit with the
National Labor Relations Board. Chief Justice Vinson emphasized the
escapability feature of section 9(h), the fact if a Communist renounces
his allegiance to the Party and revises his beliefs so that he would be
able to execute truthfully the prescribed affidavit, then he would be
permitted to hold union office. This does distinguish section 9(h) from
the act of Congress and the provisions of the Missouri constitution in-
volved in Garland and Cummings, respectively: both were concerned
with past acts that become final and immutable as soon as they were
committed." 9 But the escapability feature of the provision challenged
in Douds only emphasizes the true nature of that provision. The deter-
rent aspect of section 9(h) was aimed at compelling a person to do a
certain act (renunciation of allegiance) before, not after, he executed
the affidavit. Thus, if a professed Communist signed the required affi-
davit, his offense would be complete and he could be prosecuted re-
gardless of any subsequent disavowals of his adherence to the tenets
espoused by the Party. Similarly, a person who had renounced his be-
liefs in Communism and then executed the affidavit (and thus repre-
sented truthfully his present state of mind), but subsequently recanted
his prior renunciation, would not fall within the literal terms of a stat-
ute requiring only an avowal of current belief (although the govern-
ment could certainly use his subsequent conduct as evidence of the fact
that the affidavit was executed falsely). Thus, in all cases, section 9(h)
focuses primarily on present affiliation and advocacy beginning at
some point in the past.
Consequently, Chief Justice Vinson's facile distinction between
past action and future conduct glosses over some genuine complexities.
He admitted that the history of past activities is a foundation for the
judgment as to what future conduct is likely to be, but this only ob-
scures the fact that it is past conduct (reflected in either present beliefs
or a current affiliation) that is the basis for imposing any disability. The
effect of Douds was thus to confuse hopelessly an already abstruse area
of the law; not only did the plurality decision advance the proposition
present, but such a factual possibility is relatively unimportant; one is unlikely to initiate the
forbidden affiliation or advocacy at the very same moment one executes the affidavit. On
the meaning of "affiliation" in section 9(h), see note 1072 infra.
359. See notes 55-56, 73, 75 supra.
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that bills of attainder could not be prospective in nature, but it also
blurred the line of demarcation between prospectivity and
retrospectivity.
Although Chief Justice Vinson's opinion represented the views of
only three justices,"' many state and federal courts have relied on the
dichotomy that he identified.36 But at least Chief Justice Vinson re-
quired a relatively close causal connection between that which the stat-
ute proscribed (the incumbency of Communists in union offices) and
that which Congress ultimately sought to prevent (political strikes).
Moreover, the latter factor had been rather narrowly defined by Con-
gress. 362 Later cases, however, turned on far flimsier showings of cau-
sality. Thus, in Albertson v. Millard,363 a federal district court upheld
360. See note 354 supra.
361. They did so in a variety of contexts. See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 87 (1961) (statute involving registration of Communist action orga-
nizations); Albertson v. Millard, 106 F. Supp. 635, 644-45 (E.D. Mich. 1952), vacated, 345
U.S. 242 (1953) (law for registering of Communists and denying them a place on the ballot
in state elections); Orange Coast Junior College Dist. v. St. John, 146 Cal. App. 2d 455, 461,
303 P.2d 1056, 1060 (1956) (provision of state's Dilworth Act exacting anti-Communist oath
from public school teachers); Board of Educ. v. Cooper, 136 Cal. App. 2d 513, 525-26, 289
P.2d 80, 81-82 (1955) (provision of Dilworth Act mandating dismissal of teachers refusing to
cooperate with legislative committees investigating subversion); Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md.
177, 195, 76 A.2d 332, 339-40 (1950), appeal dismissed, 340 U.S. 881 (1950) (state's Ober Act
requiring candidates for public office to file affidavits stating that they are not subversives);
Opinion of the Justices, 332 Mass. 785, 789, 127 N.E.2d 663, 666 (1955) (proposed statute
requiring dismissal of teachers who refuse to answer questions put to them by legislative
investigating committees regarding their Communist affiliations); Thorp v. Board of Trust-
ees, 6 N.J. 498, 516, 79 A.2d 462, 469 (1951) (statute exacting loyalty oath from public school
teachers); Peters v. New York City Housing Auth., 9 Misc. 2d 942, 950, 128 N.Y.S. 2d 224,
230-31 (1953), mod on other grounds, 283 App. Div. 801, 128 N.Y.S. 2d 712 (2d Dep't), rev'd
on other grounds, 307 N.Y. 519, 121 N.E.2d 529 (1954) (Gwinn Amendment to 1937 Federal
housing act providing that no unit constructed with government funds could be occupied by
one failing to file an affidavit certifying his non-affiliation with the Communist Party);
Weinstock v. Ladisky, 197 Misc. 859, 875, 98 N.Y.S.2d 85, 100-01 (1950) (amendment to
union constitution banning fascists and subversives); Dworken v. Collopy, 56 Ohio L. Abs.
513, 521, 91 N.E.2d 564, 570 (1950) (statute denying welfare benefits to subversives); Nos-
trand v. Balmer, 53 Wash. 2d 460, 476, 335 P.2d 10, 19 (1959) (state statute prohibiting
public employment of subversives); Huntamer v. Coe, 40 Wash. 2d 767, 773, 246 P.2d 489,
493 (1952) (statute requiring candidate for public office to file an affidavit stating that he is
not a subversive). But Sf Opinion to the House of Representatives, 80 R.I. 281, 285-86, 96
A.2d 623, 626 (1953) (advisory opinion citing Douds as support for the conclusion that a
proposed law, which would require the relatives (and their spouses) of either an elected
official (or his or her spouse) or the director of any municipal agency (or his or her spouse)
to be disqualified from holding any appointive municipal office during the elected term of
the official or the tenure of the director, was a bill of attainder).
362. See note 253 and accompanying text supra.
363. 106 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Mich. 1952), vacated on other grounds, 345 U.S. 242 (1953).
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the lower federal court for the purpose of
allowing state courts an opportunity to construe the challenged statute. Id. at 245.
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the constitutionality of the Michigan Trucks Act of 1952, which re-
quired that any person who remained within the state of Michigan for
five consecutive days and was a knowing member of a "Communist-
front organization" (as defined by the act) had to register with the state
police and that neither the name of the Communist Party nor the
names of its members could be printed on the ballot in state elec-
tions.3" Citing Douds, the court held:
The plaintiffs are subject to possible loss of opportunity to seek
election to public office only because there is substantial ground
that their beliefs and loyalties will be transformed into future
conduct. The history of past or present conduct may be the foun-
dation for judgment as to what that future conduct is likely to be.
The registration provisions are intended to prevent future action
rather than to punish past action.365
In Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities
Control Board,366 a challenge was raised against, inter alia, subsection
(a) of section fourteen of the Subversive Activities Control Act of
1950,367 which required the Party to register as a "Communist-action"
organization and file annual statements with the Board. Speaking on
behalf of himself and four colleagues, Justice Frankfurter stated with-
out any supporting citations that "[flar from attaching to the past and
ineradicable actions of an organization, the application of the registra-
tion section is made to turn upon continuingly contemporaneous fact;
its obligations arise only because, and endure only so long as, an organ-
ization presently conducts operations of a described character. 3 68
Thus, in Albertson, the district court was satisfied that the electoral re-
strictions were necessary because of the general tendency of Commu-
nists to translate their beliefs concerning world revolution into
action.369 In the Communist Party case, Justice Frankfurter specifically
364. 106 F. Supp. at 639. See 1952 Mich. Pub. Acts 117, §§ 4, 5. 7.
365. 106 F. Supp. at 644-45.
366. 367 U.S. 1 (1961). For a detailed accounting of the tangled history of this litigation,
see note 720 infra.
367. 50 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1970).
368. 367 U.S. at 87. Justice Frankfurter was joined by Justices Clark, Harlan, Stewart
and Whittaker. Justice Black dissented, finding an attainder. Id. at 146 (Black, J., dissent-
ing) (and at least one commentator would agree with him: see Bound_," of Specification, supra
note 45, at 361). Chief Justice Warren's dissent found a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 137 (Warren, CJ., dissenting). So did Justice Douglas. Id. at 190 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Brennan, joined by the Chief Justice, dissented in part, concluding also that
portions of the statute infringed the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 200-01 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting in part, joined by Warren, C.J.).
369. 106 F. Supp. at 642-43. The court found a "superabundance" of evidence that the
Communist Party was dedicated to violent overthrow of democracies. It cited, in particular,
testimony given in the case of Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), and the findings
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relied on the congressional findings that "the world Communist move-
ment [possessed a purpose] to employ deceit, secrecy, infiltration, and
sabotage as means to establish a Communist totalitarian dictatorship
... and utilize[d] action organizations" to effect that purpose.37 °
Whereas the nexus of causality in Douds was relatively well-defined, in
these two cases the future conduct feared by legislators amounted to
little more than broad, expansively-defined tendencies on the part of
certain political groups. While it is undoubtedly true that the govern-
ment "need not wait until the putsch is about to be executed,"'371 there
nevertheless appeared to be few practical and even fewer constitutional
limitations on the types of preventive legislation that would be upheld
by reliance on the dichotomy advanced in Douds. At least this was the
state of the law until the decision in United States v. Brown. 2
The more profound problem, however, is whether or not Chief
Justice Vinson's assertions in Douds were historically correct. Both
Cummings and Garland suggest that they were not. It is true, as Chief
Justice Vinson pointed out, that those cases involved the imposition of
sanctions for past acts. Justice Field reiterated this point on several oc-
casions, 373 but he never extrapolated any general theory concerning the
permissible scope of a bill of attainder from these observations. One
commentator has argued3 71 that the result in Douds was "diametrically
opposed" to the statement in Cummings that bills of attainder may in-
flict punishment absolutely or conditionally.375 But, as has been sug-
gested elsewhere,376 that language is not helpful because it refers only
to the mode of imposing sanctions, not to the temporal referents of the
conduct for which those sanctions are being imposed. There are, how-
ever, indications implicit in Cummings that favor a theory of prospec-
of a resolution adopted by the American Bar Association, which expelled its members who
were also affiliated with the Communist Party. 106 F. Supp. at 643. Rarely has the doctrine
of judicial notice been applied so creatively.
370. 367 U.S. at 83.
371. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951) (Vinson, C.J., for the Court).
372. 381 U.S. 437 (1965). See notes 898-945 and accompanying text infra.
373. See Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 376 (1867); Cummings v. Missouri, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 318, 327 (1867). See also Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889)
(Field, J., for the Court). But the oaths in Cummings and Garland also involved prospective
commitments. See notes 56, 73 supra. These promissory affirmations of loyalty were valid
in 1867, Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 376; Exparte Law, 15 F. Cas. 3, 10 (S.D. Ga.
1866) (No. 8,126), see note 75 supra, and are valid today, Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676,
679-80 (1972) (promissory oaths permissible as a condition to public employment so long as
they do not impinge upon protected speech or associational activities).
374. Waning Guaranty, supra note 12, at 852 n.58.
375. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 324 (1867).
376. Punishment, supra note 14, at 241.
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tive bills of attainder. Justice Field cites as authority for his discussion
of conditional punishment 7 the opinion of Judge Nicholas in Doe ex
dem. Gaines v. Buford.378 Another portion of Buford stated that bills of
attainder "have generally been applied to punish offenses already com-
mitted; but they have been and may be, applied to the punishment of
those thereafter to be committed, or for criminal omissions thereafter
incurring."37 9 Although Justice Field did not adopt this language of
Judge Nicholas,8 0 he did cite examples of bills of attainder at common
law in support of his analysis of the meaning of punishment. Thus, for
all its revolutionizing of the bill of attainder doctrine,38 1 Cummings
sanctioned reliance upon historical examples by courts confronting at-
tainder claims.38 2 With this in mind, it is easy to discern the error inher-
ent in Chief Justice Vinson's statements in Douds because some bills of
attainder in English history were prospective in nature. These bills im-
posed sanctions upon conduct occurring at some unspecified time in
the future. For example, language in section four of the bill against the
Jesuits, enacted in 1585 during the reign of Elizabeth I, provided:
And every Person which after the End of the same forty days,
and after such time of departure as is before limited and ap-
pointed, shall wittingly and willingly receive, relieve, comfort,
aid or maintain any such Jesuit ... knowing him to be a Jesuit
... shall also for such offence be adjudged a felon, without Ben-
efit of Clergy, and suffer Death, lose and forfeit, as in Case of
377. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 324 (1867).
378. 31 Ky. (I Dana) 481 (1833).
379. Id. at 510 (opinion of Nicholas, J.) (emphasis added). One commentator has ar-
gued that Buford is unreliable precedent because (1) only one of the two judges hearing the
case found a violation of the proscriptions against bills of attainder, (2) since the challenged
act required a forfeiture to the commonwealth of tracts of land exceeding one hundred acres
unless the proprietor made certain improvements thereon, alternative remedies like eject-
ment were unfeasible, see id. at 508, (3) Judge Nicholas was said to have deemed the statute
in question to be penal and (4) Judge Nicholas was said to have misconstrued the attainder
against the Earl of Clarendon, 19 Car. 2, c. 10; 3 STATS. U.K. 314 (1667), reprintedin Clar-
endon's Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 291, 391 (1667), as a prospective attainder, whereas in fact it
imposed only a conditional punishment. See Punishment, supra note 14, at 241-42 n.56. Ob-
jections (1) through (3) are irrelevant. But objection (4) is correct; yet while it is true that
Judge Nicholas did not cite any precedent in support of his generalization, such precedent
does exist. See notes 383-384 and accompanying text infra.
380. Although he did quote a statement appearing one sentence later. Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 324 (1867) (quoting Doe ex dem. Gaines v. Buford, 31 Ky.
(I Dana) 481, 510 (1833) (opinion of Nicholas, J.)).
381. See notes 82-91 and accompanying text supra.
382. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320-21, 323-24 (1867). Later deci-
sions have corroborated the thesis that the United States Supreme Court may utilize history
to explicate the meaning of the concept of punishment in the context of the bill of attainder
doctrine. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 473-74 (1977); United
States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441-42 (1965).
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one attainted of felony.383
This attainder is clearly prospective. While it is true that some act must
occur before the taint of felony can attach (and thus, in that very nar-
row sense, the deprivation is inflicted for a past act), the statute is di-
rected at a class of activity, which, by its terms, could not have taken
place at the date of its enactment. The focus of the language quoted is
exclusively prospective, not retrospective. In light of this and other ex-
amples, 38 4 Chief Justice Vinson's statements in Douds simply reflect an
unfamiliarity with English common law, which, according to
Cummings, may be relied upon, at least for the purpose of analyzing
the punishment component of a bill of attainder.
Nevertheless, at least one commentator has advanced a compara-
tively sophisticated defense of Douds.385 He suggests that if Cummings
and Buford label as an attainder a statute inflicting punishment condi-
tioned on future conduct upon the members of a "shifting" group (ie.,
one whose number is not fixed as of the time of the enactment of the
statute38 6), then these two cases would indeed be irreconcilable with
Douds.38 7 But he concludes that Cummings and Buford support a
much more limited proposition, namely that:
Attainder in the future is limited to stituations where persons are
named in a statute; the conduct for which they are being pun-
ished is actually past conduct. These named persons are given a
future choice to remove themselves from the classification, and
that choice is either illusory or one that has no relation to sub-
stantive policy. Any expansion of this statement comes from amisunderstanding or misconstruction of Cummins [sic] and
[Buford] and a refusal to recognize Douds .... 
3 88
The problem with this theory is that, like Douds, it ignores history. As
indicated, 8 9 Cummings relied on English history, which is replete39 °
with examples of attainders like section four of the act of 1585, quoted
previously. 391 That act describes no fixed class because there was no
way of determining who would render assistance to the Jesuits in the
future. The persons who would become affected by the law have com-
mitted no objectionable act prior to its passage, so they are not being
383. 27 Eliz., c. 2, § 4; 2 STATS. U.K. 633 (1585).
384. See note 34 supra.
385. See Punishment, supra note 14, at 239-41.
386. Id. at 239.
387. Id. at 241.
388. Id.
389. See note 382 and accompanying text supra.
390. See note 34 supra.
391. See note 383 and accompanying text supra.
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punished for past conduct. Moreover, the choice given such persons to
remove themselves from the statutory classification by declining know-
ingly to aid Jesuits is real, not illusory; no punishment will attach if
they refrain from acting. Under all criteria, then, section four of the act
of 1585 is an exclusively prospective attainder. It does, of course, con-
tradict the logic of Douds, but this contradiction only underscores the
fact that Douds, when interpreted in light of Cummings, was decided
incorrectly.392
c. Rights v. Privileges
The third and perhaps the most pernicious of these spurious dis-
tinctions is based on the putative dichotomy between rights and privi-
leges.393 The underlying theory may be summarized as follows: if a
person is only being deprived of a privilege granted by the state, then
that deprivation cannot constitute a punishment because the state is
entitled to grant or withhold privileges at its pleasure; consequently, if
no punishment is being inflicted, then, by definition, the challenged
enactment cannot be a bill of attainder. In the context of the prohibi-
tions contained in article one, sections nine and ten of the Constitution,
this theory has its greatest impact in three different areas: legislative
deprivations of the franchise, of positions of public employment and of
equal access to .state facilities and disbursements. Each one of these
subjects will be discussed in turn, followed by a brief overview of the
rights/privileges dichotomy in general as it relates to the bill of attain-
der doctrine.
392. Accord, Wormuth, supra note 12, at 607; Need/or Clarificaion, supra note 12, at
240; Bounds of Spec/fication, supra note 45, at 338; Waning Guaranty, supra note 12, at 851-
52. Cf. Davis, supra note 2, at 41 (criticizing Justice Frankfurter's Lovett concurrence by
noting that prospective attainders existed at common law).
393. A note on terminology is necessary. Perhaps the most functional method of distin-
guishing between rights and privileges is to consider the safeguards that must accompany
the curtailment of either of these classes of interests. It is recognized that a "right" is a
legally-protected interest that may be terminated only through due process of law whereas a
"privilege" is a residual category covering all interests that may be terminated without the
protections of a notice and a hearing. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 7.12 at
175 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS]; Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privi-
lege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1442 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Van Alstyne]. But at this point a caveat is required. Arguably, some of the decisions that
will be discussed in this section use the term "right" as a means of expressing a moral judg-
ment. Thus, when a court states that a petitioner has no "right" to a given item, it may
simply be indicating that, in the opinion of the presiding judge, it would be wrong to allow
the petitioner to succeed in staking a claim to some given res. See, e.g., Dworken v. Collopy,
56 Ohio L. Abs. 513, 524-28, 91 N.E.2d 564, 572-75 (1950). See notes 440-442 and accompa-
nying text infra. For a general discussion of this distinction and the confusion it can cause,
see R. DwoRKN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 188-92 (1977).
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(1) Voting
Both before and after the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court in Cummings and Garland, state tribunals had held that legisla-
tive deprivations of the franchise could not be bills of attainder.3 94 The
reason advanced for this conclusion was the theory that the so-called
"right to vote" was really no right at all, but rather a privilege, or, at
best, a "conventional" right3 95 that could be terminated at will by the
state. Quotations from a few of these cases betray their nineteenth-cen-
tury origins. In Blair v. Ridgely,396 for example, the Missouri Supreme
Court upheld the validity of the test oath for voters that had been in-
volved tangentially in Cummings397 by endorsing the view that:
The right to vote or to exercise the privilege of the elective
franchise is neither a natural, absolute, nor a vested right of
which a man cannot be deprived but by due process of law, but it
is purely a conventional right, and may be enlarged or restricted,
granted or withheld, at pleasure, with or without fault, for
outside of society, and disconnected with government, no person
either has or can exercise the elective franchise as a natural right,
and he only receives it upon entering the social compact, subject
to such qualifications as the state may prescribe.39
Similarly, in Shepherd v. Grimmett,399 the Idaho Supreme Court
394. See Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884); Shepherd v. Grimmett, 3 Ida.
403, 411-12, 31 P. 793, 796 (1892); Wooley v. Watkins, 2 Ida. 590, 602-03, 22 P. 102, 106
(1889); Boyd v. Mills, 53 Kan. 594, 604, 37 P. 16, 18 (1894); Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531,
624-25 (1865); Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 40, 123 (1867); Randolph v. Good, 3 W. Va. 551, 555
(1869). Contra, Burkett v. McCarty, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 758, 761 (1874); Green v. Shumway,
39 N.Y. 418, 425 (1868).
395. See, e.g., Washington v. State 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884) ("honorable privilege, and
not... a personal right or attribute of personal liberty"); Shepherd v. Grimmett, 3 Ida. 403,
411, 31 P. 793, 796 (1892) ("privilege conferred or withheld by the lawmaking power");
Wooley v. Watkins, 2 Ida. 590, 603, 22 P. 102, 106 (1889) (conventional right); Anderson v.
Baker, 23 Md. 531, 619 (1865) ("not one of the universal inalienable rights with which all
men are endowed by their Creator, but ... altogether conventional"); Blair v. Ridgely, 41
Mo. 40, 120 (1867) (conventional right); Ridley v. Sherbrook, 43 Tenn. (3 Coldwell) 569, 577
(1867) ("political privilege or grant, that may be extended or recalled, at the will of the
sovereign power"). As Anderson suggests, a "conventional right" means one conferred by
virtue of the social compact, rather than one of the rights a person has in the state of nature.
396. 41 Mo. 40 (1867).
397. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
398. This quotation is actually the text of a headnote to the Blair case, as printed in the
ninety-seventh volume of American Decisions. Blair v. Ridgely, 97 Am. Dec. 248 (1867).
That headnote is a pastiche of several separate statements made by the court within a span
of three pages of the original opinion. Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 40, 119-21 (1867). It should
be noted that the Blair case was eventually appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
where it was afflrmed by an equally divided group of justices in an unreported opinion. See
1 C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, at 616 (1971).
399. 3 Ida. 403, 31 P. 793 (1892).
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upheld the constitutionality of an anti-Mormon expurgatory oath that
required the voter to affirm that he had neither practiced nor advo-
cated the practice of polygamy. It distinguished this law from the en-
actments challenged in Cummings and Garland by noting that those
enactments foreclosed the capacity to practice certain professions and
that this capacity was deemed to be:
a natural right attaching to every man, both in a state of nature
and as a member of society, and as sacred and inviolable as the
right to till the soil, and in no sense similar to the right of suf-
frage, which we have seen is a privilege conferred or withheld by
the lawmaking power4
Are these distinctions legitimate? Cummings v. AfLissour, 401 as the
Idaho court noted, involved restrictions on specified professions. But
the provisions of the Missouri constitution creating these restrictions
incorporated by reference all the affirmations contained in another
provision exacting an oath from prospective voters.4 °2 Justice Field said
that the nature and scope of the affirmations themselves were too broad
to be relevant to the issue of one's fitness to engage in a specific avoca-
tion.4°3 The courts in Shepherd and Blair failed to demonstrate why
those recitals would be any more relevant to one's capacity to exercise
the franchise. But the issue of relevancy does not reach the larger prob-
lem of whether or not disenfranchisement is punishment. Yet here too
Cummings supplied some guidelines. Justice Field stated that "the dep-
rivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be
punishment, the circumstances attending and the causes of the depriva-
tion determining this fact."'  He then illustrated this proposition by
citing, inter alia, an English stature that disenfranchised those who
committed contempts against the king's title' ° and the provisions of
the French penal code that punish by suspending the right to vote.4°
The inference that arises from these statements is that deprivation of a
civil right is punishment and voting is a civil right. Thus, the logic of
Cummings dictates the conclusion that rights/privileges distinction has
no place in a discussion of legislative deprivations of the franchise. So
the attempt of the Idaho Supreme Court in Shepherd to distinguish
400. Id. at 411-12, 31 P. at 796.
401. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
402. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
403. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 319. See note 65 and accompanying text supra.
404. Id. at 320.
405. Id. at 321. See 1 Geo. 1, c. 13; 5 STATS. U.K. 30, 31 (1714). Of course, a number of
bills of pains and penalties at common law imposed the deprivation of disenfranchisement.
See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
406. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 321.
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Cummings was simply misinformed. A truer reading of the latter case
would compel the conclusion reached by the New York Court of Ap-
peals in Green v. Shumway,4 °7 which held that a law imposing a test
oath upon voters requiring them to deny service in or support for the
confederacy inflicted the loss "of a right guaranteed [to a citizen] by the
Constitution, and the laws of the land, and one of the most inestimable
and invaluable privileges of a free government."'4"S
Thus, Cummings should have silenced all doubts that suspension
of the franchise could be a punitive sanction within the meaning of the
definition of a bill of attainder. Yet Shepherd, for example, was de-
cided in 1892, a quarter century after Cummings. One way to explain
that decision and similar rulings is that they inadvertently (or con-
sciously) misconstrued the mandate of the earlier opinion by the
United States Supreme Court. But implicit in the decisions of courts
utilizing the rights/privileges distinction is a second thesis: the state has
an inherently plenary power to regulate the exercise of the franchise
and it could therefore deny the vote to those whom it considered to be
untrustworthy or undeserving, without any due process of law. A dic-
tum discussing the proscriptions against bills of attainder in an opinion
of the United States Supreme Court rendered after Cummings con-
firmed this broad conception of the regulatory power of the state.409
407. 39 N.Y. 418 (1868).
408. Id. at 421. Accord, Burkett v. McCarty, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 758, 761 (1874) (suffrage
is an "organic right being fundamental and above legislative power"). The Idaho Supreme
Court in Shepherd distinguished Green on the ground that the case was really decided on
the basis of the New York constitution. Shepherd v. Grimmett, 3 Ida. 403, 412, 31 P. 793,
796 (1892). It is true that the New York Court of Appeals relied partially on the state consti-
tution. See 39 N.Y. at 425-26. But it did so as an afterthought; its primary analysis was
based on Cummings and the federal Constitution. See id. at 423-25.
409. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 176 (1874). The case involved a chal-
lenge to the provision of the Missouri constitution, which excluded women from voting. The
Court said:
Women were excluded from suffrage in nearly all the States by the express provi-
sions of their constitutions and laws. If that had been equivalent to a bill of attain-
der, certainly its abrogation would not have been left to implication. Nothing less
than express language would have been employed to effect so radical a change.
The attitude of the Court during this period is perhaps best exemplified by Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). There the Court stated, "Though not regarded strictly as a
natural right, but as a privilege merely conceded by society according to its will, under
certain conditions, nevertheless [the franchise] is regarded as a fundamental political right,
because preservative of all rights." Id. at 370. This right was said to be subject to "reason-
able and uniform" regulations respecting the time and manner of its exercise, including the
establishment of qualifications for voters. Id. at 371. Yick Wo epitomizes the semantic con-
fusion surrounding the subject: in the same sentence it labels suffrage as a privilege that may
or may not ripen into a right, but wholly fails to explain that key qualifying phrase "under
certain conditions".
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Nevertheless, the modem view is unquestionably that the franchise is a
right, not a privilege;41 0 more importantly, it is a fundamental right so
that any legislative attempt to impinge upon it must undergo strict judi-
cial scrutiny.41' Thus, the distinctions drawn by cases like Blair and
Shepherd were invalid both at the time those cases were decided and
today.
(2) Public Employment
The second area in which the rights/privileges distinctions has
been utilized is legislative deprivations of positions of public employ-
ment. For a long time, courts have relied upon the notorious remark
made by Justice Holmes in the decision of McAuli/fe v. City of New
Bedford41 2 that a person may have a constitutional right to discuss
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman or other
public official. 413 The conventional wisdom was that no person had an
inherent claim to a position of public service and therefore, that such
positions could be meted out with whatever conditions the state might
410. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964). Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). See note 409
supra.
411. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143
(1972); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970).
412. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
413. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517. Justice Holmes added, "[t]here are few employments for
hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional right of free speech, as
well as of idleness, by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he
takes the employment on the terms which are offered him." Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517-18.
For a discussion of the evolution of Justice Holmes' views on this subiect, see Van Alstyne,
supra note 393, at 1458-64. The views of the United States Supreme Court on this subject
defy easy characterization; language can be found supporting entirelx contrasting philoso-
phies. Compare Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99, 108 (1890) ("in substance, a statute
under which one takes office, and which fixes the term of office at one year, or during good
behavior, is the same as one which adds to those provisions the declaration that the incum-
bent shall not be dismissed therefrom. Whatever the form of the statute, the officer under it
does not hold by contract. He enjoys a privilege revocable by the sovereignty at will and one
legislature cannot deprive its successor of the power of revocation.") with Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) ("The established doctrine is that this liberty [protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process] may not be interfered with,
under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or
without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect.
Determination by the legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of the police power is
not final or conclusive but is subject to supervision by the courts"; the decision reversed the
conviction of a schoolteacher who taught German to his pupils in violation of state law.)
Meyer might be distinguished from Crenshaw in that the former case involved a criminal
prosecution rather than administrative action. Yet the marked attitudinal discrepancy be-
tween the-two views of public employment expressed in these cases is really emblematic of
the Court's stance toward the rights/privileges distinction and public service. See notes 426-
435 and accompanying text infra.
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wish to attach. If the individual seeking public employment found
those conditions to be intolerable, he could simply locate a job
elsewhere.
The fullest illustration of this reasoning appears in the case of City
of Detroit v. Division 26 of the Amalgamated Association of Streetcar,
Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees ofAmerica,4 14 decided by
the Supreme Court of Michigan in 1952. In that suit, the city filed a bill
in equity to determine the constitutionality of the state's Hutchinson
Act415 and its applicability to employees of Detroit's municipal transit
system. The act specified that public employees were not allowed to
strike and those who did would automatically lose their jobs and forfeit
their pension and retirement benefits.416 The state supreme court held:
We know of no constitutional provision which gives an indi-
vidual the right to be employed in governmental service or to
continue therein. If there is no such right then there is no consti-
tutional inhibition of reasonable restrictions or limitations being
applied thereto, and such restrictions or limitations could not be
held to be in the nature of bills of attainder.
There is ample authority to the effect that public employ-
ment does not vest in such employees any fixed or permanent
rights of employment. As individuals or in groups public employ-
ees may discontinue their employment, but, having done so, such
public employees have no vested right to insist upon their reem-
ployment on terms or conditions agreeable to the employees, or
even without compliance with such conditions. To hold otherwise
would result in public agencies being powerless to render public
service and to effectively administer public affairs; and the public
would thereby be deprived of its right to efficient government.417
414. 332 Mich. 237, 51 N.W.2d 228 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 805 (1952).
415. MICH. STAT. A N. § 17.455(1)-(7) (1947).
416. 332 Mich. at 243-44, 51 N.W.2d at 231.
417. Id. at 252-53, 51 N.W.2d at 232-33. Cf. Gallas v. Sanchez, 48 Haw. 370, 373-75,
405 P.2d 772, 775-76 (1965) (upheld statute removing civil service status of incumbent per-
sonnel directors by saying petitioners held their jobs at the pleasure of the state commission,
so challenged enactment could not constitute punishment as long as it was reasonable);
Faxon v. School Comm., 331 Mass. 531, 538, 120 N.E.2d 772, 776 (1954) (followed analysis
of McAuliffe with the conclusion that there would be insurmountable difficulties "in consid-
ering the dismissal of a teacher for the good of the schools as a punishment of the teacher.");
Gaidamavice v. Nenaygo Bd. of County Rd. Comm'rs, 341 Mich. 280, 288, 67 N.W.2d 178,
182 (1954) (cited Detroit case at length); State ex rel. Wingate v. Woodson, 41 Mo. 227, 230
(1867) (incorporated by reference the logic of Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 40 (1867), with re-
spect to a challenge to a test oath exacted from candidates for public office); Exparte Strat-
ton, 1 W. Va. 304, 306 (1866) (upheld test oath for public officers against ex post facto
challenge, stating: "[n]o one having a natural or inalienable right to an office, it follows that
all who seek it must accept the office with all the restrictions and conditions imposed by
law"). But cf Commonwealth v. Jones, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 725, 746 (1874) (in striking down
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Implicit in this statement is the disturbing concept that the safeguards
of the Constitution have been exchanged by that class of persons
known as public employees in return for their jobs.418 If so, any in-
fringement of the rights of such employees could not constitute
punishment.
The Hutchinson Act might be defended on the theory (which was
mentioned by the court) that it is an essentially regulatory piece of leg-
islation enacted to ensure that public employees cannot deprive com-
munities of vital services. But the rights/privileges analysis has also
figured predominantly in other cases involving, for example, challenges
to a resolution by a county board of road commissioners dismissing an
employee after he had voted in favor of unionizing himself and his
coworkers, 4 19 or a decision by the Boston School Committee to dis-
charge a teacher who had exercised his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination in response to questioning by a congressional
committee concerning his alleged Communist affiliations.42 Thus, the
rights/privileges distinction was used by some courts in cases where it
would be rather difficult to characterize the challenged enactment as
being regulatory in nature.
Here again, a careful reading of Cummings suggests that the logic
of decisions like that of the Michigan Supreme Court in the Detroit
case was ill-advised. The provisions of the Missouri constitution at is-
sue in CummingS exacted an oath not only from private professionals
anti-duelling test oath as a bill of attainder, called tenure in public office a "valuable right");
State ex rel. Pittman v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570, 585-86 (1869) (in striking down a statute remov-
ing curators of St. Charles College who failed to execute a test oath, said reinstatement
would give the petitioners "no new rights only such as arise from peaceable possession,
claiming title and subject to any lawful proceeding to test that title.") See also Gray v.
McLendon, 134 Ga. 224, 253, 67 S.E. 859, 872-73 (1910) (upheld statute authorizing expul-
sion of officeholders against attainder challenge by finding it simply deprived one so ex-
pelled of the "right to hold the particular office" in the present).
418. This was probably a false proposition, even in 1952. See United Pub. Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947) ("Appellants urge that federal employees are protected by
the Bill of Rights and that Congress may not enact a regulation providing that no Republi-
can, Jew or Negro shall be appointed to federal office, or that no federal employees shall
attend mass or take any active part in missionary work. None would deny such limitations
on congressional power .. "); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923), see note
413 supra. It is certainly false today. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,
233-35 (1977); City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 (1976); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 357-59 (1976); Epper-
son v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1966).
419. Gaidamavice v. Nenaygo Bd. of County Rd. Comm'rs, 341 Mich. 280, 288, 67
N.W.2d 178, 182 (1954).
420. Faxon v. School Comm., 331 Mass. 531, 538, 120 N.E.2d 772, 776 (1954).
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but also from persons "holding any office of honor, trust, or profit,
under the constitution or laws thereof, or under any municipal corpora-
tion. .... ,,421 Thus, the challenged provisions also reached public em-
ployees. As Justice Field emphasized:
all men have certain inalienable rights-that among these are
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and that in the pursuit
of happiness all avocations, all honors, all positions, are alike
open to everyone, and that in the protection of these rights all are
equal before the law. Any deprivation or suspension of any of
these rights for past conduct is punishment, and can be in no
otherwise defined.422
Certainly there is no broader statement in any decision of the United
States Supreme Court to the effect that a position of public employ-
ment, once obtained, has the attributes of a right and may not be termi-
nated lightly or without regard for constitutional inhibitions. This
doctrine was re-emphasized in United States v. Lovett423 where Justice
Black held that "permanent proscription from any opportunity to serve
the Government is punishment, and of a most severe type."424 It might
be argued that Cummings and Lovett apply only where there is a per-
petual exclusion from governmental service and not in situations where
there is an exclusion that persists only if the victim of the enactment
fails to discard certain prohibited affiliations or revise certain forbid-
den beliefs.425 But the broad mandate of Cummings ("any deprivation
or suspension") belies any attempt to construct distinctions based upon
semantic niceties in this area.
Cummings and Lovett should have taught courts once and for all
that deprivation of a position of public employment can constitute pun-
ishment as that term is used in the context of a definition of a bill of
attainder. But as can be seen, the Detroit case was decided six years
after Lovett and reached an entirely different conclusion. The problem
is that key decisions rendered by the federal courts in the 1950's ad-
vanced theories inconsistent not only with Lovett and Cummings, but
with each other. Thus, in Bailey v. Richardson,426 the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the discharge by
421. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 281.
422. Id. at 321-22.
423. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
424. Id. at 316.
425. A good example would be the type of oath involved in American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), which was phrased entirely in the present tense. See
note 352 and accompanying text supra.
426. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), afjdper curiam by an equally divided court, 341 U.S.
918 (1951).
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a Loyalty Review Board of a training officer from the United States
Employment Service on the theory that:
To hold office at the will of a superior and to be removable there-
from only by constitutional due process of law are opposite and
inherently conflicting ideas. Due process of law is not applicable
unless one is being deprived of something to which he has a right.
Constitutionally, the criterion for retention or removal of
subordinate employees is the confidence of superior executive of-
ficials. Confidence is not controllable by process.427
Similarly, in Adler v. Board of Education,42s the United States Supreme
Court found the Feinberg law429 to be constitutional. Justice Minton,
speaking for the majority, said that the imposition of conditions on the
privilege of public employment was permissible and if such an em-
ployee disliked the restrictions, then he would be:
at liberty to retain his beliefs and associations and go elsewhere
.... If... a person is found to be unfit and is disqualified from
employment in the public school system because of membership
in a listed organization he is not thereby denied the right of free
speech and assembly. His freedom of choice between member-
ship in the organization and employment in the school system
might be limited, but not his freedom of speech and assembly
except in the remote sense that limitation is inherent in any
choice.43 °
Yet the same year, the Court, in Wieman v. Ufpdergraf 431 held uncon-
stitutional an Oklahoma statute exacting an expurgatory oath from
public officials that proscribed mere membership in a subversive or-
ganization without any showing of scienter.432 Justice Frankfurter's
majority opinion noted that
"to draw. . . the facile generalization that there is no constitu-
tionally protected right to public employment is to obscure the
issue . . . .We need not pause to consider whether an abstract
right to public employment exists. It is sufficient to say that con-
427. 182 F.2d at 58.
428. 342 U.S. 485 (1952). See note 199 supra.
429. See notes 200-204 and accompanying text supra.
430. 342 U.S. at 492-93.
431. 344 U.S. 183 (1952). The Oklahoma Supreme Court had held that the statute in
question was not a bill of attainder. Board of Regents v. Updegraff, 205 Okl. 301, 312, 237
P.2d 131, 138 (1951). In doing so, it relied on the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951). See notes 520-527 and ac-
companying text infra. But the Oklahoma court neglected to note that Garner specifically
left open the constitutionality of expurgatory oaths proscribing unknowing membership in
specified organizations. See id. at 723-24 n.*. It was this point upon which the Supreme
Court focused.
432. 344 U.S. at 191.
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stitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose ex-
clusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or
discriminatory."
433
Similarly, in Slochower v. Board of Higher Education,434 the Court
voided a municipal ordinance requiring dismissal of every New York
employee who exercised the privilege against self-incrimination to
avoid answering a question related to his official conduct by saying "to
state that a person does not have a constitutional right to government
employment is only to say that he must comply with reasonable, lawful,
and nondiscriminatory terms laid down by the proper authorities.
435
These decisions are symptomatic of the confusion that surrounded
the rights/privileges analysis. The court of appeals in Bailey, like the
Michigan Supreme Court in the Detroit case, endorsed the position
that a public employee has, ipsofacto, traded away his constitutional
due process protections. The Supreme Court in Adler offered the Del-
phic remark that any state enactment requiring a person to choose be-
tween either his job or his political affiliations is permissible because it
infringes liberty only to the extent that the act of choosing infringes
liberty. Yet Wieman describes the rights/privileges distinction en-
dorsed in Adler and Bailey as "facile" and condemns arbitrary depri-
vations, while Slochower proffers a paradox by equating the assertion
that one has no constitutional right to public employment with the as-
sertion that one indeed does have such a right and a rather broad one,
at that. In light of all this tortured logic, it is not surprising that the
Michigan Supreme Court in the Detroit case should place little
credence in the doctrines of Cummings and Lovett. Fortunately, how-
ever, decisions like Adler and Bailey are certifiable antiques.436 As Jus-
tice Blackmun said in a 1971 ruling, "this Court now has rejected the
concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental
benefit is characterized as a 'right' or a 'privilege.' ',437 Thus, whereas
Cummings and Lovett suggested that public employment might be a
433. Id. at 191-92.
434. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
435. Id. at 555.
436. The Supreme Court has since indicated that the basis of the holding in Bailey "has
been thoroughly undermined in recent years." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571
n.9 (1972). Similarly, the precedential value of Adler was undercut in a 1967 decision in-
volving the same statute. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). See note 199
supra.
437. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971). See note 455 and accompanying
text infra. Professor Davis dates the erosion of the rights/privileges doctrine in this area
from 1959. See DAvis, supra note 393, § 7.13 at 181 (citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
474, 496 (1959)).
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species of right rather than a privilege, the modem rule obviates the
necessity for even discussing such a distinction.
(3) Access to Facilities and Funds
The third area in which the rights/privileges distinction has had a
significant impact is the access to governmental facilities and disburse-
ments. Again, the underlying premise is that where the state makes
available an institutional service or a gratuity, it may specify the terms
on which individuals have access to that institution or gratuity with
impunity. This is because those individuals seek conferral of a privi-
lege, not a pre-ordained right; hence the imposition of restrictive terms
cannot be a source of punishment.
Two examples will suffice. In Pierce v. Carskadon,43s the West
Virginia Supreme Court held that an amendment to a statute, provid-
ing that a nonresident defendant in an attachment suit who suffers a
default judgment without having been present within the state could
reopen the judgment within one year only if he first executed an oath
denying that he had ever served, aided or voluntarily submitted to the
authority of the Confederacy, was not a bill of attainder because it af-
fected no "vested rights."43 9 Similarly, an Ohio trial court in Dworken
438. 4 W. Va. 234 (1870).
439. Id. at 248. Cf National Maritime Union of America v. Herzog, 78 F. Supp. 146,
164 (D.D.C. 1948), afjfd, 334 U.S. 854 (1950) (held statute denying the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board to unions whose officers failed to execute a prescribed ex-
purgatory oath was not an attainder because such jurisdiction was a privilege rightfully
withheld "from one who cannot or will not meet the valid conditions on which it is of-
fered"); Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293, 319 (1863) (upheld statute exacting test oath from
attorneys and suitors, stating: "[t]he right to practice law [and thus appear in state courts as
an attorney] is not an absolute right, derived from the law of nature. It is the mere creature
of the statute, and when the license is issued and the official oath taken, which authorizes the
attorney to exercise the right, it confers but a statutory privilege, subject to the control of the
Legislature"); Losier v. Sherman, 157 Kan. 153, 156, 139 P.2d 272, 273 (1943) (upheld stat-
ute providing that a judgment creditor who assigned his account against the debtor to a
collection agency would not be entitled to receive any of the amount recovered by that
agency in any subsequent garnishment proceeding undertaken pursuant to the statute, stat-
ing: "[t]he statute conferred a right on the creditor of which he could avail himself if he
observed its terms and conditions. The choice was his and it may not be said that the provi-
sion in question is in any sense a bill of attainder"); Exparte Quarrier & Fitzhugh, 4 W. Va.
210, 220 (1870) (validated attorney's test oath; found the privilege to practice (and thus ap-
pear as an attorney in West Virginian courts) could be revoked "and the more especially so
if the privilege, thus withdrawn, was originally granted and subsequently continued for the
public good. And the case is even stronger where the privilege in question was only granted
during good behavior, and only withdrawn as a precautionary measure, to guard the public
safety .. "); Exparte Hunter, 2 W. Va. 122, 144 (1867) (validated attorney's test oath on
the ground that "[i]t is the right of every citizen to appear in court by attorney, but it is not
the right of every citizen to appear in court as an attorney-at-law for another .... This is a
special privilege conferred on a few only-and the qualifications and fitness most carefully
[Vol. 5
Summer 1978] BILL OF ATTAINDER DOCTRINE
v. Collopy440 upheld a statute denying unemployment benefits to one
administratively determined to be either a subversive or a member of a
subversive organization on the theory that:
In the last analysis, unemployment compensation is a gratuity
furnished by the state, from a fund paid in by the employers and
to which the worker makes no contributions and the privilege to
participate therein has been made conditioned upon the recipient
not being engaged in efforts to destroy the very source from
which he seeks that gratuity."'
At least partly on the basis of this logic, an attainder challenge failed." 2
Here, too, courts were drawing improper distinctions. With respect
to access to state facilities, Cummings had stated, three years before the
decision of the West Virginia Supreme Court in Carskadon, that deny-
ing a person the opportunity to appear in state courts was a form of
punishment." 3 Thus, when the Carskadon case was appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, that Court overturned the state tribu-
nal's ruling in a two-sentence per curiam opinion characterizing the
challenged enactment as a bill of attainder and deeming it to be uncon-
situtional in light of Cummings and Garland.4' The denial of access to
state disbursements, however, is more troublesome. This is so because
guarded.") But cf Exparte Law, 15 F. Cas. 3, 10 (S.D. Ga. 1866) (No. 8,126). See note 75
supra. While cases like Cohen, Hunter and Quarrier seem to involve solely the regulation of
private professions, they in fact involve much more. The statutes in those cases disbar previ-
ousl)y qualfied professionals for past conduct, and by denying that class of persons access to
state courts, deprive them of their livelihood. Thus they are institutional access cases in as
crucial a sense as are cases like Carskadon. It should also be noted that the United States
Supreme Court had an opportunity to rule on the statute involved in Herzog in the case of
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). There, the Court stated
that the withholding of the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board could not be
treated "as if it merely withdraws a privilege." Id. at 390. This remark conflicts squarely
with the cited language in Herzog.
440. 56 Ohio L. Abs. 513, 91 N.E.2d 564 (1950).
441. Id. at 524, 91 N.E.2d at 872. See also State v. Hamilton, 92 Ohio App. 285, 287,
110 N.E.2d 37, 40 (1951) (cited Dworken with approval in case involving a challenge to the
same statute).
442. 56 Ohio L. Abs. at 524, 91 N.E.2d at 572.
443. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320 (1867). However, Justice Field
denominated this opportunity as a "privilege."
444. Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234, 239 (1872). As a result, the West Vir-
ginia courts promptly reversed themselves and invalidated test oaths imposed on litigants.
See Lynch v. Hoffman, 7 W. Va. 553, 556 (1874); Ross v. Jenkins, 7 W. Va. 284, 287 (1874);
Pierce v. Carskadon 6 W. Va. 383, 386 (1873); Kyle v. Jenkins, 6 W. Va. 371, 375-76 (1873).
Yet in another class of cases, where statutes immunized from suit persons who had commit-
ted tortious acts under the authority of military governments during the Civil War, the
United States Supreme Court concluded that the challenged enactments imposed no punish-
ment by denying certain potential plaintiffs the right to sue, but rather resembled, in effect,
an indemnity act. Drehman v. Stifle, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 595, 601 (1870). Accord, Clark v.
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of the case of lemming v. Nestor,"5 decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 1960. There, a resident alien who had emigrated
from Bulgaria to the United States in 1913 and remained in this coun-
try argued that subsection (n) of section 202 of the Social Security
Act" 6 was a bill of attainder. That section specified that a deportee
would no longer be eligible to receive social security old-age benefits.
The petitioner had begun receiving such benefits in November of 1955,
slightly more than a year after section 202(n) had been enacted. In July
of 1956, he was deported for having been a member of the Communist
Party from 1933 to 1939." A district court ruled that the challenged
enactment violated the Fifth Amendment" 8 but the Supreme Court re-
versed. Justice Harlan, writing for a five-member majority,4 4 9 con-
cluded that the statute could not be a bill of attainder because it was
regulatory, not punitive.450 Yet in the course of his discussion, he made
a point of noting that all the petitioner was deprived of was a "noncon-
tractual governmental benefit. '' 451 This language suggested that the
Court in 1960 might be willing to look at deprivation of social security
benefits only as a loss of something amounting to a privilege and thus
not serious enough to constitute punishment. But a decade later in
Goldberg v. Kel, 45' a case involving a state's withdrawal of welfare
Dick, 5 F. Cas. 865, 867 (D. Mo. 1870) (No. 2,818). Both decisions rejected bill of attainder
challenges.
445. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
446. 42 U.S.C. § 402(n) (1970).
447. 363 U.S. at 605.
448. Nestor v. Folsom, 169 F. Supp. 922, 934 (D.D.C. 1959).
449. Justice Harlan was joined by Justices Clark, Frankfurter, Stewart and Whittaker.
Two dissenters concluded that the statute was a bill of attainder. See 3o3 U.S. at 627 (Black,
J., dissenting); id. at 629 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The other two dissenters (joined by Justice
Douglas) deemed the challenged enactment to be unconstitutional as an ex post facto law.
Id. at 640 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J.).
450. 363 U.S. at 616-17.
451. Id. at 617. Cf Reyes v. Flemming, 287 F.2d 735, 736 (1st Cir. 1961) (challenge to
42 U.S.C. § 417(d)(2) (1970), which denies social security wage credits to survivors of
soldiers killed as a lawful punishment for military offenses committed during wartime);
Thompson v. Whittier, 185 F. Supp. 306, 312 (D.D.C. 1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 465
(1961), affid sub nom. Thompson v. Gleason, 317 F.2d 901, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (challenge
to 38 U.S.C. § 3504 (1970), which operated so as to curtail the veterans' disability benefits
paid to an honorable dischargee who had subsequently spoken out against the Korean War).
Both cases dismissed attainder challenges by citing Flemming v. Nestor. See also Simmons v.
United States, 120 F. Supp. 641, 649 (M.D. Pa. 1954) (dismissed attainder challenge to 38
U.S.C. § 711 (1970) (repealed 1972), former 38 U.S.C. § 812 (1940), denying recovery on
National Service Life Insurance policy where insured was executed for murder, held, no
forfeiture, only inherent limitation on risk assumed). But see Reich, The New Property, 73
YALE L.J. 733, 769 (1964) (criticizing Nestor). This critique proved to be influential. See
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970).
452. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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payments, the Court stated, "such benefits are a matter of statutory
entitlement for persons qualified to receive them. Their termination in-
volves state action that adjudicates important rights. The constitutional
challenge cannot be answered by an argument that public assistance
benefits are 'a "privilege" and not a "right." ' ,453 In light of this volte-
face, the cited language in Flemming is probably of questionable prec-
edential value.
(4) Some General Observations
Although the subject is not completely free of doubt,45 4 it is
probably accurate to assert that during the past fifteen years the
rights/privileges distinction became a defunct tenet of constitutional
law.455 Indeed, at least in the context of the bill of attainder doctrine,
this development was adumbrated over a century ago by the decision in
Cummings.
Although on several occasions in that opinion Justice Field re-
ferred to "civil and political rights," 45 6 at one point he implied that the
453. Id. at 262. But cf Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 321 (1977) (in rejecting an
age-based discrimination challenge to certain provisions of the Social Security Act, observed
that, under the logic of Flemming v. Nestor, old age benefit payments cannot be constitu-
tionally immunized against retroactive alteration).
454. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 353 n.4 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan suggests the majority in Bishop, by holding that a state may define unilaterally the
meaning of the term "property" in the context of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, has, in effect, resurrected the rights/privileges distinction, because a state may
now be able to create categories of interests not protected by any constitutional guarantees.
See also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 216, (1976) (stating that well-behaved prisoner
has no due process right entitling him to avoid being transferred to a prison where condi-
tions are less favorable absent some state law conferring such a right).
455. This point has been emphasized in various contexts. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 571 n.9 (1972) (dismissal from a position of public employment); Graham v. Rich-
ardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) (denial of welfare benefits to aliens); Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (revocation of driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262
(1970) (general withdrawal of welfare benefits); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6
(1969) (imposition of residency requirements for those seeking to receive welfare payments);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1963) (denial of unemployment benefits). See
generally Van Alstyne, supra note 393, at 1445-58. He points out four distinct concepts that
have contributed to the erosion of the rights/privileges distinction: the doctrine of unconsti-
tutional conditions, the rule of "indirect unconstitutional effect," procedural due process and
the bill of attainder doctrine itself. In support of this assertion regarding the effect of the bill
of attainder doctrine on the rights/privileges distinction, Van Alstyne cites primarily United
States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). See notes 730-766 and accompanying text infra. But,
as a matter of fact, the Court in Brown never even discussed this distinction and the cases
cited above do not derive from Brown any teaching on this point. Thus, it is probably more
accurate to say that the erosion of the rights/privileges distinction was a phenomenon that
occurred independently from the judicial development of the bill of attainder doctrine dur-
ing the past three decades.
456. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 321, 322-34, 325 (1867).
Summer 1978] BILL OF ATTAINDER DOCTRINE
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
challenged provisions of the Missouri constitution were objectionable
because they inflicted punishment by depriving persons "of some of the
rights and privileges of the citizen." '457 An inference that may be drawn
both from this statement and from the general analysis undertaken in
Cummings is that the concept of punishment in no way depends upon
the label attached to that which a person is being deprived of; thus, it is
arguable that the term "rights," as used by Justice Field, was meant to
encompass privileges as well.
Rarely have courts attempted to give extended consideration to the
term "civil and political rights" as that term is employed in Cummings.
There are two interesting exceptions. The first is the case of Davis v.
Berry.4 58 In that suit, a challenge was raised against an Iowa statute
authorizing vasectomies on "idiots, feeble-minded, drunkards, drug
fiends, epileptics, syphilitics, moral and sexual perverts [and made such
surgery] mandatory as to criminals who have been twice convicted of a
felony. ' 459 The petitioner had received two separate sentences for fel-
ony convictions, the first occurring in another state before the passage
of the statute." ° The federal district court held:
One of the rights of every man of sound mind is to enter into the
marriage relation. Such is one of his civil rights, and deprivation
or suspension of any civil right for past conduct is punishment for
such conduct, and this fulfills the definition of a bill of attainder,
because a bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts pun-
ishment without a jury trial. ...
457. Id. at 320.
458. 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914), vacated on other grounds, 242 U.S. 468 (1917). The
Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court by relying on an opinion of Iowa's
attorney general stating that the challenged enactment could apply only against persons who
had committed two felonies after the passage of the law. Therefore, the Iowa statute could
not affect the petitioner, who had committed only one felony since the date of passage. As a
result, the lower court's ruling was vacated as moot. Id. at 470.
459. 216 F. at 414.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 419. Davis was an advanced decision for its time. In 1927, the United States
Supreme Court held that a state had the authority to perform a salpingectomy upon a fee-
ble-minded inmate of one of its mental institutions. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court,
remarked that "[t]he principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to
cover the cutting of the Fallopian tubes." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). In a later
litigation, a plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Ster-
ilization Act, which provided for the vasectomy of one convicted of larceny on three differ-
ent occasions. The state supreme court dismissed a bill of attainder challenge. Skinner v.
State ex rel. Williamson, 189 Okla. 235, 237, 115 P.2d 123, 126 (1941). The court reached
this conclusion by claiming that the act had a eugenic, rather than a punitive, purpose. On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court found that the statute violated the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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The second exception is Steinberg v. United States.462 That case
involved a statute cutting off the annuity of any retired federal em-
ployee who, on the ground of self-incrimination, refused either to tes-
tify or to produce records when ordered to do so by a court, a grand
jury or a legislative investigating committee seeking to make inquiries
concerning his former governmental service.4 63 The plaintiff, an Inter-
nal Revenue Service agent, had retired in 1951; in 1954, he exercised
his privilege against self-incrimination in response to a subpoena issued
by a federal grand jury in New York. He was subsequently indicted but
was eventually found not guilty of all offenses charged. In August of
1955, the plaintiffs retirement annuity was suspended and that suspen-
sion later was made permanent. 464 A plurality of judges on the Court of
Claims465 held:
Notwithstanding that plaintiff had no vested or contractual right
to his annuity, we believe that Congress in prescribing a punish-
ment for persons who exercised a constitutional right has acted
beyond the scope of the Constitution. Congress may repeal laws
which it has passed but Congress even with Presidential approval
cannot repeal a constitutional provision, nor exact a penalty as a
condition to the exercise of a constitutional privilege.466
On this theory, the plurality deemed the statute in question to be a bill
of pains and penalties.' 7
These cases are interesting because of the expansive readings they
give to the term "civil and political rights" used in Cummings. Thus
Davis, decided in 1914, found a civil right of procreation protected by
462. 163 F. Supp. 590 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
463. Id. at 590. See 5 U.S.C. § 740(d) (1954).
464. 163 F. Supp. at 590-91.
465. The primary opinion was written by Judge Laramore and concurred in by Judge
Littleton. Chief Judge Jones concurred separately in the result. Id. at 592-94 (Jones, C.J.,
concurring). He concluded that the plaintiff had a vested right to his annuity. Id. at 593.
Therefore, Congress could not extinguish that obligation; but the chief judge stated that he
was uncertain whether the act in question was an unlawful exercise of legislative power
because he was unsure whether or not the act was merely a restriction on appropriation or
an attempt to destroy a vested right, and therefore he elected not to pass on its constitution-
ality. Id. at 594. Judge Whittaker also concurred separately. Id. at 594-97 (Whittaker, J.,
concurring). He also believed that the plaintiff had a vested right to an annuity because that
annuity was, in effect, deferred compensation for services rendered. Id. at 594. Therefore, he
concluded that Congress had effected an attempted disvestiture of that right without due
process of law. Id. at 596. Alternatively, he believed that penalizing the exercise of a consti-
tutional right was "an unjust, an arbitrary, and an unreasonable discrimination" against the
plaintiff. Id. Only Judge Madden dissented, he characterized the decision of Congress em-
bodied in the challenged enactment as "eminently fair and sensible." Id. at 598 (Madden, J.,
dissenting).
466. 163 F. Supp. at 592.
467. Id.
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the bill of attainder clause nine years before the United States Supreme
Court was to intimate that such an interest exists.4 6S In Steinberg, the
plurality admitted there was no right to any retirement annuity but said
the concept of punishment encompassed all penalties placed upon the
exercise of freedoms granted by the bill of rights. It remains to be seen
whether future courts will be willing to adopt seriously such expansive
readings of the proscriptions against bills of attainder. To date, no
court has attempted to offer a broad-guaged definition of the term
"civil and political rights" used in Cummings. Nor has the "incorpora-
tionist" theory of Steinberg been explored or developed, perhaps be-
cause many enactments might legitimately be questioned under such
an approach. But these decisions do point in new directions; they do
suggest ways of defining the punishment component of a bill of attain-
der that merit further examination by the judiciary.
If it is true that the rights/privileges distinction is moribund, what
remains? An answer was provided by the United States Supreme Court
in Board of Regents v. Roth.4 69 Justice Stewart's majority opinion in
that case suggested that with the abandonment of reliance upon the
rights/privileges dichotomy, the inquiry shifted to whether a person
can claim the infringement of either a liberty or a property interest.470
The former was said to include both a variety of personal freedoms47
and also one's interest in one's reputation;472 the latter was said to cover
468. While this Court has not attempted to defte with exactness the liberty...
guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], the term has received much con-
sideration and some of the included things have been definitelv stated. Without
doubt it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to ac-
quire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to wor-
ship God according to the dictates of his conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized. . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). See also Bjerkan v. United States, 529 F.2d
125, 128 (7th Cir. 1975). The appellate court in this case cited Cummings for the proposition
that any deprivation of a person's basic civil rights by a state because of a federal conviction
that was the subject of a subsequent presidential pardon would constitute both punishment
and an infringement of the pardoning power. Among the rights enumerated by the court
were those of the franchise, jury service and the opportunity to work in certain professions.
469. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
470. Id. at 571.
471. Id. at 572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). See note 468
supra.
472. 408 U.S. at 573 (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)).
But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (held, at least for the purposes of a suit
lodged under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), that reputation alone, apart from some tangible inter-
est like employment, is not such an interest that its deprivation will invoke the safeguards of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). For an analysis of Paul and a compi-
lation of lower federal court decisions construing it, see Lehmann, Bi'ens and Its Progeny:
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all interests in benefits where one can allege a "legitimate claim of
entitlement.
473
This type of analysis is exemplified by the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the case of Muzquiz v.
City of San Antonio.47 4 In that suit, former municipal firemen and po-
licemen challenged the constitutionality of a pension fund program cre-
ated by the city pursuant to guidelines set forth in a state statute.475 The
fund offered death or disability benefits to policemen and firemen (or
their families) killed or injured in the line of duty; it also provided re-
tirement benefits to those who had been employed by the city long
enough to become eligible. If an employee quit before becoming eligi-
ble, he received no refunds for the amounts already contributed. It was
this last feature that was attacked as a bill of attainder. The court ad-
mitted that the rights/privileges doctrine had been thoroughly discred-
ited.476 But it characterized the pension plan as follows:
While the plaintiffs contributed to the pension fund, they in re-
turn received protection in the event of death or disability far in
excess of their contributions. This protection continued so long as
they remained employed as firemen or policemen. They thus en-
joyed the benefits of their contributions during their term of em-
ployment, and no other compensation is due them.477
In light of this conclusion, the court was subsequently able to dismiss
the bill of attainder challenge on the theory that the plaintiffs were not
punished because they suffered no deprivation of property to which
they had a legitimate claim.47 8 From the perspective of the plaintiff, the
property-entitlement approach probably seems as fruitless as the for-
mer rights/privileges analysis; under the newer technique the Muzquiz
court, for instance, still accorded the bill of attainder challenge only the
briefest of considerations. But the newer approach is decidedly better
because it requires courts to examine what the plaintiff claims he is
being deprived of and his interest in that item and thereby precludes
them from substituting the invocation of labels for the task of legal
The Scope f a Constitutional Cause ofActionfor Torts Committed by Government Offcials, 4
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 531, 600-03 & n.488 (1977).
473. 408 U.S. at 577. See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 (1975); Arnett v. Ken-
nedy, 416 U.S. 134, 165-67 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part, joined by Blackmun, J.).
474. 520 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. f975).
475. Id. at 995-96. See TEX. CIV. CODE ANN. § 6243f (1971).
476. 520 F.2d at 1001.
477. Id.
478. Id. at 1002. Cf. Goodin v. Clinchfield R. Co., 125 F. Supp. 441, 449 (E.D. Tenn.
1954) affrd, 229 F.2d 578 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 953 (1956). See note 160 supra.
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reasoning. To that extent, the liberty/property analysis is an improve-
ment, although admittedly not necessarily much of an improvement.
d. Punishment Per Se
This subsection, unlike the three previous ones, does not deal with
judicial efforts to draw false distinctions. Rather it is concerned with
various decisions that have ruled that a particular sanction is not intrin-
sically penal. These cases rejected attainder challenges by advancing a
negative definition of punishment, by holding that a given deprivation,
by its very nature, can never be punitive. This approach has been uti-
lized most prominently in cases involving attainder challenges in which
the plaintiff is a resident alien and the sanction sought to be imposed is
deportation. The United States Supreme Court has said repeatedly that
deportation of an alien, unlike banishment of a citizen, is not punish-
ment.479 Although some decisions of the Court have admitted that de-
portation of an alien may, on occasion, be the effective equivalent of
exiling a citizen,480 the prevailing view is that expressed by Justice
Frankfurter in Galvan v. Press.48' He concluded that a statute precrib-
ing deportation for membership in the Communist Party48 2 was not an
ex post facto law as applied to one who had terminated his membership
in the Party four years before the enactment of the statute:
In light of the expansion of the concept of substantive due proc-
ess as a limitation upon all powers of Congress, even the war
power,. . . much could be said for the view, were we writing on
a clean slate, that the Due Process Clause qualifies the scope of
political discretion heretofore recognized as belonging to Con-
gress in regulating the entry and deportation of aliens. And since
the intrinsic consequences of deportation are so close to punish-
ment for crime, it might fairly be said also that the expostfacto
479. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 616 (1960); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S.
522, 530-31 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96 (1952); Carlson v. Lan-
don, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924); Bugajewitz v. Adams,
228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913); Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227. 242 (1912); Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 709 (1893). Most commentators conclude that the dis-
tinction between banishment and deportation is ill-advised and argue that the latter sanction
is indeed punishment. See Needfor Clarification, supra note 12, at 241; Bounds of Specfica-
lion, supra note 45, at 356-57; Note, SpecialLegislation Discriminating Against Spec//led Indi-
viduals and Groups, 51 YALE L.J. 1358, 1363-64 (1942).
480. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966);
Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 642-43 (1954); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954);
Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948); Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391
(1947); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945).
481. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
482. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6)(c) (1970).
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Clause, even though applicable only to punitive legislation,
should be applied to deportation ...
But the slate is not clean. As to the extent of the power of
Congress under review, there is not merely a "page of his-
tory,". . . but a whole volume. Policies pertaining to the entry of
aliens and their right to remain here are peculiarly concerned
with the political conduct of government. In the enforcement of
these policies, the Executive Branch of the Government must re-
spect the procedural safeguards of due process. But that the for-
mulation of these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has
become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial
tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government. And
whatever might have been said at an earlier date for applying the
expostfacto Clause, it has been the unbroken rule of this court
that it has no application to deportation.483
Relying on this logic, numerous courts have held that provisions of
the immigration and nationality laws imposing the sanction of deporta-
tion for specified acts cannot, by definition, be bills of attainder be-
cause deportation is not punishment.484 An illuminating example of
this logic is presented by the decision in the case of In re Yung Sing
Hee.4s5 That case involved a challenge to an act of Congress passed in
1884 amending an 1882 statute; the combined effect of both laws was
that if any "Chinese laborer" residing in the United States left the
country for any reason, he or she would be perpetually barred from
483. 347 U.S. at 530-31 (citations omitted).
484. See MacKay v. McAlexander, 268 F.2d 35, 37 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 961 (1960) (challenge to 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6) (1970), authorizing deportation of any
alien who is or was a member of the Communist Party); Ocon v. Guercio, 237 F.2d 177, 180
(9th Cir. 1956) (same statute as in MacKay); United States v. Heikkinen, 221 F.2d 890, 893
(7th Cir. 1955) (Major, J., joined by Shnackenberg, J.), aft'd, 240 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1957),
rev'd on other grounds, 355 U.S. 273 (1958) (same statute as in MacKay); Quattrone v. Nic-
oils, 210 F.2d 513, 519 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 976 (1954) (challenge to 8 U.S.C. §
1182 (1970), authorizing deportation of any alien who advocates, or is a member of an or-
ganization which advocates forcible overthrow of the government); Fougherouse v. Brown-
ell, 163 F. Supp. 580, 588 (D. Ore. 1958) (same statute as in MacKay); Niukkanen v. Boyd,
148 F. Supp. 106, 107 (D. Ore. 1956), aIj'd, 241 F.2d 938, 938 (9th Cir. 1957), aff'd, 265 F.2d
825, 827 (9th Cir. 1958) (same statute as in MacKay). But see Jimenez v. Barber, 226 F.2d
449, 451 (9th Cir. 1955), affid, 235 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 903 (1957)
(challenge to ruling that the petitioner was not eligible to be considered for a suspension of
deportation pursuant to the predecessor of 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1970); said in dictum: "Likewise
the scope of the bill of attainder clause is unclear as applied to the taking away of a right or
privilege because of beliefs, memberships or associations."); Sentner v. Colarelli, 145 F.
Supp. 569, 578 (E.D. Mo. 1956), affd without considering thepoint sub nom. Barton v. Sent-
ner, 353 U.S. 963 (1957) (said in dictum that attainder proscription might apply to the terms
of an order of supervision issued against one appealing a pending deportation order, see
notes 151-155 and accompanying text supra).
485. 36 F. 437 (C.C.D. Ore. 1888).
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ever returning.486 The petitioner was the daughter of a merchant; she
had been born in San Francisco in 1863. In 1880, her parents returned
to China; she accompanied them, but apparently always intended to
return to the United States. On the last phase of her return voyage, she
chartered passage on a steamer travelling from Vancouver, British Co-
lumbia, to Portland, Oregon. However, when the vessel arrived in Port-
land, she was denied the opportunity to disembark on the theory that
the Chinese exclusion acts of 1882 and 1884 applied to her. 87 The fed-
eral district court found that she was an American citizen of Chinese
descent.488 It doubted whether she was a "laborer," but concluded that
if she were neither a citizen nor a laborer, the state could rightfully
deny her the right to land unless she could produce a certificate issued
by her own government confirming her identity and occupation.489
Thus, it was said that only insofar as the acts of Congress were in-
tended to apply to citizens, they were bills of pains and penalties, be-
cause they inflicted the sanction of banishment without any judicial
trial.4 90 Implicit in this assertion was the premise that if, for instance,
the petitioner had been an alien living in the United States for seven-
teen years, then the government could rightfully deny her the opportu-
nity to disembark.
It is difficult to ascertain why federal courts have concluded that
deportation of an alien cannot be punishment. At least five possible
rationales for this conclusion may be advanced. First, it may be argued
that deportation is not a punitive sanction because Congress has ple-
nary power49' to regulate the entry of aliens into and exclusion of
aliens from this country and, therefore, that this power is not con-
strained by other constitutional limitations, such as the proscription
against bills of attainder in article one, section nine. Secondly, one
might contend that whereas banishment is directed against citizens, de-
portation is directed against aliens and the latter class of persons is sim-
ply not entitled to rely on constitutional protections like the bill of
attainder clause. A third argument might be that whereas banishment
of a citizen abridges a right to reside within this country, deportation of
an alien abridges only a privilege of residency which the deporting
country may revoke at will. Fourth, one could contend that deportation
486. See id. at 438-39. See 22 Stat. 58 (1882), amended by 23 Stat. 118, § 15 (1884).
487. 36 F. at 438.
488. Id.
489. Id. at 439.
490. Id.
491. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, saying Congress has power "to establish an uni-
form rule of naturalization."
[Vol. 5
Summer 1978] BILL OF AITAINDER DOCTRINE
is not punishment because it imposes only a civil rather than a criminal
sanction. Finally, it might be argued that deportation, by its very na-
ture, cannot be classified as punishment.
Rationales three and four, based, respectively, on the
rights/privileges and criminal/civil distinctions, may be dismissed out
of hand. Both are grounded on false distinctions which have been thor-
oughly discarded by modem decisions.492 The first rationale, founded
on the broad nature of congressional power to regulate immigration
and naturalization, is inaccurate because it overstates the issue. Justice
Frankfurter in Galvan493 stated unequivocally that although regulation
of aliens is "peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of govern-
ment," the executive branch is nevertheless constrained by "the proce-
dural safeguards of due process." Since the bill of attainder doctrine is,
in part, justified by considerations of procedural due process, 4 94 it
would be incorrect to presume that it does not restrict the manner in
which the regulations governing entry and exclusion of aliens are ad-
ministered.495 The second rationale, that aliens as a class cannot rely on
the safeguards provided by the bill of attainder clause, might seem to
be superficially plausible. Certainly the key distinction between banish-
ment and deportation is not the severity of the penalty; being excluded
from the country can be as traumatic an experience for an alien as it
would be for a native-born citizen. The major difference between ban-
ishment and deportation is actually the legal status of the victim, sug-
gesting implicitly that non-citizens, as a class, may not invoke the
constitutional proscription against bills of attainder in order to invali-
date legislation directed against them. But this, too, overstates the case.
If Congress passed a law that all aliens joining the Communist Party
should be summarily executed or that all aliens expressing dissatisfac-
tion over the government's immigration policies should be imprisoned
without trial, there would seem to be little doubt that these enactments
492. For a discussion of the criminal/civil distinction, see notes 291-338 and accompa-
nying text supra; for a discussion of the rights/privileges distinction, see notes 393-478 and
accompanying text supra.
493. See note 483 and accompanying text supra.
494. See notes 49-51 and accompanying text supra.
495. But the United States Supreme Court has indicated that whatever administrative
findings are made by the government preceding a decision to deport carry a conclusive
presumption of accuracy and will therefore be subject to minimal judicial review, regardless
of the fact that a potential deportee is not entitled to a jury trial. See, e.g., Zakonaite v.
Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275 (1912); Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 468 (1912); Tang
Tun v. Edsell, 223 U.S. 673, 675 (1911); Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 11 (1908);
Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 290-91 (1904); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,
237 (1896); United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475, 481 (1896).
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would be unconstitutional as bills of attainder. Certainly, the United
States Supreme Court has never intimated that aliens as a class may
not invoke the protections afforded by the bill of attainder clause.496
Therefore, this proposed rationale has little merit. Thus, one is com-
pelled to conclude that there is something inherent in the sanction of
deportation that prevents it from constituting punishment.
In order to analyze this argument, it is necessary to consider how
the United States Supreme Court has defined punishment as a general
matter of constitutional law. That consideration entails a brief scrutiny
of three decisions rendered between 1958 and 1963, only one of which
actually involved a bill of attainder challenge. The first of these cases
was Trop v. Dulles.497 That lawsuit involved questions about the consti-
tutionality of section 401(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1940,498 which mandated denationalization of all persons convicted by
court-martial for the crime of desertion in wartime. The petitioner in
this case was a former serviceman who had been stationed in French
Morocco during World War II and had escaped from a military stock-
ade in which he was being incarcerated for a disciplinary infraction.
After being court-martialed for and convicted of the crime of desertion
and having served the prescribed sentence, the petitioner sought a pass-
port in 1952 in order to return to the United States; his request was
denied on the basis of section 401(g),499 and an intermediate appellate
court confirmed his loss of citizenship."°° Chief Justice Warren, speak-
ing for a divided court,501 concluded that the statute was invalid be-
496. But at least one court has indicated that a class of persons may be effectively de-
nied the capacity to invoke the constitutional proscriptions against bills of attainder. In
Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1010 (1973), a
federal law restricting the sale of firearms to ex-felons was upheld on the theory that the
"legislature, in exercising its rule-making powers, may disqualify convicted felons from pur-
suing activities open to others without running afoul of the bill of attainder clause." 460 F.2d
at 37.
497. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
498. Act of October 14, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137.
499. See 356 U.S. at 87-88.
500. Trop v. Dulles, 239 F.2d 527, 530 (2d Cir. 1956).
501. He was joined in his opinion by Justices Black, Douglas and Whittaker. Justices
Black and Douglas also penned a joint concurring opinion, wherein they additionally con-
tended that a military tribunal lacked the inherent power to denationalize any person. 356
U.S. at 104-05 (Black, J., concurring, joined by Douglas, J.). Justice Brennan also concurred
with the result reached by the plurality. Id. at 105-14 (Brennan, J., concurring). But he
claimed it was the Court's duty to consider whether there was a rational connection between
the terms of the enactment and the power Congress claimed it was exercising. Id. at 105. In
this instance, he said that he found no such connection. Id. at 113-14. Justice Frankfurter
registered a scathing dissent. Id. at 114-28 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting, joined by Burton,
Clark and Harlan, JJ.) His conclusion was that the statute was no more than an exercise of a
vested legislative power. Id. at 128. The intensity of the dissent can be explained'by the fact
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cause it violated the Eighth Amendment's ban against cruel and
unusual punishment. 2 In the course of his analysis, he offered the fol-
lowing remarks about punishment:
In deciding whether or not a law is penal, this Court has gener-
ally based its determination upon the purpose of the statute. If
the statute imposes a disability for the purposes of punish-
ment-that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others,
etc.-it has been considered penal. But a statute has been consid-
ered nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to punish but to ac-
complish some other legitimate governmental purpose. The
Court has recognized that any statute decreeing some adversity as
a consequence of certain conduct may have both a penal and
nonpenal effect. The controlling nature of such statutes normally
depends on the evident purpose of the legislature. The point may
be illustrated by the situation of an ordinary felon. A person who
commits a bank robbery, for instance, loses his right to liberty
and often his right to vote. If, in the exercise of the power to
protect banks, both sanctions were imposed for the purpose of
punishing bank robbers, the statutes authorizing both disabilities
would be penal. But because the purpose of the latter statute is to
designate a reasonable ground of eligibility for voting, this law is
sustained as a nonpenal exercise of the power to regulate the
franchise. °3
In 1lemming v. Nestor,"° the Court upheld a statute denying social
security old-age benefits to deportees. Justice Harlan's majority opin-
ion rejected a bill of attainder challenge by concluding that the enact-
ment in question was essentially regulatory rather than punitive in
nature.505 In the course of reaching this conclusion, he made the fol-
lowing statement about punishment:
that at the same time it decided Trop, the Court upheld the constitutionality of section
401(e) of the 1940 act which denationalized citizens who voted in foreign elections. See
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 62 (1958). In Perez, three members of the prevailing coali-
tion in Trop had dissented. See id. at 62-78 (Warren, C.J., dissenting, joined by Black and
Douglas, JJ.) (found the challenged statute overbroad and beyond the powers of Congress);
id. at 79-84 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J.) (similar theory of dissent). Nine
years later, a differently constituted Court overruled Perez. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253,
268 (1967). See generally Schwartz, American Citizenship After Afroyim and Bellei" Continu-
ing Controversy, 2 HASTINGs CONST. L.Q. 1003, 1013-20 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Schwartz].
502. 356 U.S. at 101 (footnotes omitted).
503. Id. at 96-97 (footnotes omitted). At another juncture in his opinion, Chief Justice
Warren noted the Court's practice of saying that deportation is not punishment. He admit-
ted that such a view was "highly fictional," but went on to say that the government could not
rely on that fiction because the case at bar involved denationalization of a citizen rather than
denaturalization of an alien. Id. at 98.
504. 363 U.S. 603 (1960). See notes 445-451 and accompanying text supra.
505. Id. at 617.
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Where the source of legislative concern can be thought to be the
activity or status from which the individual is barred, the disqual-
ification is not punishment even though it may bear harshly upon
one affected. The contrary is the case where the statute in ques-
tion is evidently aimed at the person or class of persons
disqualified." 6
Because of this logic, Justice Harlan noted that the Court had declined
to interfere with legislative regulation of "activities within its sphere of
concern," 50 7 harsh, as that regulation may be. As an example, he cited
prior decisions of the Court concluding that deportation is not a puni-
tive sanction.0
Finally, in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, °9 the Court was con-
fronted with a complex consolidated suit510 challenging the constitu-
tionality of section 401(j) of the amended Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1940, 111 which mandated the withdrawal of citizenship from all
persons remaining outside the jurisdiction of the United States during
wartime in order to avoid military service. 2 Justice White's opinion
for the Court 13 found the statute unconstitutional because it effected
506. Id. at 614.
507. Id. at 616.
508. Id.
509. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
510. There were two cases involved. In the first, one Mendoza-Martinez, who was a
citizen of both Mexico and the United States, visited the former country in 1942 in order to
avoid military conscription. He returned to the United States in 1946; six years later, expatri-
ation proceedings were begun against him. See 372 U.S. at 147-48. In an unreported deci-
sion, a federal district court upheld the administrative deetermination to expatriate, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Mendoza-Martinez v. Mack-
ey, 238 F.2d 239, 240 (9th Cir. 1956). The United States Supreme Court vacated that ruling
and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), see
notes 497-503 and accompanying text supra. Mendoza-Martinez v. Mackey, 356 U.S. 258
(1958). In a second unreported opinion, a federal district court voided the challenged enact-
ment and an appellate panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed that ruling. Mendoza-Martinez v.
Rodgers, 192 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Cal. 1960). In the second case involved in Kennedy, one
Cort, an American citizen, visited England in 1951. In February, 1953, his draft board or-
dered him to report for induction. He failed to do so and, a year later, left England for
Czechoslovakia. In 1959, he sought to receive an American passport and was informed of his
denationalization. A three-judge district court held that the statute in question was unconsti-
tutional. Cort v. Herter, 187 F. Supp. 683, 688 (D.D.C. 1960).
511. Act of Oct. 14,1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137, amendedby Act of Sept. 27,
1944, Pub. L. No. 78-431, ch. 418,58 Stat. 746, amendedby Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No.
82-414, § 349(a)(10), 66 Stat. 163, 267-68 (repealed by Act of Sept. 14, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
412, 90 Stat. 1258). The section of the 1952 act repeated the language of the provision of the
1944 amendment, but added the presumption that noncompliance with prescribed proce-
dures for dealing with a draft board's notice indicated an intent to evade conscription.
512. See Schwartz, supra note 501, at 1006-08.
513. Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas.
The latter two justices also penned a brief separate opinion reciting their dissents in Perez v.
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denationalization without affording any of the procedural safeguards
guaranteed by the fifth and sixth amendments.' 1 4 Included in his opin-
ion was the following definition of the constitutional meaning of
punishment:
The punitive nature of the sanction here is evident under the
tests traditionally applied to determine whether an Act of Con-
gress is penal or regulatory in character, even though in other
cases this problem has been extremely difficult and elusive of so-
lution. Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as punish-
ment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punish-
ment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which
it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to
which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned are all relevant to the inquiry and may often point in
differing directions. Absent conclusive evidence of congressional
intent as to the penal nature of a statute, these factors must be
considered in relation to the statute on its face.
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Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), and affirming the assertions expressed therein. 372 U.S. at 186
(Douglas, J., concurring, joined by Black, J.). Justice Brennan issued a separate concurrence.
Id. at 187-97 (Brennan, J., concurring), but joined the Court in its discussion of punishment.
Id. at 187. There were three dissenters. See id. at 197-201 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by
Clark, J.); id. at 201-20 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
514. 372 U.S. at 165-66.
515. Id. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted). The Court in Kennedy cited considerable case
authority in support of its seven criteria. On the need to show an affirmative disability or
restraint, it referred to Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377 (1867) (exclusion from
the practice of law in federal courts; see notes 71-81 and accompanying text supra); United
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946) (debarment from positions of federal employment;
see notes 180-198 and accompanying text supra) and Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617
(1960) (denial of noncontractual governmental benefits held not to be punitive; see notes
445-451 and accompanying text supra). With respect to considerations of history, the Court
cited Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320-21 (1867) (disqualification from
one's lawful avocation as a clergyman deemed punitive; see notes 54-70 and accompanying
text supra) and the decisions of Exparte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 426-29 (1885); Mackin v.
United States, 117 U.S. 348, 350-52 (1886) and Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,
236 (1896) (all holding that the sanctions of imprisonment and compulsory hard labor fall
within the category of infamous punishments). Regarding the issue of scienter, Justice White
pointed to Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 610-12 (1903) (held, an additional duty
imposed for making an undervalued customs declaration, even in good faith or through
ignorance or mistake, which duty is greatly in excess of the maximum amount of the regular
ad valorem assessment, operates as a penalty) and Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S.
20, 37-38 (1922) (deemed federal excise tax imposed upon one who knowingly employs mi-
nors to be punitive). Respecting the criterion of whether or not an enactment promotes retri-
bution or deterrence, the majority referred to United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287,
295 (1935) (federal excise tax enacted from retail liquor dealers doing business contrary to
local state or municipal law held to be penal) and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958)
(provision denationalizing wartime deserters deemed to be punitive; see notes 497-503 and
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These proposed definitions are unhelpful in varying ways. 16 The
accompanying text supra). On whether or not the behavior which is the subject of a sanction
is already a crime, the majority in Kennedy cited Constantine again and the decisions of
Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 562 (1922) (tax under Volstead Act levied against one
charged with violations of liquor laws held invalid because it had the characteristics of a
fine) and United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1931) (same). Regarding the
possibility of an alternative purpose, Justice White offered citations to Cummings v. Mis-
souri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 319; Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. at 43; Lipke v.
Lederer, 259 U.S. at 561-62; United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. at 572; Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. at 96-97; and Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. at 615, 617. On the final criterion of exces-
siveness, the Court made references to Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 318;
Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. at 613; United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. at 295; and
Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956) (upheld $2,000 as liquidated
damages for fraudulent purchase of war surplus goods if it were shown that such an amount
is not so unreasonable to convert the damages into a penalty). It should be noted that the
Court in Kennedy, after presenting this heptad of factors, remarked that "a detailed exami-
nation along such lines is unnecessary, because the objective manifestations of congressional
purpose indicate conclusively that the provisions in question can only be interpreted as pu-
nitive." 372 U.S. at 169 (footnote omitted). It then restricted its scrutiny to the statements of
purpose underlying the enactment of and the judicial construction of the predecessor of
section 401(j), Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 79, § 21, 13 Stat. 490, see note 641 infra. 372 U.S. at
170-79. This exegesis was followed by a brief analysis of the immediate legislative history of
section 401(j) itself, an analysis which was said to confirm the conclusion that the statute was
intended to be punitive. Id. at 180-84.
516. It should be noted that although Trop and Kennedy did not discuss the bill of
attainder clauses, the analysis of punishment offered in those decisions has influenced subse-
quent rulings on attainder challenges. For cases citing Trop, see, e.g., Cody v. United States,
460 F.2d 34, 37 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1010 (1973) (statute placing restrictions
on the ability of ex-felons to purchase firearms); Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445,
449 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1967) (statute disenfranchising those convicted of
a felony in federal court); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 372
(D.D.C. 1976) (law regulating the custody and control of former President Nixon's private
papers); Mones v. Austin, 318 F. Supp. 653, 658 (S.D. Fla. 1970) (rule prohibiting those
formerly convicted of bookmaking from patronizing state racetracks); Thompson v. Whit-
tier, 185 F. Supp. 306, 310-11 (D.D.C. 1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 465 (1961), aff'dsub
nom. Thompson v. Gleason, 317 F.2d 901 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (enactment depriving veterans'
benefits from an honorable dischargee who subsequently engages in disloyal conduct). For
cases citing Kennedy, see, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 476
(1977) (same statute referred to above); Green v. Board of Elections, 3S0 F.2d at 450; Mones
v. Austin, 318 F. Supp. at 657; Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26, 34 (D. Ariz. 1969) (resolu-
tion expelling certain parties from reservation lands; see notes 115-121 and accompanying
text supra). See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 n.30 (1968) (noting
similarity of inquiry in Trop, Kennedy and attainder decisions). The decision of the Court in
Flemming v. Nestor has also been influential in a number of subsequent cases involving
attainder claims. See, e.g., Monaco v. United States, 523 F.2d 935, 940 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1975) (Dual Compensation Act of 1964, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3501-03 (1976),
giving civil service preferences to fewer classes of retired servicemen than had previously
been the case); Reyes v. Flemming, 287 F.2d 735, 736 (Ist Cir. 1961) (statute denying survi-
vors' benefit to the relatives of veterans punished by execution during wartime); Nixon v.
Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. at 373; Mones v. Austin, 318 F. Supp. at 658;
Thompson v. Whittier, 185 F. Supp. at 312; Sheridan v. Gardmer, 347 Mass. 8, 14, 196
N.E.2d 303, 308 (1964) (law prohibiting ex-felons or members of their families from serving
on the Massachusetts Crime Commission).
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Court in Trop provides an excellent example of circular reasoning. It
says that in order to ascertain if an enactment is penal, one must look at
the motive or purpose of the legislators. But the object of that search is
the motive to punish, ie., the purpose to inflict punishment, the very
term that one is seeking to define in the first place. As examples of a
punitive purpose, Chief Justice Warren offers two concepts: the repri-
mand of the wrongdoer and the deterrence of others; punishment in-
cludes any legislative sanction enacted to effectuate these purposes.
Tested in the light of this language, laws deporting aliens who join or
have joined the Communist Party or who advocate forcible overthrow
of the government 517 are undeniably punitive. Congress has decided
that such acts are blameworthy and has elected to penalize those who
commit them by expelling those wrongdoers from this country. The im-
position of such a draconian penalty was undoubtedly also intended to
deter other aliens who might have considered engaging in the pro-
scribed courses of conduct. Yet Chief Justice Warren carefully noted
that, although the view that deportation is not punishment may be "fic-
tional," his opinion in Trop did not necessarily undermine that view.
5 18
Considering legislative purpose can be a useful judicial technique, but
its usefulness lies not in its utilization as a referent for defining the
concept of punishment, but rather in its application as a guideline for
determining whether a given enactment is regulatory or penal. A by-
product of such a determination is, at best, a list of the many sanctions
that are not punishment, at least within the confines of a particular
factual framework. The approach advocated in Trop thus yields a neg-
ative definition of punishment by circumscribing the bounds of those
classes of purposes that the Court will be content to categorize as regu-
latory. The language in Trop would be helpful if courts had dismissed
attainder challenges to naturalization statutes on the theory that such
statutes merely prescribe qualifications for continued residency, but the
courts instead dismissed such challenges by concluding that deporta-
tion is not punishment per se.5 19 Trop would seem to suggest that such
517. See note 484 supra.
518. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 98 (1958). See note 503 supra.
519. See note 484 and accompanying text supra. The emphasis in this section has been
on the subject of deportation, because that subject presents the most useful exemplar of the
punishment per se problem. However, a few other cases suggest that the same approach
might be applied to other types of sanctions. See United States v. Ricketson, 498 F.2d 367,
374 (7th Cir. 1974) (challenge to a change in the rules of evidence respecting the acquisition
of depositions; held, such a change is not an attainder because it is not punishment); Cole v.
Cardoza, 441 F.2d 1337, 1341 (6th Cir. 1971) (challenge to statutes imposing excise taxes on
amounts wagered and a special tax on the occupation of wagering; held, it is not punishment
to assess a tax); Cox v. State, 222 Tenn. 606, 614, 439 S.W.2d 267, 271 (1969) (challenge to a
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assertions are inaccurate (or, at best, unproven), because the courts
never really considered the purpose of the legislators in enacting the
provisions being questioned. 2 ° But the irrelevance of Chief Justice
Warren's remarks, at least in the view of those lower federal courts, is
underscored by the counterargument that if the sanction ultimately be-
ing imposed could never be classified as punitive, then why Congress
chose to pass a statute invoking that sanction for specified offenses is
unimportant. Trop then, resolves no problems in this area.
Neither does Flemming. There, the Court snatched an aphorism
from Justice Field's opinion in Cummings v. Missouri5 l2 and elevated it
into a definition of punishment: a statute imposing disqualifications on
a status or activity is not punitive, while one imposing disqualifications
on a person or persons is. In the context of Cummings, this statement
made sense because it was relatively easy to see that preventing a Cath-
olic priest from preaching his religion within Missouri because he had
allegedly left that state during the Civil War in order to avoid military
service, was the imposition of a disability on an individual qua individ-
ual rather than on an individual qua priest. But in the deportation
cases, that dichotomy breaks down. In those cases, disabilities are im-
posed upon one's status as a resident alien and, arguably, that status
cannot be so neatly differentiated from the person to whom it attaches.
Thus, when one is deported for having once been a member of the
Communist Party, there is no pretense that the legislature is establish-
ing qualifications for a profession or avocation, as in Cummings;
rather, it is imposing a disqualification on one's official identity as a
foreign resident in this country. Applying the rule of Flemming in sup-
port of decisions saying deportation is not punishment requires one to
argue that the deprivation being exacted by Congress is one that affects
only a person's official status, rather than the person himself. This
presumes that the two are separable and discrete, but, arguably, they
are not. It is possible to distinguish between laws affecting a person and
laws affecting what that person may do; it is less possible to distinguish
between laws affecting a person and laws affecting how the government
defines who that person is. In modem society, the concept of selfhood
is, to a great extent, dependent upon the status conferred upon an indi-
law providing that if a person charged with a crime is adjudged to be insane and is thereafter
committed, costs of such commitment are to be paid from his estate, if any; held, no attain-
der because no punishment, only commitment for the benefit of a defendant).
520. Of course, had the courts undertaken such a consideration, they would have then
confronted all the problems attendant to judicial scrutiny of legislative motive. See notes
177-190 and accompanying text supra.
521. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320 (1867). See note 532 and accompanying text infra.
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vidual by the state; one's official identity affects both one's own defini-
tion of oneself and how others perceive and deal with that self. The
language in Cummings which Fiemming relies upon was only meant to
serve as a shorthand method of expressing the rule of relevance, that is,
whether the qualification being imposed reasonably related to one's fit-
ness to practice a profession. To remove that language from its specific
context and transmogrify it into a general definition of punishment is
unsound because the language in question was never meant to serve as
a rule of universal application and, in making it serve as such, the
Court in Flemming fashioned a remedy that was worse than the disease
it was intended to cure.
Kennedy, however, is a different matter. Justice White's decision
adopts as its main criterion for determining whether a given enactment
is punitive the rule laid down in Trop: legislative purpose. But in the
high percentage of cases where such scrutiny yields no conclusive re-
sults, he advances seven subsidiary criteria: whether the statute in ques-
tion imposes disabilities, inflicts an historically penal sanction, requires
scienter, promotes retribution and deterrence, applies an additional
sanction to already criminal conduct, effectuates a possible nonpenal
purpose and imposes too excessive a sanction to secure that purpose.
Taken individually, few of these tests are adequate; statutes imposing
disabilities are not necessarily punitive, criminal statutes do not always
require scienter nor do they always apply to pre-existing crimes, exces-
siveness of a sanction does not necessarily imply that it is punitive, and
so on. But Justice White said that one should consider these seven tests
together. This statement does not mean that if a law meets only four or
five of these criteria then it is, ipsofacto, nonpenal; these criteria are
not meant to operate as a general definition of punishment, but rather
are merely meant to serve as relevant guidelines for any inquiry about
whether a given statute is punitive or not. This approach invites a
scrupulous case-by-case analysis. In that respect it has merit; but, un-
fortunately, it provides a very nebulous decisionmaking technique.
What happens when some factors support one conclusion and others
suggest another? Are all these factors to be accorded equal weight? Jus-
tice White notes the potential problem, but never discusses it. What
happens for example, when it is not apparent what aims the statute will
promote or what purpose it was designed to effect? Are these terms
simply deleted from the judge's decisional calculus or should he give a
legislature the benefit of his doubts? The language in Kennedy is symp-
tomatic of the difficulties in dealing with the elusive problem of pun-
ishment; the traditional tests described by Justice White do direct
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judicial attention to profitable areas of inquiry, but they also provide
scant assistance in enabling a judge to rationalize and derive a conclu-
sion from all the conflicting evidence such an inquiry is likely to pro-
duce. As a result, the criteria cited in Kennedy only exacerbate, rather
than resolve, the underlying problem of how punishment is to be de-
fined. Yet, even so, application of the Kennedy tests to, for example, a
statute deporting all aliens who are or were members of the Communist
Party522 betrays its penal aspects: it imposes a disability of expulsion; it
forces one to leave the country where he presently resides and there is
an historical basis for labeling that as punishment, even if the resident
is not also a citizen;523 it promotes retribution against those who do join
the party and deters others from becoming members; if its purpose is to
regulate the political activities of aliens, its sanction is suspiciously ex-
cessive, whereas if its purpose is to prohibit aliens from joining the
Party, its sanction is clearly excessive, because mere membership in the
Party is not, in and of itself, a crime. So the tests laid down in Kennedy,
unhelpful as they are, do militate against the conclusion that deporta-
tion for being a member of the Communist Party is not punishment.
The conclusion that may be derived from the foregoing analysis is
simple: deportation of an alien, like banishment of a citizen, is punish-
ment; any view to the contrary is based upon the doctrine of stare
decisis, not the dictates of logic. But this criticism does not mean that
the courts rejecting attainder challenges to naturalization laws neces-
sarily made incorrect rulings; the statutes in question may have been
upheld alternatively as regulatory enactments. But utilization of the
regulation/punishment distinction would have required those courts to
analyze the questions of what Congress was seeking to regulate and
whether or not the means it used bore a rational connection to the ends
it sought. And that analysis, if rigorously conducted, would have com-
pelled consideration of many imponderables which lower federal
courts may simply have been unwilling to deal with.524 Thus, the "de-
portation is not punishment per se" label may be revealed for exactly
what it is: not a conclusion founded upon any painstaking analysis of
the constitutional meaning of the term "punishment," but rather a sub-
terfuge by which courts could shirk their responsibility to solve legal
522. See note 484 supra.
523. Consider, for instance, the parliamentary bill expelling all Jesuits from England. 27
Eliz., c.2, § 2; 2 STATS. U.K. 633 (1585), quoted in note 10 supra.
524. The most troublesome of which would probably be that concerning the ability of
Congress to exact a deprivation for beliefs or associations. See Jimenez v. Barber, 226 F.2d
449, 451 (9th Cir. 1955), quoted in note 484 supra.
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issues by the utilization of logic and reason, rather than the invocation
of some facile descriptive tag.
3. Regulation v. Punishment
After having considered four spurious distinctions and definitions
drawn by courts in analyzing the bill of attainder doctrine, it is now
necessary to consider the genuine distinction that may be made be-
tween regulation and punishment. The problem is simply summarized.
Many statutes impose sanctions upon specified groups of persons with-
out judicial trial, but the underlying purpose of such statutes is regula-
tory, not punitive. Thus, for example, courts have dismissed bill of
attainder challenges to a law governing the conditions on which
automobiles may be bought or sold within a state,525 a statute authoriz-
ing federal district courts to entertain suits to cancel certificates of natu-
ralization obtained by fraud,5 26 an ordinance requiring revocation of a
liquor license where the licenseholder has engaged in illegal betting
practices on the premises where liquor is being sold, 527 a rule exempt-
ing supervisors from the coverage of the National Labor Relations
Act,528 and an enactment prohibiting the organization of private mili-
tias without prior licensing by the governor of the state.529 All these
laws are designed to regulate a defined class of transactions, not to pun-
ish groups of persons. Legislators were concerned, respectively, with
curtailing fraudulent practices by automobile dealers, rescinding natu-
ralization certificates acquired through knowing misrepresentations,
preventing the efforts of organized crime to establish a syndicate of
bookie outlets, limiting the coverage of the National Labor Relations
Act to employees rather than agents of management and preventing the
flourishing of armed, civilian paramilitary groups likely to engage in
vigilantism. 530 The extension of the proscription against bills of attain-
525. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 59-1701 to 59-1720 (1968). See Ford Motor Co. v. Pace, 206
Tenn. 559, 582, 335 S.W.2d 360, 370 (1960).
526. Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3592, § 15, 34 Stat. 601. See United States v. Mansour,
170 F. 671, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1908).
527. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 561.291 (West 1962). See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 1901
Collins Corp., 83 So.2d 865, 873 (Fla. 1955).
528. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970). See NLRB v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 571,
579 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. deniedsub nonm Foremen's Ass'n v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 335
U.S. 908 (1949).
529. Act of May 28, 1879, 1879 M. Laws, ch. 192. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252,
268 (1886).
530. For other examples, see text accompanying notes 256-259 supra. Cf. United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1977) (stated the constitutional prohibitions of
article one, section ten limit the power of states only with respect to the subject of
punishment).
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der to such enactments would effectively undermine the ability of Con-
gress and local legislatures to pass any meaningful regulatory
measures. The problem, then, is not whether the distinction between
regulation and punishment is valid; that will be presumed. The prob-
lem is rather one of extracting from the language of decisions refusing
to construe regulatory enactments as bills of attainder a coherent the-
ory for distinguishing regulation from punishment. A resolution of this
problem may best be attempted by considering four key decisions ren-
dered by the United States Supreme Court during a period extending
from 1867 to 1951.
In Cummings v. Missouri,5 31 Justice Field limned the broad out-
lines of a theory for distinguishing regulation from punishment. He ad-
mitted that a state could prescribe qualifications that each person
would have to meet in order to practice a profession or avocation, but
such qualifications could not be exacted "in order to reach the person,
not the calling. '5 3z There must be a relationship between the acts or
omissions constituting a disqualification and an individual's fitness to
undertake the practice of a certain profession. In a word, the state bears
the burden of showing that such acts or omissions are relevant. A closer
reading of Cummings, however, suggests that the state might have a
difficult task of bearing that burden. Justice Field indicated that the list
of acts incorporated by reference in the oath prescribed by the Missouri
constitution was divisible into three categories: (1) acts constituting "of-
fenses of the highest grade, to which, upon conviction, heavy penalties
are attached";5 33 (2) acts which had never previously been classified as
legal offenses, but which might nevertheless be morally blameworthy
and (3) acts which, under most circumstances, could never be blame-
worthy.5 34 Certainly, one would have little difficulty in agreeing with
Justice Field that it is impermissible to penalize mere disaffection with
the Union or sympathy for the Confederacy. But other types of pro-
scribed acts, e.g., engaging in bushwacking, sending information to in-
surgents in wartime or aiding guerrilleros to evade capture, would seem
to be- very relevant to an individual's subsequent fitness to hold posi-
tions of public trust; one might seriously doubt the wisdom of ap-
pointing as a marshal, for example, someone who had previously
served as a member of Quantrill's Raiders. Justice Field seemed to rec-
ognize this problem when he intimated that innocent acts could be le-
531. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867). See notes 54-70 and accompanying text supra.
532. Id. at 320.
533. Id. at 316.
534. Id See note 55 supra.
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gitimately distinguished from acts motivated by "malignant enmity,"
and that desires or sympathies could be similarly distinguished from
"overt and visible acts of hostility to the government." '535 At one junc-
ture in his opinion, he condemned the challenged enactment because it
failed to draw distinctions between those who "ever expressed sympa-
thy with any who were drawn into the rebellion, even if the recipients
of that sympathy were connected by the closest ties of blood. . .[and
those who were] the most active and the most cruel of the rebels
.. * ,;536 at another, he admitted that "many of the acts have no pos-
sible relation to [one's] fitness for those pursuits and professions. 537
Thus, the oath could have been exacted only for the purpose of penaliz-
ing persons like Cummings because the challenged provision of the
Missouri constitution encompassed past conduct that was irrelevant as
well as that which was relevant to his fitness to practice his profession.
As Justice Field himself stated, the oath as a whole was exacted "not
from any notion that the several acts designated indicated unfitness for
the callings, but because it was thought that the several acts deserved
punishment. ' 538 The net effect of the decision in Cummings is that it
severely limits the type of prior occurrence for which a subsequent
sanction may be imposed. As the Court pointed out,
it by no means follows that, under the form of creating a qualifi-
cation or attaching a condition, the states can in effect inflict a
punishment for a past act which was not punishable at the time it
was committed. The question is not as to the existence of the
power of the state over matters of internal police, but whether
that power has been made in the present case an instrument for
the infliction of punishment against the inhibition of the
Constitution.539
From this assertion one might derive the conclusion that a legislature
could unilaterally punish a person for any past act for which he could
have been subjected to a criminal prosecution. But this conclusion is
inaccurate. When the Court went on to analyze bills of attainder in
general, it observed that the constitutional inhibitions against such an
enactment are based in part on the rationale that it is forbidden for
legislatures to punish "without any of the ordinary forms and guards
provided for the security of the citizen in the administration of justice
535. Id. at 318.
536. Id.
537. Id. at 319 (emphasis added). See also Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128
(1889).
538. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 319.
539. Id. at 320.
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by the established tribunals."'" Thus, as a practical matter, Cummings
precludes a state from imposing test oaths conditioning deprivations
upon anything other than past acts which are relevant to professional
fitness and which have been the subjects of prior criminal convictions.
Justice Field's discussion of the regulation-punishment distinction is
therefore implicitly qualified by his later analysis of the judicial trial
component of the bill of attainder doctrine. As a result, the Court
barred Missouri from denying persons the right to practice their profes-
sions on the basis of past acts or beliefs which may have been extremely
relevant in determining vocational fitness but which never served as the
basis for a judgment of culpability by a court of law. Consequently, the
net effect of Justice Field's analysis of the regulation-punishment dis-
tinction, coupled with his discussion of the need for affording each in-
dividual the safeguards of a judicial trial, is to bar legislatures from
exacting deprivations for past acts unless and until a judicial tribunal
has branded those acts as crimes.
The teachings of Cummings were clarified and, to some extent,
mitigated, a dozen years later by the decision in Dent v. West
Virginia. 4 In that case, a challenge was raised against a statute that
required anyone seeking to practice medicine within the state to first
acquire a certificate from the West Virginia Board of Health stipulating
that the licentiate had either graduated from a reputable medical col-
lege, practiced medicine within the state continuously for the decade
prior to March 8, 1881, or been found, upon examination, to be quali-
fied to serve as a physician.542 One who practiced without such a certif-
icate could be punished as a misdemeanant. 43 In June of 1882, the
petitioner was indicted and convicted for practicing medicine in Pres-
ton County, West Virginia, without a certificate. He had received a di-
ploma from the American Medical Eclectic College of Cincinnati,
Ohio, but the board of health had concluded it was not a reputable
institution. Since he had only been practicing in the county since 1876,
he could not claim the benefit of the ten-year provision in the statute,
and he had refused to submit to any examination by the board.5" After
being fined fifty dollars, the petitioner obtained a writ of error to the
Supreme Court of West Virginia. That tribunal concluded that no seri-
ous argument could be broached against the constitutionality of the
540. Id. at 325.
541. 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
542. See id. at 115-17. See 1882 W. Va. Acts, ch. 93, §§ 9, 15.
543. 129 U.S. at 117.
544. Id. at 117-18.
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statute in question.5 45 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed this ruling in a unanimous decision authored by Justice Field.
He pointed out that the statute was not arbitrary because it applied to
all resident physicians, imposed achievable qualifications and was en-
forced in a reasonable manner."4 He then distinguished Cummings
and Exparte Garland547 by concluding:
The constitution of Missouri and the act of Congress in question
in those cases were designed to deprive parties of their right to
continue in their professions for past acts or past expressions of
desires and sympathies, many of which had no bearing upon
their fitness to continue in their professions. The law of West Vir-
ginia was intended to secure such skill and learning in the profes-
sion of medicine that the community might trust with confidence
those receiving a license under authority of the state.
48
Thus, the statute in Dent was deemed to be an example of a legitimate
qualificatory scheme because it imposed only relevant prerequisites.
Requiring an examination, evidence of graduation from a reputable
institution or a decade of responsible practice were deemed reasonable
methods of determining fitness to undertake the profession of
medicine.
Dent did not involve test oaths or governmental scrutiny of past
beliefs. Moreover, as the Court noted,549 the prerequisites imposed by
the West Virginia statute worked no perpetual bar to the practice of
medicine since an applicant could always acquire a certificate by taking
an examination or, if necessary, continuing his education so that he
might receive a diploma from a reputable college. This was entirely
different from Cummings, where the Missouri constitution had no
analogous escapability feature. On these bases, Dent was distinguisha-
ble from Cummings and thus was arguably not even governed by the
precedent of the latter case. Yet the authors of the former decision nev-
545. State v. Dent, 25 W. Va. 1, 19 (1884).
546. 129 U.S. at 124.
547. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867). See notes 71-81 and accompanying text supra.
548. 129 U.S. at 128.
549. Id. at 124.
550. One commentator has argued that Dent established the principle that a law creat-
ig attainable qualifications which all persons could theoretically meet is not a bill of attain-
der. Waning Guaranty, supra note 12, at 850. This assertion is misleading. The Court
mentions the fact that the West Virginia statute imposed achievable qualifications only in
passing; it never expounded any full-blown theory about whether or not an enactment con-
taining escapability features can attaint. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court subse-
quently indicated that the mere fact that a challenged enactment imposes a disability upon a
person that can be avoided by conforming to a further mandate contained in the statute
itself was not decisive in determining whether such an enactment could be construed as a
bill of attainder. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 457 n.32 (1965).
BILL OF ATTAINDER DOCTRINESummer 19781
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
ertheless felt constrained to differentiate the two cases. Justice Field in
Dent advanced a thoroughly reasonable proposition: if the state of
West Virginia could license physicians, it should also be able to satisfy
itself about the competency of potential licenseholders. Thus, the pos-
session of sufficient medical skills and training was deemed a relevant
subject of inquiry and the means used to measure it (evidence of a di-
ploma from an accredited college, proof of satisfactory diagnosis and
treatment over an extended period or the successful passage of a stan-
dardized exam) were reasonable in themselves. But the ultimate impor-
tance of Dent is that it purports to derive from Cummings a fixed
principle: the state can impose conditions on access to a profession that
entail a consideration of all past conduct relevant to potential profes-
sional competency. The sensibility of this thesis is self-evident in the
context of a case like Dent, but it is not at all clear that it has equal
applicability to cases like Cummings. Nor is it evident that Justice
Field's explication of Cummings in Dent deals adequately with the un-
expected complexities and ambiguities of his own opinion in the former
case.
A decade later, in Hawker v. New York,5"' the Court reinterpreted
the rule of relevancy. In that case, the petitioner had been convicted of
committing an abortion in 1878 and was sentenced to a term of ten
years in the state penitentiary. In 1896, he was found guilty of practic-
ing medicine in violation of statute enacted in 1893, which provided
that a convicted felon could not practice as a doctor in the state of New
York and that if he attempted to do so, he could be charged with a
misdemeanor.5 2 The petitioner alleged that this statute was unconstitu-
tional, inter alia, both as a bill of attainder and as an ex post facto law.
Although the Appellate Division overturned his conviction, 5 3 the New
York Court of Appeals reinstated it, specifically repudiating the attain-
der claim by pointing out that the statute in question prescribed only an
additional penalty for a prior conviction.5 5 4 The United States Supreme
Court, in a six-to-three ruling, upheld the validity of the challenged
enactment. 5 Justice Brewer, writing for the majority, asserted that the
state could inquire legitimately into the character as well as the compe-
551. 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
552. See id. at 189-90. See 1893 N.Y. Laws, ch. 661, § 153.
553. The appellate division concluded that insofar as the statute in question was applied
prospectively, it was valid, but insofar as it was given retroactive effect, it was unconstitu-
tional. Since the petitioner had committed the underlying felony fifteen years before the date
of enactment, his conviction could not stand. See People v. Hawker, 14 App. Div. 188, 193,
43 N.Y.S. 516, 520 (lst Dep't 1897).
554. People v. Hawker, 152 N.Y. 234, 240, 46 N.E. 607, 608 (1897).
555. The three dissenting justices contended that the New York statute was unconstitu-
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tence of an applicant for a professional license.556 Since character was a
permissible topic of scrutiny, he went on to conclude that the state
could determine the method by which that complex of traits could be
ascertained, provided the method finally selected only takes into ac-
count "whatever, according to the experience of mankind, reasonably
tends to prove the fact and make it a test." '557 Thus, the Court laid
down the precept that the legislature may consider whatever is "ordina-
rily" indicative of bad character in determining whether a prospective
licentiate is qualified. 58 As long as the administrative inquiry fell
within these bounds, the question of whether other characterological
tests would be more satisfactory was deemed to be one best left to the
discretion of the legislature.5 59 Having thus stated its premises, the
Court found itself able to dispose of the bill of attainder challenge quite
easily. Justice Brewer noted that good people do not commit felonies,
and as the petitioner had been convicted of a felony, he was presump-
tively "a man of such bad character as to render it unsafe to trust lives
and health of citizens to his care. '5 60 He pointed out that while superfi-
cially the challenged enactment appeared to impose an additional pun-
ishment for a past offense, in fact it was designed to protect the public
from untrustworthy physicians.5 6 1 Although the rule adopted by the
New York legislature operated harshly and arbitrarily because it de-
nied a license solely on the basis of a prior conviction without ascer-
taining whether the prospective licenseholder had in fact rehabilitated
himself, the Court concluded that the legislature was within its rights to
make a rule of general application "based upon a state of things which
is ordinarily evidence of the ultimate fact sought to be established."
62
The Court distinguished Cummings and Garland by essentially reiter-
ating the rationale of Dent: the legislation in question was "not to be
regarded as a mere imposition of additional penalty, but as prescribing
the qualifications for the duties to be discharged and the position to be
filled, and naming what is deemed to be and what is in fact appropriate
evidence of such qualifications. 5 63 Hawker went beyond Dent in sev-
eral respects. First, the New York statute, unlike the West Virginia law,
tional as an ex post facto law. See 170 U.S. at 200-05 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by
Peckham, and McKenna, JJ.).
556. Id. at 194.
557. Id. at 195.
558. Id.
559. Id. at 197.
560. Id. at 196.
561. Ad.
562. Id. at 197.
563. Id. at 200.
Summer 19781 BILL OF ATTAINDER DOCTRINE
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
had no escapability features. Once a person was convicted of a felony,
there was no way for him to avoid automatic disqualification. Second,
while the West Virginia ordinance dealt solely with the issue of profes-
sional competence, the New York enactment had a wider scope in that
it compelled consideration of personality traits, although the admissible
evidence for those traits was a record of conviction. Third, and most
importantly, although Hawker purported to apply the relevance test of
Dent, it in fact did more than that. Justice Brewer admitted that in
some cases proof of a prior conviction might be irrelevant to one's fit-
ness to practice a profession because the person in question might have
rehabilitated himself; as long as the legislative classification itself was
"reasonable," that was sufficient. 5" Thus Hawker actually eroded the
theory expounded by Dent, while pretending to espouse it.
The combined effect of Dent and Hawker was to allow states to
regulate access to licensed professions by requiring an administrative
ascertainment of individual character as well as competence and char-
acter as evidenced by past conduct. 65 In Garner v. Board of Public
564. Id. at 197. One commentator has stated that what the author refers to as the rele-
vancy test established by Dent and Hawker was not intended to serve "as a valid general
test for bills of attainder, but as a means of suggesting that the label 'qualification' does not
preclude a finding of punishment in a bill of attainder context." Needfor Clarfication, supra
note 12, at 239 n.160. This is an inaccurate conclusion. It is true that "relevancy" or "reason-
able relationship" is not a general test for an attainder, but it is false to suggest that all the
rule of relevancy does is indicate that some types of qualifications are punishment. The rule
is intended to enable courts to distinguish regulation from punishment; by definition, if a
statute is merely regulatory, it cannot be a bill of attainder. Conversely, if a statute estab-
lishes an ostensible qualificatory scheme that is actually punitive (because the legislatively-
denominated bases for classification are irrelevant), it will fall within the proscriptions of
article one, section nine or ten of the Constitution (assuming the other three definitional
criteria are met).
565. Many state and federal courts rendered decisions prior to 1965 relying either ex-
plicitly or implicitly on the regulation-punishment distinction established by Dent and
Hawker in order to reject bill of attainder challenges to various types of enactments. See,
e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (statute denying social security benefits
to deportees); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (enactment prohibiting ex-
felons from soliciting or collecting union dues from persons covered by New York's Water-
front Commission Act); Smith v. California, 336 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1964) (code provi-
sions prescribing qualifications for professional engineers); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170
F.2d 247, 267 (7th Cir. 1948), affdsub nom. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382 (1950) (rule withholding jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board from
unions whose officers fail to execute a test oath); NLRB v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 169
F.2d 571, 579 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied sub non Foremen's Ass'n v. Edward G. Budd
Mfg. Co., 335 U.S. 908 (1949) (provision of the Taft-Hartley Act excluding supervisors from
coverage of the National Labor Relations Act); Butcher v. Maybury, 8 F.2d 155, 158 (W.D.
Wash. 1925) (statute creating a new qualificatory scheme for naturopaths); Thompson v.
Whittier, 185 F. Supp. 306, 311-12 (D.D.C. 1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 465 (1961),
ajfd sub nom. Thompson v. Gleason, 317 F.2d 901 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (enactment denying
veterans' disability benefits to honorable dischargees committing disloyal acts); Washington
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Works,566 however, the Court sanctioned the ultimate step by permit-
ting legislative scrutiny into past beliefs. The case arose from a 1941
amendment to the charter of the city of Los Angeles, which stipulated
that no person could hold municipal office who advocated or belonged
to an organization that advocated the violent overthrow of the govern-
ment; the same bar to employment applied against those committing
the proscribed acts or holding the proscribed beliefs within five years
prior to the effective date of the amendment.567 The city enforced this
charter provision by enacting a municipal ordinance in 1948 that cre-
ated an expurgatory oath reiterating the terms of the 1941 amend-
v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884) (law disenfranchising persons convicted of treason, embez-
zlement of public funds, malfeasance in office and other crimes); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Nineteen Hundred and One Collins Corp., 83 So. 2d 865, 873 (Fla. 1955) (statute
revoking the liquor license of tavern owners conducting bookmaking operations on their
premises); Davis v. Mayor of Savannah, 147 Ga. 605, 606, 95 S.E. 6, 7 (1918) (ordinance
prohibiting the maintenance of cowpens and stables within city limits); Crampton v.
O'Mara, 193 Ind. 551, 555, 139 N.E. 360, 362 (1923), writ of error dismissed, 267 U.S. 575
(1925) (rule disqualifying one sentenced to a term exceeding six months for violating federal
law from holding state office); In re Platz, 60 Nev. 296, 309, 108 P.2d 858, 864 (1940) (provi-
sion requiring disbarment of an attorney whose license was suspended and who practiced
law during that period of suspension); France v. State, 57 Ohio St. 1, 20, 47 N.E. 1041, 1043
(1897) (enactment mandating denial of a license to a prospective physician who had com-
mitted felonies, acts of gross immorality, acts of drunkenness or the like); Ford Motor Co. v.
Pace, 206 Tenn. 559, 582, 335 S.W.2d 360, 370 (1960) (law governing the sale and purchase
of automobiles); Davis v. Beeler, 185 Tenn. 638, 653-54, 207 S.W.2d 343, 350 (1947), appeal
dismissed, 333 U.S. 859 (1948) (statute providing for the licensing of naturopaths); Pierce Oil
Corp. v. Weinert, 106 Tex. 435, 439, 167 S.W. 808, 810 (1914) (enactment denying foreign
corporations that violate local antitrust laws the right to do business in Texas); State ex rel
Carroll v. Simmons, 61 Wash. 2d 146, 147, 377 P.2d 421, 422 (1962), cer. denied, 374 U.S.
808 (1963) (provision stipulating that a public official who is convicted of a felony while in
office will automatically forfeit his position); Fox v. Territory, 2 Wash. Terr. 297, 300, 5 P.
603, 605 (1884) (statute prescribing qualifications for physicians); State v. Coubal, 248 Wis.
247, 262, 21 N.W.2d 381, 390 (1946) (law stipulating that one who permits gambling on his
premises may have his liquor license revoked). Even the one major decision striking down a
proposed qualificatory rule relied on the relevancy test. In Opinion to the House of Repre-
sentatives, 80 R.I. 281, 96 A.2d 623 (1953), the Rhode Island Supreme Court had to consider
the validity of a proposed law disqualifying the relatives (and their spouses) of an elected
official (or his or her spouse) or an agency head (or his or her spouse) from holding any
appointive municipal office during the elected term of the official or the tenure of the agency
head. The relatives so affected included children, grandchildren, parents, grandparents,
brothers, sisters, half-brothers and half-sisters. Id. at 282, 96 A.2d at 624. The court noted
that relatives were prohibited from taking any post, not just a post under the official in
question; for instance, a person could not serve as a streetsweeper if he was the spouse of a
half-sister of the municipal recorder of deeds. See id. at 284, 96 A.2d at 625. Thus, the court
concluded, "such an extreme disqualification may subject the provision in its present form
to the claim that it is an arbitrary and direct proscription of a class, that it exceeds a reason-
able exercise of police powers and that in effect it is at least in the nature of a bill of attain-
der." Id. at 285, 96 A.2d at 626.
566. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
567. Id. at 717-18. See 1941 Cal. Stats., ch. 67.
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ment.568 All existing municipal employees had to execute this oath
prior to January 6, 1949; some of them filed suit, alleging that the mu-
nicipal ordinance was both a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law.
The California district court of appeals rejected the attainder chal-
lenge,5 69 citing American Communications Association v. Douds. 7 On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
oath. Justice Clark, writing for himself and four of his colleagues,
571
568. 341 U.S. at 718-19. The oath read:
I further swear (or affirm) that I do not advise, advocate or teach, and have not
within the period beginning five (5) years prior to the effective date of the ordi-
nance requiring the making of this oath or affirmation, advised, advocated or
taught, the overthrow by force, violence or other unlawful means, of the Govern-
ment of the United States of America or of the State of California and that I am
not now and have not, within said period, been or become a member of or affili-
ated with any group, association, society, organization or party which advises, ad-
vocates or teaches, or has, within said period, advised, advocated or taught, the
overthrow by force, violence or other unlawful means of the Government of the
United States of America, or of the State of California. I further swear (or affirm)
that I will not, while I am in the service of the City of Los Angeles, advise, advo-
cate or teach, or be or become a member of or affiliated with anN group, associa-
tion, society, organization or party which advises, advocates or teaches, or has,
within said period, advised, advocated or taught, the overthrow by force, violence
or other unlawful means, of the Government of the United States of America, or of
the State of California ...
569. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 98 Cal. App. 2d 493, 499, 220 P.2d 958, 961 (1950).
570. 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See 98 Cal. App. 2d at 497-98, 220 P.2d at 960-61. This reli-
ance seems questionable. The oath in Douds was phrased entirely in the present tense, see
note 352 and accompanying text supra, and the Court in that case advanced the argument
that, because of this, it referred solely to prospective conduct, see note 355 and accompany-
ing text supra. The oath in Garner, however, is phrased both in the present and the past
tenses and reaches past, present and future conduct. See note 522 supra.
571. The other four were Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Jackson, Minton and Reed.
Justice Frankfurter dissented in part, claiming that the oath impermissibly proscribed mem-
bership in an organization not known to advocate subversion at the time one joined. 341
U.S. at 726 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Burton regis-
tered the objection that the oath had an improper retrospective effect. Id. at 729 (Burton, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). In his dissent, Justice Black alleged that the ma-
jority's decision "creates considefable doubt as to the continuing validity" of Cummings
and its analysis of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. Id. at 730-31 (Black, J., dissent-
ing). Similarly, Justice Douglas condemned the Los Angeles ordinance as a bill of attainder.
Id. at 736 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J.). The majority opinion did skirt the
objections of Justices Frankfurter and Burton. It found that the municipal ordinance was
not an ex post facto law because the oath it created extended back in time only to 1943 while
the original amendment to the city charter had been passed in 1941; thus the activity covered
by the oath had already been proscribed two years before the beginning of the time span
covered by that oath. Id. at 721. This rather ingenious argument was advanced in two
paragraphs occupying half of one page. Justice Frankfurter's contention was countered by a
footnote arguing that, although the statute itself did not mention any requirement of scien-
ter, California courts had construed other similar statutes in a way that required proof of
knowing membership. See id. at 723-24 n.* (citing People v. Steelik, 187 Cal. 361, 376, 203
P. 78, 84 (1921) (construing the California Criminal Syndicalism Act of 1919)). A year later,
the Court struck down another similar test oath because it declined to make this assumption
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concluded that the municipal ordinance was a general regulation that
merely imposed "standards of qualification and eligibility for employ-
ment. ' 572 He cited Dent and Hawker for the proposition that the hold-
ings of Cummings and Garland are "inapplicable when the legislature
establishes reasonable qualifications for a vocational pursuit with the
necessary effect of disqualifying some persons presently engaged in
it." 57 3
With Garner, the Court had come full circle by upholding an ex-
purgatory oath proscribing past political associations and beliefs on the
theory that inquiry into such subjects was a legitimate means of deter-mining qualifications for public offices in general, rather than particu-
lar professions. The effect of this decision was to undermine
Cummings. Like the provisions of the Missouri constitution in
Cummings, the expurgatory oath established by the Los Angeles ordi-
nance proscribed past affiliations and advocacy; yet by invoking the
label of "regulation," the Court held such an enactment was beyond
the constitutional proscriptions against bills of attainder. Many lower
courts have since followed suit.574 Although Justice Clark in Garner
claimed to rely on the Dent-Hawker relevance test, his purported ad-
herence to those decisions was spurious. He presumed that mere advo-
cacy unaccompanied by conduct or a prior criminal conviction could
be a reason for permanently disqualifying a person from public em-
ployment. Neither Dent nor Hawker advanced such a thesis;
Cummings rejected it explicitly by pointing out that mere past expres-
sions of desires and disaffections are irrelevant to present fitness to
serve in a position of public trust.57 5 More importantly, although the
Court in Garner pretended to apply a theory of relevance, it had in fact
about what the Oklahoma courts might do. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191
(1952). See note 431 supra.
572. 341 U.S. at 722.
573. Id. at 723. See also Hirschman v. Los Angeles County, 231 P.2d 140, 143 (App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1951), af'd on other grounds, 39 Cal. 2d 698, 249 P.2d 287 (1952) (upheld
the same oath, as applied to county employees, against a bill of attainder challenge; found
the city's board of supervisors merely sought to "acquaint themselves with whether an em-
ployee of the county holds to a philosophy inimical to the maintenance of the state").
574. All these cases dealt with the validity of anti-subversive expurgatory oaths exacted
from public employees. See Heckler v. Shepard, 243 F. Supp. 841, 850 (D. Idaho 1965);
Orange Coast Junior College Dist. v. St. John, 146 Cal. App. 2d 455, 461, 303 P.2d 1056,
1060 (1956); Pickus v. Board of Educ., 9 111. 2d 599, 608, 138 N.E.2d 532, 538-39 (1956);
Dworken v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 57 Ohio L. Abs. 449, 463, 94 N.E.2d 18, 27 (1950),
appeal dismissed, 156 Ohio St. 346, 102 N.E.2d 253 (1951); Board of Regents v. Updegraff,
205 Okl. 301, 312, 237 P.2d 131, 138 (1951), rey'd on other grounds sub nom. Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Nostrand v. Balmer, 53 Wash. 2d 460, 476, 335 P.2d 10, 19
(1959). For post-1965 cases following Garner, see note 983 infra.
575. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 319-20 (1867).
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undermined that theory. Under the Los Angeles ordinance any person
who had advocated or belonged to a group that had advocated subver-
sion at any point in the five years preceding the effective date of the
enactment was barred from serving as a municipal employee, regard-
less of whether or not he had since repudiated his former beliefs or
terminated his former affiliation. Thus, even a person who had thor-
oughly revised his political philosophy and who could truthfully swear
that he did not presently advocate subversion and would not do so in
the future would be excluded from further public employment; he or
she would be branded as unfit and untrustworthy because of a past
episode that no longer had any bearing on the present or the future.
This type of indiscriminate, arbitrary imposition of sanctions is exactly
what the Court in Cummings had condemned.
Thus, with each subsequent construction of the relevancy standard
it became increasingly difficult to reconcile the Court's interpretation
of the regulation/punishment distinction with the broad mandate of
Cummings. By the time Garner was decided in 1951, the relevancy
standard had been so loosely construed as to become almost meaning-
less. Nor were other proposals for distinguishing between punishment
and regulation any more useful. One commentator has argued that a
statute imposing disabilities works against a fixed group, le., one
whose members are identifiable at the time of enactment, while a stat-
ute imposing qualifications works against a shifting group, te., one
whose members are unascertainable at the time of enactment.5 7 6 As has
been indicated elsewhere,577 this thesis ignores contrary examples of
bills of attainder at English common law. More importantly, however,
it fails to explain Garner, where the Court construed a statute affecting
a fixed group578 as one that was exclusively regulatory in nature. Thus,
this proposed theory is both historically unsound and inadequate to
explain the decisions rendered by the United States Supreme Court.
576. See Punishment, supra note 14, at 239.
577. See notes 385-391 and accompanying text supra.
578. The group was fixed in two senses. First, at least one subclass of the statute's vic-
tims was determinable in that it comprised those public employees committing subversive
advocacy between 1943 and 1948. A second determinable subclass consisted of all such em-
ployees on the municipal rolls at the time of the enactment who did not advocate subversion,
but who subsequently came to do so before they executed the oath and before January 6,
1949. Only those who had committed no past acts of subversion and who had not advocated
subversion at the time they executed the oath but who, when doing so, harbored an intent to
become a subversive in the future might be deemed to be members of a shifting class. But
even that group was not truly shifting in that it could only consist of municipal employees
who had been hired before January 6, 1949. Yet the commentator developing the notion of
fixed and shifting groups appears to believe that the Court's characterization of the statute
involved in Garner as regulatory is correct. See Punishment, supra note 14, at 241.
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A more sophisticated theory has been advanced by Professor Wor-
muth.5 79 He begins with the premise that there can be no attainder ob-
jections when a legislature establishes qualifications for a vocation
because the mere creation of qualifications excludes no one, since all
are eligible to qualify themselves."' For him, the problems arise when
a legislature imposes disqualifications. Yet even in those instances, re-
strictions are inherently valid when there is no implicit censorial judg-
ment of individuals, but only the derivation of presumptions about
character from aspects of common knowledge or principles of general
psychology.581 This would explain a case like Hawker where it could
be argued it is common knowledge that ex-felons are likely to have bad
characters.5 2 But Professor Wormuth would draw the line where legis-
latively-imposed disqualifications result from a "judgment that the
proscribed persons possess a characteristic not found in people in gen-
eral. It rests, not upon general psychology, but upon evidence. It is a
determination, judicial in nature, of culpability or blameworthi-
ness." 583 To his credit, Professor Wormuth acknowledges a key diffi-
culty. In citing Hawker as an example of a case in which there existed a
"notorious connection between the disqualification and the activity
barred,"584 he admits that the very same characterization could be
made of Exparte Garland58 5 because past acts of disloyalty are proba-
tive evidence of lack of present fitness to be a practicing attorney in
federal courts. But he distinguishes the two cases by stating that the
statute in Garland, in effect, identified its victims, whereas those af-
fected by the enactment in Hawker were "determined by an imper-
sonal process outside the control of the legislature. ' 5 6 Therefore, the
law involved in Garland was properly deemed to be a bill of attainder,
while that involved in Hawker was properly construed not to be one.
This theory has its flaws. In the first place, inherent in any creation
of qualifications is the imposition of disqualifications; 587 one who fails
to meet prescribed prerequisites is automatically disqualified. Whether
or not the mere establishment of qualifications #7sofacto excludes cer-
579. See Wormuth, supra note 12, at 608-14.
580. Id. at 609.
581. Id. at 610.
582. The Court in that case adopted this approach. See note 559 and accompanying text
supra.
583. Wormuth, supra note 12, at 610.
584. Id. at 612.
585. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
586. Wormuth, supra note 12, at 613.
587. Even the Court in Garner recognized this point. See note 573 and accompanying
text supra.
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tain persons from ever attaining a status of eligibility requires a consid-
eration of both the phrasing of the qualificatory standards themselves
and the social context in which those standards are being enforced. For
example, if a statute of State X permitted the licensure of resident phy-
sicians only if each prospective licentiate could produce a diploma is-
sued by an accredited medical college within State X. and the various
colleges so accredited admitted white students only, one would have to
conclude that the statute, though it ostensibly established only qualifi-
catory standards, really imposed disqualifications on any nonwhite
seeking to practice medicine within State X. Thus, reliance on an ab-
stract distinction between qualificatory and disqualificatory enactments
is misplaced because the two may often merge in reality.
Apart from this, there are other difficulties with Professor Wor-
muth's thesis. He fails to make an adequate distinction between cases
like Hawker and Cummings. If it is "common knowledge" that a for-
mer felon possesses a character which makes him unfit to practice
medicine, then it should also be an item of "common knowledge" that
former service as a guerrillero renders one unfit to serve in a position of
public trust in a state where, a few years earlier, guerrilla warfare had
been rampant. Yet Cummings found unconstitutional a statute impos-
ing the latter disability. Professor Wormuth would distinguish the
Cummings type of case from the Hawker type of case by saying that in
the latter situation, (a) the identity of the persons affected is not ascer-
tainable from the terms of the statute itself, but (b) is rather ascertain-
able only by reference to extrinsic factors outside the legislature's
control. It is true that the class of persons affected by the enactment in
Hawker included all persons who had in the past committed or who
would in the future commit felonies; thus, at the time of the passage of
that law, the identities of the members of that class could only be par-
tially ascertained. But the same is true in Cummings. The class of per-
sons affected by the challenged provisions of the Missouri constitution
consisted of all those who declined to execute the prescribed expurga-
tory oath. That class of persons was comprised of those whose identities
were readily ascertainable because of their past conduct, as well as
those unascertainable persons who might decline to take the oath at
some point in the future, not because they had committed any of the
specified proscribed acts, but rather because they believed the state had
no right to demand such affirmations as a matter of principle, or be-
cause they did not wish to swear perpetual allegiance to the Constitu-
tion, or because they were atheists and thus could not execute an oath
which referred to God, or because they had no intention of faithfully
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executing the duties of the office they were about to enter or for some
other similar independent reason. Thus, Professor Wormuth's attempt
to distinguish the Hawker type of case from the Cummings type of case
on this basis is ill-conceived. Reference to an "impersonal process
outside the control of the legislature" is also unilluminating. Certainly
the legislature has no control over the fact that persons are indicted,
convicted and sentenced for the commission of a felony by the judicial
system. But neither does it have control over the fact that at some pre-
vious point in time, persons served or sympathized with the Confeder-
acy. From the perspective of a legislature convened several years later,
those decisions to express sympathy or render service may also be
deemed the results of an "impersonal" process.
Moreover, Professor Wormuth's thesis provides no credible expla-
nation for the decision in Garner. That case involved a class of persons
whose identity could not be inferred from the text of the statute itself;
arguably, the identity of those persons was determined by the
lawmakers themselves (rather than by impersonal, external processes)
because only they or their agents could define the meaning of the con-
cept of "advocacy of the violent overthrow of the government," as that
concept would be applied to the facts presented in each individual case
history. 8 8 Yet the Court in Garner deemed the challenged enactment
588. This point merits some elaboration. Many of the prohibitions in Cummings in-
volved actual past acts. See note 55 supra. If one had committed bushwacking or had left
the state to avoid conscription, one's act could easily be corroborated and whether that act
fell within the statutory proscription could be determined with relative ease because the
description provided by the statute itself was susceptible to a specific interpretation. The
definitions of "bushwacking" or "to avoid conscription" are relatively free of ambiguity.
The same, of course, could not be said of other descriptions included in the prohibitions of
the Missouri constitution like "inimical to the government" or "disaffection."
However, the Los Angeles ordinance involved in Garner was wholly ambiguous in
several respects and those ambiguities could be resolved, not by reference to a dictionary,
but only by discretionary judgments on the part of those administering and enforcing the
law. The oath proscribed advising, advocating and teaching subversion. But what does
advocacy or advice mean? It could include anything from giving instruction in guerrilla
tactics, to teaching the Communist Manifesto as an example of rhetoric, to standing upon a
soapbox and saying that the President and all members of Congress should be hanged. Even
the United States Supreme Court admitted as much when it drew the distinction between
advocacy of forcible overthrow as abstract doctrine and advocacy of action to that end and
said only the latter could be legislated against. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318-20
(1957). The oath also speaks of overthrow by force, violence or other unlawful means.
Again, this language is so broad it can only be practically defined in the course of case-by-
case administrative action: the agent of the legislature might conclude that the act proscribes
both the advocacy of urban terrorism and the advice to cast a ballot for Henry Wallace in
the 1948 election. These difficulties are only compounded by reference to membership or
affiliation in an organization advocating forcible overthrow. The Los Angeles Board of Su-
pervisors appeared to be resolving those difficulties by compiling its own subversives list: it
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to be no more than an exercise in regulation. 589 For all these reasons,
Professor Wormuth's theory does not provide a feasible distinction be-
tween regulation and punishment.
The foregoing discussion yields an ineluctable conclusion: Garner
and, to a much lesser extent, Hawker simply cannot be reconciled with
Cummings. These two decisions subvert rather than perpetuate the doc-
trine of the latter case. Thus, the net effect of Dent, Hawker and
Garner was to expand the distinction between regulation and punish-
ment to the extent that reliance on that distinction would allow courts
to negate all the protections afforded by the bill of attainder clauses of
the Constitution. At least that was the state of the law until United
States v. Brown.
590
C. "Upon a Designated Person or Class of Persons"
Superficially, this component of the definition of a bill of attainder
would seem to present few difficulties and, indeed, until recent times, it
presented none. But in the three decades since 1945 the issue of the
ascertainability of the victims of an attainder has received more and
more consideration in judicial decisions.591 The problem is simply
stated: just how specifically must an enactment refer to its intended
victims before it can be classified as a bill of attainder? Of course,
where the challenged statute lists its victims by name52 or is so phrased
also required affidavits admitting or denying membership in the Communist Party or the
Communist Political Association. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 719 (1951).
The problem is that the statutory language is susceptible to so many constructions that the
correct (or at least controlling) construction cannot be ascertained by recourse to lexico-
graphical definitions, but rather must be determined by reference to what definition the
legislature itself elects to promulgate. Thus, the coverage of the Los Angeles statute could
only be discovered by considering the patterns of enforcement undertaken by those
responsible for administering it.
589. Of course, it is possible that Professor Wormuth would say Garner was incorrectly
decided. Although his article was published a year before that decision, he did evince scorn
for the decision in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See
Wormuth, supra note 12, at 619.
590. 381 U.S. 437 (1965). See notes 946-989 and accompanying text infra.
591. This subsection will only deal with the evolution of the topic up to the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). For an
analysis of Brown and subsequent cases dealing with this subject, see notes 990-1061 and
accompanying text infra.
592. But merely because a statute names its victims does not mean, 4Osofaeto, that it is a
bill of attainder. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 471 (1977); Cf. Mar-
shall v. Sawyer, 365 F.2d 105, 111 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967) (black-
list maintained by the Nevada Gaming Commission; see note 144 and accompanying text
supra); Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221, 1239 (D.D.C. 1974) (Presidential commutation;
see notes 161-168 and accompanying text supra); Gaidamavice v. Nenaygo Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 341 Mich. 280, 288, 67 N.W.2d 178, 180 (1954) (resolution allegedly terminating
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that it can only operate against a very few identifiable persons,593 there
is no specificity problem; indeed, bills of attainder and bills of pains
and penalties at common law affecting either named persons594 or eas-
ily ascertainable groups595 or sometimes both596 were common. But
where the law in question is of generalized applicability some courts
have claimed that it is too unspecific to be a bill of attainder. Thus, a
federal appellate court held that a provision of the Taft-Hartley Act
5 9 7
excluding supervisors from the coverage of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act did not attaint, because it did not operate against named per-
sons, but rather expressed "a policy, applicable to all within a general
classification, not found to be either arbitrary or invalid; it is remedial
public legislation rather than punitive to the individual. Congress was
not interested in the activities of supervisors as individuals."'598 Simi-
larly, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a statute providing for
compulsory arbitration of labor disputes involving the employees of
public utilities599 against an attainder challenge on the theory that the
enactment was not directed specifically against the particular union
that had instituted the lawsuit,6" and a New York trial court dismissed
plaintiffs employment because of his union activities); Christie v. Lueth, 256 Wis. 326, 332,
61 N.W.2d 338, 341 (1953) (resolution setting up a special committee to investigate the peti-
tioner). Other examples are provided by the cases involving attainder challenges to contempt
citations. See notes 811-864 and accompanying text infra.
593. Here, too, specificity without more precludes any finding of a bill of attainder. See,
e.g., Flood v. Margis, 64 F.R.D. 59, 61 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (denial of license to operate a
mobile home park); State ex re. Brassell v. Teasley, 194 Ala. 574, 581, 69 So. 723, 725
(1915) (statute limiting eligibility to hold municipal office by excluding persons who had
been incumbents during the immediately previous term); Gallas v. Sanchez, 48 Haw. 370,
375-76, 405 P.2d 772, 776 (1965) (law removing civil service status of incumbent personnel
directors); Bessette v. Commissioner of Pub. Works, 348 Mass. 605, 609-10, 204 N.E.2d 909,
912 (1965) (enactment in effect abolishing the position of the state's Director of the Division
of Waterways); Starkweather v. Blair, 245 Minn. 371, 386, 71 N.W.2d 869, 879 (1955) (ap-
propriation bill in effect abolishing the position of the state's assistant director of the Game
and Fish Division; see notes 212-221 and accompanying text supra).
594. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
595. See note 32 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of a theory contending
that bills of attainder at common law applied only against fixed groups, see notes 385-391
and accompanying text supra.
596. See, e.g., 9 Geo. I, c. 15; 5 STATS. U.K. 448 (1722), quoted in notes 8, 9 and 29
supra; 13 Will. 3, c. 3, §§ 1, 2; 4 STATS. U.K. 81-82 (1701), quoted in notes 24 and 37 supra;
26 Hen. 8, c. 25, § 2; 3 STATS. OF THE REALM 529 (1534), quoted in note 33 supra.
597. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
598. NLRB v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 571, 579 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied
sub nom. Foremen's Ass'n v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 335 U.S. 908 (1949). Cf. Cockrill v.
United States, 292 F.2d 288, 290 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (defined an attainder as a legislative act
attempting to exercise the power to adjudicate the cases of individuals).
599. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13B-20 (1965).
600. Van Riper v. Traffic Tel. Workers Fed'n, 2 N.J. 335, 352, 66 A.2d 616, 625 (1949).
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an attainder objection to an enactment terminating the tenure of the
members of an existing state board of education 60' because that enact-
ment failed to name particular persons and did not designate the ex-
isting board as a unit.6 2
Implicit in these rulings is the conclusion that if a challenged pro-
vision does not identify its purported victims with sufficient specificity,
it cannot be a bill of attainder.6°3 The rulings of the United States
Supreme Court on this topic are, unfortunately, somewhat confusing.
Cummings v. Missouri6°4 never even mentioned specificity as one of the
definitional requirements of a bill of attainder.6 05 This omission is un-
derstandable when one remembers that the challenged provisions of
the Missouri constitution in that case imposed sanctions upon such
nebulous groups as those giving "comfort, countenance or support" to
the Confederacy, or those belonging to organizations "inimical to the
Government" or those expressing either disaffection with the Union or
sympathy for the forces of secession and rebellion. 60 These designa-
tions were imprecise and unspecific, yet the Court held that an oath
incorporating them by reference was a bill of attainder." 7 The implicit
lesson of Cummings is that a piece of legislation can attaint even
though it describes its intended victims in a generalized manner.
The specificity requirement was adopted by the Court in United
States v. Lovett,60 8 in which Justice Black defined a bill of attainder as
a legislative act inflicting punishment without trial upon "named indi-
viduals" or "easily ascertainable members of a group.' ' 61 Nevertheless,
this requirement was never explicated in Lovett because that case in-
volved an enactment directed against three named individuals.6 1 0 The
entire subject lay dormant for fifteen years until the decision of the
Court in Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities
Control Board.611 That case involved various constitutional challenges
601. 1961 N.Y. Laws, ch. 971.
602. Lanza v. Wagner, 30 Misc. 2d 212, 214, 220 N.Y.S.2d 477, 481 (1961), af'dper
curlam, 15 App. Div. 2d 552, 222 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (2d Dep't 1961), affd, 11 N.Y.2d 317, 324-
25, 183 N.E.2d 670, 674, 229 N.Y.S.2d 380, 385-86 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 901 (1963).
603. For other, similar conclusions reached in cases decided after 1965, see notes 1020-
1031 and accompanying text infra.
604. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867). See notes 54-70 and accompanying text supra.
605. See id. at 323. See note 67 and accompanying text Supra.
606. See note 55 supra.
607. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 323-25.
608. 328 U.S. 303 (1946). See notes 180-198 and accompanying text supra.
609. See id. at 315.
610. See note 182 supra.
611. 367 U.S. 1 (1961). See notes 366-368, 370 and accompanying text supra.
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to the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,612 which required
"Communist-action" and "Communist-front" organizations to register
with and report annually to the government; the statute also imposed
various disabilities upon such organizations and their members.613 Jus-
tice Frankfurter's opinion for the majority concluded the act was not an
attainder, because, inter alia,
it attaches not to specified organizations but to described activi-
ties in which an organization may or may not engage. The sin-
gling out of an individual for legislatively prescribed punishment
constitutes an attainder whether the individual is called by name
or described in terms of conduct which, because it is past con-
duct, operates only as a designation of particular persons. See
Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall 277, Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall
333.614
This is a rather startling conclusion when one considers the text of
the act itself. Section 3(3) defines a "Communist-action" organization
as one substantially directed, dominated or controlled by a foreign
Communist government or the world Communist movement and oper-
ated primarily to advance the objectives of such a government or move-
ment.6 15  Similarly, section 7(b) described a "Communist-front"
612. 64 Stat. 987, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-826 (1950) (repealed in part 1968).
613. See 367 U.S. at 9-16. The act required annual accountings, membership lists and
printing press lists from the affected organizations. 50 U.S.C. § 782(b) (1970) ("Communist
action" groups); 'd. at § 786(b) ("Communist front' groups), repealed, Act of Jan. 2, 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-237, § 5, 81 Stat. 766. The statute also stipulated that anyone joining a "Com-
munist action" organization knowing it to be registered as such, but whose name is not
included on that entity's membership list must personally register with the government
within sixty days after acquiring such knowledge. 50 U.S.C. § 787(a) (1950), repealed, Act of
Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-237, § 5, 81 Stat. 766. This section was subsequently held to
violate the self-incrimination provisions of the Fifth Amendment. Albertson v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 77-78 (1965). The 1950 act also made it unlawful for: (1)
a member of the government to communicate with a member of a "Communist action"
organization, 50 U.S.C. § 783(b) (1970); (2) a member of a "Communist action" organiza-
tion to receive information from a governmental employee, id. § 783(c); (3) a member of a
"Communist action" organization to engage in employment in a defense facility, 50 U.S.C. §
784(a)(1)(D) (1950); this provision was struck down as unconstitutional in United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 266 (1967); (4) a member of a "Communist action" organization to
apply for a passport, 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1950); this provision was struck down as unconstitu-
tional in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 514 (1964); (5) a "Communist action"
organization to broadcast or advertise without identifying itself as such to the public, 50
U.S.C. § 789 (1970). The act also denied tax exemptions to such organizations. Id. § 790.
614. 367 U.S. at 86. But see id. at 146 (Black, J., dissenting); Bounds of Spec(i/cation,
supra note 45, at 361.
615. 50 U.S.C. § 782(3)(a) (1970). The original act also regulated any "section, branch,
fraction, or cell" of a "Communist action" organization, but that provision was subsequently
revised. 50 U.S.C. § 782(3)(b) (1950), amended, Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-237, § 2,
81 Stat. 765.
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organization as one operated for the purpose of giving aid and support
to Communist action groups, foreign Communist governments, or the
world Communist movement. 1 6 Pursuant to section 13(e), an entity's
status as a "Communist-action" organization is to be determined by
considering eight fixed factors, namely, the extent to which its policies
are developed in conformity with the directives of foreign Communist
governments, the extent to which its policies deviate from those of such
governments, the extent to which it receives material support from for-
eign Communist states, the extent to which its members are instructed
in the tactics of Communism in such states, the extent to which it re-
ports to foreign Communist governments, the extent to which its mem-
bers are subject to discipline by such governments, the extent to which
its leaders consider their allegiance to the United States subordinate to
their allegiance to such foreign governments and the extent to which it
conceals its foreign domination by failing to disclose membership lists
and other relevant data.617 Similarly, section 13(f) defined a "Commu-
nist-front" organization by ascertaining if it was managed by members
of a foreign Communist government or a "Communist-action" organi-
zation, if it received financial support from such entities, if it promoted
objectives espoused by such entities and if its positions deviated from
the doctrines advanced by such entities.61 8 While this statute does not
mention organizations by name,619 it is specious to claim that it fails to
specify; in fact, the law provides painstakingly detailed descriptions of
organizational characteristics so that those entities affected will be eas-
ily ascertainable. The fact that the Communist Party, for instance, can
change its policies and thus avoid the coverage of the act is irrelevant to
the issue of whether the terms of the act itself are sufficiently spe-"
cific. 62° The key concern is not what the intended victim of an alleged
attainder might do to avoid a legislative sanction but rather whether
the descriptive apparatus contained within the text of the statute in
question ensures that the petitioner is indeed one of the intended vic-
616. 50 U.S.C. § 786(b) (1950), repealed, Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-237, § 5, 81
Stat. 766.
617. 50 U.S.C. § 792(e) (1970).
618. 50 U.S.C. § 792(f) (1970).
619. Justice Frankfurter made much of the fact that Congress refused to outlaw the
Communist Party by name. See 367 U.S. at 84-85.
620. It is relevant (or was relevant, in 1961) to the issue of whether or not the challenged
enactment was exclusively prospective in nature and thus not punitive. See notes 339-392
and accompanying text supra. But that distinction, false as it is, relates solely to the issue of
punishment and not to the issue of specificity, as Justice Frankfurter seemed to imply.
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tims.621 While Justice Frankfurter purported to apply Cummings, he
did, in fact, repudiate the logic of that decision, for the challenged pro-
visions in that case were far less specific than those involved in the
Communist Party decision. It is difficult to reconcile the conclusion
that a statute imposing disabilities upon members of organizations "in-
imical to the Government" is a bill of attainder with the thesis that a
law imposing disabilities on members of the organizations described in
sections 3(3), 7(b), 13(e) and (f) of the Subversive Activities Control Act
of 1950 is not. Thus, by 1965, when the United States Supreme Court
decided the Brown case,622 the subject of specificity was shrouded in
confusion.
D. "Without the Safeguards of a Judicial Trial"
A few commentators have characterized the judicial trial aspect as
the "forgotten" element of the definition of a bill of attainder.623 This is
only partly accurate. While the United States Supreme Court has
slighted this aspect of the subject,624 many lower federal and state
courts have rejected attainder challenges by relying explicitly or implic-
itly on the theory that the petitioners in question were given an ade-
quate hearing before legislative sanctions were imposed upon them.625
621. This issue might also involve aspects of standing. See notes 1051-1061 and accom-
panying text infra.
622. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). See notes 1005-1061 and accompa-
nying text infra.
623. See Needfor Clarification, supra note 12, at 242; Waning Guaranty, supra note 12,
at 857.
624. The Court has accorded meaningful consideration to this topic in only three of its
decisions. See De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960); United States v. Lovett, 328
U.S. 303, 317-18 (1946); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1898). See also Com-
munist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 87 (1961).
625. See Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34, 37 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1010 (1973) (challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (1976), which restricts ex-felons from
purchasing firearms; held the statute was not an attainder in light of the holding in De Veau
v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960)); United States v. Karnes, 437 F.2d 284, 289 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1008 (1971); (challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(2) (1976), which prohib-
its persons dishonorably discharged from the armed forces from transporting firearms in
interstate commerce; upheld as merely a legislative recognition of a prior judicial convic-
tion); Williams v. United States, 426 F.2d 253, 255 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 881
(1970) (challenge to 15 U.S.C. § 902(e) (1976), prohibiting persons convicted of a crime
punishable by more than one year in prison from transporting ammunition or firearms in
interstate commerce; found no attainder because the prior conviction and interstate trans-
portation had to be judicially established); Zwick v. Freeman, 373 F.2d 110, 119 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835 (1967) (challenge to 7 U.S.C. § 499h(b) (1976), requiring the revo-
cation of the licenses of commodity dealers who file for bankruptcy and receive court ap-
proval of a reorganization plan; held, no attainder because revocation occurs after an
administrative hearing subject to judicial review); Byers v. Crouse, 339 F.2d 550, 552 (10th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 933 (1965) (challenge to Kansas Habitual Criminal Act,
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Thus, this component of the definition of a bill of attainder has both
required and received a relatively extensive amount of analysis.
permitting a judge to impose a more stringent sentence upon those deemed to be habitual
criminals; found no attainder, citing People v. Lawrence, 390 Ill. 499, 504-05, 61 N.E.2d 361,
364 (1945) (see infra)); Postma v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 294, 337 F.2d 609,
611 (2d Cir. 1964) (challenge to 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1970), prohibiting, inter alia, ex-felons
from serving as union officers; held valid, citing De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160
(1960)); Dodez v. United States, 154 F.2d 637, 638 (6th Cir.), rev'don oihergroundssub nom.
Gibson v. United States, 329 U.S. 338 (1946) (challenge to various provisions of the Selec-
tive Service Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 301-309a (1940); found no punishment without
judicial trial because a draftee had available a writ of habeas corpus with which to challenge
the constitutionality of the enactments in question); Story v. Rives, 97 F.2d 182, 188 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 595 (1938) (challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 716(b) (1932), authorizing
revocation of parole granted to ex-felons who subsequently commit another crime; said the
statute did not attaint, but merely compelled the petitioner to serve the balance of his initial
sentence); United States v. Furem, 389 F. Supp. 285, 286 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (challenge to
same statute involved in Cody; found no attainder, citing Cody); United States v. Three
Winchester 30-30 Caliber Level Action Carbines, Model 94, 363 F. Supp. 322, 323 (E.D.
Wis. 1973), affjd, 504 F.2d 1288, 1290 n.5 (7th Cir. 1974) (challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)
(1976), prohibiting felon from possessing firearms; found no attainder, citing Cody); Keyi-
shian v. Board of Regents, 255 F. Supp. 981, 987-88 (W.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd on other
grounds, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (challenge to New York's Feinberg Law, see notes 203-204
and accompanying text supra; held, no attainder because the petitioners were accorded a
pretermination administrative hearing); United States ex rel. Heacock v. Myers, 251 F.
Supp. 773, 774 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 367 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. demedsub non Heacock
v. Rundle, 386 U.S. 925 (1967) (challenge to a Pennsylvanian statute authorizing revocation
of parole of one committing another crime; held as constitutional, citing United States ex
rel Home v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Parole, 234 F. Supp. 368, 370 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (see infra));
Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 244 F. Supp. 745, 746 n.l (W.D. Pa. 1965),
vacatedon other grounds, 372 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 463 (1967) (challenge to
same statute involved in Postma; found no attainder, citing the logic of Hawker v. New
York, 170 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1898)); United States exrel. Kloiber v. M ers, 237 F. Supp. 682,
684 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (challenge to same statute involved in Heacock; held, no attainder,
citing Story); United States ex rel Home v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Parole, 234 F. Supp. 368,
370 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (challenge to same law involved in Heacock; found no attainder, citing
Story for the proposition that the petitioner suffered a deprivation only after a full judicial
trial); Dalton v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 216 F. Supp. 600, 603 (D. Md.), cert. denied
sub nom. Bosler v. Dalton, 373 U.S. 942 (1963) (challenge to Mar.land act allowing an
administrative board the discretion to give or deny a recommitted parolee credit for the time
he was on parole; dismissed attainder argument as meritless); United States v. Kuzma, 141
F. Supp. 91, 94 (E.D. Pa. 1954) (challenge to the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1976), pro-
scribing subversive advocacy; upheld because penalties could be assessed against the peti-
tioners only after a full judicial trial); United States v. Silverman, 132 F. Supp. 820, 832 (D.
Conn. 1955) (challenge to the Smith Act; found no attainder because the petitioner was
"entitled to a full judicial trial in this case"); Peer v. Skeen, 108 F. Supp. 921, 922 (N.D.W.
Va.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 930 (1952) (challenge to West Virginian habitual criminal stat-
ute; found no attainder, citing People v. Lawrence, 390 Ill. 499, 504-05, 61 N.E.2d 361, 364
(1945) (see infra)); United States ex rel Lubbers v. Reimer, 22 F. Supp. 573, 575 (S.D.N.Y.
1938) (challenge to 8 U.S.C. § 213a (1937), authorizing deportation of an immigrant who
enters the country by promising fraudulently to marry a citizen; found no attainder because
sanctions imposed only after an administrative hearing); United States v. Stein, 18 F.R.D.
17, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (challenge to the Smith Act; found no attainder, citing Silverman);
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The meaning of the phrase "safeguards of a judicial trial" should
be self-evident. It simply signifies that if a legislature wishes to adjudi-
cate the cases of individuals, it must provide those individuals with the
same procedural protections which they would be entitled to were they
Westmoreland v. Chapman, 268 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5, 74 Cal. Rptr. 363, 366 (1968) (challenge
to Californian law requiring the revocation of the license of any driver refusing to submit to
sobriety tests; said revocation preceded by full administrative hearing); People v. Douglas,
187 Cal. App. 2d 802, 811, 10 Cal. Rptr. 188, 194 (1961) (challenge to Californian habitual
criminal statute; upheld because it merely increased the penalty attendant to a criminal con-
viction); People v. Israel, 91 Cal. App. 2d 773, 784, 206 P.2d 62, 69 (1949) (challenge to same
statute involved in Douglas; upheld because punishment was said to be imposed only after a
full trial); Perez v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 78 Cal. App. 2d 638, 650, 178 P.2d 537, 544
(1947) (challenge to resolution of the defendant board stipulating that no police officer could
remain or become a union member, found no attainder because the Los Angeles city charter
was said to provide for a full trial); People v. Camperlingo, 69 Cal. App. 466, 474, 231 P.
601, 603 (1924) (challenge to state law prohibiting ex-felon from possessing a firearm; found
no attainder because deprivation imposed only after prior felony conviction); People v. Law-
rence, 390 Ill. 499, 504-05, 61 N.E.2d 361, 364 (1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 731 (1945)
(challenge to Illinois habitual criminal statute; held, that the law does not punish without
trial because a person's "prior conviction is no ingredient of the main offense, but is merely
a matter of aggravation going solely to the punishment to be imposed, and we do not see
how that could attaint the class of persons referred to"); Hamilton v. Indiana ex rel Van
Natta, - Ind. App. -, 323 N.E.2d 659, 660-61 (1975) (challenge to state law depriving
habitual traffic offenders of their driver's licenses; found no attainder because deprivation
occurred only after repeated convictions); Daly v. State, 296 Minn. 238, 239, 207 N.W.2d
541, 543 (1973) (challenge to state law revoking license of motorist refusing to submit to
sobriety tests; upheld because those affected were entitled to judicial review of revocation
decision); King v. Swenson, 423 S.W.2d 699, 704-05 (Mo. 1968) (challenge to state statute
providing that the sentence of one convicted of committing a crime while incarcerated shall
commence to run only after the expiration of the sentence for which the inmate is being
held; found no attainder because guilt was to be judicially determined); Oueilhe v. Lovell,
560 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Nev. 1977) (challenge to Las Vegas ordinance prohibiting the operation
of businesses promoting wrestling between members of the opposite sex; held, no attainder
because a violation of the enactment would be the subject of a judicial determination); Wil-
liams v. Sills, 55 NJ. 178, 186, 260 A.2d 505, 509 (1970) (challenge to state law requiring an
uninsured motorist involved in an automobile accident to post bond or suffer forfeiture of
his or her driver's license; upheld because review of any forfeiture was said to be left up to
the courts); Application of Marvin, 53 N.J. 147, 154-55, 249 A.2d 377, 381 (1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 821 (1969) (challenge to state enactment requiring an applicant for a pistol
permit to disclose membership in subversive organizations; upheld because key determina-
tions were to be made by the judiciary); Thompson v. Wallin, 301 N.Y. 476, 493, 95 N.E.2d
806, 814 (1950), aff'dsub nom. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (challenge to
New York's Feinberg Law (see notes 203-204 and accompanying text supra); found no at-
tainder because of the availability of an administrative hearing); Weinstock v. Ladisky, 197
Misc. 859, 875, 98 N.Y.S.2d 85, 101 (1950) (challenge to union charter banning subversives;
found no attainder because charter provided for a "hearing" to determine guilt); Common-
wealth exrel. Thomas v. Myers, 419 Pa. 577, 581, 215 A.2d 617, 619-20 (1966) (challenge to
same statute involved in Heacock; found no attainder, citing Home); Cox v. State, 222
Tenn. 606, 614, 439 S.W.2d 267, 271 (1969) (challenge to law providing that a person
charged with a crime who is thereafter deemed insane and committed may be compelled to
have his estate pay commitment costs; found no attainder because of jury trial on issue of
insanity); State v. Scheffel, 82 Wash. 2d 872, 881, 514 P.2d 1052, 1058 (1973) (challenge to
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being tried in a court of law. Justice Black emphasized this point quite
forcefully in his opinion for the Court in the case of United States v.
Lovett.
.626
Those who wrote out Constitution well knew the danger in-
herent in special legislative acts which take away the life, liberty,
or property of particular named persons because the legislature
thinks them guilty of conduct which deserves punishment. They
intended to safeguard the people of this country from punish-
ment without trial by duly constituted courts ..... nd even the
courts to which this important function was entrusted were com-
manded to stay their hands until and unless certain tested safe-
guards were observed. An accused in court must be tried by an
impartial jury, has a right to be represented by counsel, he must
be clearly informed of the charge against him, the law which he is
charged with violating must have been passed before he commit-
ted the act charged, he must be confronted by the witnesses
against him, he must not be compelled to incriminate himself, he
cannot twice be put in jeopardy for the same offense, and even
after conviction no cruel and unusual punishment can be in-
flicted upon him.. . . When our Constitution and Bill of Rights
were written, our ancestors had ample reason to know that legis-
lative trials and punishments were too dangerous to liberty to ex-
ist in the nation of free men they envisioned. And so they
proscribed bills of attainder.627
This language is uncompromising. It establishes a simple syllogism,
namely, that the bill of attainder clauses were intended to prevent legis-
latures from inflicting punishment without judicial trial. Therefore, if
the legislature wishes to enact punitive laws, the sanctions imposed by
those laws must be accompanied by the same set of procedural safe-
guards available at a trial. As Justice Black himself points out, this syl-
logism is not innovative; it does no more than restate the traditional
due process justification for the proscriptions against bills of
attainder.628
One important gloss has been added to the basic interpretation
promulgated by Justice Black in Lovett. In Putty v. United States,629
the petitioner was convicted on January 27, 1953 of conspiracy and
theft of federal property by a district court located in the Trust Terri-
law depriving habitual traffic offenders of licenses; found no attainder because of the availa-
bility of an administrative hearing).
626. 328 U.S. 303 (1946). See notes 180-198 and accompanying text supra.
627. Id. at 317-18. Accord, Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 160 (1959) (Black,
J., dissenting).
628. See notes 49-51 and accompanying text supra.
629. 220 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 821 (1955).
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tory of Guam.630 His conviction had been based on an information
filed by the local prosecutor; at the time, however, the Organic Act of
Guam applied the federal rules of criminal procedure, which required
grand jury indictments.631 Accordingly, in 1954, two decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
Guamanian prosecutions based on informations were invalid.632 Sub-
sequently, on August 27, 1954, Congress amended the Organic Act of
Guam by passing a statute that validated all convictions founded upon
prosecutorial informations filed since August 1, 1950.633 The Ninth
Circuit, after concluding that the proscription against bills of attainder
applied to territories,6" characterized the 1954 amendment as one en-
acted for the purpose of denying a class of defendants in criminal cases
the power to attack collaterally the judgments of conviction rendered
by trial courts lacking jurisdiction.635 It therefore found that the
amendment "would inflict imprisonment on them 'without a judicial
trial' and mark them as felons with subsequent denial of employment,
etc."'636 Thus, in Putty it was held that an attempt by a legislature to
cure retroactively a jurisdictional defect in a criminal conviction,
thereby denying the person convicted the opportunity to wage a collat-
eral attack on the proceedings against him, was a bill of attainder. The
case underscores the fact that the concept of a "judicial trial," as dis-
cussed in Lovell, entails providing a defendant procedural fairness
both at the indictment stage of the proceedings against him and at the
appeal stages.
Unfortunately, Lovett and Putty are rarities. Both the United
States Supreme Court and lower state and federal courts have not con-
formed strictly to the mandates of Lovett and the tradition that Lovett
represents. In this section, two areas of discrepancy between the ideal
stated in Lovett and the reality promulgated by other courts will be
examined: the timing of the judicial trial afforded to the victim of a
given enactment and the nature of the trial afforded to such a person.
630. 220 F.2d at 474.
631. See id See 48 U.S.C. § 1424(b) (1970).
632. Hatchett v. Government of Guam, 212 F.2d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 1954); Pugh v.
United States, 212 F.2d 761, 763 (9th Cir. 1954).
633. See Act of August 27, 1954, Pub. L. No. 679, ch. 1017, 68 Stat. 882.
634. 220 F.2d at 475. See Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 142 (1904) (quoting Scott
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 614 (1857); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 276-77
(1901)).
635. 220 F.2d at 478.
636. Id.
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. Timing of the Hearing
Problems of timing can be most readily comprehended by estab-
lishing a typology of the cases presenting such problems. A cursory
consideration of the various decisions yields the conclusion that there
are four major types of cases which the courts have confronted. The
first type is the least troublesome; it involves situations in which a stat-
ute exacts deprivations from an individual after a full judicial trial.
This class of cases is best exemplified by the Smith Act decisions, par-
ticularly United States v. Kuzma.6 37 The Smith Act3 proscribes the
advocacy of, or membership in or establishment of an organization that
advocates forcible overthrow of the government; thus, it defines a par-
ticular offense. Conspiracy to commit this offense is punishable under
the terms of the general federal conspiracy statute63' and, of course, a
full judicial trial precedes such punishment. The court in Kuzma, con-
fronted with an indictment alleging conspiracy to violate the Smith Act
accordingly asserted the enactment conformed to the accepted pattern
of criminal legislation because it defined an offense and, in conjunction
with another statute, penalized a conspiracy to commit that offense.' 4
Thus, conviction under the general conspiracy statute was, necessarily,
a prerequisite to the imposition of any penal sanction. Consequently,
637. 141 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. Pa. 1954). The other Smith Act cases adopting a similar
position are United States v. Silverman, 132 F. Supp. 820, 832 (D. Conn. 1955); United
States v. Stein, 18 F.R.D. 17, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), afl'd, 140 F. Supp. 761, 767 (S.D.N.Y.
1956). In both Kuzma and Silverman, convictions for violation of federal conspiracy laws
were obtained but not uniformly affirmed on appeal. See United States v. Kuzma, 249 F.2d
619, 623 (3d Cir. 1957) (upheld convictions wherever there was some evidence those con-
victed subscribed to and approved of the teaching of Marxism-Leninism); United States v.
Silverman, 248 F.2d 671, 686-87 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 942 (1958) (reversed
convictions because evidence adduced at trial indicated advocacy falling short of
incitement).
638. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1976). The general constitutionality of the act was upheld by a
total of six justices in three different opinions in the case of Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951). The major opinion adopted the view that courts in subversive advocacy
cases could legitimately ask "'whether the gravity of the "evil," discounted by its improba-
bility, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."' Id. at 5 10
(Vinson, C.J., joined by Burton, Minton & Reed, JJ.) (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183
F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950) (opinion of L. Hand, J.)). Several years later, a differently
constituted plurality held that the act prohibited only advocacy of action rather than advo-
cacy of ideas. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 324-25 (1957) (Harlan, J., joined by
Warren, C.J., and Frankfurter, J.) Finally, in 1961, a majority of the Court held that the
membership provisions of the act applied only to persons possessing knowledge of an organ-
ization's proscribed advocacy and harboring a specific intent to forcibly overthrow the gov-
ernment. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1961). Accord, Noto v. United
States, 367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961). See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM
OF ExPREsSION 110-29 (1970)[hereinafter cited as EMERSON].
639. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). See note 1074 infra.
640. 141 F. Supp. at 94.
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the court noted that the two statutes did not combine to create a bill of
pains and penalties because the defendants were afforded a full judicial
trial at which, inter alia, an attainder challenge could be thoroughly
litigated." Kuzma, and cases like it," 2 present few problems because
they meet the criteria laid down by Justice Black in Lovett. The legisla-
ture is not itself trying individuals but is instead defining a crime; indi-
vidual guilt is at all times determined by a court of law, thus ensuring
the defendant all the usual safeguards inherent in a criminal
adjudication.
The second type of case also presents relatively few difficulties. It
involves the situation in which a deprivation is first imposed upon an
individual and he is then given a subsequent opportunity to test the
validity of that imposition in the courts. A few examples will illustrate
the problem. In Dodez v. United States,"3 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Selective Training and
Service Act of 194064 was not an attainder because "the writ of habeas
corpus is available to protect rights of the individual after his induction
into the service. The Constitution does not guarantee one the right to
select his own tribunal or his own method of procedure." 64 Thus, if a
641. Id.
642. Id See Perez v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 78 Cal. App. 2d 638, 650, 178 P.2d 537,
544 (1947); King v. Swenson, 423 S.W.2d 699, 704-05 (Mo. 1968). For brief discussions of
these cases, see note 625 supra Cf. State v. Thompson, 221 Kan. 165, 173, 558 P.2d 1079,
1085 (1976) (challenge to statute prohibiting forcible sodomy; held, it does not contain the
elements of an attainder, including lack ofjudicial trial); State v. MePhaul, 116 N.H. -, 362
A.2d 199, 201 (1976) (challenge to murder statute; held, no attainder, because no legislative
determination of guilt). See also Gotcheus v. Matheson, 58 Barb. 153, 160 (1870), rev'd on
othergrounds, 61 N.Y. 420 (1875); Huber v. Reilly, 53 Pa. St. Rep. 112, 121 (1866). Both of
these cases involved attainder challenges to an act of Congress denationalizing deserters, Act
of March 3, 1865, ch. 79, § 21, 13 Stat. 490. In each lawsuit, alleged deserters who had never
been court-martialed were denied the right to vote in state elections because they were said
to have forfeited their citizenship. Both the New York and Pennsylvanian courts held that
the act in question did not attaint because it contemplated a court-martial on the underlying
charge of desertion prior to denationalization. Therefore, each court held that the plaintiff in
question, never having been court-martialed, was entitled to cast his ballot.
643. 154 F.2d 637 (6th Cir.), rey'd on other grounds sub nom. Gibson v. United States,
329 U.S. 338 (1946).
644. 54 Stat. 885, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 301-309a (1940).
645. 154 F.2d at 638. In the context of the factual situation in Dodez, this statement is
classifiable as a dictum. The petitioner in that case, a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses,
was aggrieved about the failure of his local draft board to reclassify him from IV-E (consci-
entious objector status) to IV-D (minister of religion status); he therefore failed to respond to
requests to report for alternative non-combatant service and was tried, convicted and sen-
tenced to five years in prison. See id. at 640-41. Thus, his particular case did not fit within
the option described by the court of appeals. Dodez also argued that he had exhausted his
administrative remedies and thus was entitled to judicial review of his selective service clas-
sification as a defense to his indictment. Id. at 638. The Sixth Circuit cited a 1944 decision
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draftee discontented with his classification wished to challenge the ad-
ministrative determination made in his case without first breaking the
law, he had to submit to military service and then seek redress through
the courts. In Application of Marvin,6 4
6 a New Jersey enactment 6" 7
deemed to permit the state to require applicants for pistol permits to
disclose membership in subversive organizations was found not to be a
bill of attainder both because the state had an overriding interest in
restricting sales of firearms to certain classes of untrustworthy persons
and because it ensured that all key adjudicative determinations (most
particularly, the definition of "subversive organization") would be left
to the courts." Yet the New Jersey Supreme Court neglected to con-
sider the timing problem: a companion statutory provision permitted
one denied a permit the right to request a hearing only within the
thirty-day period following the administrative refusal. 49 Similarly, in
Williams v. Sills,65° an attainder challenge was raised against another
New Jersey law requiring the state's director of the Department of Mo-
tor Vehicles to suspend the license of any uninsured motorist involved
in an automobile accident causing personal injury or property damage
exceeding two hundred dollars unless that motorist posted a prescribed
of the Supreme Court in support of the theory that the petitioner had not exhausted his
administrative remedies because he had failed to report for induction. Id. (citing Falbo v.
United States, 320 U.S. 549, 553 (1944)). On appeal, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed on this point, asserting that Dodez could defend against the charge of desertion
made against him in his criminal trial by showing that his local draft board improperly
refused to reclassify him. Gibson v. United States, 329 U.S. 338, 350 (1946).
This issue has prompted one commentator to raise an interesting contention. He argues
that courts improperly emphasize whether or not a statutory scheme provides for a trial and
hearing when they should instead be focusing on whether the legislature acted with the
intent to burden a fixed class. Punishment, supra note 14, at 253. As a result of this megiti-
mate emphasis, he contends that the courts ignore whether or not the trial in question af-
fords an individual a meaningful opportunity to challenge both his inclusion within the class
created by the enactment in question and the constitutionality of so legislating a fixed class;
he then cites Dodez as an example of a situation in which a petitioner may be precluded
from raising the broader constitutional issue of punishment. Id. at 253-55. But Gibson ex-
plicitly grants persons like Dodez the right to raise such an issue, so the criticism is mis-
placed in this context; Dodez, like the defendants in Kuzma, see note 641 and
accompanying text supra, was entitled to raise all constitutional defenses to any criminal
charges arising from his violation of the statute. The problem with the Dodez case is really
the issue of timing rather than the substantive nature of the judicial hearing afforded. But
other cases do present issues about an individual's ability to raise broad constitutional chal-
lenges within the context of statutorily-prescribed administrative hearings. See note 720
infra.
646. 53 N.J. 147, 249 A.2d 377 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 821 (1969).
647. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:151-35 (West 1973).
648. 53 N.J. at 154-55, 249 A.2d at 381.
649. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:151-34 (West 1973).
650. 55 N.J. 178, 260 A.2d 505 (1970).
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surety bond or filed a notice of release or settlement.65' This statute was
upheld because the court concluded that the administrative decision to
suspend was subject to judicial review after the fact.
652
Each of these decisions ignores a basic point: one of the underlying
"safeguards of a judicial trial" is that a hearing precedes imposition of
any sanction. In Dodez, Marvin and Williams, the courts endorsed stat-
utory schemes whereby individuals were accorded a hearing only after
the state had inflicted a deprivation upon them; to say that such
schemes satisfy the requirement of a judicial trial is to undermine the
very safeguards that that requirement was designed to protect. This last
assertion does not mean that these three cases were decided incorrectly.
The acts in question might well be construed as regulatory rather than
punitive legislation653 (and, indeed, the courts in Williams and Marvin
explicitly, and the court in Dodez implicitly, advanced such a construc-
tion6 ') in order to avoid the proscription against bills of attainder. But
it is important to realize that while the results reached may have been
right, the reasoning used was, at least in part, wrong.
The third type of case involves a situation in which an individual
has been tried and convicted in the past and the state now seeks to
impose an additional deprivation upon him because of that conviction
without granting him a new trial. Two decisions of the United States
Supreme Court typify this genre. In Hawker v. New York,655 the Court
upheld a state law denying ex-felons licenses to practice medicine. Af-
ter noting that good character was a legitimate prerequisite which the
state could insist upon and that the absence or presence of a prior fel-
ony conviction was a reliable indicator of whether or not a person pos-
sessed a bad character,656 the Court said:
That the form in which this legislation is cast suggests the
idea of the imposition of an additional punishment for past of-
fenses is not conclusive. We must look at the substance and not
the form, and the statute should be regarded as though it in terms
declared that one who had violated the criminal laws of the state
should be deemed of such bad character as to be unfit to practice
medicine, and that the record of a trial and conviction should be
651. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-25(a), (b) (West 1973).
652. 55 NJ. at 186, 260 A.2d at 509.
653. For an analysis of this distinction, see notes 479-544 and accompanying text supra.
654. See Dodez v. United States, 154 F.2d 637, 638 (6th Cir. 1946) (said the challenged
enactment did not impose punishment without a judicial trial); Williams v. Sills, 55 NJ. 178,
186, 260 A.2d 505, 509 (1970); Application of Marvin, 53 N.J 147, 154-55, 249 A.2d 377, 381
(1969) (both decisions labelling the acts questioned as regulatory).
655. 170 U.S. 189 (1898). See notes 505-518 and accompanying text supra.
656. Id. at 196.
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conclusive evidence of such violation. . . . The State is not seek-
ing to further punish a criminal, but only to protect its citizens
from physicians of bad character. The vital matter is not the con-
viction, but the violation of law. The former is merely the pre-
scribed evidence of the latter. Suppose the statute had contained
only a clause declaring that no one should be permitted to act as
a physician who had violated the criminal laws of the state, leav-
ing the question of violation to be determined according to the
ordinary rules of evidence, would it not seem strange to hold that
that which conclusively established the fact effectually relieved
one from the consequences of such violation?
It is no answer to say that this test of character is not in all
cases absolutely certain, and that sometimes it works harshly.
Doubtless, one who has violated the criminal law may thereafter
reform and become in fact possessed of a good moral character.
But the legislature has power in cases of this kind to make a rule
of universal application, and no inquiry is permissible back of the
rule to ascertain whether the fact of which the rule is made the
absolute test does or does not exist.657
Over half a century later, in DeVeau v. Braisted,658 the Supreme Court
had occasion to consider the validity of section eight of the New York
Water-front Commission Act of 1953,659 which forbade a union to as-
sess contributions from employees licensed pursuant to the act if any
officer or agent of the union had ever been convicted of a felony. Jus-
tice Frankfurter's plurality opinion 660 dismissed an attainder challenge
by remarking that the statute did not substitute a legislative for a judi-
cial determination of guilt but rather embodied only those implications
of culpability already inherent in the prior conviction of any union of-
ficer affected by the act.6 6 '
Both these decisions pose some thorny problems. As the Court in
Hawker noted, the New York statute in that case established, in effect,
657. Id. at 196-97.
658. 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
659. 1953 N.Y. Laws, chs. 882, 883, UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 9801-9937 (McKinney 1953).
All three levels of the New York judicial system had upheld the constitutionality of this
enactment. See De Veau v. Braisted, 11 Misc. 2d 661, 664, 166 N.Y.S.2d 751, 754 (1957),
aff'd, 5 App. Div. 2d 603, 614, 174 N.Y.S.2d 596, 607 (2d Dep't 1958), affd, 5 N.Y.2d 236,
242, 157 N.E.2d 165, 168, 5 N.Y.S.2d 793, 797 (1959).
660. Justice Frankfurter was joined by Justices Clark, Stewart and Whittaker. Justice
Harlan did not participate. Justice Brennan's separate concurrence characterized the statute
as a "reasonable means for achieving a legitimate state aim." 363 U.S. at 161 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). A group of three dissenters concluded that federal law (most particularly, the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-525 (Supp. V 1975)) governed the field to the exclusion
of other state legislation. 363 U.S. at 164 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C..,
and Black, J.).
661. 363 U.S. at 160.
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an irrebuttable presumption: because one has been convicted of a fel-
ony, it therefore follows that one is necessarily unfit to practice
medicine. This conclusive assumption is not merely harsh; it is possibly
unconstitutional: "permanent irrebuttable presumptions have long
been disfavored under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments." '662 But the inequity of such a statute is even more
fundamental. Implicit in the Court's approach in Hawker is the thesis
that the state is imposing a disability on the basis of a conviction arising
from a prior trial, a conviction that is supposedly conclusive evidence
of moral degeneracy; therefore, the disability is being exacted after and
as a result of a full adjudication in a court of law. While Hawker does
not expressly make this connection,663 DeVeau and other lower court
662. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973) (struck down a Connecticut statute con-
clusively presuming a student attending a state university to be a non-resident for tuition
purposes if he or she had lived outside the state at any time during the preceding year).
Accord, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632, 646 (1974) (challenge to
mandatory maternity leave regulation for public school teachers incorporating a presump-
tion that a woman could not teach classes after her fourth month of pregnancy; held "the
conclusive presumption embodied in these rules, like that in Viandis, is neither 'necessarily
[nor] universally true,' and is violative of the Due Process Clause."); Department of Agricul-
ture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973) (challenge to a provision of the federal food stamp
act withholding eligibility to participate in the food stamp program from any household that
includes a member who is eighteen or older and who is claimed as a dependent for income
tax purposes by one who is not a member of an eligible household; held "the deduction
taken for the benefit of the parent in the prior year is not a rational measure of the need of a
different household with which the child of the tax-deducting parent lives and rests on an
irrebuttable presumption often contrary to fact."); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657
(1972) (challenge to state law containing conclusive assumption that unmarried fathers are
incompetent to raise their children; said this procedure "forecloses the determinative issues
of competence and care, when it explicitly disclaims present realities in deference to past
formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over important interests of both parent
and child."); Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 329 (1932) (challenge to a provision of the
Internal Revenue Act creating a conclusive presumption that a gift made within two years of
the donor's death is classifiable as a gift made in contemplation of death; said a law "creat-
ing a presumption which operates to deny a fair opportunity to rebut it violates the due
process clause. . . .") Critical reaction to the doctrine of irrebuttable presumptions has been
mixed, although it is probably accurate to say that a preponderance of the commentators on
the subject believe that it is a wholly unprecedented and unfounded theory of constitutional
law. Compare Tribe, From Environmental Foundations to Constitutional Structures. Learning
From Nature's Future, 84 YALE L.J. 545, 553-54 (1975) (approving of the technique) with
Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1534,
1544-49 (1974); Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 449,
462-74 (1975) (disapproving of the technique as it has been applied).
663. The closest the Court comes to doing so is in the following statement:
The conviction is, as between the State and the defendant, an adjudication of the
fact. So if the legislature enacts that one who has been convicted of crime shall no
longer engage in the practice of medicine, it is simply applying the doctrine of res
judicata and invoking the conclusive adjudication of the fact that the man has
violated the criminal law, and is presumptively, therefore, a man of such bad char-
acter as to render it unsafe to trust the lives and health of citizens to his care.
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decisions do.664 The difficulty with this contention is that the issues of a
person's guilt for a certain crime and a person's fitness to practice a
profession arise in different contexts and involve differing concerns. A
judicial determination of the former issue is not intended also to decide
the latter issue. Absent a full hearing on each denial of an individual
application for a professional license, there is no way to consider the
variety of factors that need to be taken into account, including: the age
of the person when he committed the prior felony, the nature of the
felony itself, whether the prior sentence was the result of plea bargain-
ing, the mitigating circumstances (if any) surrounding the commission
of the prior felony, the nature of the sentence handed down as a result
of conviction, the lapse of time between the commission of the felony
and the application for a professional license, the extent to which the
ex-felon can be said to have rehabilitated himself, whether or not he
was paroled for good behavior, whether or not he ever breached the
conditions of that parole, whether or not the felony for which he was
convicted related directly (as in Hawker)66 to the profession he now
seeks to practice, whether or not the licensing statute might be uncon-
stitutional solely as applied to the particular applicant in question
666
and so on. The original trial court might consider the first four of these
issues, but it will do so only to the extent that they bear upon the de-
fendant's culpability for the crime with which he is charged; analyzing
how these issues bear upon the defendant's prospective fitness to prac-
tice a profession is simply beyond the scope of the trial court's inquiry.
Similarly, the trial court is in no position to take into account the other
seven enumerated factors because all of these factors postdate the trial
on the felony charge. Thus, the courts arguing that a person who has a
subsequent deprivation inflicted upon him because of his status as an
Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898).
664. See Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34, 37 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1010 (1973); United States v. Karnes, 437 F.2d 284, 289 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
1008 (1971); Williams v. United States, 426 F.2d 253, 255 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
881 (1970); Postma v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 294, 337 F.2d 609, 611 (2d Cir.
1964); United States v. Furem, 389 F. Supp. 285, 286 (E.D. Wis. 1975); United States v.
Three Winchester 30-30 Caliber Level Action Carbines, Model 94, 363 F. Supp. 322, 323
(E.D. Wis. 1973), affd, 504 F.2d 1288, 1290 n.5 (7th Cir. 1974); Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass
Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 244 F. Supp. 745, 746 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 1965), vacated on other grounds,
372 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 463 (1967); People v. Camperlingo, 69 Cal. App.
466, 474, 231 P. 601, 603 (1924). For brief descriptions of these cases, see note 625 supra.
665. Hawker had been convicted of committing an illegal abortion. See notes 551-552
and accompanying text supra.
666. Hawker also claimed that the law, as applied to him, was ex post facto. One New
York appellate court and three justices of the United States Supreme Court agreed with this
contention. See notes 553, 559 supra.
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ex-felon cannot be the victim of an attainder because he had a prior
trial are really denying such a person any meaningful hearing
whatsoever.
The fourth and final type of case involves the situation in which
there exists both a prior and present trial, each of which results in a
conviction, and an additional penalty included in the sentence arising
from the second conviction, which is added because of the combined
effect of the two convictions. Two major variants of this situation are
prevalent. The first is exemplified by Story v. Rives.667 The appellant in
that case was convicted of robbery in the District of Columbia on Janu-
ary 20, 1933. He was sentenced to serve a prison term of from two years
and seven months, to five years.668 On September 30, 1936, Story was
released conditionally pursuant to an 1875 federal statute that provided
for early release of convicts who exhibit good conduct while in
prison.669 In November of 1936, a warrant was issued for the detention
of the appellant; he was taken into custody, indicted and convicted of
having committed a second crime while on release.67° Under a 1932
federal statute, a person whose sentence was reduced for good conduct
while in prison could be treated as if he had been paroled and, if he
violated the terms of his release, could thus be required to serve not
only the full duration of the sentence for his second conviction, but also
the unexpired term of his prior sentence, which had been reduced pro-
visionally.671 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia dismissed an attainder challenge on the ground that:
The act does not attempt "to inflict punishment without a judicial
trial," or otherwise. The penalty suffered by a prisoner who is
returned to custody following violation of the conditions of his
release is the serving of the balance of his sentence, for which
credit for good conduct was provisionally allowed. The rule ap-
plicable is the same as that which controls when a prisoner is
returned to custody following a breach of parole. The sentence
originally imposed was merely suspended during the period ofparole. 672
667. 97 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 595 (1938).
668. 97 F.2d at 183.
669. Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 479, amended, Act of June 21, 1902, 32 Stat. 397
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 710-713 (1902)).
670. 97 F.2d at 184.
671. Id. See Act of June 29, 1932, 47 Stat. 381 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 7166 (1932)).
672. 97 F.2d at 188. The logic of Story has been followed, either explicitly or implicitly,
by a group of federal and state rulings on the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Board of
Parole Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.21a (1964). See United States ex rel. Heacock v.
Myers, 251 F. Supp. 773, 774 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 367 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. deniedsub
nom. Heacock v. Rundle, 386 U.S. 925 (1967); United States exreL. Kloiber v. Myers, 237 F.
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The second variant is typified by People v. Lawrence.673 That case
involved a challenge to the Illinois Habitual Criminal Act, 674 which
permits a judge to impose a more severe sentence upon a defendant
found guilty of committing a felony who has been convicted at least
once before and thus may be deemed an habitual criminal. The peti-
tioner in Lawrence, having been so characterized, received a twenty-
year sentence for a second conviction of robbery."7 The Illinois
Supreme Court pointed out that a prior conviction was not an ingredi-
ent of the main offense charged, but merely a matter of aggravation
with respect to the punishment to be imposed.6 76 As a result, it found
no infliction of a penalty without judicial trial because the punishment
imposed was for the new crime only, but was "heavier if the [defendant
was] a habitual criminal, and in this respect he [had] been given a judi-
cial trial. '67 7 Thus, an attainder challenge was rejected.6 7
These cases offer an interesting contrast. On balance, it can be
seen that Story was correctly decided. The initial sentence imposed
upon the appellant in that case followed a full judicial trial on the un-
derlying charge. That sentence was reduced provisionally as a matter of
grace and nothing prevented the state from attaching a condition to
that reduction.6 79 In Story, the appellant was not being penalized with-
out a trial but rather was being compelled to serve the remainder of a
sentence handed down after full proceedings in a court of law. The
point to remember is that the first (and provisionally reduced) and sec-
ond sentences imposed upon Story were exacted as a result of a judicial
Supp. 682, 684 (E.D. Pa. 1965), United States ex rel. Home v. Pennsy ivania Bd. of Parole,
234 F. Supp. 368, 370 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Commonwealth ex rel. Thomas v. Myers, 419 Pa.
577, 581, 215 A.2d 617, 619-20 (1966).
673. 390 Ill. 499, 61 N.E.2d 361 (1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 731 (1945).
674. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 1 602 (1943).
675. 390 Ill. at 501, 61 N.E.2d at 362.
676. Id. at 504-05, 61 N.E.2d at 364.
677. Id. at 504, 61 N.E.2d at 364.
678. Id. at 504-05, 61 N.E.2d at 364. Various state habitual criminal acts have been
defended against attainder challenges by state and federal courts applying the rationale of
Lawrence. See Byers v. Crouse, 339 F.2d 550, 552 (10th Cir. 1964), cert denied, 382 U.S. 933
(1965); Peer v. Skeen, 108 F. Supp. 921, 922 (N.D. W.Va.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 930 (1952);
People v. Douglas, 187 Cal. App. 2d 802, 811, 10 Cal. Rptr. 188, 194 (1960); People v. Israel,
91 Cal. App. 2d 773,784,206 P.2d 62, 69 (1949). Cf. Hamilton v. Indiana ex rel. Van Natta,
-Ind. App. -, 323 N.E.2d 659, 660-61 (1975) (see note 625 supra, for a brief description of
this case).
679. Accord, Douglas v. King, 110 F.2d 911, 913 .(8th Cir. 1940) (challenge to 18 U.S.C.
§ 876 (1930), which found that a prisoner adjudged insane and hospitalized was ineligible
for the benefits of the reduced-sentence act involved in Story, see note 669 and accompany-
ing text supra; held section 876 was not a bill of attainder since the reduced-sentence act
accorded, at best, a conditional right and that condition had been suspended by the onset of
the petitioner's insanity).
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finding of the commission of specific criminal acts. The same is not
true in Lawrence. There, the state is not exacting a penalty as the result
of a conviction for a particular, discrete crime; rather it is inflicting an
additional and quite separate punishment upon a person for having
achieved the status of an habitual criminal. Yet the petitioner in
Lawrence was never granted a hearing on his putative habitual crimi-
nality; the presiding judge simply deduced such criminality because of
a prior conviction for a felony. The logic of such a deduction is irrele-
vant;6 0 at all times, the defendant has been tried only with respect to
the commission of specific crimes, never with respect to his status as an
inveterate offender. Thus, to say that a statute permitting a judge to
inflict additional punishment upon one whom he deems to be an habit-
ual criminal is not a bill of attainder because the person so punished
received a full trial is an example of incorrect reasoning; it is founded
on the erroneous premise that several judicial trials for one purpose
(determination of guilt in a given factual context) can serve as a trial
for another, independent purpose (determination of habitual criminal-
ity). The conclusion to be drawn from this typology of cases is that in
two of five factual situations, the judicial trial component of the defmi-
tion of a bill of attainder has not been slighted. In the three remaining
situations, however, it has been construed in such a fashion as to render
meaningless the safeguards it purports to provide.
2. Nature of the Hearing
Where, as in the Smith Act cases, 68' a statute provides for a full
trial in the first instance by a court of law, there exists little doubt that a
defendant will receive the procedural safeguards mandated by Justice
Black in Lovet 6 2 and elaborated upon by the Ninth Circuit in
put y. 6 3 But a number of statutes impose deprivations and authorize
only limited judicial proceedings or substitute administrative for judi-
cial hearings. Three examples will suffice to illustrate the problem. In
Thompson v. Wallin,68 4 the New York Court of Appeals upheld the
680. In fact, one could argue it is illogical. The mere fact that a person has received two
separate felony convictions does not necessarily indicate that he is an habitual criminal.
Before that judgment can be made, it is necessary to undertake a full inquiry into the cir-
cumstances surrounding both convictions and the conduct of the defendant during the pe-
riod between the two convictions.
681. See notes 637-642 and accompanying text supra.
682. See note 627 and accompanying text supra.
683. See notes 629-636 and accompanying text supra.
684. 301 N.Y. 476, 95 N.E.2d 806 (1950), qf/dsub nom. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342
U.S. 485 (1952). See notes 199-211 and accompanying text supra.
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Feinberg Law685 against an attainder challenge partly on the theory
that the statute afforded a sufficient hearing. It noted that while the act
authorized the state's board of education to compile a list of subversive
organizations to be used in determining whether or not to dismiss indi-
vidual teachers, the text of the enactment also made "provision for a
hearing to be had on appropriate notice, which hearing is afforded any
organization as to which the Board of Regents shall determine to insti-
tute an inquiry."686 Moreover, the court remarked that any organiza-
tion aggrieved by a decision of the board could seek relief through
what is known in New York civil practice as an article seventy-eight
proceeding.687 Accordingly, it concluded that the Feinberg Law had
none of the attributes of a bill of attainder.688
The explicit premise adopted by the court was that an administra-
tive hearing by the Board of Regents followed, if necessary, by an arti-
cle seventy-eight proceeding, sufficed as a substitute for a full judicial
trial. That premise is incorrect. While the Feinberg Law authorized the
board to hold hearings, it prescribed no procedure governing those
hearings.689 The board, then, was free to follow any ad hoc approach it
might choose: it could deny suspected organizations the right to have
counsel present, it could admit rumor and hearsay into evidence, it
could ask self-incriminating questions of witnesses, and so on. Nor
does an article seventy-eight proceeding cure these procedural defects.
685. See notes 203-204 and accompanying text supra.
686. 301 N.Y. at 493, 95 N.E.2d at 814.
687. Id.
688. Id Accord, Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 255 F. Supp. 981, 988-89 (W.D.N.Y.
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), see note 199, supra. See also Zeluck v.
Board of Educ., 62 Misc. 2d 274, 275, 307 N.Y.S.2d 329, 332-33 (1970), aJ/d, 36 App. Div.
2d 615, 319 N.Y.S.2d 409 (2d Dep't 1971) (upheld New York's Taylor Law, which regulates
state civil servants, against an attainder challenge by pointing out that the law (which, inter
alia, mandates dismissal of public employees who go on strike) provided for a pretermina-
tion administrative hearing, the findings of which were reviewable by an article seventy-
eight proceeding).
689. The relevant section of the Feinberg Law reads:
The board of regents shall, after inquiry, and after such notice and hearing as may
be appropriate, make a listing of organizations which it finds to be subversive ...
The board, in making such inquiry, may utilize any similar listings or designations
promulgated by any federal agency or authority authorized by federal law, regula-
tion or executive order, and for the purposes of such inquiry, the board may re-
quest. . . from such federal agencies or authorities any supporting material or
evidence that may be made available to it.
N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 3022(2) (McKinney 1973). Not only does the statute fail to provide for a
hearing procedure, but it also permits the board to rely on the findings of other "agencies
and authorities" that may have compiled evidence by wholly informal means.
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Such a proceeding, while it occurs in a court of law,69° is limited to an
inquiry into four rather narrow questions concerning the official action
at issue.691 Although the rules of pleading in such a proceeding are
almost identical to those prevailing in a full trial,692 the right to a jury is
not as extensive; if the issue in contention is whether an administrative
determination is supported by substantial evidence based on the record
as a whole, issues of fact will be decided either by a referee or by a
judge at the trial term of the supreme court. 93 Moreover, as Judge
Heam noted in Lederman v. Board of Education,694 if an organization
or one of its members wished to challenge its inclusion on a list of
subversives, the presiding judge in an article seventy-eight proceeding
might possibly refuse to subject the administrative decision of the
Board of Regents to exacting scrutiny on the theory that the contro-
versy caused by that decision is nonjusticiable in nature.
6 95
Consequently,
A teacher is then charged with membership in the listed organi-
zation. At such hearing the organization is deemed to be subver-
sive within the definition of Civil Service Law, § 12-a even
though the fitding was by an administrative body and, as to the
accused teacher, the supporting evidence was hearsay and he had
no opportunity to meet it. In short-the listing, as to him, was exparte. 96
690. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7804(b) (McKinney 1973) (says an article seventy-eight
proceeding is to be brought in the appropriate special term of the supreme court).
69 1. The four questions are: whether an agency or officer failed to perform a legal duty;
whether an agency or officer proceeded or will proceed in excess ofjurisdiction; whether an
administrative determination was made in violation of lawful procedure or constituted an
error of law or abuse of discretion; and whether an administrative determination is sup-
ported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7803
(McKinney 1973).
692. Compare N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 7804(d) (McKinney 1973) with N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
LAW § 402 (McKinney 1973).
693. An independent section of New York's civil practice code preserves trial by jury on
all issues so triable, and would govern article seventy-eight proceedings. N.Y. CIV. PRAc.
LAW § 410 (McKinney 1973). But as noted in the text, a provision of article seventy-eight
precludes jury trial in certain situations. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7804(h) (McKinney 1973).
694. 196 Misc. 873, 95 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1949), rev'd, 276 App. Div. 527, 96 N.Y.S.2d 466
(2d Dep't), aff'd sub nom. Thompson v. Wallin, 301 N.Y. 476, 95 N.E.2d 806 (1950), aff'd
sub nom. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952). See note 199 supra.
695. 196 Misc. at 881, 95 N.Y.S.2d at 121.
696. Id. Judge Hearn noted that a dismissed teacher had certain options. He or she
could appeal to the state Commissioner of Education rather than to the courts, see N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 310 (McKinney 1973), but then any determination by that officer would be
final and nonreviewable by any court. 196 Misc. at 882, 95 N.Y.S.2d at 122. If the teacher
chose to institute an article seventy-eight proceeding, which he or she could, under N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 2523 (McKinney 1973), Judge Hearn characterized the level ofjudicial review
as inadequate, if not illusory. 196 Misc. at 852, 95 N.Y.S.2d at 122 (citing Matter of Park
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This system simply does not accord an individual the procedural safe-
guards mandated by Lovett. The Board of Regents is constrained by
few considerations of due process, yet the record it compiles, by admit-
ting whatever evidence it wishes, forms the basis for a review proceed-
ing that may be either non-existent (if the reviewing court deems the
administrative decision to be nonjusticiable) or minimal at best (due to
the inherently narrow focus of an article seventy-eight proceeding) and
that may or may not be accompanied by a jury trial.
Westmoreland v. Chapman697 is another case in point. In that deci-
sion, a California district court of appeal upheld a statute depriving a
person of his driver's license if he failed to submit to certain sobriety
tests when requested to do so by police officers.698 The court found no
attainder partly because it claimed an individual was entitled to an ad-
ministrative hearing before his license was revoked. 619 But again, the
court failed to analyze adequately the nature and limitations of that
hearing. Under the California Vehicle Code, a licenseholder is entitled
to only an informal hearing unless he requests otherwise7°° and where
the action is taken "on grounds ascertainable on examination or re-
examination" under the code, he is never entitled to a formal hear-
ing.701 If all a licenseholder receives is an informal proceeding, he is
permitted, at best, to file a written, or make an oral, statement on his
own behalf;7 2 that is the utmost extent of his procedural rights.70 3 Even
East Land Corp. v. Finkelstein, 299 N.Y. 70, 75, 85 N.E.2d 869, 872 (1949); Kim v. Noyes,
262 App. Div. 581, 584, 31 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92 (3d Dep't 1941)). Finally, he noted that the
likelihood of a teacher being allowed to perfect an appeal under the state civil service law,
N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 105(1), (2) (McKinney 1973),formerly N.Y. C v. SERV. LAW § 12(a)
(McKinney 1940), was almost nil in light of the two alternative remedies present in the
state's education code. 196 Misc. at 882-83, 95 N.Y.S.2d at 122-23.
697. 268 Cal. App. 2d 1, 74 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1968).
698. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353 (West 1975).
699. 268 Cal. App. 2d at 5, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
700. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 14106-14107 (West 1975). The decision to grant the request is
entirely a discretionary one. See also id. § 14100 (prescribing limits for the right to a hearing
on demand).
701. Id. § 14102.
702. Id. § 14104.
703. The safeguards generally provided by the state's Administrative Procedure Act,
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11500-11523 (West 1975), yield to the provisions of the vehicle code
whenever a variance exists. Lacy v. Orr, 276 Cal. App. 2d 198, 201, SI Cal. Rptr. 276, 279
(1969). Thus it has been held that the protections afforded by the APA do not apply in
informal hearings. Hough v. McCarthy, 54 Cal. 2d 273, 286-87, 353 P.2d 276, 285, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 668, 677 (1960). A particular section of the vehicle code stipulates that informal hear-
ings the APA governs all matters not covered by that code. CAL. VEH. CODE § 14112 (West
1975). But see Reirdon v. Director of the Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 266 Cal. App. 2d 808,
811, 72 Cal. Rptr. 614, 616 (1968) (claimed the APA is not applicable in formal hearings
held pursuant to CAL. VEH. CODE § 14107 (West 1975) and accordingly held that hearing
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if the licentiate is granted a formal hearing, however, the nature of that
hearing is limited. Such a proceeding is conducted by the director of
the Department of Motor Vehicles, or a referee or hearing board ap-
pointed by him." The presiding officers may admit hearsay70 5 and
other specified types of evidence, including reports of their own investi-
gators and testimony received in other, separate cases. 70 6 Moreover, the
director of the department (or a managerial employee appointed by
him) has full discretion to reverse or modify the order of the hearing
boards,70 7 and his ruling can only be tested by a writ of mandamus to
an appropriate superior court, wherein a judge is charged with deter-
mining if the administrative findings are supported by substantial evi-
dence in light of the whole record, or in certain cases, by the weight of
the evidence.70 ' Measured against the standards laid down in Lovell,
this hearing procedure is a poor substitute for a judicial trial. An infor-
mal proceeding provides few safeguards, while a formal hearing does
not preclude such protections as trial by jury, the right of confronta-
tion, or the right to have an impartial party rule on the alleged bias of
the presiding officer.70 9
A third example is presented by United States ex rel Lubbers v.
Reimer.710 That case involved a challenge to a federal statute authoriz-
ing deportation of an alien who had gained access to the country by
fraudulently promising to marry a citizen.7 11 The federal district court
dismissed an attainder challenge by remarking that deportation was ac-
officers in such proceedings need not be attorneys, at least with respect to cases involving
suspension of drivers' licenses).
704. CAL. VEHI. CODE § 14107 (West 1975).
705. Id. § 14110.
706. Id. § 14108(b), (c). It has been held that even in the case of sworn statements of
witnesses that were improperly admitted into evidence as official records, their admission
would not provide sufficient grounds to vacate the findings of a formal hearing if the peti-
tioner's own testimony could be construed so as to support a suspension order. Goss v. De-
partment of Motor Vehicles, 264 Cal. App. 2d 268, 270, 70 Cal. Rptr. 447, 448 (1968).
707. CAL. VEH. CODE § 14110 (West 1975).
708. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(c) (West 1975). See Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d
130, 143, 481 P.2d 242, 251, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 243 (1971) (holding that whenever an agency
determination affects fundamental rights, a trial court reviewing the evidence under a writ
of mandamus must exercise independent judgment in assessing that evidence); Strumsky v.
San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 32, 520 P.2d 29, 35, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 805, 807 (1974) (applied the Bixby rule to both state agencies of statewide jurisdiction
and state agencies of local jurisdiction). See generally Note, Strumsky v. San Diego County
Employees Retirement Association: Determining the Scope of Judicial Review in Administrative
Decisions in California, 26 HAsTINGs LJ. 1465-1501 (1975).
709. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11512(c) (West 1975). For the applicability of this section,
see note 703 supra.
710. 22 F. Supp. 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
711. 8 U.S.C. § 213(a) (1937).
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companied by an administrative hearing.7 12 But in deportation cases,
circa 1938, procedural safeguards were minimal. Since deportation is
not a penal sanction,713 a potential deportee is not entitled to trial by
jury.1 He also has no right to refuse to answer incriminating but rele-
vant questions71 5 nor must his responses made during a preliminary
interrogation during which he was denied counsel be excluded from
evidence.7 16 Hearsay is admissible in deportation proceedings7 7 and, at
least formerly, the potential deportee bore the burden of proof as to the
lawfulness of his entry into the country.7 Lubbers presents perhaps the
most extreme case in which a purported substitute for a judicial trial
provided almost none of the due process protections inherent in a judi-
cial proceeding.
These cases are difficult to reconcile with Lovett. Justice Black's
712. 22 F. Supp. at 575. For the nature of deportation hearings at this point in time, see
generally J. CLARK, DEPORTATION OF ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO EUROPE 363-
88 (1968 ed.) Under modem immigration law, an alien whose deportability is inquired into
is entitled to: (1) notice of the charges against him and the timing of his hearing; (2) counsel
at the hearing; (3) examine adverse evidence, present favorable evidence and cross-examine
witnesses; and (4) a decision based only on probative evidence. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1970).
713. See note 479 and accompanying text supra.
714. Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275 (1912); United States ev rel. Turner v. Wil-
liams, 194 U.S. 279, 290 (1904); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896);
United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475, 481 (1895); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698, 730 (1893). However, the Court in Wong Wing did point out that trial by jury was
mandatory where the sanction of deportation was accompanied by a term of imprisonment.
715. United States ex reL. Rennie v. Brooks, 284 F. 908, 909-10 (E.D. Mich. 1922); In re
Chan Foo Lin, 243 F. 137, 139-40 (6th Cir. 1917); Tom Wah v. United States, 163 F. 1008,
1009 (2d Cir. 1908).
716. Loh Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460,470 (1912); In re Kosopud, 272 F. 330, 336
(N.D. Ohio 1920); Exparte Ah Sue, 270 F. 356, 357 (W.D. Wash. 1920); Guiney v. Bonham,
261 F. 582, 585 (9th Cir. 1919); Exparte Chin Quock Wah, 224 F. 138, 139 (W.D. Wash.
1915); Exparte Garcia, 205 F. 53, 55-59 (N.D. Cal. 1913); United States ex rel. Buccino v.
Williams, 190 F. 897, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
717. Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U.S. 673, 679-81 (1912); Lewis ex rel. Lai Thuey Lem v.
Johnson, 16 F.2d 180, 182 (1st Cir. 1926); United States ex rel. Georgian v. Uhi, 271 F. 676,
677 (2d Cir. 1921).
718. United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 110
(1927) (construing Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, § 23, 43 Stat. 165). But see Woodby v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966) (construing 8 U.S.C. §
1105a(a)(1) (1970); the Court in this case concluded that "no deportation order may be en-
tered unless it is found by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence that the facts alleged
as grounds for deportation are true").
719. Nor are these the only cases that could be cited. See Daly v. State, 296 Minn. 238,
239, 207 N.W.2d 541, 543 (1973); State v. Scheffel, 82 Wash. 2d 872, 881, 514 P.2d 1052,
1058 (1973). Daly upheld a Minnesota statute, which, like the enactment involved in
Westmoreland, revoked the license of a driver who declined to submit to a sobriety test; the
court found no attainder because it claimed the administrative decision to revoke was sub-
ject to full judicial review. In fact, this statement was correct; the Minnesotan act provides
significantly greater safeguards to the individual than were afforded by the Californian stat-
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language in that case is susceptible to two possible interpretations. The
first is that a legislative infliction of punishment is only constitutional if
it provides for a full-fledged trial in a court of law. If this interpretation
is accurate, then the statutory schemes involved in Thompson,
Westmoreland and Lubbers, to the extent that they punish rather than
regulate, are bills of attainder and are not saved from being so classi-
fied because they provide for administrative hearing procedures. But a
more pragmatic construction of Justice Black's language would yield
the conclusion that, in order to avoid the proscription against bills of
attainder, a legislative act inflicting punishment must provide, at the
very least, a substitute for a judicial trial that accords a person the very
utory scheme questioned in Westmoreland. Under Minnesota law, before the state commis-
sioner of public safety can revoke any license, there must be a nonjury hearing before a
municipal or county judge charged with determining the answers to four questions: whether
the police officer requesting the motorist to submit to a sobriety test had probable cause to
believe the latter was driving while intoxicated; whether the motorist was lawfully arrested;
whether the motorist refused to permit the test and, if so, whether his refusal was reasonable;
and whether the police officer informed the motorist of the possible consequences of his
refusal and his right to have the sobriety test administered by an impartial third party.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123 subd. 6 (West Supp. 1976). If a person's license is revoked, he
may file a petition for review in state district court within twenty days after the revocation
decision was rendered; that court must afford a jury trial de novo. Id. § 169.123 subd. 7.
Thus the Minnesota statute, unlike its Californian counterparts, provides for an initial judi-
cial hearing followed, in effect, by a new trial on appeal. In Scheffel, the Washington
Supreme Court dismissed an attainder challenge against the state's habitual traffic offenders
statute (which requires those motorists involved in three or more accidents resulting in con-
victions to forfeit their licenses) because it was said that the statute afforded an adequate
prerevocation hearing. In fact, the law stipulates that once a prosecuting attorney files a
complaint incorporating transcripts of the three prior convictions in state superior court, the
presiding judge is authorized to issue a "show cause order" to the motorist in question re-
questing him to bring forth reasons why he should not be barred from operating a vehicle on
the state's highways. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 46.65.050 (West Supp. 1977). Unless the
superior court finds a misidentification or absence of habitual offense, it is authorized to
revoke a license for five years. Id. § 46.65.060. An appeal from such a decision may be had
"in the same manner and form as such an appeal would be noted, perfected, and tried in any
criminal case." Id. § 46.65.110. Although the statute is ambiguous about the nature of the
initial hearing (and, indeed, would seem to place the burden of proof on the motorist rather
than on the state), in practice, a licenseholder is entitled to be represented by counsel, and
submit memoranda, present testimony and make oral arguments on his own behalf. See
State v. Scheffel, 82 Wash.2d at 874, 514 P.2d at 1054. Moreover, the appeal procedure
would appear to incorporate the usual safeguards of a judicial hearing (although, unlike the
statute in Dal,, it distinctly provides for an appeal, as opposed to a trial de novo). See also
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 87 (1961) (upheld the
registration provisions of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-
785 (1970), against an attainder challenge by noting, inter alia, that the decision to place an
organization on the list of those required to register "must be made after full administrative
hearing, subject to judicial review which opens the record for the reviewing court's determi-
nation whether the administrative findings as to fact are supported by the preponderance of
the evidence"; the Court never scrutinized the extent of the procedural safeguards afforded
in that initial administrative hearing in the context of the attainder challenge).
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same procedural safeguards.72 ° And this the statutes in Thompson,
720. At this juncture, it is necessary to consider a point adverted to earlier, see note 645
supra: do these purported substitutes for a judicial trial offer an opportunity to raise a con-
stitutional challenge to the very statutory scheme creating the substitute? The answer would
seem to be no. Such a challenge would simply be beyond the scope of the inquiry in a
deportation hearing or a license revocation proceeding, or so it would appear. The problem
is underscored by considering the procedural contexts in which constitutional claims were
raised in Thompson, Westmoreland, Lubbers and the three cases cited in note 719. Thus, in
Thompson, two separate constitutional challenges were made, one by means of a declaratory
judgment proceeding and one, oddly enough, by New York City school employees in an
article seventy-eight proceeding. Thompson v. Wallin, 196 Misc. 686, ')2, 93 N.Y.S.2d 274,
280 (1949). This is odd because constitutional questions would not appear to fit within any
of the four narrowly-phrased issues which may be raised in such a proceeding, see note 691
supra. In Westmoreland, on the other hand, the constitutional challenge was raised after the
administrative hearing by means of an alternative writ of mandate. Westmoreland v. Chap-
man, 268 Cal. App. 2d 1, 4,74 Cal. Rptr. 363, 363 (1968). Similarly in Lubbers, an attainder
challenge was advanced not during the deportation hearing, but as part of a subsequent
habeas corpus proceeding. United States ex rel. Lubbers v. Reimer, 22 F. Supp. 573, 574
(S.D.N.Y. 1938).
The pattern does not vary in Daly and Scheffel, see note 719 supra; in the former case,
the constitutional claims were apparently raised in the course of the statutorily-prescribed
appellate procedure, Daly v. State, 296 Minn. 238, 238, 207 N.W.2d 541.542 (1973), whereas
the constitutional issues involved in Scheffel were deemed important enough to merit a
direct appeal to the Washington supreme court, State v. Scheffel, 82 Wash. 2d 872, 874, 514
P.2d 1052, 1054 (1973). But perhaps the most interesting procedural history is that underly-
ing the case of Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961). See
note 719 supra. On November 22, 1950, the Attorney General requested the Board to order
the Communist Party to register as a "Communist action organization." The Party sought a
preliminary injunction in a three-judge district court, but was summarily denied that rem-
edy. Communist Party v. McGrath, 96 F. Supp. 47, 47 (D.D.C. 1951). Subsequent hearings
before the Board extending from April 23 to July 1, 1952 yielded 14,000-plus pages of testi-
mony. On April 20, 1953, the Board declared the Party to be a "Communist action organiza-
tion." The Party then sought appellate relief under section 14(a) of the Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1950), which permits a reviewing court to order the
Board to adduce additional evidence if a movant can show that such evidence is material.
The Party claimed that three witnesses appearing before the Board had perjured themselves,
but the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied a motion
to adduce additional evidence. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 223
F.2d 531, 576 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The Supreme Court reversed, however, ordering the Board
to base its findings solely on untainted testimony. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 125 (1956). On remand, the Board denied the Party's requests to
reopen the record and to adduce additional evidence, but it did decide to re-examine the
allegedly perjuring witnesses. On December 18, 1956, the Board issued a modified report
reconfirming its original conclusions but expunging the testimony of three witnesses. The
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed most of the Board's actions, but directed it to produce
documents relating to the testimony of a fourth witness, one Mrs. Markward, whom the
Party claimed had also lied while under oath. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 254 F.2d 314, 332-33 (D.C. Cir. 1958). The scope of the remand was subse-
quently enlarged to require production of recorded statements made to the FBI by one
Victor Budenz, a witness for the Attorney General. The hearings were convened for a third
time, the Board reevaluated the credibility of Budenz and Markward and issued a modified
report on second remand, again recommending classification of the Party as a "Communist
action organization." The Party once more appealed under section 14(a), but this time was
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Westmoreland and Lubbers fail to do. Thus, it would seem that, to the
extent the courts in those cases dismissed attainder challenges on the
theory that the enactments in question provided adequate hearings,
they were mistaken. An obvious objection could be raised at this junc-
ture: if a statutory scheme must provide the equivalent of a full judicial
trial, it will be inefficient to administer. The equally obvious response
is that if the proscriptions against bills of attainder are to truly provide
a "bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights,"' 721 then
such rights cannot be sacrificed upon the altar of administrative expe-
diency. Nor is it permissible for legislatures to provide some of the pro-
tections listed by Justice Black and eschew others. There is no
indication that he believed some of his enumerated safeguards were of
less importance than others; rather, it would seem that he believed
"procedural due process" entails an indivisible set of measures consist-
ing of all the protections that he cited. This conclusion is not meant to
suggest that all statutes imposing deprivations after an administrative
hearing are unconstitutional per se. The bill of attainder clauses apply
only to punitive enactments; the statute involved in Westmoreland and,
less assuredly, that involved in Lubbers might be construed as regula-
tory.7 22 Thus, the ultimate conclusions arrived at in these cases- are not
necessarily invalid; it is simply that the reasons given for reaching those
conclusions misconstrue and therefore subvert the meaning of the judi-
cial trial component of the definition of a bill of attainder.
denied any relief. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 277 F.2d 78, 83
(D.C. Cir. 1959). It was this decision that was appealed to the Supreme Court. See 367 U.S.
at 19-22. Much can be said in favor of the view that if a procedural substitute is created for a
full judicial trial in the first instance, that substitute must accord a person the opportunity to
raise a constitutional challenge at the initial hearing. Yet the decisions of the four state
courts cited in this footnote and the implicit ruling of the United States Supreme Court in
the Communist Party case is that due process is not offended if such a challenge can only be
raised on appeal. Lubbers goes even further and sanctions a system whereby constitutional
questions may be raised only after an administrative hearing, in the course of a wholly
independent habeas corpus proceeding. All these decisions, therefore, dilute the meaningful
safeguards supposedly preserved in the judicial trial aspect of the concept of a bill of
attainder.
721. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
722. Westmoreland, at least, relies in part on the punishment/regulation distinction. See
Westmoreland v. Chapman, 268 Cal. App.2d 1, 5,74 Cal. Rptr. 363, 366 (1968). Cf. Beamon
v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 180 Cal. App. 2d 200, 210, 4 Cal. Rptr. 396, 403 (1960)
(said suspension or revocation of a driver's license is not a penal sanction). The statute in-
volved in Thompson, however, is, in this author's opinion, unquestionably a bill of attainder.
See notes 210, 288 supra.
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IV. A Renascence: The Brown Case
A. The Case
In enacting the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947,723 Con-
gress included within that statute section 9(h), which required each of-
ficer of a labor union to execute an expurgatory oath disclaiming
present membership in or affiliation with the Communist Party and
present advocacy of or present membership in an organization advocat-
ing forcible overthrow of the government. Execution of the oath was a
condition precedent to that union's obtainment of the jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board in mediating labor disputes.724 In
the case of American Communications Association v. Douds,725 a coali-
tion of five justices726 of the United States Supreme Court adjudged the
membership clauses of section 9(h) to be constitutional. Three mem-
bers of that coalition also expressly rejected a bill of attainder chal-
lenge.727 Subsequently, Congress enacted a successor to the 1947 act,
known as the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959.728 Section 504 of that act replaced section 9(h). The new provi-
sion stipulated that no person who is or was a member of the Commu-
nist Party or who had ever been convicted of or imprisoned for
specified felonies could serve in a managerial position in any labor or-
ganization or as a labor relations consultant during or for five years
after the termination of his membership in the Party or during or for
five years after his conviction or after the end of his prison term.72 9
723. 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (currently codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1970)).
724. 29 U.S.C. § 147(h) (1947) (superseded 1959). See note 352 and accompanying text
supra.
725. 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See notes 349-359 and accompanying text supra.
726. See note 354 supra.
727. 339 U.S. at 413-14 (Vinson, C.J., joined by Burton and Reed, JJ.) See note 355 and
accompanying text supra.
728. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-525 (Supp. V
1975)).
729. 73 Stat. 536, 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1970). The relevant text reads:
(a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist Party or
who has been convicted of, or served any part of a prison term resulting from
his conviction of, robbery, bribery, extortion, embezzlement, grand larceny,
burglary, arson, violation of narcotics laws, murder, rape, assault with intent to
kill, assault which inflicts grievous bodily injury... or conspiracy to commit
any such crimes, shall serve-
(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar
governing body, business agent, manager, organizer, or other employee (other than
as an employee performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any labor
organization, or
(2) as a labor relations consultant to a person engaged in an industry or ac-
tivity affecting commerce, or as an officer, director, agent, or employee (other than
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Archie Brown had been a member of the Communist Party since
at least 1935. From 1959 to 1961, he was elected to and served succes-
sive one-year terms on the Executive Board of Local 10 of the Interna-
tional Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, located in San
Francisco, California.730 On May 24, 1961, Brown was indicted in fed-
eral district court for violating section 504."' A jury trial resulted in a
judgment of guilty and a sentence of six months' imprisonment.
Brown appealed his conviction and, in Brown v. United States,73 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc,
reversed the judgment rendered in the trial court. A majority of the
judges of the Ninth Circuit held that section 504 infringed both the
freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment, in that it
proscribed mere membership rather than knowing membership cou-
pled with specific intent,733 and the due process guarantees of the Fifth
Amendment, in that it embodied the impermissible concept of guilt by
association.7" The majority distinguished Douds by contending that
section 9(h) worked merely an indirect discouragement on Party affilia-
tion, whereas section 504 effected a flat prohibition;735 it never dis-
cussed the appellant's bill of attainder challenge.
7 36
as an employee performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any group or
association of employers dealing with any labor organization,
during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the Communist
Party, or for five years after such conviction or after the end of such imprisonment
(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
The provisions barring felons, with which the Brown case did not deal, have been upheld
against attainder challenges. See Postma v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 294, 337
F.2d 609, 611 (2d Cir. 1964); Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowing Ass'n, 244 F. Supp.
745, 746 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 1965), vacated on other grounds, 372 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1966), rev'd,
389 U.S. 463 (1967). See note 625 supra.
730. Brown v. United States, 334 F.2d 488, 491 (9th Cir. 1964).
731. Id. The statute has its own penalty provisions. See note 729 supra.
732. 334 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1964).
733. Id. at 495. The majority cited in support of its thesis two decisions of the United
States Supreme Court that had involved construction of the Smith Act. See note 638 supra.
734. Id. at 495-96 (citing Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224-25, 226, 227 (1961)).
735. Id. at 494 (citing American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 390
(1950)).
736. Nor did the other four opinions written in this case discuss the appellant's attainder
challenge. The prevailing majority consisted of Judges Merrill (who wrote the main opin-
ion), Browning, Duniway, Jertberg and Koelsch. Judge Duniway also penned a separate
opinion in which he attempted to answer some of the objections raised by the dissenters. 334
F.2d at 497-501 (Duniway, J., concurring). There were three dissents. Id. at 501-05 (Hamley,
J., dissenting); id. at 505 (Chambers, J., dissenting) and id. (Barnes, J., dissenting). Judge
Hamley contended that the case should be reversed and remanded, not on constitutional
grounds, but because the trial court judge had improperly arrogated to himself the decision
on an issue of fact which should have been left up to the jury: whether or not the executive
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Therefore, it was especially surprising that the United States
Supreme Court chose to dispose of the issues raised by the government
on appeal by referring exclusively to the proscriptions against bills of
attainder contained in article one, section nine of the Constitution.
Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion in United States v. Brown737
was divided into four sections. The first two parts were essentially his-
torical in nature. Part I was an extended recapitulation of the history
and nature of attainders at common law and during the formative years
of this nation. Chief Justice Warren, after considering all the various
types of English bills of attainders and bills of pains and penalties, con-
cluded that while history provided some definitional guidelines, it did
not provide enough to be helpful; the "wide variation in form, purpose
and effect" of common law attainders required a determination of the
reasons for inclusion of the proscriptions against bills of attainder in
the text of the Constitution.738 According to the Court,
The best available evidence, the writings of the architects of our
constitutional system, indicates that the Bill of Attainder Clause
was intended not as a narrow, technical (and therefore soon to be
outmoded) prohibition, but rather as an implementation of the
separation of powers, a general safeguard against legislative exer-
cise of the judicial function, or more simply-trial by
legislature.739
Implicit in this assertion about separation of powers was a corollary
about procedural due process: trial by a legislature susceptible to the
whims of its constituency was a poor substitute for the deliberations of
"politically independent judges and juries. '740 Part II of Chief Justice
Warren's opinion was a brief review of the Court's decisions in Cum-
board of Local 10 was, in fact, an "executive board," as that term is defined by the act of
1959; Id. at 502. Judge Barnes disagreed with the majority, because he believed that no
constitutional challenge could be raised against a statute that only deprived Communists of
union officerships rather than union jobs in general. Id. at 505. Finally, Judge Chambers
argued that the act was a permissible application of Congress' power over interstate com-
merce; he asserted that, while a person may have the right to claim the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, he has no corresponding right to retain his job after
doing so. Id.
737. 381 U.S. 437 (1965). The majority opinion in this case was written by Chief Justice
Warren, joined by Justices Black, Brennan, Douglas and Goldberg. Justice White, joined by
three of his colleagues, dissented. Id.' at 462-78 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Clark,
Harlan & Stewart, JJ.). For a discussion of his dissent, see notes 768-7S7 and accompanying
text infra.
738. 381 U.S. at 442.
739. .Id.
740. Id. at 445. The Court also cited Macaulay's description of the attainder of Sir John
Fenwick as an example of the evils inherent in trial by legislature. Id. at 445-46 n.19. See
note 39 and accompanying text supra.
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mings v. Missouri,741 Ex parte Garland742 and United States v.
Lovett,743 all of which were said to have been premised upon the sepa-
ration of powers thesis.'"
Part III is the crux of Chief Justice Warren's opinion. He began
that section by stating that section 504 was a bill of attainder in light of
judicial precedent because instead of disbarring persons who possess
certain characteristics or commit certain acts that make such persons
likely to foment political strikes, Congress designated a class of persons
whom it excluded from union office.745 In support of this contention,
he cited the Court's previous decision in Communist Pary of the United
States v. Subversive Activities Control Board7 46 for the proposition that
if the act in question in that case had applied to the Party by name, it
would have been a bill of attainder.747 The Chief Justice noted that
section 504 fit within that prohibited type of legislation because it im-
posed disabilities upon the members of a named organization.748
The Court then dealt with the solicitor general's argument that
section 504 was no more than a conflict-of-interest statute regulating a
certain class of positions. In support of this contention, the solicitor
general offered the analogy of Board of Governors v. Agnew, 749 a case
decided in 1947, in which the United States Supreme Court had con-
strued the meaning of section 32 of the Banking Act of 1933.750 That
provision prohibited an officer or director of a firm issuing or under-
writing securities from serving as a director or an employee of a bank
belonging to the Federal Reserve System unless such a dual officership
would not unduly influence either the investment policies of the mem-
ber bank or the advice it would give to its customers. The majority of
the Court distinguished section 504 of the Labor Management Report-
741. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867). See notes 54-70 and accompanying text supra.
742. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867). See notes 71-81 and accompanying text Supra.
743. 328 U.S. 303 (1946). See notes 180-197 and accompanying text supra.
744. See 381 U.S. at 447-49.
745. Id. at 449-50.
746. 367 U.S. 1 (1961). See notes 366-372, 611-622 and 721 and accompanying text
supra.
747. 381 U.S. at 451 (citing Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367
U.S. 1, 84-85 (1961)).
748. Id. at 452.
749. 329 U.S. 441 (1947).
750. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1933) (amended 1935). No attainder challenge was raised in
Agnew. Indeed, the case involved a matter of statutory interpretation: whether Eastman
Dillon & Co. was "primarily engaged" in underwriting as that phrase is used in section 32.
The Court construed the phrase to mean "principally" or "substantially engaged" in under-
writing and really reached no constitutional issues. See Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329
U.S. 441, 447 (1947).
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ing and Disclosure Act from section 32 of the Banking Act on several
grounds. First, the former inflicted a deprivation upon a political mi-
nority thought to endanger national security, while the latter did not.
75'
Moreover, section 504 incorporated a judgment of censure upon mem-
bers of the Communist Party, whereas section 32 was said to rely upon
a general principle of human psychology that a person concurrently
holding the two designated positions might be tempted to engage in
self-dealing. 2 Most importantly, however, Chief Justice Warren stated
that section 32 estabished an objective standard of conduct insofar as it
regulated the activities of those who held a position in a bank that
could be used to influence investment policies and who were also in a
position to benefit financially from investment in securities handled by
an underwriter with which the bank dealt.753 The Chief Justice claimed
that in this situation Congress merely used a shorthand expression to
legislate "with respect to general characteristics rather than with respect
to a specific group of men. . . . The Court further pointed out that
the escapability clause of section 32, while not essential to its constitu-
tionality, militated against the conclusion that it, like section 504, em-
bodied a censorial judgment upon a particular group of persons. 755 In
contrast, the challenged provision in Brown did not merely utilize a
shorthand expression because the implied substitution of the term
"members of the Communist Party" for the term "persons likely to en-
gender political strikes" was said to rest
upon an empirical investigation by Congress of the acts, charac-
teristics and propensities of Communist Party members. In a
number of decisions, this Court has pointed out the fallacy of the
suggestion that membership in the Communist Party, or any
other political organization, can be regarded as an alternative,
but equivalent, expression for a list of undesirable characteris-
tics. . . . Even assuming that Congress had reason to conclude
that some Communists would use union positions to bring about
political strikes, "it cannot automatically be inferred that all
members share their evil purposes or participate in their illegal
conduct.
'756
751. 381 U.S. at 453.
752. Id. at 454. Although Chief Justice Warren provided no attribution for this concept,
it is clear that he borrowed it from Professor Wormuth's 1950 article on the subject. See
notes 579-588 and accompanying text supra. This is so because one of his examples of legiti-
mate legislative use of shorthand descriptions-an act prohibiting one subject to seizures
from operating dangerous machinery-is very similar to an example offered by Wormuth.
Compare 381 U.S. at 454 n.29 with Wormuth, supra note 12, at 609.
753. 381 U.S. at 454.
754. Id. at 454-55.
755. Id. at 455.
756. Id. at 455-56 (citing Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232,246 (1957)).
[Vol. 5
Thus, the Court rebutted the argument that the term "Communist
Party members" was semantically equivalent to the term "persons
likely to engender political strikes" by pointing out that the two were
demonstrably not coextensive because section 504 exempted from its
coverage classes of persons who, though not affiliated with the Party,
were nevertheless likely to foment political strikes. Therefore, Congress
could not have intended to offer merely an alternative, shorthand de-
scriptive label in section 504 but must have entertained a purpose of
legislating against Communists qua Communists.
Finally, in Part IV, Chief Justice Warren dealt with the problem of
punishment. The solicitor general argued that section 504 was preven-
tive rather than retributive: "its aim is not to punish Communists for
what they have done in the past, but rather to keep them from positions
where they will be able in the future to bring about undesirable
events. 7 57 In support of this contention, he relied on the holding of the
Court in American Communications Association v. Douds,75 8 which up-
held the predecessor of section 504 on just such a theory. But the Court
at first distinguished Douds by suggesting that the statute involved in
that case attached sanctions to present membership,759 whereas the stat-
ute involved in the present case imposed disabilities on both present
members of the Communist Party and on anyone who had been a
member within the five preceding years.760 Nevertheless, as soon as the
Chief Justice had thus distinguished Douds, he proceeded to under-
mine the premise it had advanced by stating that punishment need not
be retaliatory or retributive but could also be preventive or prospec-
tive.76 1 He supported his assertion by citing historical examples of at-
tainders, statements in prior cases and the writing of various
commentators.762 In light of such authorities, the Chief Justice accused
the Court in Douds of misreading the majority opinion in United States
v. Lovett 763 by attempting to exempt legislation having a purely pro-
spective effect from the constitutional prohibitions against bills of at-
tainder.764 Finally, the Court dismissed cursorily the contention that
The Court also cited Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509-11 (1964); Schneider-
mann v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 120 (1943).
757. 381 U.S. at 457.
758. 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See notes 349-355 and accompanying text supra.
759. See note 352 and accompanying text supra.
760. See note 729 and accompanying text supra.
761. 381 U.S. at 458.
762. Id. at 459-60. See notes 373-392 and accompanying text supra, for an analysis of
this problem.
763. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
764. 381 U.S. at 460.
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section 504 did not attaint the 'respondent because it failed to designate
Archie Brown by name; in light of precedent, that fact was said not to
be enough to take the stature out of the classification of a bill of attain-
der.7 65 Thus the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Ninth
Circuit.766
Justice White, writing for himself and three others, issued a scath-
ing dissent.7 67 He pointed out that the Court had previously distin-
guished regulatory from punitive enactments by relying on a multifold
set of fattors.768 Now, the Court appeared to be placing "the burden of
separating attainders from permissible regulation on an examination of
the legislative findings implied by the nature of the class desig-
nated. '769 He then suggested that a close analysis of the majority opin-
ion yielded a conclusion that could best be phrased in terms originally
developed in the context of equal protection analysis, namely those of
"overinclusiveness" and "underinclusiveness. ' ' 770 According to Justice
White, the majority on the one hand argued that a statute is sufficiently
general if it designates the characteristics of a group of persons that is
likely to engage in legitimately prohibited conduct and, on the other
hand, contended that a law designating the characteristic of member-
ship in the Communist Party cannot be the basis for such a prohibi-
tion.771 Therefore, "§ 504 is too narrow in specifying the particular
class; but it is also too broad in treating all members of the class alike.
On both counts-nderinclusiveness and overinclusiveness-§ 504 is
invalid as a bill of attainder . . 772
He then proceeded to catalogue the casualties caused by the ma-
jority opinion. First, Douds was "obviously overruled. 773 Second,
Congress could no longer pass conflict-of-interest legislation because
section 32 of the Banking Act of 1933 is both underinclusive, in that
others besides directors or officers of underwriting firms may have
765. Id. at 461. For a discussion of this aspect of the opinion, see notes 1005-1017 and
accompanying text infra.
766. Id. at 462.
767. Id. at 462-78 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Clark, Harlan & Stewart, JJ.).
768. Id. at 462-63. See note 515 and accompanying text supra.
769. Id. at 463.
770. Id. at 464. This terminology originated in an influential law review article pub-
lished in 1949. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REv. 341, 348, 351 (1949).
771. 381 U.S. at 463-64.
772. Id. at 464. One other commentator also concludes that Chief Justice Warren's
opinion relied on the overinclusiveness-underinclusiveness doctrine. See NeedFor Clar jflca-
tion, supra note 12, at 232, 237. In the author's opinion, both he and Justice White are
simply mistaken. See note 798 and accompanying text infra.
773. 381 U.S. at 464-65. For other cases in agreement, see note 928 infra.
[Vol. 5
business interests creating divided loyalties and a consequent potential
for self-dealing, and overinclusive, in that not all directors or officers of
underwriting firms would be likely to violate their dual fiduciary re-
sponsibilities, and because the defects of section 32 are typical of con-
flict-of-interest statutes.7 74 Third, statutes like those upheld in Hawker
v. New York 775 and DeVeau v. Braisted 76 would also be of questiona-
ble validity because those enactments were equally deficient in that not
all ex-felons possess bad characters and not all persons with bad char-
acters are ex-felons. 7 7 Fourth, Justice White suggested that the major-
ity's approving reference to Communist Party of the United States v.
Subversive Activities ControlBoard778 was inconsistent with its ultimate
holding, because the statute upheld in that case also contained a provi-
sion disqualifying members of "Communist-action organizations"
(like, according to the Board, the Communist Party) from holding
union offices.77 9 If that provision did not attaint, then neither could
section 504.
As Justice White viewed it, there was an inherent difficulty in
claiming that the challenged enactment in Brown was a bill of attain-
der "because it has disqualified all Communist Party members without
providing for a judicial determination as to each member that he will
call a political strike. ' 780 If the government were to follow this logic,
then it could not, for instance, deny Communists positions in the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency unless each individual who was the subject of
such a denial had his alleged disloyalty fully adjudicated. Justice White
deemed such an approach to be absurd. Unless one accepted the gen-
eral administrative determination that members of the Communist
Party are likely to be security risks, then the government would be re-
strained from acting until it could actually apprehend a person in the
act of calling for a political strike or committing treason.
7 8 1
Because of these implications of the majority's ruling, Justice
White felt compelled to "inquire whether the Court's reasoning does
774. Id. at 465-67.
775. 170 U.S. 189 (1898). See notes 551-563 and accompanying text supra.
776. 363 U.S. 144 (1960). See notes 658-661 and accompanying text supra.
777. 381 U.S. at 469.
778. 367 U.S. 1 (1961). See note 746 and accompanying text supra. For Brown's effect
on the continuing validity of this case, see notes 1006-1017 and accompanying text infra.
779. 50 U.S.C. § 784(a)(1)(E) (1950).
780. 381 U.S. at 471.
781. Id. at 471-72. But it should be noted that the majority said Congress retained the
power to bar subversives from sensitive government positions so long as it did so by rules of
general application. Id. at 461.
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not contain some flaw that explains such perverse results."7 2 He found
several flaws. First, he argued that the bill of attainder clauses do not
enshrine any hallowed dichotomy between judicial and legislative
functions because Congress can and does enact private bills and punish
persons for contempt and, at least on the state level, determinations of
how the executive, legislative and judicial powers are to be allocated
among the three branches of government are a matter of local discre-
tion.7" 3 A second flaw was that the majority advanced too restrictive a
view of the legislative process: any overinclusive and underinclusive
statute was presumed to be punitive. But Justice White pointed out that
the Court had often recognized that a legislature can choose to deal
with only part of a perceived evil and thus that it may single out a
group "for regulation without any punitive purpose even when not all
members of the group would be likely to engage in feared conduct."7 4
The mere fact that legislation is specific does not mean that it is
punitive.
Finally, Justice White considered the issue of whether or not sec-
tion 504 fitted within the traditional definition of a bill of attainder. He
quoted his own language in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez8 5 on the
subject of punishment, but instead of conducting the painstaking analy-
sis called for by that language, he simply concluded that the purpose of
Congress in enacting section 504 was to prevent political strikes, both
because it did away with some of the impracticalities and inequities of
section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act786 and because Congress had a ra-
782. Id. at 472.
783. Id. at 473. Justice White obscures the issue at this juncture. His remark about
legislative contempt citations is a telling one. See notes 811-864 and accompanying text
infra. But the example of private bills is misleading because such bills do not necessarily
adjudicate and punish; they merely "affect" individuals, as he himself said. In support of his
statement about the allocation of powers among the various branches of government, Justice
White cited Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957); Carfer v. Caldwell, 200
U.S. 293, 297 (1906); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 507 (1903); Dryer v. Illinois, 187 U.S.
71, 84 (1902). Again the citations are misleading because the problem is not one of how the
various functions of government are allocated initially, but rather one of whether or not the
legislative branch is deliberately ignoring those allocations once they have been made. Even
a governmental authority possessing legislative and executive powers can enact a bill of
attainder, depending upon which of those powers it is exercising in a given case. See notes
115-121 and accompanying text supra.
784. 381 U.S. at 474.
785. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), quoledin 381 U.S. at 476. See note 515 and accompa-
nying text supra.
786. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, § 9(h), 61 Stats. 136, 146, 29
U.S.C. § 159(h) (superseded 1959). See note 352 and accompanying text supra. Section 9(h)
was said to be ineffective because it could only be enforced through the medium of a prose-
cution for perjury and such a prosecution presented difficult evidentiary problems. 381 U.S.
at 477. Moreover, section 9(h) was said to be unfair "both because the disqualification was
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tional basis for its belief that Communists would call political
strikes.787 On that theory, he concluded that section 504 was not a bill
of attainder, but he left open the issue of whether it was a violation of
First Amendment freedoms, as the Ninth Circuit had assumed.788
B. Some General Observations
Brown is a crucial decision for several reasons. First, there was the
matter of timing. Between 1868 and 1965, the United States Supreme
Court had invalidated only two enactments as bills of attainder. One
was the West Virginian expurgatory oath held void in Pierce v.
Carskadon,789 which consisted of a two-sentence per curiam opinion of
relatively little intrinsic importance. The other was United States v.
Lovett, 79° which was an important but anomalous decision. Because it
involved a statute imposing disabilities on three named individuals,
79'
Lovett could be very easily distinguished on its facts from most other
cases in which bill of attainder challenges were raised. Thus, the last
time the Court had handed down an opinion invalidating a statute di-
rected against a general class of unnamed persons was in Cummings v.
Missouri792 and Exparte Garland.793 One could be excused for con-
cluding, circa 1965, that the proscriptions against bills of attainder con-
tained in article one, sections nine and ten of the Constitution formed
an often-glimpsed but little-used backwater of constitutional law that
had once been heavily trafficked, but had since fallen into an enduring
desuetude. Brown changed that; it breathed life back into the mori-
bund corpus of the bill of attainder doctrine.
visited on the whole union membership and because the taking of an oath was exacted of all
union leaders, many of whom resented it." Id. Justice White's summary is accurate. Al-
though the Court held that proof of membership proscribed by section 9(h) could be based
on statements protected by the First Amendment, Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 253
(1961), it had also held that the National Labor Relations Board lacked independent juris-
diction to determine if an oath was executed falsely, so that any such determination had to
be made by a court in a peijury prosecution, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. NLRB, 352 U.S.
153, 156 (1956); Leedom v. International U. of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers, 352 U.S. 145,
151 (1956). As a result, only eighteen such prosecutions were brought. EMERSON, supra note
638, at 171.
787. 381 U.S. at 477-78. This rational basis was said to consist of the Court's conclusion
that the Communist Party is likely to cause political strikes. See American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 391 (1950).
788. 381 U.S. at 478.
789. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234, 239 (1872). See notes 438-439, 444 and accompanying text
supra.
790. 328 U.S. 303 (1946). See notes 180-197 and accompanying text supra.
791. See note 182 supra.
792. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867). See notes 54-70 and accompanying text supra.
793. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867). See notes 71-81 and accompanying text supra.
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Second, Brown was the first decision to strike down a modem ex-
ample of anti-Communist, anti-subversive legislation. The one decision
by a state court that had attempted a similar approach was promptly
reversed on appeal.794 Indeed, after decisions like American Communi-
cations Association v. Douds,7 95 Garner v. Board of Public Work 7 9 6 and
Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive 4ctivities Control
Board,7 9 7 an impartial observer might have reasonably concluded that
such legislation was, in general, impervious to bill of attainder chal-
lenges. Brown indicated that such a conclusion would be false.
Third, Brown raised the level of discourse about the bill of attain-
der clauses. Other decisions had allotted the subject minimal considera-
tion. In the course of Chief Justice Vinson's plurality opinion in Douds,
the attainder challenge was allotted two paragraphs amounting to less
than one page out of a total of thirty. Justice Clark's seven-page major-
ity opinion in Garner relegated discussion of the topic to three
paragraphs comprising less than two pages. Similarly, Justice Frank-
furter's one hundred and forty-four page opinion in the Communist
Party case devoted a scant seven pages to the subject. If length of dis-
cussion and incompleteness of treatment are reliable indicators, these
three opinions suggested that the Court did not believe that attainder
arguments presented a constitutional challenge meriting as serious or
as extended an analysis as would be accorded to a First Amendment
claim, for example. Brown indicated otherwise. The Supreme Court
could have followed the lead of the Ninth Circuit in this case and dis-
posed of the issues raised by the government's appeal on First and
Fifth Amendment grounds; instead, it elected to engage in a twenty-
one page analysis of the bill of attainder doctrine. By this very fact, it
reaffirmed a principle recognized in Cummings and Garland: that the
proscriptions contained in article one, sections nine and ten of the Con-
stitution impose serious restraints on the powers of federal and state
legislatures, which courts are duty-bound to appraise in a meaningful
and careful fashion.
Fourth, and most importantly, Brown appeared to augur a new
direction in the Court's development of the bill of attainder doctrine.
This is indicated by Justice White's dissent. In many ways, that dissent
is itself problematical because Justice White deliberately misrepre-
sented Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion by claiming that it re-
794. See notes 199-211 and accompanying text supra.
795. 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See notes 349-355 and accompanying text supra.
796. 341 U.S. 716 (1951). See notes 566-573 and accompanying text supra.
797. 367 U.S. 1 (1961). See notes 366-372, 611-622 and 721 and accompanying text
supra.
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lied on the concepts of underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness, when
in fact the Chief Justice expressly disavowed such an intention.798 In
claiming that the majority's logic would prohibit Congress from enact-
ing conflict-of-interest statutes, Justice White neglected the three differ-
ences the Chief Justice posited between such statutes and section
504.799 Similarly, Justice White ignored the mass of supporting author-
ity cited by the majority when he asserted that the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers could not be utilized to justify the presence of the bill of
attainder clauses in the Constitution.8" Moreover, after arguing that
the majority should have analyzed the issue of punishment by adopting
the methodology established in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Marinez,80' the
dissenters themselves eschewed such an approach, relying on inferences
drawn from the differences between section 504 and its predecessor and
the nature of the evidence presented by witnesses who testified before
Congress.802 But Justice White was accurate when he suggested that the
majority opinion in Brown casts doubt upon the holdings in cases like
798. At one point in his opinion, Chief Justice Warren said that "[a]lthough it may be
that underinclusiveness is a characteristic of most bills of attainder, we doubt that it is a
necessary feature. We think it clear from [United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946)] that
[the rider to the appropriations bill involved in that case] would have been voided even if it
could have been demonstrated that no one other than Lovett, Watson and Dodd possessed
the characteristics Congress was trying to reach. The vice of attainder is that the legislature
has decided for itself that certain persons possess certain characteristics and are therefore
deserving of sanction, not that it has failed to sanction others similarly situated." United
States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 449 n.23 (1965). Similarly, the Court warned that its use of
overbreadth analysis in ascertaining why section 504 did not utilize a legitimate shorthand
expression was not meant to indicate that overbreadth is a necessary characteristic of an
attainder. Id. at 456 n.31.
799. See notes 751-755 and accompanying text supra. Two subsequent cases upheld
conflict-of-interest statutes by citing this language in the Chief Justice's opinion. See United
States v. Nasser, 476 F.2d 1111, 1116 (7th Cir. 1973) (upheld 18 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1976),
which bars former government employees from acting as agents or attorneys for another in a
matter in which the employee participated personally and substantially while in government
employ as this statute was applied to the case of an IRS attorney who accepted work as
counsel for one who had been the subject of a tax investigation in which the attorney had
taken part; the work accepted was the defense of a prosecution arising from that investiga-
tion); Fitzgerald v. Catherwood, 388 F.2d 400, 407 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 934
(1968) (upheld N.Y. LAB. LAw §§ 723, 725 (McKinney 1973), making it unlawful for an
officer of a labor organization to hold a financial interest in an employer whose workers are
represented by that organization). See also United States v. McCarthy, 300 F. Supp. 716,
721 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), af/'d, 422 F.2d 160 (2d Cir.), appeal dismissed, 398 U.S. 946 (1970)
(upheld 29 U.S.C. §§ 432(a), 439(b) (1970), requiring the criminal prosecution of one who
contemporaneously serves as both the officer of a labor union and a corporate labor rela-
tions consultant without disclosing these facts to the Secretary of Labor, dismissed the at-
tainder challenge as "not weighty.")
800. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443-46 (1965).
801. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). See note 515 and accompanying text supra.
802. See notes 786-787 and accompanying text supra.
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Hawker v. New York,8"3 Communist Party and Douds, because the ma-
jority in Brown evinced a willingness to consider whether the means of
classification used in an allegedly regulatory enactment are truly rele-
vant to the end sought to be achieved. Yet Justice White's fears proved
to be unwarranted. In the dozen years since Brown was decided, only
two decisions have invalidated enactments as bills of attainder.8 4 The
remainder of this article will examine why the hopes raised by the
Brown decision have remained largely unfulfilled.
V. Development of the Bill of Attainder Doctrine:
Post-Brown
In this section of the article, various decisions rendered by state
and lower federal courts from 1965 to the present will be examined.
The range of topics considered will be similar to that covered in Section
111,805 except that the material dealt with under the topic heading of a
legislative act will differ and the subsections under the heading of pun-
ishment concerning legislative purpose,80 6 the civil/criminal distinc-
tion,80 7 the rights/privileges distinction 08 and the punishment per se
problem8 9 will not be dealt with here because they have been fully
analyzed earlier. The same is true for the judicial trial component of
the definition of a bill of attainder.810
A. "A Legislative Act"
The material in this subsection will be dealt with under two differ-
ent topic headings. The first topic is the bill of attainder doctrine as it
applies to legislative contempt citations. The second is the various types
of legislative acts that recent cases have suggested may be exempt from
the proscriptions contained in article one, sections nine and ten of the
Constitution.
803. 170 U.S. 189 (1898). See notes 551-563 and accompanying text supra.
804. See Blawis v. Bolin, 358 F. Supp. 349, 354 (D. Ariz. 1973) (see notes 1032-1046 and
accompanying text infra); Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26, 34 (D. Ariz. 1969) (see notes
115-121 and accompanying text supra). For a list of all the cases invalidating legislation as
attainders decided since 1868, see note 98 supra.
805. See notes 99-722 and accompanying text supra.
806. See notes 177-290 and accompanying text supra.
807. See notes 291-338 and accompanying text supra.
808. See notes 393-478 and accompanying text supra.
809. See notes 479-524 and accompanying text supra.
810. See notes 623-722 and accompanying text supra.
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1. Legislative Contempt Citations
At first glance, legislative contempt citations might seem to be ob-
vious examples of bills of attainder. In issuing such citations the legisla-
ture punishes a specified individual, often without any judicial trial
whatsoever. 81 1 No court, however, has accepted the proposition that
legislative contempt citations are proscribed by article one, section nine
or ten of the Constitution. In this section, the reasons underlying that
consistent refusal will be explored.81 2
No majority opinion of the United States Supreme Court has ever
considered whether a legislative contempt citation can be classified as a
bill of attainder. However, one or two dissents have addressed the issue
and certainly the most notable of these is Justice Black's dissenting
opinion in Barenblatt v. United States.81 3 On June 28, 1954, Lloyd Bar-
enblatt, an instructor in psychology at Vassar College, was subpoenaed
to testify before the House Un-American Activities Committee. When
he appeared before Congress, he refused to answer a set of five ques-
tions relating to his membership in the Communist Party or one of its
alleged affiliates, the Michigan Council of Arts, Sciences and Profes-
sions and his acquaintance with one Francis Crowley, alleged to be a
Party member. Barenblatt declined to answer these queries because he
contended that the committee had no power to inquire into his private
affairs; he did not invoke the Fifth Amendment.814 After a trial for and
conviction of contempt of Congress and after four years of appeals,
81 5
811. There are, of course, two major types of congressional contempt procedures, one of
which does involve a full judicial trial. See notes 830-835, 844-849 and accompanying text
infra. Judicial contempts will not be discussed in this section primarily because there is no
direct case authority on the subject and what little indirect case authority exists suggests that
such contempts may not be subject to the prohibitions contained in article one, sections nine
and ten of the Constitution. See note 173 supra. In this connection, however, one court has
dismissed as meritless an attainder challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 1826 (1976), which mandates
confinement for contempts consisting of a witness' failure to testify before a grand jury after
having been granted use immunity. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 542 F.2d 166, 169 (3d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 755 (1977).
812. For a general discussion of how the constitutional proscriptions against bills of
attainder limit the contempt power, see R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 222-24
(1963) [hereinafter cited as GOLDFARB].
813. 360 U.S. 109 (1959). See id. at 153-62 (Black, I., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J.,
and Douglas, J.).
814. See id. at 113-15.
815. Barenblatt's contempt conviction was originally upheld by a unanimous panel of
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Barenblatt v. United States,
240 F.2d 875, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court vacated
this judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings in light of its ruling in another
decision that a conviction for contempt of Congress could not stand where the alleged con-
temnor was not adequately appraised of the pertinency of the questions that he had refused
to answer. Barenblatt v. United States, 354 U.S. 930 (1957) (citing Watkins v. United States,
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the United States Supreme Court finally considered the case on its mer-
its. Justice Harlan's majority opinion8 16 sought to balance the peti-
tioner's First Amendment rights against the countervailing concerns of
the government. After indicating that the committee had a legitimate
purpose in ascertaining the extent of Communist infiltration into this
nation's educational system, he concluded that "the balance between
the individual and the governmental interests here at stake must be
struck in favor of the latter.
817
In his dissent, Justice Black disagreed. He believed that the pur-
pose of the committee was "to try witnesses and punish them because
they are or have been Communists or because they refuse to admit or
deny Communist affiliation. ' 818 After reviewing the origins and record
of the House Un-American Activities Committee, Justice Black identi-
fied a consistent pattern: the committee would subpoena witnesses sus-
pected of being Communists or "fellow travelers," and insist that each
witness divulge the names and addresses of all persons he or she had
ever known to be either Communists or members of Communist-front
organizations. The resultant compilation of names would then be re-
leased to the press and the victims of such a blacklist became pariahs in
354 U.S. 178, 214-15 (1957)). On remand, the court of appeals again upheld the petitioner's
conviction. Barenblatt v. United States, 252 F.2d 129, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (en banc). It was
this ruling that the United States Supreme Court was reviewing.
816. Justice Harlan was joined by Justices Clark, Frankfurter, Stewart and Whittaker.
There were two dissents. See 360 U.S. at 134-66 (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Warren,
C.J., and Douglas, J.); id. at 166 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
817. 360 U.S. at 134. The continuing validity of the majority decision in Barenblat is
not entirely certain. Two subsequent decisions involving contempts by witnesses who de-
clined to respond to questions put to them by members of the House Un-American Activi-
ties Committee upheld convictions by relying expressly on Barenblat. Braden v. United
States, 365 U.S. 431, 435 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 414 (1961). But
two other decisions involving state legislative investigating committees reversed contempt
convictions by construing Barenblaut rather narrowly. See De Gregory v. New Hampshire,
383 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1966) (said the staleness of the allegedly subversive and Communist
activities which constituted the subject matter of the state investigation precluded any com-
pelling state interest that warranted invasion of associational privacy protected by the First
Amendment); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 549
(1963) (reversed the contempt conviction of witnesses who refused to produce records de-
manded by a state commission investigating "Communist infiltration" into the Miami
branch of the NAACP; distinguished Barenblatt by saying that the nature and aims of the
NAACP differed significantly from those of the Communist Party). See generally EMERSON,
supra note 638, at 247-84; GOLDFARB, supra note 812, at 185-224.
818. 360 U.S. at 153 (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J.). See
also Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 108 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.)
(asserted that contempt proceedings instituted against a witness who refused to cooperate
with an investigating committee chaired by New Hampshire's attorney general amounted to
a bill of attainder). For similar suggestions by commentators, see note 102 supra.
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their communities.819 The same tactic would also be utilized to subject
critics of the committee to similar opprobium and ostracism. Justice
Black argued that the questioning of Barenblatt conformed to this pat-
tern. He had been a teaching fellow at the University of Michigan from
1947 to 1950, a period during which, according to the committee, Com-
munists had had success in infiltrating into the state's educational insti-
tutions.8 " It therefore subpoenaed various persons employed by those
institutions and when those persons claimed their Fifth Amendment
right of silence, they were, for the most part, later dismissed from their
positions.8"' Similarly, members of the committee called upon labor
unions, including teachers' unions to amend their constitutions so as to
deny membership to all persons belonging to the Communist Party. As
a result, Party members were, in effect, foreclosed from seeking em-
ployment in the only kind of jobs for which their particular skills quali-
fied them. 22 Justice Black asserted that it was not the function of a
legislature to compel witnesses to testify in order to expose them "to
ridicule and social and economic retaliation." '823 According to him, "if
communism is to be made a crime, and communists are to be subjected
to 'pains and penalties,' I would still hold this conviction bad, for the
crime of communism, like all others, can be punished only by court
and jury after a trial with all judicial safeguards," '824 such as those enu-
merated in his opinion in United States v. Lovett. 25 He concluded that
the sole purpose of the House Un-American Activities Committee was
that of exposure and punishment and this amounted to an "encroach-
ment on the judiciary which bodes ill for the liberties of the people of
this land." '26
Disregarding the rhetorical flourishes of this portion of Justice
Black's dissenting opinion, it can be seen that his fundamental conten-
tion is indefensible. Lloyd Barenblatt was found guilty of statutory
contempt of Congress. Federal law prescribes that any person subpoe-
naed to appear before Congress who willfully fails to answer a perti-
nent question put to him or her is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable
by a fine ranging from one hundred to one thousand dollars and im-
prisonment for not less than one month or more than one year.
827
819. 360 U.S. at 156-57.
820. Id. at 158 (citing H.R. RnP. No. 57, 84th Cong., 1st Sess, 15 (1955)).
821. Id. at 158-59.
822. Id. at 159.
823. Id.
824. Id. at 160.
825. 328 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1946). See note 627 and accompanying text supra.
826. 360 U.S. at 162.
827. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1976).
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When a witness fails to comply with an order to respond, the commit-
tee must report that omission to the full House, if Congress is in ses-
sion, or to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House, if it
is not.828 When Congress is in session, the house in question must vote
on whether or not to certify the alleged contempt to the United States
Attorney for the District of Columbia; when it is not, either the Presi-
dent of the Senate or the Speaker of the House must make an in-
dependent determination whether or not to effect such a
certification.829 Once the United States Attorney receives notice of cer-
tification, he can go before a federal grand jury and seek an indictment.
If the alleged contemnor is indicted, then he is, of course, entitled to a
full trial in district court.
It is readily apparent that this procedure does not constitute a bill
of attainder. First, there is no legislative act inflicting punishment. The
report by the committee and the certification by either the full house or
its presiding officer do not impose punishment. They merely authorize
the United States Attorney to seek an indictment if he, in his own dis-
cretion, concludes that such a measure is warranted.3 ' Similarly, the
federal grand jury is under no compulsion to indict, and, if it does, the
government bears the burden of proving, inter alia, not only that the
investigative committee in question had acted within the scope of its
authorizing resolution831 and in conformity to its own internal rules,
8 32
828. Id. § 194. For a general discussion of statutory contempt and its attendant proce-
dures, see J. HAMILTON, THE POWER TO PROBE: A STUDY OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGA-
TIONS 91-95 (Vintage ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as HAMILTON].
829. This particular procedural schema is not explicitly detailed in the relevant statute.
See note 828 supra. Instead, it has been established by various rulings of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See Sanders v. McClellan, 463 F.2d 894, 899
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Ansara v. Eastland, 442 F.2d 751, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Wilson v. United
States, 369 F.2d 198, 201-03 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
830. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 381 U.S.
935 (1965); Deutsch v. Aderhold, 80 F.2d 677, 678 (5th Cir. 1935). Both these decisions
reiterate the view that federal district attorneys retain the general authority to determine
how to conduct prosecutions for violation of federal law. See also 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1970)
(vesting the power to conduct federal criminal litigation in the Attorney General and his
delegates).
831. See, e.g., United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41,47-48 (1953) (invalidated contempt
conviction because the subpoena issued by the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activi-
ties because the Court defined the term "lobbying" as used in the committee's authorizing
resolution to encompass only representations made directly to Congress rather than to the
community as a whole); Shelton v. United States, 327 F.2d 601, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert
denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1968) (invalidated contempt conviction because the subpoena issued
by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee was beyond the scope of its authorizing reso-
lution). Cf. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955) (said contempt conviction may
not be based on a refusal to respond to a line of inquiry involving matters in which Congress
is forbidden to legislate).
832. Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702, 708-09 (1966) (reversed a contempt convic-
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but also that the questions to which the defendant refused to respond
were pertinent 33 and that he was informed of the reasons why they
were pertinent.8" Thus, throughout this chain of events, no single legis-
lative act inflicting punishment can be designated; at best, the certifica-
tion can merely be said to authorize another federal agency to initiate
action that may or may not result in the imposition of a sanction. But
more importantly, such sanctions cannot be imposed until after a full
trial in a court of law. At least in the area of statutory contempt, Con-
gress is not arrogating to itself any judicial functions because it is the
tion where the House Un-American Activities Committee failed to follow its own Rule I,
requiring that all major investigations must be authorized by a majority vote of the members
of the committee); Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 121 (1963) (reversed a contempt
conviction where the House Un-American Activities Committee failed to follow its own
Rule IV, requiring testimony to be taken in executive session whenever a majority of the
members of the committee believe that public responses to proposed inquiries will impair
the reputation of the witness). But where an investigating committee fails to follow parlia-
mentary rules of order which are not also part of internal regulations, such a procedural
defect is not material. See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 329-30 (1950) (held quorum
of a subcommittee need not be present when a witness refuses to respond to a subpoena).
833. See, e.g., Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 755 (1962); Hutcheson v. United
States, 369 U.S. 599, 618-19 (1962); Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 468 (1961); Bra-
den v. United States, 365 U.S. 431, 433, 435-36 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S.
399, 407-09, 413 (1961); McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 381-82 (1960); Sacher v.
United States, 356 U.S. 576, 577 (1958); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 208 (1957);
Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 292 (1929).
834. See, e.g., Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 468 (1961); Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109, 117 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 214-15 (1957);
Knowles v. United States, 280 F.2d 696, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Watson v. United States, 280
F.2d 689, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1960). Cf. Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219, 223 (1955) (invali-
dated indictment for contempt of Congress because committee members failed to advise the
petitioner of their position on his failure to respond to questions, claiming this omission
negated any possibility that the accused harbored the requisite criminal intent). Moreover,
the witness could always claim as a defense to indictment that he had invoked his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. A federal district court first so held in this
context in 1950. United States v. Yukio Abe, 95 F. Supp. 991, 992 (D. Hawaii 1950). Five
years later, two decisions of the United States Supreme Court assumed sub silentio that the
Fifth Amendment applies in legislative investigations. Empsak v. United States, 349 U.S.
190, 194 (1955); Quinn v. United States, 340 U.S. 155, 161-62 (1955). In the former decision,
the Court held that if an answer would be incriminating, a witness cannot be deprived of his
Fifth Amendment protections merely because he could refute any adverse influence arising
from his answer at some subseqent prosecution, Empsak v. United States, 349 U.S. at 201; in
the latter, it held a mere reference to the Fifth Amendment was sufficient to invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination, Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. at 165. Later decisions
of the Court indicate that the Bill of Rights in general limits the investigative powers of
Congress. Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599, 610-11 (1962); Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. at 111-12; Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. at 188. For a general analysis
of the pertinency requirement, see C. BECK, CONTEMrr OF CONGRESS 155-80 (1959). For a
general analysis of the Fifth Amendment in this context, see GOLDFARB, supra note 812, at
230-57; HAMILTON, supra note 828, at 211-20.
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task of the judiciary to carry out any ensuing adjudication of individu-
als. Thus, contrary to Justice Black's contention, 835 conviction for statu-
tory contempt does not fit within the definition of a bill of pains and
penalties.
But although Justice Black cites precedents involving legislative
contempt citations, 36 his true concern was not with statutory procedure
but with the House Un-American Activities Committee's establishment
of an informal blacklist that exposed those included on it to obloquy
and economic reprisals. Here, if one ignores a federal statute specifi-
cally saying that a witness cannot refuse to cooperate with a legislative
investigation because his testimony "may tend to disgrace him or other-
wise render him infamous," 37 Justice Black seems to have a better ar-
gument. There is a legislative act involved in the creation of an
informal blacklist. Although no bill was ever passed into law, the com-
mittee indexed and published the names of "Fifth Amendment Com-
munists" and "fellow travelers" as a routine part of its operations;
indeed, Justice Black pointed out that as of 1949 it had disseminated
the names of 335,000 people who had allegedly signed "Communist"
petitions.838 These were not judicial acts: the legislature was not apply-
ing an existing rule of general application.839 What was or was not a
"Communist" petition was left entirely up to the committee itself. Simi-
larly, whether a person's name should be included on a list of "Fifth
Amendment Communists" (itself a new definition of the word "Com-
munist") was a matter relegated to the discretion of the members of the
committee, who could so classify persons like Lloyd Barenblatt, even
though he had never invoked the Fifth Amendment. Similarly, such an
argument satisfies the specificity and judicial trial components of a bill
of attainder. The index consisted of individual names and the persons
whose names were included on it received no prior hearing whatsoever.
835. See note 824 and accompanying text supra. The error inherent in Justice Black's
thesis has been underscored by the Court. Seven years after Barenblatt, it noted that
"[m]oreover, the Congress in enacting § 192, specifically indicated that it relied upon the
courts to apply the exact standard of criminal jurisprudence to charges of contempt of Con-
gress in order to assure that the Congressional investigative power, when enforced by penal
sanctions, would not be abused." Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702, 707 (1966).
836. See 360 U.S. at 154, 162 (citing Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881)).
Kilbourn involved Congress' self-help power of contempt rather than its statutory power.
See notes 844-849 and accompanying text infra.
837. 2 U.S.C. § 193 (1976).
838. 360 U.S. at 158 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1950, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 19 (1950)).
839. For the source of the definition of a judicial act, see notes 122, 130 and accompa-
nying text supra.
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The problem, then, is really one of punishment and it has two as-
pects. First, could the sanctions inflicted (public ridicule and loss of
employment) be deemed punitive? Although ridicule is probably too
subjective a phenomenon to be construed as punishment, loss of em-
ployment was a penal sanction both at common law and in modem
case law."4 To the extent that the blacklists imposed that sanction, they
had penal repercussions. But this raises the second aspect of the prob-
lem: who were the authors of these sanctions? Certainly not the House
Un-American Activities Committee; it had no inherent power to termi-
nate union membership or dismiss state employees. The role of the
committee in inflicting punishment was indirect at best. The sanctions
were, in fact, imposed by state authorities and private organizations
reacting to the committee's index. It was their actions that could have
been and often were subjected to attainder challenges.8 4' The acts of
the House Un-American Activities Committee, therefore, could not
constitute attainders unless, like Justice Black, one would be willing to
add new and hitherto unexpected dimensions to the concept of causal-
ity underlying the bill of attainder doctrine. No decision of the United
States Supreme Court has accepted such an expansive approach; as
Ronald Goldfarb has suggested, such an extension of the prohibition of
article one, section nine "is less likely to be the successful constitutional
law from which any solution will derive in this perplexing conflict.
'8 42
A majority of the Court seems to recognize this point: it has been
stated that legislative investigating committees may not expose merely
for the sake of exposure, but this assertion has been premised not on
any expansive conceptualization of the bill of attainder doctrine but
840. For common law examples, see note 87 supra. The key modem decision would be
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867), which deemed an expurgatory oath
that operated to deprive persons of, inter alia, existing positions of employment, was a bill of
attainder. See note 66 and accompanying text supra. Accord, Putty v. United States, 220
F.2d 473, 478 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 821 (1955). See note 636 and accompanying
text supra.
841. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Cooper, 136 Cal. App. 2d 513, 525-26, 289 P.2d 80, 81-
82 (1955) (provision of state's Dilworth Act mandating dismissal of teachers refusing to co-
operate with legislative committees investigating subversion); Opinion of the Justices, 332
Mass. 785, 789, 127 N.E.2d 663, 666 (1955) (proposed statute requiring dismissal of teachers
who refuse to answer questions put to them regarding their Communist affiliations); Faxon
v. School Comm., 331 Mass. 531, 538, 120 N.E.2d 772, 776 (1954) (dismissal of teacher who
invoked the Fifth Amendment before a United States Senate Committee investigating Com-
munism); Weinstock v. Ladisky, 197 Misc. 859, 875, 98 N.Y.S.2d 85, 101 (1950) (amendment
to union constitution banning fascists and subversives). None of these challenges were
successful.
842. GOLDFARB, supra note 812, at 223.
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rather on the First and Fifth Amendments. 43
Nevertheless, the foregoing discussion takes into account only part
of the problem. In addition to its statutory contempt power, Congress
possesses an implied power of self-help, formally recognized by the
United States Supreme Court since 1821.844 This authority is narrowly
circumscribed; as the Court stated in 1917:
It is clear that it does not embrace punishment for contempt as
punishment, since it rests only upon the right of self-preservation,
that is, the right to prevent acts which in and of themselves inher-
ently obstruct or prevent the discharge of legislative duty or the
refusal to do that which there is inherent legislative power to
compel in order that legislative functions may be performed. 45
If a person engages in such acts or commits such a refusal, the legisla-
ture may have its sergeant-at-arms arrest him and imprison him for, at
most, the duration of the session of Congress in which the contempt
occurred.8 4 6 The validity of such a detention may be tested after the
fact either through a writ of habeas corpus 47 or a tort action for false
843. See Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599, 614 (1962); Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955).
844. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 228-35 (1821) (upheld contempt pro-
ceedings against one who allegedly attempted to bribe a member of the House of Represent-
atives to gain his vote on a land claim pending in Congress). There are three other major
decisions by the Court construing this self-help power of Congress: Jurney v. MacCracken,
294 U.S. 25 (1935); Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168 (1881). Jurney involved a congressional investigation into contracts of carriage of
air and ocean mail made by the Postmaster General. In response to a subpoena duces tecum,
the alleged contemnor, a lawyer for some of the private carriers, relied on the attorney-client
privilege. While the committee was deliberating on this claim, directors of Western Air Ex-
press and Northwest Airways were allowed to remove relevant documents from the attor-
ney's files so that when he finally did produce the requested documents, there were some
crucial omissions. Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. at 144-46. The Court upheld the denial
of a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 152. In Marshall, a United States Attorney for the southern
district of New York conducted a grand jury investigation leading to the indictment of cer-
tain members of the House of Representatives in connection with antitrust violations. One of
the congressmen so affected initiated impeachment proceedings against the attorney; the
latter wrote a letter to the press, claiming that the House Judiciary Committee was trying to
frustrate the efforts of the grand jury. For this, he was held in contempt. Marshall v.
Gordon, 243 U.S. at 530-3 1. The Court upheld the granting of a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at
548. Kilbourn arose from a congressional contempt citation against a witness who declined
to answer questions or produce records relevant to a real estate partnership of which he was
a member (and which was implicated in the failure of Jay Cooke's banking firm). Kilbourn
v. Thompson, 103 U.S. at 170. The Court upheld a $20,000 award for false imprisonment
against Congress' sergeant-at-arms. Id. at 200. See generally GOLDF.ARB supra note 812, at
25-45; HAMILTON, supra note 828, at 85-91.
845. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 532 (1917).
846. Id.; Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821).
847. See Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 143 (1935); Marshall v. Gordon, 243
U.S. 521, 532 (1917).
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imprisonment against the sergeant-at-arms who executed the command
of Congress.84 In this nonstatutory variant of legislative contempt,
Congress votes to imprison a person without any judicial trial before-
hand, although it usually will, if feasible, afford him an opportunity to
appear so that he may attempt to rebut the charge of misconduct lev-
eled against him.849 No case has ever discussed whether the proscrip-
tion against bills of attainder applies to such an act of Congress, but the
issue was raised in state and federal lawsuits arising from the arrest and
incarceration of Father James E. Groppi by agents of the Wisconsin
legislature.
On September 29, 1969, Groppi, a well-known civil rights activist,
led a throng of people onto the floor of the assembly of the Wisconsin
legislature while it was in session in order to protest against cuts in the
state budget for certain welfare programs. The resultant disruption
lasted nearly twelve hours and prevented the State Assembly from con-
ducting any further business during that day.850 Two days later, the
Assembly passed a resolution finding Father Groppi guilty of contempt
and ordering the sheriff of Dane County to detain him in jail for six
months, or the duration of the 1969 regular session, whichever was
shorter.8 5 ' This action was taken in accordance with a provision of the
Wisconsin constitution enabling the legislature to punish for contempt
and disorderly conduct 8 2 and a statute enacted pursuant to that consti-
tutional provision authorizing each house of the State Assembly to pe-
nalize as contempt "[d]isorderly conduct in the immediate view of the
house and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings. 853 At the time
the resolution had passed, Groppi was already confined in jail, having
been arrested on disorderly conduct charges; he had been given neither
notice nor an opportunity to appear before the legislature to state his
case."' He challenged the constitutionality of the resolution in habeas
corpus proceedings intiated in both state and federal courts, alleging,
inter alia, that the resolution was a bill of attainder. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court dismissed this challenge by concluding that since no
legislative act was being questioned, there could be neither a bill of
848. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 170 (1881); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 204, 204-05 (1821).
849. Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 501 (1971); Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125,
143-44 (1935); Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 532 (1917); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168, 173-74 (1881); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 209-11 (1821).
850. State ex rel. Groppi v. Leslie, 44 Wis.2d 282, 288, 171 N.W.2d 192, 194 (1969).
851. For the text of this resolution, see Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496,497-98 n.1 (1972).
852. WIs. CONsT. art. IV, § 8 (West 1957).
853. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 13.26(1)(b) (West 1972).
854. Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 498-99 (1972).
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attainder nor a bill of pains and penalties.855 One of the decisions in
federal court made an inapposite reference to Justice Black's dissent in
Barenblatt, but concluded that the bill of attainder doctrine had never
been seriously considered as a defense to a legislative contempt cita-
tion.856 This position was affirmed by other opinions in the same
case.
857
On a writ of certiorari, however, the United States Supreme Court
reversed. 858 Chief Justice Burger's opinion for a unanimous court ig-
nored Groppi's attainder contention but reversed the rulings of the
lower federal courts on the theory that the action of the Wisconsin leg-
islature violated the due process protections guaranteed by section one
of the Fourteenth Amendment.859 The Court claimed that Groppi
should have been accorded both adequate notice and an opportunity to
respond by way of defense or extenuation;860 the hearing granted need
not be lengthy or incorporate all the safeguards of a judicial trial but it
could not be summarily dispensed with, at least in the circumstances of
this case.
86 '
The contempt citation directed against Groppi would satisfy all
the definitional prerequisites of a bill of attainder, yet both the state
and federal courts dismissed such a challenge. Why they chose to do so
855. State exrel. Groppi v. Leslie, 44 Wis. 2d 282,299, 171 N.W.2d 192,200 (1969). It is
difficult to divine what the court meant by this statement; it never specified why the resolu-
tion of the Assembly was not a legislative act. It may well be that the court believed that the
legislature was acting in a constitutionally-prescribed judicial capacity and that a judicial act
could therefore not be subject to the proscriptions against bills of attainder. The court, how-
ever, at one point said it was not analogizing the legislative contempt power and its judicial
counterpart. Id. at 295, 171 N.W.2d at 197. But it then proceeded to draw a number of
parallels between the two. Id. at 295-96, 171 N.W.2d at 197-98. Thus, there is some reason
to believe that it assumed that the Assembly, in citing for contempt, was adopting the func-
tion of a court of law.
856. Groppi v. Froehlich, 311 F. Supp. 772, 781 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
857. Groppi v. Froehlich, 311 F. Supp. 765, 771 (W.D. Wis.), affd sub nom. Groppi v.
Leslie, 436 F.2d 326, 330 (7th Cir. 1970). Groppi had originally sought a declaratory judg-
ment that the Wisconsin statute in question was unconstitutional. This relief was denied.
Groppi v. Froehlich, 311 F. Supp. at 772. He also sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal
court and the district judge hearing his request concluded that the procedure utilized by the
Assembly constituted a denial of due process. Groppi v. Froehlich, 311 F. Supp. 772, 781
(W.D. Wis. 1970). The judge therefore granted the desired writ. Id. at 782. A panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed this last ruling, concluding
that the interests of the citizenry (as represented by the Assembly) outweighed the interests
of Father Groppi and the full court of appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed this conclusion.
Groppi v. Leslie, 436 F.2d at 330-31, affid, 436 F.2d 331, 332 (7th Cir. 1971) (en bane).
858. Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 507 (1972).
859. Id. at 499.
860. Id. at 502-03.
861. Id. at 504-05. The Court found it decisive that the resolution was enacted two days
after the disorderly conduct in question occurred.
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is easily ascertainable. This type of summary contempt procedure is
usually applied only where the necessity of preserving order and deco-
rum require it; it is a policing device that "should be limited to '[t]he
least possible power adequate to the end proposed.' "862 Any extension
of the proscription against bills of attainder to such sanctions for con-
tempt would, because of their very nature, destroy the power of the
legislature to utilize them. In view of the perceived and probably legiti-
mate863 need for such a policing device, it can be argued that the attain-
der doctrine is too indiscriminate a safeguard to apply in these cases
because its ultimate effect will be to eradicate all use of, rather than
merely prevent, abuses of legislative contempt citations. The United
States Supreme Court arguably accepted this contention in Groppi's
case. Rather than utilizing the blunt tool presented by the prohibition
of article one, section ten of the Constitution, it chose to rely on the
finer protective mechanism afforded by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, Justice White was correct when, in his
dissent in United States v. Brown,8" he stated the area of legislative
contempt citations presents one situation in which the doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers would be undermined, because in this situation legis-
latures do adjudicate and impose punishment in individual cases. But
862. .d at 506 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 274 (1948); Anderson v. Dunn, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821)).
863. The legitimacy of this device has best been stated by Justice William Johnson:
That a deliberating assembly, clothed with the majesty of the people, and charged
with care of all that is dear to them, composed of the most distinguished citizens,
selected and drawn together from every quarter of this great nation; whose deliber-
ations are required by public opinion to be conducted under the eye of the public
and whose decision must be clothed with all that sanctity which unlimited confi-
dence in their wisdom and purity can inspire; that such an assembly should not
possess the power to suppress rudeness, or repel insult, is a supposition too wild to
be suggested. And accordingly, to avoid the pressure of these considerations, it has
been argued, that the right of the representative Houses to exclude from their pres-
ence, and their absolute control within their own walls, carry with them the right to
punish contempts committed within their presence ...
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 228-29 (1821). Yet in Groppi one might well ask
if this summary contempt power was not superfluous. The state possessed two other statu-
tory prohibitions which it sought to enforce: one is directed against disorderly conduct in
public places. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 947.01 (West 1975). Groppi was, in fact, promptly
imprisoned for violating this statute, although his subsequent trial resulted in a hung jury.
404 U.S. at 498-99 & n.3. The other renders any person cited for contempt of the Assembly
subject to prosecution for a misdemeanor after the adjournment of the legislature. See Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 13.27(2) (West 1975). The Assembly invoked this sanction. 404 U.S. 497-98
n. I. The latter penalty is too remote to serve as a deterrent, but the former is not. Yet none of
the courts in this case considered whether the availability of these criminal prohibitions in
any way militated against the necessity for a summary contempt proceeding.
864. 381 U.S. 437, 473 (1965) (White, J., dissenting). See note 783 and accompanying
text supra.
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one should not extrapolate from this anomaly any general thesis that
the attainder clauses in the Constitution were not meant to safeguard
that doctrine, as does Justice White. The legislative contempt cases
constitute the one narrow exception to the contrary general rule.
2 Purported Exceptions
This section will consist of analyses of three recent decisions ren-
dered by lower federal courts. These cases are unimportant in and of
themselves but are indicative of a type of strategy on which courts may
rely to avoid classifying challenged enactments as bills of attainder.
This strategy entails an identification of those types of legislative acts
that are deemed exempt from the prohibitions contained in article one,
sections nine or ten of the Constitution.
The first case is Flood v. Margis.65 In that suit, the plaintiffs insti-
tuted an action in federal district court to challenge the refusal of the
municipal board of Caledonia, Wisconsin, to renew their license to op-
erate a mobile trailer park within the town's limits. The court dismissed
an attainder contention by remarking that "[1]icensing is a function of
the town board; regardless of how arbitrary its actions are alleged to
have been, such actions cannot constitute a bill of attainder." '66
The second decision is Clay v. United States."7 This suit arose
from Muhammad Ali's challenge to his 1-A classification by various
Texas and Kentucky selective service boards and to their concomitant
refusal to accord him either 1-0 (conscientious objector exemption) or
IV-D (ministerial exemption, sought because appellant alleged he was
a minister of the Lost Found Church of Islam) status.168 One of his
contentions was that the "whole proceeding of his classification and
induction into the military service constituted a prohibited bill of at-
tainder."8 69 After having been convicted for knowingly and willfully
refusing to report for and submit to induction into the armed forces,
8 70
Ali raised this argument as a ground for reversal in his appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court re-
jected his contention in a rather suggestive fashion. It could have sim-
ply stated that the purpose of the selective service legislation was not to
865. 64 F.R.D. 59 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
866. Id. at 61.
867. 397 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds sub norm. Giordano v.
United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969).
868. See 397 F.2d at 905-06.
869. Id. at 921.
870. Ali was convicted of violating 50 U.S.C. app. § 462 (1970). He was sentenced to
five years' imprisonment and fined $10,000. 397 F.2d at 906-07.
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punish either the appellant in particular, or the members of either his
religion or his race in general. But the court seemed to accept, at least
for the sake of argument, that a penalty was being exacted, because it
elected to dispose of the attainder challenge by scrutinizing the judicial
trial aspect.871 The Fifth Circuit held that proceedings before local
draft boards are both non-judicial and non-criminal in nature8 72 and it
cited with approval an unpublished opinion of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denying Ali pre-induction injunctive
relief on the theory that Congress did not intend that draftees should be
able to litigate the validity of their classifications in the courts. Such
litigation would cause interminable delays, which would, in turn, "in-
terfere with the orderly proceedings of the draft boards and prevent
them from filling their quotas and supplying the armed forces with
much needed personnel. ' 8 73 The Fifth Circuit adopted a similar posi-
tion, arguing that judicial review prior to induction would constitute an
"open invitation to a large volume of litigation, much of which we
could expect would undoubtedly be based on frivolous grounds in an
attempt to delay or evade military service.1874 It cited in support of its
conclusion a 1944 ruling of the United States Supreme Court that em-
phasized the need for administrative efficiency in processing the claims
of conscripts and declared that unhesitating obedience to orders made
during that process was indispensable to the achievement of the goal of
national defense.8 75 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the ap-
pellant could either challenge his classification as part of his defense to
a criminal prosecution for failure to report or accept induction and
thereafter test the validity of that classification by means of a writ of
habeas corpus.876 Consequently, the court rejected sub silentio Ai's at-
tainder challenge.
8 77
871. For a discussion of this aspect, see notes 623-722 and accompanying text supra.
872. 397 F.2d at 921.
873. Ali v. Breathlitt, Docket no. 17834 (6th Cir. 1967) (unpublished), quoted in 397
F.2d at 922.
874. 397 F.2d at 922.
875. Id. at 922-23 (citing Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 554 (1944)).
876. Id. at 923 (citing Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 377 (1955)). Accord,
Dodez v. United States, 154 F.2d 637,638 (6th Cir.), rev'don other grounds sub nom. Gibson
v. United States, 329 U.S. 338 (1946). See notes 643-645 and accompanying text supra.
877. Other decisions have also rejected attainder challenges against provisions of selec-
tive service legislation. See Dodez v. United States, 154 F.2d 637, 38 (6th Cir.), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Gibson v. United States, 329 U.S. 338 (1946); United States v. Gos-
ciniak, 142 F.2d 240, 240 (7th Cir. 1944); United States v. Olson, 253 F. 233, 234-35 (W.D.
Wash. 1917). Only Dodez offered any explanation for its ruling. See notes 643-645 and
accompanying text supra.
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Finally, in Gianatasio v. W'hyte, 878 an enlistee in the Connecticut
Army National Guard challenged an order requiring him to report for
two years of active duty in the United States Army for having engaged
in "unsatisfactory participation" in unit drills. The appellant had, in
fact, attended all national guard drills but he had ignored repeated or-
ders to have his hair cut shorter. He claimed that his hairstyle was a
necessary adjunct to his civilian job as a shoe salesman and did not
measurably interfere with his ability to perform his duties as a reserv-
ist.879 First Lieutenant Eamonn Whyte, the appellant's immediate com-
manding officer, disagreed on the ground that Gianatasio was violating
army regulations. After failing to get satisfactory compliance with
Whyte's orders to have the appellant's hair cut shorter, the Army
placed Gianatasio on two years' active duty.88 It did so pursuant to a
term in the appellant's enlistment contract which stated that any person
who joined the Army Reserve and failed to serve satisfactorily could be
shifted to fully active status for the duration of the period specified
therein. 81 Rather than being ordered to report to the local selective
service board for induction, however, Gianatasio was ordered directly
into active duty in accordance with a statute passed two years after he
enlisted.882 One of the appellant's constitutional objections, therefore,
was that this order to active duty constituted punishment without judi-
cial trial in violation of the precepts promulgated in United States v.
Brown.883 Judge Waterman's opinion for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected this contention. His rationale
advances so inimitable a theory that it merits quotation in full:
Appellant overlooks the fact, however, that he agreed in his en-
listment contract to immediate induction into the active service
should he "fail to participate satisfactorily" in the National
Guard. Even assuming that this contract agreement did not
waive any procedural rights which might otherwise have existed
without it, Gianatasio does not intimate that he has actually been
injured by the lack of any of these procedures. He does not here
contest the fact that his hair is longer than National Guard stand-
ards permit, nor does he allege that he would have made such a
contention to the Guard in hearings which were not made avail-
able to him or were not fairly conducted. We have already held
878. 426 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 941 (1970).
879. 426 F.2d at 909.
880. Id.
881. Id. at 910. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(c)(2)(D) (1970), which mandates the inclusion
of such a provision in enlistment contracts.
882. 426 F.2d at 910. See Act of June 30, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 6(l), 81 Stat. 105
(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 673a (1976)). Gianatasio had enlisted on July 14, 1965.
883. 381 U.S. 437 (1965). See notes 728-766 and accompanying text supra.
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that the military has wide discretion in regulating hair
length. . . Therefore, inasmuch as Gianatasio has failed to
show or even allege that he might have substantive rights to pro-
tect, we fail to see how any hypothetical deprivation of procedu-
ral rights can harm him.
These decisions are disturbing.88 5 Flood suggests that licensing
rulings fall outside the scope of the bill of attainder doctrine. In doing
so, it ignores cases like Dent v. West Virginia886 and Hawker v. New
York,887 in which the United States Supreme Court, when confronted
with attainder challenges to statutory licensing schemes, made no such
facile pronouncements, but instead engaged in relatively painstaking
efforts to show why the enactments being questioned ought to be char-
acterized as regulatory rather than punitive. Of course, those cases in-
volved laws governing professional licensure, whereas the court in
Flood was concerned with the denial of a permit to operate a trailer
park. Nevertheless, the Wisconsin district court offered no reason for
distinguishing the licensing decision of the town board of Caledonia
from the qualificatory schemes established by West Virginia and New
York. Indeed, its statement is an assertion about licensing in general
and contains no implicit differentiation based upon the subject matter
being licensed. Thus, the proposition espoused in Flood can be seen for
what it is: a wholly unsubstantiated ipse dixit.
Similar problems arise in connection with the Fifth Circuit's deci-
sion in Clay. That ruling seems to suggest that if the government has a
compelling interest (like national defense), which can be fulfilled only
through the creation of some specialized bureaucracy with its own
streamlined administrative procedure, then the due process safeguards
afforded by the proscriptions against bills of attainder simply become
expendable. And, in light of the court's discussion, this proposition
would appear to hold true even if that bureaucracy was entrusted with
884. 426 F.2d at 911. In support of its conclusion about the military's wide discretion in
regulating hair length, the court cited its own ruling in Raderman v. Kaine, 411 F.2d 1102,
1106 (2d Cir. 1969).
885. Other decisions have similar connotations. See Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34,
37 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1010 (1973) (upheld 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (1976),
which restricts ex-felons from purchasing firearms, against an attainder challenge, saying
that the "legislature, in exercising its rule-making powers, may disqualify convicted felons
from pursuing activities open to others without running afoul of the bill of attainder
clause."); Whitehill v. Elkins, 258 F. Supp. 589, 596 (D. Md. 1966), rev'd on other grounds,
389 U.S. 54 (1967) (upheld expurgatory oath exacted from public employees against attain-
der challenge by claiming that "loyalty oaths, as conditions precedent for public employ-
ment, if otherwise valid, are not invalid as bills of attainder.")
886. 129 U.S. 114 (1889). See notes 541-548 and accompanying text supra.
887. 170 U.S. 189 (1898). See notes 551-563 and accompanying text supra.
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the duty to punish rather than to regulate. The problem is that this
thesis can't prove anything. If national defense is an example of a com-
pelling interest, then so is internal security, which is, after all, a compo-
nent of such defense. Consequently, since the need to further internal
security is a vital one, legislation like section 504 of the Labor Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,888 invalidated in United
States v. Brown, could be defended against an attainder challenge by
relying on the logic of Clay and by claiming that the need to effectively
prevent the occurrence of crippling industrial strikes necessitates the
exclusion of members of the Communist Party from union officerships.
Obviously, the United States Supreme Court in Brown did not do so;
instead, it considered whether or not the means used to achieve the end
sought by Congress were in fact relevant.890 In Clay, the Fifth Circuit
eschewed such an exacting scrutiny and simply denied pre-induction
judicial hearings because it claimed to foresee definite abuses if such a
procedural accommodation were allowed. Thus, on the basis of its own
purportedly infallible prognostications, the court of appeals exempted
from the purview of the proscription against bills of attainder that class
of legislation intended to effectuate compelling goals, thereby overrid-
ing the obligation to afford the panoply of constitutional protections
enumerated by Justice Black in United States v. Lo'ett.91 Once this
conclusion is accepted, the implicit consequence becomes obvious: ap-
plication of the prohibitions against attainders in a given case will de-
pend primarily on how the presiding judge defines the term
"compelling state interest." The mere statement of this proposition
reveals its inherent fallaciousness: the language of the Constitution ex-
presses an absolute prohibition, not a conditional restriction to be bal-
anced against some countervailing governmental interest.
Gianatasio is an even more unconscionable decision. Judge Water-
man's opinion advances three distinct theses: a person who contracts
with the government (1) may, by implication, waive the procedural
rights protected by the bill of attainder clauses, (2) may not be able to
raise an attainder challenge if he admits that he violated standards in-
corporated by reference into his contract, or if he admits that he is un-
able to allege full compliance with those standards at some
hypothetical hearing that he was, in fact, never granted and (3) may not
avail himself of an attainder defense to enforcement of a contract by
888. See note 729 supra.
889. 381 U.S. 437 (1965). See notes 728-766 and accompanying text supra.
890. See note 756 and accompanying text supra.
891. 328 U.S. 303 (1946). See note 627 and accompanying text supra.
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the state, if the contractual provision sought to be enforced is one over
which the government possesses a wide discretion. One cannot help but
feel that in his zeal to preserve the military's disciplinary authority,
Judge Waterman has, in effect, eviscerated the safeguards afforded by
the proscriptions contained in article one, section nine of the Constitu-
tion. His decision seems to exempt a class of enactments-those creat-
ing standardized contracts between the state and the individual-from
the coverage of the bill of attainder clauses. The theory of implied
waiver of constitutional rights is an innovative one that no other court
has ever espoused in this context; indeed, decisions in the field of pub-
lic employment rendered both before and after Gianatasio suggest that
a person does not forfeit his constitutional rights when he assumes a
position in public service.892 Similarly, to say that a person is not enti-
tled to a judicial hearing prior to punishment if he cannot first allege
full compliance with the very standards that he claims are unconstitu-
tional 93 would seem to flout the logic of Lovett and Brown, both of
which emphasized the procedural due process aspects of the attainder
doctrine.8 94 Finally, Judge Waterman's dictum about "wide discretion"
evokes the same difficulty implicit in Clay, namely, if an attainder
challenge cannot be raised against official action undertaken in accord-
ance with statutory authorization because that action is deemed to be
discretionary, then the safeguards afforded by the prohibitions against
attainders may be easily evaded by a simple exercise of semantic
manipulation.
The common flaw in all of these decisions consists of the fallacy of
overgeneralization. The key aspect in most attainder cases is distin-
guishing punishment from regulation. It is an ad hoc process; one can-
not identify a class of enactments (e.g., all licensing laws, all tax
892. See note 418 supra. However, as one commentator has pointed out, the exact ex-
tent of the constitutional rights retained by servicemen is presently uncertain and, when
eventually clarified, will probably not entail any severe inhibitions on the power of the mili-
tary to regulate hair length. See J. BISHOP, JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: A STUDY OF MILITARY
LAW 144-45 (1974). Cf. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 246-48 (1976) (Court upheld hair
length regulations for state policemen, citing the organizational structure of the police force
and the need to promote esprit de corps as a basis for its ruling).
893. Gianatasio claimed that the military regulations on appearance effected an uncon-
stitutional deprivation of livelihood. The Second Circuit disagreed and upheld their validity.
Gianatasio v. Whyte, 426 F.2d 908, 911 (2d Cir. 1970). Accord, Wallace v. Chafee, 451 F.2d
1374, 1380 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 933 (1973); Agrati v. Laird, 440 F.2d 683,
684 (9th Cir. 1971); Anderson v. Laird, 437 F.2d 912, 914 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
865 (1971). None of these cases, however, dealt with attainder challenges.
894. See notes 627, 740 and accompanying text supra. However, later decisions of the
Supreme Court do raise barriers to collateral constitutional challenges in criminal proceed-
ings. See notes 1062-1112 and accompanying text infra.
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legislation, all loyalty oaths) and say that such enactments can never be
bills of attainder. In all cases, courts must consider a challenged law in
context, analyzing the purpose for which it was enacted, the sanctions
that it imposes, the method by which it was supposed to be adminis-
tered, the method by which it is in fact administered and so on. A bill
of attainder challenge thus raises issues which can be properly dealt
with only by a discrete analysis of the legislation being questioned.
Clay, Gianatasio and Flood are of interest because the courts in those
cases eschewed this technique. They offered broad generalizations
about how certain types of statutes are immune to attainder challenges
and then disposed of specific claims on the basis of those generalities.
Significantly, the courts utilizing this illegitimate decision-making tech-
nique did not rely on precedential rulings of the United States Supreme
Court in attainder cases; instead they either engaged in the assertion of
ipse dixits or relied on the language of unrelated decisions to bolster
conclusions concerning the scope and applicability of the attainder
clauses. Such a simplistic approach is understandably attractive; it is an
easy task to define the characteristics of a type of enactment and then
contend that the very presence of those characteristics negates the ap-
plicability of a specific constitutional prohibition. But the problem with
this methodology is the same as that which arose in the decisions draw-
ing the distinction between civil and criminal penalties8 95 or those ad-
vancing the prenise that deportation is not punishment per se.896 All
these rulings substitute the invocation of simplistic labels for the hard
task of ratiocination. The bill of attainder problem is not (or, at least,
should not be) susceptible to a facile resolution that consists of carving
out exceptions to its coverage. To the extent that courts like those in
Flood, Clay and Gianatasio do so, they misrepresent the very nature of
the inquiry that they are being asked to make.
B. "Inflicting Punishment"
L Prospectiviy andRetrospectivity
In 1950, in the case of American Communications Association v.
Douds,897 three justices898 of the United States Supreme Court upheld
895. See notes 295-338 and accompanying text supra.
896. See notes 479-524 and accompanying text supra.
897. 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See notes 349-359 and accompanying text supra.
898. The three were Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Burton. See note 354
supra.
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the expurgatory oath created by section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act 899
against an attainder challenge by claiming that no enactment which
prohibited future conduct instead of punishing past actions could at-
taint.9°° This conclusion was accepted and applied in a number of
lower federal and state court decisions.90' As late as 1961, five justices
of the United States Supreme Court reiterated the view that the pros-
pectivity/retrospectivity distinction would be decisive in determining
whether or not an attainder challenge lacked merit.9 2 As has been ar-
gued earlier,90 3 this purported dichotomy is a false one; it is not sub-
stantiated by prior rulings of the Supreme Court, nor is it supported by
an analysis of bills of attainder at English common law. The purpose of
this section is to examine what effect the majority opinion in United
States v. Brown9 4 had upon this aspect of the bill of attainder doctrine
in general and upon the Douds case in particular.
It could be argued that Douds is completely distinguishable from
Brown. The former case involved an oath provision, noncompliance
with which directly affected a union rather than its officers.90 5 More-
over, the oath was phrased in the present tense and thus, superficially
at least,9 6 did not appear to reach into the past. In addition, the oath
itself had an implicit escapability feature in that an individual could
resign his membership in a subversive organization or renounce his un-
suitable beliefs and thus become immediately eligible to execute the
prescribed affidavit. Also, the oath exacted by section 9(h) established a
class of proscribed beliefs as well as a category of prohibited associa-
tions.9° 7 Finally, a false execution of the requisite affidavit was not
punishable under the terms of section 9(h) itself, but instead could only
be penalized through the medium of various independent criminal pro-
899. 61 Stat. 146, 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (1947) (superseded 1959). See note 352 and accom-
panying text supra.
900. 339 U.S. at 413-14. See note 355 and accompanying text supra.
901. See note 361 and accompanying text supra.
902. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 87 (1961). The
five were Justices Clark, Frankfurter, Harlan, Stewart and Whittaker. See notes 366-368
and accompanying text supra.
903. See notes 372-393 and accompanying text supra.
904. 381 U.S. 437 (1965). See notes 728-766 and accompanying text supra.
905. The effect of noncompliance with the oath requirement was, inter alia, to deny the
union in question the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board in settling labor
disputes. See note 352 and accompanying text supra.
906. As has been suggested earlier, the phrasing of the oath in the present tense only
disguised its essential retrospective elements. See notes 358-359 and accompanying text
supra.
907. See note 352 and accompanying text supra.
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visions contained in Title eighteen of the United States Code.908
Brown, however, involved an entirely different situation. The statute
invalidated in that case-section 504 of the Labor Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act of 1959 9° 9-- created an absolute prohibition
directly affecting only union officers and involved no oath-taking.
Moreover, the prohibition reached not only present membership in the
Communist Party (which was designated by name, just as it had been
in former section 9(h)), but also membership at any juncture during the
five preceding years. Thus, unlike the oath in Douds, the statute in-
volved in Brown expressly proscribed past action. Similarly, under sec-
tion 504, if an individual terminated his membership in the Party, he
could not immediately be installed as a union officer but would have to
wait five years until the putative taint of his past association had suffi-
ciently dissipated. Moreover, the statute involved in Brown, unlike the
one involved in Douds, reached only individual membership in the
Communist Party and not individual beliefs. Finally, section 504, un-
like former section 9(h), contained its own penalty provisions.910 All
these differences suggest that when Chief Justice Warren in Brown
confronted the government's contention that section 504 did not impose
punishment in view of the Court's prior holding in Douds, he could
have dismissed that argument by deeming Douds inapposite to the case
at bar.
Chief Justice Warren did not do so, however. It is true that he did
differentiate former section 9(h) from section 504 by pointing out the
retrospective elements of the latter provision.911 But he then went on to
state categorically that punishment is not limited to retribution; it may
also serve rehabilitative, deterrent and preventive purposes.912 The
Chief Justice supported this assertion by pointing out that English and
colonial bills of attainder often were enacted for the purpose of deter-
rence and thus "inflicted deprivations upon. . .[a] person or group in
order to keep it from bringing about the feared event."" 3 Also, judges
had recognized the prospective effects of attainders as far back as
908. In deciding two post-Brown cases involving prosecutions arising from violations of
former section 9(h), the United States Supreme Court deemed this feature to be crucial. See
notes 1062-1112 and accompanying text infra.
909. 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1970). See note 729 supra.
910. See note 729 supra. The statute prescribed both a fine and imprisonment as
penalties.
911. 381 U.S. at 457-58.
912. Id. at 458.
913. Id. at 459 (footnote omitted). For some examples, see Exparte Law, 15 F. Cas. 3,
9-10 (S.D. Ga. 1866) (No. 8,126).
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1798. 9 14 Thus, this historical exegesis led Chief Justice Warren to con-
clude that the Court in Douds "misread" the prior ruling in United
States v. Lovett,915 when it suggested that the doctrine of the later case
applied only to retributive enactments.91 6 He argued that Lovett had
implicitly recognized that prospective legislation could attaint because
it invalidated on attainder grounds a statute enacted for the purpose of
purging from the government's employment rolls those persons who
harbored subversive beliefs.917 The effect of this portion of Chief Jus-
tice Warren's opinion on Douds is devastating. The sole basis for the
attainder ruling in that latter case was the prospectivity/retrospectivity
dichotomy. With that distinction invalidated, Douds is deprived of all
its precedential value, at least with respect to its analysis of the bill of
attainder doctrine. Indeed, this seems to have been Chief Justice War-
ren's intent; he did not need to reconsider the validity of Douds and the
fact that he engaged in a special effort to do so suggests he and his
colleagues desired to discredit that prior holding. Thus, one can agree
with Justice White that, after Brown, Douds is "obviously over-
ruled,"918 and the decisions adopting its logic must also be deemed to
retain questionable precedential value.919 A number of other opinions
have expressed similar suspicions about the continuing validity of
Douds;920 indeed, in the thirteen years since 1965 only two obscure de-
cisions921 by state courts have chosen to rely on the prospectiv-
914. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399-400 (1798).
915. 328 U.S. 303 (1946). See notes 180-198 and accompanying text supra.
916. 381 U.S. at 460.
917. Id. (citing United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313 (1946)).
918. Id. at 464-65 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Clark, Harlan & Stewart, J3).
919. This statement may not hold true in the case of Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961), because that case involved judicial trial and specif-
icity issues. See notes 611-622, 721 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of
Brown's possible effects on the continuing validity of this decision, see notes 1006-1017 and
accompanying text supra.
920. See Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 76 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined
by Black, J.) (called Douds part of a "discredited regime"); Dennis v. United States, 384
U.S. 855, 880-81 (1966) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Doug-
las, J.,) (claimed no substantial differences exist between the statute upheld in Douds and
the one struck down in Brown as an attainder), United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72, 80 n.20
(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967) (found Brown to be inconsistent with
Doud); Haskett v. Washington, 294 F. Supp. 912, 917 (D.D.C. 1968) (pointed out that the
law invalidated in Brown was very similar to the one dealt with in Douds ); Cooper v.
Henslee, 257 Ark. 963, 981, 522 S.W.2d 391, 401 (1975) (Fogleman, J., concurring) (suggests
Brown undercuts the continuing validity of Douds).
921. See King v. Swenson, 423 S.W.2d 699, 704 (Mo. 1968), overruled on other grounds,
State v. Baker, 524 S.W.2d 122, 131 (Mo. 1975) (challenge to a state statute providing that
the sentence of one convicted of committing a crime while incarcerated shall commence to
run only after the expiration of the sentence for which the inmate is being held); College
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ity/retrospectivity dichotomy and one of those based its ruling
exclusively on the holding in a prior state court opinion appearing
twelve years before Brown.922 Thus, after Chief Justice Warren's opin-
ion in Brown, it would have seemed that the prospectiv-
ity/retrospectivity issue was a defunct tangent of the bill of attainder
doctrine. As a matter of fact, however, Brown may simply have de-
flected the controversy surrounding this issue to another plane, where
courts are required to distinguish between bills of attainder and ex post
facto laws.
The prohibitions against the enactment of ex post facto legislation
appearing in article one, sections nine and ten of the Constitution923
proscribe certain types of retroactive laws, namely, those which: (1)
criminalize formerly innocent conduct committed before their enact-
ment; (2) impose a severer punishment for the commission of a crime
than that which existed at the time the criminal conduct in question
was committed; (3) aggravate retrospectively the nature of a crime by,
for example, transforming it from a misdemeanor into a felony; and (4)
require lesser or different evidence to convict an accused offender than
was necessary at the time the offense occurred.9 24 Even so brief a sum-
mary discloses why bills of attainder and ex post facto laws are funda-
mentally dissimilar. The latter prohibition applies only to criminal
laws92 and concerns either a change in the nature of such a law or an
alteration in the way prosecution for a violation of such a law is to be
conducted. Ex post facto legislation is neither exclusively prospective in
nature nor does it deprive its victims of a trial in a court of law. In
contrast, as Brown pointed out, bills of attainder may impose either
civil or criminal sanctions926 and may be exclusively prospective; their
distinctive feature is that they involve trial and punishment by the leg-
islature rather than by the judiciary. Thus, although both these prohibi-
tions limit how governments enforce criminal strictures rather than
Barn, Inc. v. State, 60 Misc. 2d 715, 717, 303 N.Y.S.2d 894, 899 (1969) (challenge to a law
requiring a license to sell liquor).
922. See.College Barn, Inc. v. State, 60 Misc. 2d 715, 717, 303 N.Y.S.2d 894, 899 (1969)
(citing Peters v. New York City Hous. Auth., 9 Misc. 2d 942, 950, 128 N.Y.S.2d 224, 230-31
(1953), modf/fed on other grounds, 283 App. Div. 801, 128 N.Y.S.2d 712 (2d Dep't), rev'don
other grounds, 307 N.Y. 519, 121 N.E.2d 529 (1954)).
923. See note 2 supra.
924. This typology was first established by Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386, 390 (1798). Accord, Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169 (1925); Malloy v. South
Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 183-84 (1915); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 589-90 (1896);
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325-26 (1867).
925. See note 314 and accompanying text supra.
926. For a discussion of this subject, see notes 295-338 and accompanying text supra.
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how they define criminal conduct,927 the two are not identical and
should not be confused with one another. Often, given.enactments are
subject to ex post facto and attainder challenges, 9 8 but in each case the
two objections are separate and ought to be accorded independent
consideration.
Nevertheless, language in a few cases suggests that as long as a
questioned law does not operate retroactively, it cannot be attacked as
being either a bill of attainder or an example of ex post facto legisla-
tion. Thus in France v. State,929 ex post facto and attainder challenges
to an Ohio statute930 establishing a licensing scheme for physicians
were jointly rejected with the observation that "neither the refusal to
grant nor the revocation of the [physician's] certificate has any retroac-
tive operation, nor imposes any new or additional punishment or disa-
bility for a past act. The statute, in all its provisions, has prospective
operation only and does not purport to have a retroactive effect.
93 1
Similarly, in Weinstock v. Ladisky,932 an amendment to section 107 of
the constitution of the Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paper-
hangers of America barring fascists and subversives from that union's
ranks was deemed not to be a bill of attainder because that proscription
"applies to legislative enactments passed after the commission of the
offense which is to be punished. The defendant's Section 107 does not
create a penalty for past conduct not then an offense or increase a pen-
alty for past misconduct. . ... it operates prospectively, and only in
futuro.' 933 In Moone v. Hand,934 the Kansas Supreme Court dealt with
a challenge to the state's robbery statute935 by concluding that it could
not be "a bill of attainder or an expostfacto law, since it has been in
effect for many years prior to. . .the date the petitioner was alleged to
have committed the offense for which he was convicted. '93 6 Finally, in
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,937 a case involving various con-
stitutional objections to the practice of the California Commission of
927. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168 (1952). On the interrelationship among
the bill of attainder clauses and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, see Ullmann v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422, 451-52 n.5 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
928. For examples, see note 132 supra.
929. 57 Ohio St. 1, 47 N.E. 1041 (1897).
930. Act of Feb. 27, 1896, 92 Ohio Laws 44-49.
931. 57 Ohio St. at 20, 47 N.E. at 1043.
932. 197 Misc. 859, 98 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1950).
933. Id. at 875, 98 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
934. 187 Kan. 495, 357 P.2d 808 (1960).
935. KAN. STAT. § 21-5277 (1949) (repealed 1970).
936. 187 Kan. at 496, 357 P.2d at 809.
937. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
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Bar Examiners of questioning prospective applicants about their affili-
ations with the Community Party, the United States Supreme Court
stated in a footnote that "[n]o more does the state's action bear any of
the hallmarks of a bill of attainder or an ex post facto regulation...
especially in light of the fact that the petitioner was explicitly warned in
advance of the consequences of his refusal to answer. ' 938 All of these
rulings are founded on the thoroughly erroneous premise that the fac-
tors which will dispose of an ex post facto objection will also suffice as
a basis for rejecting a bill of attainder challenge. But the ex post facto
and attainder clauses in the Constitution are directed against funda-
mentally dissimilar legislative abuses and must be defended against in
significantly different ways by the state. None of the cases cited above
appear to recognize this basic proposition. Nevertheless, the impor-
tance of these rulings can always be discounted; three obscure state
cases decided over a period of sixty-three years and a footnote in a
decision of the United States Supreme Court best remembered for its
First Amendment analysis939 do not augur any trend of enduring sig-
nificance. Moreover, these decisions antedate Brown's disavowal of the
prospectivity/retrospectivity dichotomy, which, by analogy, would ap-
pear to undermine the viability of the technique utilized by the judges
in these four cases.
Having confidently made that assertion, however, one will be
stopped short by an extraordinary decision rendered by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Campanale,94 decided in 1975. In that suit, the defendants had been
convicted of various federal crimes, including conspiracy to commit
racketeering. 94 1 The government had shown that the defendants, who
were affiliated with the Meat and Provisions Drivers Local 626 and the
Pronto Loading and Unloading Company, had intimidated meat pack-
ers into employing Pronto by threatening labor strikes; it had also
shown that the defendants had engaged in acts of extortion against
Pronto's competitors.942 On appeal, the defendants contended that the
938. Id. at 47-48 n.9.
939. See EMERSON, supra note 638, at 178-81.
940. 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
941. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1976). The defendants were also charged with receipt of
money in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 186 (Supp. V 1975), attempting to obstruct interstate
commerce by extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976), picketing for personal profit
in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 522 (Supp. V 1975), and obstruction of justice through injury to
property in connection with grand jury testimony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976).
See 518 F.2d at 355.
942. 518 F.2d at 355.
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federal antiracketeering statute,943 which included the provision
criminalizing conspiracy to commit racketeering, violated the prohibi-
tions against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder contained in arti-
cle one, section nine of the Constitution. The Ninth Circuit claimed,
however, that both contentions could be jointly rejected because a pro-
vision of the challenged legislation required at least one act of racket-
eering activity after the effective date of the enactment before the
government could initiate a prosecution. 9 "4 In support of this thesis, the
court of appeals quoted the following extract from the report submitted
to the Senate prior to the passage of the antiracketeering law:
One act in the pattern must be engaged in after the effective date
of the legislation. This avoids the prohibition against ex post
facto laws, and bills of attainder. Anyone who has engaged in the
prohibited activities before the effective date of the legislation is
on prior notice that only one further act may trigger the increased
penalties and new remedies of this chapter.945
Here again, the basic problem reappears: both the court and the
Senate failed to distinguish between the separate purposes of and the
differing defenses that must be raised against challenges based on the
ex post facto and attainder proscriptions. Indeed, the effect of
Campanale is even more deleterious than that of the discredited
passages in Douds. At least in the latter case, the United States
Supreme Court stated that a statute having an exclusively prospective
effect could not attaint. Campanale, however, indicates that a law hav-
ing some prospective effect in a specific case cannot attaint because of
that minimal element of prospectivity. In light of this logic, if a legisla-
ture employs careful draftsmen in framing its enactments, it may, with
negligible effort, ensure that the constitutional prohibition against bills
of attainder will never again be used to invalidate its handiwork.
Campanale not only ignores the clear language of the Court's decision
in Brown; it ignores the self-evident distinction between ex post facto
laws and attainders as the clauses containing those prohibitions have
943. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976).
944. 518 F.2d at 364. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976). The ruling of the Ninth Circuit
has been followed by at least one subsequent decision involving this same legislation. United
States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 417 (5th Cir. 1977). But the Fifth Circuit dealt solely with an
ex post facto rather than an attainder challenge.
945. S. REmr. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., 158 (1970), quotedin 518 F.2d at 364. It
is worth noting that neither the Senate nor the Ninth Circuit needed to go to such extremes
to avoid the prohibition against bills of attainder. The anti-racketeering statute requires the
imposition of punishment only after a full judicial trial in which a defendant could, presum-
ably, challenge the very validity of the law he was charged with violating. Thus one of the
key definitional components of an attainder-trial by legislature-is absent. For a general
analysis of this subject, see notes 623-722 and accompanying text supra.
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been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court for over one hun-
dred and eighty years.
2. Regulation v. Punishment
To understand how the Supreme Court in United States v.
Brown946 dealt with the issue of regulation, it is necessary to reconsider
what was said in Part III of Chief Justice Warren's maJority opinion in
that case. He initially made a key distinction: Congress can enact rules
of general application stipulating that persons who possess certain
characteristics or who commit certain acts cannot hold union office, but
in all cases it must entrust to the courts the task of determining who
falls within that statutory description.947 The vice of section 504 of the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959948 was that
Congress excluded from union officerships all those who belonged to a
particular organization-the Communist Party-and thus deprived the
courts of the responsibility of adjudication. In support of this thesis, the
Chief Justice cited language in the case of Communist Party of the
United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board,9 49 suggesting that
had the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950950 referred to the
Communist Party by name rather than to "Communist-action" or
"Communist-front" organizations in general, it would have been classi-
fiable as a bill of attainder. 95'
Taken out of context, 952 this is an alarming proposition. At this
juncture in the majority's opinion, it appears that the regula-
tion/punishment distinction 953 has become inextricably intertwined
with the problem of specificity:9 5 4 if a statute is too specific, it must be
946. 381 U.S. 437 (1965). See notes 728-766 and accompanying text supra.
947. Id. at 450.
948. 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1959). See note 729 supra.
949. 367 U.S. 1 (1961). See notes 366-372, 611-622 and 721 and accompanying text
supra.
950. 64 Stat. 987, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-826 (1950) (repealed in part 1968). For a detailed
description of this act, see notes 612-618 and accompanying text supra.
951. 367 U.S. at 84-85, quotedin 381 U.S. at 451.
952. The term "context" at this point refers not only to section III but also to section IV
of Chief Justice Warren's opinion. In that latter portion, he stated that bills of attainder
could apply against large groups of unnamed but sufficiently well-described persons. For a
full quotation of this subsequent passage, see note 1015 and accompanying text infra.
953. The term "regulation/punishment distinction" refers to the fact that the proscrip-
tions against bills of attainder apply only to statutes enacted for punitive rather than for
regulatory purposes. See notes 525-530 and accompanying text supra.
954. The term "specificity problem" refers to the controversy surrounding the issue of
how specifically must an enactment refer to its intended victims before it can be classified as
a bill of attainder. See notes 591-596 and accompanying text supra. For a fuller discussion of
the specificity problem after Brown, see notes 990-1061 and accompanyng text infra.
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punitive; if it is not, it must be regulatory. Such a simplistic approach is
erroneous because courts have often found legislation directed against
named individuals or groups to be enacted for nonpunitive purposes.9 "
The problem in bill of attainder analysis is not merely one of who is
affected by a given law but also one of why that law was enacted; in-
deed, this was the lesson in United States v. Lovett. 5 6 To accept Chief
Justice Warren's implied thesis that too much specificity is, ipsofacto,
indicative of punishment "would cripple the very process of legislating.
For any individual or group that is made the subject of adverse legisla-
tion can complain that the lawmakers could and should have defined
the relevant affected class at a greater level of generality." 957 Moreover,
this portion of the Chief Justice's opinion seems to undercut Cummings
v. Missouri958 itself. That case pointed out that courts should be con-
cerned with "substance, not shadows" and thus should strike down as
bills of attainder those enactments that inflict punishment without trial
even though the person penalized is neither designated by name nor
identified by reference to any specific organization to which he be-
longs.959 To the extent that Brown places undue emphasis on the speci-
ficity problem as it applies to the regulation/punishment distinction, it
would seem to undermine the logic of Cummings.
But, to his credit, Chief Justice Warren's initial statements should
not be read out of context because he did not rely solely on the facile
connection between specificity and punishment. Instead, he proceeded
to distinguish section 504 from a typical conflict-of-interest statute like
section 32 of the Banking Act of 1933.960 In drawing that distinction, he
identified three salient differences between the two enactments. On the
one hand, section 504 reached members of a "political group thought to
present a threat to the national security. ' 96 1 The Chief Justice pointed
out that such persons were the typical targets of English and early
955. See note 592 supra.
956. 328 U.S. 303 (1946). See notes 180-198 and accompanying text supra. Lovelt was
the case that established the legitimacy of the doctrine that courts could consider legislative
debates and records in order to ascertain whether or not a law was enacted for a punitive
purpose.
957. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,470 (1977) (footnote omitted).
The Court also pointed out that the proscriptions against bills of attainder cannot serve as a
variant of the equal protection clause, "invalidating every Act of Congress or the States that
legislatively burdens some persons or groups but not all other plausible individuals." Id. at
471.
958. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867). See notes 54-70 and accompanying text supra.
959. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
960. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1933) (amended 1935). See notes 749-751 and accompanying text
upra.
961. 381 U.S. at 453.
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American bills of attainder.962 On the other hand, section 32 incorpo-
rated "no judgment censuring or condemning any man or group of
men," 963 but rather contained an implied condemnation of all men.
Congress recognized that persons with conflicting business loyalties
could be tempted to engage in self-aggrandizement. 9"4 Moreover, the
majority's opinion points out that section 32 constituted an exercise in
rule-making rather than specification because Congress legislated with
respect to general characteristics rather than with respect to any group
of individuals.965 The designation of "officers" and "directors" of un-
derwriting houses in the Banking Act was said to be no more than a
shorthand phrase to summarize the characteristics with which Congress
was concerned.966
Unfortunately, here also the Chief Justice creates unnecessary
problems for himself and his successors. His implied contention that
bills of attainder apply only to political dissidents or others thought to
endanger national security is simply wrong because both English and
American history are replete with bills of attainder or bills of pains and
penalties which did not oppress dissident political factions in any
way.967 The fact that section 32 of the Banking Act incorporated no
judgment of censure is also immaterial; Cummings itself did away with
962. Id.
963. Id. at 453-54.
964. Id. at 454.
965. Id. at 454-55.
966. Id. at 454 n.29. There is some question whether this tripartite typology was in-
tended to distinguish regulatory from punitive statutes in general or was instead intended
only to differentiate conflict-of-interest laws from true attainders. The latter, more limited
interpretation is probably the correct one. Significantly enough, this threefold typology has
been expressly relied on in only two decisions, both of which involved conflict-of-interest
statutes. See note 799 supra. The major post-Brown ruling in this respect is a decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that a New York law prohibiting the
officer of a labor union from holding a financial interest in a firm employing union mem-
bers was not a bill of attainder. After reiterating Brown's tripartite typology, the court
claimed that it was a "reasonable judgment that a person who represents both the employers
and the employees at a collective bargaining table 'might well be tempted' to use his position
as a union officer to further his interests as an employer or that consciously or subcon-
sciously he will be prevented from serving only the best interests of the union members."
Fitzgerald v. Catherwood, 388 F.2d 400, 407 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 934 (1968).
Fitzgerald is notable in two respects. First, unlike section 32 of the Banking Act, the New
York statute lacked any significant escapability feature. See N.Y. L XB. LAW §§ 723, 725
(McKinney 1973). On the escapability feature of section 32, see United States v. Brown, 381
U.S. 437, 455 (1965). Second, the court of appeals in Fitzgerald said a reasonable legislative
judgment in conflict-of-interest enactments could be based on conscious and subconscious
tendencies implicit in human nature. By contrast, the Court in Brown appeared to consider
only conscious proclivities to commit self-dealing, since it referred to deliberate, premedi-
tated uses of influence for the purposes of self-aggrandizement. See id. at 454.
967. For English examples, see notes 11, 27 supra. For American examples, see note
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the necessity that a modem attainder must evince all the formalistic
features of its parliamentary predecessors. 968 Chief Justice Warren's
third point of differentiation-that section 32 was general rather than
specific-seems to do no more than repeat his earlier thesis that the
punishment quotient of a statute corresponds directly with its degree of
specificity. But, in fact, he is interpolating a new factor into his analysis
at this juncture. While some statutes like section 32 of the Banking Act
may appear to be very specific in their references, they are, neverthe-
less, not punitive in nature, but are rather examples of rule-making,
wherein the legislature has merely used a shorthand phrase to indicate
what is being regulated. Thus, the majority opinion in Brown cannot be
construed to say that merely because an enactment imposes a sanction
on specified individuals, it is, #?so facto, an attainder. Instead, the
Court expressed a clear recognition that legislatures may burden
named persons so long as they do so for purposes of legitimate regula-
tion rather than for purposes of retribution. The motives underlying the
imposition of a sanction, not the form in which that sanction has been
drafted and enacted, will be decisive. Through this caveat, Chief Jus-
tice Warren nullifies some of the objections that could be leveled
against his earlier linkage of specificity and punishment; thus, he ex-
pressly acknowledges that Congress can impose burdens on designated
groups for nonpunitive purposes.
9 69
A key problem remains. If a statute designates those against whom
it operates with a high degree of specificity, how can it be determined
whether the legislature is merely using a shorthand expression in order
to regulate or is, in fact, inflicting sanctions for punitive purposes?
Chief Justice Warren never clearly defines punishment. He says it can
serve retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent or preventive purposes;
970
however, with respect to the hard judicial task of ascertaining what is
or is not punitive these are empty adjectives.
1004 infra. This topic is covered in greater depth in connection with the discussion of Brown
and the specificity problem. See notes 990-1004 and accompanying text infra.
968. See notes 70, 87-91 and accompanying text supra.
969. See 381 U.S. at 454 n.29. At this point, however, he repeated the thesis mentioned
earlier, see note 947 and accompanying text supra, that a legislature can impose disabilities
upon persons having certain characteristics so long as it allows the courts to be the arbiters
of whether or not a given individual is indeed one of those persons. But this is simply wrong.
There have been cases where the legislature has named the person whom it is imposing
sanctions upon, leaving the judiciary no choice whatsoever in the matter. In a case involving
one such statute, the United States Supreme Court stated "the Act's specificity-the fact that
it refers to the appellant by name-does not automatically offend the Bill of Attainder
Clause." Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 471-72 (1977).
970. 381 U.S. at 458. See notes 912-914 and accompanying text supra.
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Yet the majority opinion does offer an approach to the problem.
According to the Court, the purpose of Congress in enacting section
504 was to prevent persons likely to foment political strikes from ob-
taining powerful positions of union leadership.97" ' Thus, in general, the
legislature sought to exclude from the officerships of labor organiza-
tions all those persons having a proclivity to call strikes for political
reasons. Congress could have used a shorthand expression like "politi-
cal strikecallers" to indicate whom it meant to legislate against. Instead
it utilized the label "members of the Communist Party." Chief Justice
Warren quite rightly points out that the two phrases are not semanti-
cally equivalent since there is no demonstrable relationship between an
individual's status as a Party member and his proclivity to call political
strikes. 72 A person might be a founding member of the Communist
Party of the United States of America but nevertheless still believe that
the initiation of strikes in order to further Communist purposes would
only weaken the solidarity of the proletariat; similarly, a person might
be a member of the John Birch Society but nonetheless be committed
to using the labor walkout as a means of furthering a political objec-
tive, like the end of dbtente between the United States and the Soviet
Union. The problem with section 504, then, is that it incorporates a
dysfunctional classificatory label: the end sought (preventing political
strikes) is not achieved by the means used (barring only Communist
Party members from union officerships). What Chief Justice Warren
has done, in effect, is to restate and refine the rule of relevancy devel-
oped a century earlier in Cummings v. Missouri.9" 3 Thus, a legislature
971. Id. at 438-39.
972. See, id. at 455-56. One should not become confused about what the Court is doing
at this point. Justice White and one other commentator claim that Chief Justice Warren at
this juncture was interpolating an underinclusiveness/overinclusiveness criterion into the
bill of attainder doctrine. Id. at 464 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Harlan, Clark and
Stewart, JJ.); Needfor Clarification, supra note 12, at 232, 237. See note 772 and accompa-
nying text supra. However, the Chief Justice expressly denied this. 381 U.S. at 456 n.31. See
note 798 supra. The problem is not whether a given classification is simultaneously overin-
clusive and underinclusive, but rather whether that classification is relevant to the legislative
goal it purportedly furthers. If it is irrelevant, this in itself is an indication that the legisla-
ture's true motive was punitive, not regulatory. Thus, the overinclusive-
ness/underinclusiveness aspect is not the evil the majority opinion in Brown was inveighing
against; it is instead only a symptom of the disease that the-proscription against bills of
attainder was intended to cure.
973. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867). See notes 531-540 and accompanying text SUmra.
Another possible interpretation exists. It could be argued Brown stands for the proposition
that the state may not impose disabilities on the exercise of a constitutional right, in this case
the First Amendment freedom of association, first enunciated by the Court seven years ear-
lier. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958). Under this
analysis, section 504 would attaint, regardless of its relevance, because it penalizes a class of
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may disqualify persons from practicing a profession or serving in an
office only if it does so on grounds relevant to one's fitness to engage in
that profession or to one's capability of fulfilling the responsibilities of
that office; if the disqualificatory basis is irrelevant to that end, then the
legislature is presumably motivated by a punitive purpose. Brown fur-
ther embellishes Cummings by holding that not only the underlying
reasons for disqualification but also the means used to effectuate those
reasons must be relevant. While it is certainly relevant to bar persons
who will commit political strikes from union officerships, if the label
used to identify those persons the legislature believes are likely to en-
gage in such activity will not consistently further the admittedly legiti-
mate objective sought, then any qualificatory scheme incorporating
that label may be a bill of attainder.
At this juncture, it is useful to re-examine the cases of Dent v. West
Virginia,974 Hawker v. New York975 and *Garner v. Board of Public
Works976 in light of Brown. The statute in Dent, it will be
remembered, compelled prospective doctors to acquire a certificate
from the state board of health stipulating that the licentiate had either
graduated from a reputable medical school, practiced continuously
within the state for ten years or passed a standardized exam.977 This
statute would seem to satisfy the dual relevance test of Brown: not only
was it relevant for the state to ensure that all persons practicing
medicine within its borders would possess a minimum level of compe-
tence but also the means used to ensure that that level of competence
would exist were consistent with the state's ultimate objective. West
Virginia imposed apposite prerequisites: either the applicant had grad-
uated from a college which the state board of health deemed suffi-
ciently well-staffed and well-equipped to produce adequately-trained
alumni, or he had practiced for a lengthy enough period within the
state so that his competence could be assessed by questioning his neigh-
bors and patients or he had passed an exam, presumably drafted in a
way to measure impartially his iatric skills or lack of them.978 These
associations protected by the Constitution. Indeed, one other decision has expressly ad-
vanced a similar thesis. See Steinberg v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 590, 592 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
See notes 462-467 and accompanying text supra. To date, however, no other court has inter-
preted the Brown decision in this fashion.
974. 129 U.S. 114 (1889). See notes 541-548 and accompanying text supra.
975. 170 U.S. 189 (1898). See notes 551-563 and accompanying text supra.
976. 341 U.S. 716 (1951). See notes 566-573 and accompanying text supra.
977. See notes 542-543 and accompanying text supra.
978. Of course, the classifications utilized by the West Virginia legislature are, in many
ways, underinclusive. But this is not decisive. The West Virginian law, for instance, recog-
nized diplomas from reputable medical colleges rather than all such colleges; it barred per-
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categories all consistently furthered the state's underlying regulatory
aim and thus, under the logic of Brown, the West Virginia statute did
not punish.
The same cannot be said for the New York law in Hawker, bar-
ring ex-felons from receiving licenses to practice medicine. 97 9 While the
general objective of that statute was undoubtedly relevant in that the
state had a vested interest in assuring that it licenses as doctors only
those persons who had exhibited good moral character and were thus
worthy of being entrusted with the lives of patients, the means used to
effectuate that objective were improper. The term "ex-felons" is not the
"semantic equivalent" of the term "persons with bad character." One
individual may have been tried and convicted of the felony of burglary
but only perpetrated the offense in order to stave off starvation. An-
other individual may have committed multiple murders for profit but
may never have been charged with any crime. Hence the classificatory
label used in Hawker was a dysfunctional one because it failed to serve
the purposes purportedly furthered by the act of classifying in the first
place. In light of Brown, then, use of that label is punitive. Whether or
not the challenged enactment in Hawker was also a bill of attainder
depends, of course, upon whether it met the three other definitional
criteria implicit in that term.
A similar problem arises with respect to the resolution of the Los
Angeles Board of Supervisors in Garner. That enactment barred all
persons from public employment who failed to execute an oath denying
advocacy of forcible overthrow of the government or membership in an
organization espousing such a doctrine; the terms of the oath covered
both present beliefs and associations as well as those which had oc-
curred within the five preceding years.980 Under the logic of Brown,
this oath is punitive for several reasons. First, its underlying purpose is
irrelevant. Even assuming subversives should be barred from "sensi-
sons who have practiced in the state for less than a decade or who have practiced out of state
for over ten years. Yet these lacunae are arguably reasonable. The state could have claimed
that it need not recognize diplomas from all institutions because some such institutions pro-
vided inadequate training, and their alumni were therefore not qualified to be licensed.
Similarly, West Virginia could have contended that while any specific time span is by neces-
sity, arbitrary, ten years of prior practice is a relevant requirement because only after such
an extended period is a medical practice capable of being reviewed. As for the in-state prac-
tice requirement, it could be argued that the board of health had neither the time nor the
resources to question patients who live out of state. Certainly, the West Virginian statute was
susceptible to discriminatory application, but that would seem to be the proper subject of an
equal protection or a due process challenge rather than an attainder objection.
979. See note 552 and accompanying text supra.
980. See notes 567-568 and accompanying text supra.
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tive" positions of public employment, it does not follow that they must
be excluded from all public employment. Whether or not one believes
in the violent overthrow of the government is fundamentally irrelevant
to one's fitness to perform the functions of a janitor, a motor pool
mechanic, a zoo attendant or the third assistant clerk in the city's hall
of records. The enactment in Garner however, made no such fine dis-
tinctions and thus its underlying purpose could not be construed as
merely regulatory in nature. Furthermore, the means used by the Los
Angeles Board of Supervisors to effect its allegedly relevant purposes
were also irrelevant. Mere membership in a subversive organization or
mere advocacy of radical anarchism as an abstract doctrine rather than
as a pragmatic program of action does not automatically indicate unfit-
ness to serve as a public employee. There is no semantic equivalence
between the two descriptive classifications. In Garner, the municipal
board did use a shorthand expression to define certain characteristics
but that expression was dysfunctional because it operated against both
the fit and the unfit, the deserving and the unworthy. A similar prob-
lem arises with respect to the retroactive element of the oath. It not only
operated against the person who temporarily terminated his member-
ship in a subversive organization for the sole purpose of exacting the
prescribed affirmance, but it also applied against the person who, three
or four years earlier, experienced a true and enduring conversion from
revolutionism to republicanism. In all these respects, the oath in
Garner worked far too indiscriminate an exclusion. Because it was a
method not precisely fitted to the end it purported to achieve and be-
cause it established irrelevant disqualificatory categories, it satisfied the
punishment criterion of an attainder, at least according to Brown.
If the majority opinion in Brown is construed literally, then
Hawker and Garner may have been overruled sub silentio. Curiously
enough, only Justice White in his dissent has been willing to admit that
draconian possibility.98" ' Post-Brown decisions have implicitly or ex-
plicitly relied on the logic of either Hawker982 or Garner983 to reject
981. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 468-69 (1965) (White, J., dissenting,
joined by Harlan, Clark and Stewart, JJ.) (discussing Hawker only).
982. See Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34, 37 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1010 (1973) (challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (1976), restricting ex-felons from purchasing
firearms; held, a legitimate exercise of rulemaking powers); United States v. Donofrio, 450
F.2d 1054, 1055-56 (5th Cir. 1972) (challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1) (1976), barring ex-
felons from possessing or transporting firearms in interstate commerce; held, Brown applies
to punitive laws, not enactments like this which regulate the activities of persons with crimi-
nal records); Upshaw v. McNamara, 435 F.2d 1188, 1189-90 (1st Cir. 1970) (challenge to
Massachusetts law denying ex-felons the right to apply for jobs as policemen; held, prior
felony conviction could serve as a reasonable basis for a legislative judgment about eligibil-
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bill of attainder challenges to various types of legislation.98 4
ity); Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 449-50 (2d Cir.), certi denied, 389 U.S. 1048
(1967) (challenge to New York law denying those convicted of a felony in federal court the
right to vote in state elections; held, reasonable regulation of the franchise rather than pun-
ishment); Mones v. Austin, 318 F. Supp. 653, 657-58 (S.D. Fla. 1Q70) (challenge to state
statute barring those convicted of bookmaking from patronizing local racetracks; held, not
punitive, but rather enacted for the purpose of regulating gambling activities); Wirtz v. Lo-
cal 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 244 F. Supp. 745, 746 n. 1 (W.D. Pa. 1965), vacated on
other grounds, 372 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 463 (1968) (challenge to provision
of the statute involved in Brown affecting ex-felons; held, Brown did not affect laws regulat-
ing felons); Hamilton v. Indiana ex rel. Van Natta, - Ind. App. -, 323 N.E.2d 659, 660-61
(1975) (challenge to state law suspending license of habitual traffic offenders; held, no pun-
ishment, only lawful regulation of the highways).
983. See Ohlison v. Phillips, 304 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (D. Colo.) afdper curiam, 397
U.S. 317 (1969); Whitehill v. Elkins, 258 F. Supp. 589, 596-97 (D. Md. 1966), rev'don other
grounds, 389 U.S. 54 (1967). Both these decisions dismissed attainder challenges to oaths
exacted from public employees by referring to the Court's decision in Garner. But the Colo-
rado oath involved in Oh/son merely contained an affirmance to uphold the state and fed-
eral constitutions and to perform one's duties faithfully. 73 COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 22-61-103
to 61-105 (1973),formery 63 COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 123-17-6 to 17-8 (1963). Thus, it differed
completely from the negative, expurgatory oath involved in Garner. The same cannot be
said for the statutory affirmance involved in Whitehll; it required a certification that the
individual was "not engaged in one way or another to overthrow" either the federal or state
governments. 8A MD. ANN. CODE art. 85A, § 13 (1957). Relying on Garner and two state
cases that had previously upheld this oath against attainder challenges (Shub v. Simpson,
196 Md. 177, 195, 76 A.2d 332, 339-40 (1950), appeal dismissed, 340 U.S. 861 (1950); Ham-
mond v. Frankfeld, 194 Md. 487, 491, 71 A.2d 482, 483 (1950)), the federal district court held
that no loyalty oath, if otherwise valid, could ever be invalid as a bill of attainder. See also
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 255 F. Supp. 981, 987 (W.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd on other
grounds, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (in upholding the Feinberg Law, see notes 203-204 and accom-
panying text supra, stated Garner left open ihe issue whether dismissal from state employ-
ment could ever constitute the punishment necessary for a bill of attainder).
984. There are other decisions relying explicitly or implicitly on the regula-
tion/punishment distinction that do not conform to the models provided by either Hawker
or Garner. See Monaco v. United States, 523 F.2d 935, 940 (9th Ciri, cert denied, 424 U.S.
911 (1975) (challenge to the Dual Compensation Act of 1964, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3503 (1976),
which limited certain civil service preferences given to veterans; held, Congress had no puni-
tive purpose, only a motive to "straighten out. . . an inequity."); George Steinberg & Son,
Inc. v. Butz, 491 F.2d 988, 994 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1975) (dismissed attain-
der challenge to 7 U.S.C. § 499h(b) (1976), by relying on the Zwick case (seeinfra)); Latham
v. Tynan, 435 F.2d 1248, 1251-52 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated on other grounds, 404 U.S. 807
(1971) (challenge to Massachusetts law requiring uninsured motorist involved in an accident
to a post a bond or forfeit his license; held, no penalty, just a condition of the use of the
highways); Zwick v. Freeman, 373 F.2d 110, 119-20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835
(1967) (challenge to 7 U.S.C. § 499h(b) (1976), requiring suspension of the license of an
agricultural commodities merchant who goes bankrupt and receives court approval of a re-
organization plan; held, proper exercise of governmental regulatory power rather than pun-
ishment); Williams v. Sills, 55 NJ. 178, 186, 260 A.2d 505, 509 (1970) (challenge to similar
statute as was involved in Latham; held valid as a general regulation in furtherance of the
public welfare). One might also consider the cases rejecting attainder challenges to conflict-
of-interest laws. See note 799 supra.
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A number of theories may be advanced to explain why this is so.
First, Chief Justice Warren's confusing discussion of specificity might
lead to the assumption that unless a statute names an individual or an
organization, it cannot be said to inflict punishment. As has been sug-
gested, this assumption is undermined if the language asserting such a
proposition is read in the context of the section in which it appears. If,
however, one does not engage in such a reading, then it is a simple task
to presume that statutes directed against general classes of persons not
designated either by name or with reference to their membership in a
specified organization are regulatory in nature. Second, it is possible to
distinguish Brown from cases like Hawker or Garner by claiming, on
the one hand, that section 504 dealt with anti-Communist sanctions
rather than access to professions, or, on the other hand, that section 504
involved no expurgatory oath. Third, it is possible to strike down irrele-
vant classifactory schemes by resorting to other techniques such as the
doctrine of overbreadth; in a number of cases, the United States
Supreme Court has, in fact, relied on that technique rather than on the
bill of attainder doctrine.985 Finally, and most importantly, the Court
in Brown may simply have expected too much of judges. A literal ap-
plication of the technique utilized in the majority opinion in that case
would require a judge to second guess a legislature, to ascertain if a
disqualificatory classification that the legislature believed to be rele-
vant is in fact relevant. Many judges may simply be unable or unwill-
ing to engage in such an epistemological analysis, both because of their
985. See Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 62 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S 589, 604 (1967). Lower federal courts in both these cases had considered and rejected
attainder challenges. See notes 199, 983 supra. For other examples, see note 1226 infra. It
may well be asked why the Court in these cases chose to rely on some other rationale to
overrule the enactments in question rather than on the attainder analysis that it had so
recently promulgated in Brown. Two responses to this question might be offered. First, the
Court may have wished to base its findings of unconstitutionality on the narrowest grounds
possible. The conclusion that a given statute is overbroad simply informs a legislature that it
must employ more careful draftsmen in effectuating its goals. In contrast, the conclusion
that a given statute is an attainder implies that the very goals sought by a legislature, as well
as the means that are used to implement them, are improper. Therefore, abrogating an en-
actment on the basis of overbreadth may well be a technique that avoids undue confronta-
tion and conflict between legislatures and the judiciary. Second, application of attainder
analysis requires judges to scrutinize legislative purpose, see notes 177-230 and accompany-
ing text supra, whereas application of overbreadth analysis entails primarily a consideration
of the terms of the challenged enactment itself in order to determine if the strictures con-
tained therein could have been drafted more narrowly. This rather limited focus in over-
breadth cases may be decidedly preferable to the more wide-ranging scrutiny undertaken in
attainder analysis, especially where evidence of legislative motive is incomplete, untrustwor-
thy, inconclusive or simply non-existent. Thus, both these factors may explain why the
Court in Whitehill and Keylshian invalidated anti-subversive legislation on the grounds of
overbreadth rather than relying on the rationale of Brown.
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limited time and resources and because they may believe that it is not
the function of the judiciary to determine whether the legislature se-
lected the proper classificatory option from the many available to it.
The first and second theories are, as has been indicated, premised
upon either a misreading of Brown986 or an uncritical acceptance of
some of the erroneous assertions made in the course of the majority
opinion. 987 The third theory is a non sequitur because the application of
the proscription against bills of attainder should not depend upon the
availability of alternative grounds to find a statute unconstitutional.
988
The fourth theory ignores what the Court in Brown did. Chief Justice
Warren evinced no hesitation in second guessing Congress; indeed, he
felt compelled to engage in such an analysis because Congress could
not have been expected to correct its own abuses and because Congress
was using the judiciary to inflict, at least in part, the penalties attendant
to its irrelevant categorizations.98 9 To adopt the position that courts
986. Chief Justice Warren's confusing specificity discussion becomes clearer once it is
read in context with the remainder of section III of his opinion. See notes 960-969 and
accompanying text supra. Similarly, the argument that Brown has no effect on loyalty oath
cases ignores its devastating effect on American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382 (1950), a suit involving an expurgatory oath. See notes 911-918 and accompanying text
supra.
987. Namely, the theory that the proscriptions against bills of attainder apply only to
laws directed against political dissidents. For a critique of this thesis, see notes 996-1004 and
accompanying text infra.
988. But see Punishment, supra note 14, at 269. That commentator argued that attainder
challenges should be "subrogated" to procedural due process claims. He also contended that
the Court in Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867), only relied on the pro-
scription against attainders because it was writing at a time when the concept of due process
had not yet been developed fully and thus was unavailable as a constitutional decisionmak-
ing tool. That assessment appeared in 1959; it cannot explain the result in Brown, which was
decided six years later. There, the Court eschewed a potentially decisive First Amendment
analysis and instead relied solely on the ban against attainders in article one, section nine of
the Constitution. The fact that it did so suggests that it is premature to treat the proscriptions
against bills of attainder as dead letters of constitutional law, ready to be subsumed under
due process or equal protection analysis.
989. The role of the judiciary was to punish those persons who committed willful viola-
tions of section 504; thus, that statute contained its own penalty provisions. See note 729
supra. This fact raises a problem the Court never dealt with directly. The government might
have argued that, as applied to Archie Brown, section 504 did not attaint, because he suf-
fered punishment (i e., a sentence of six months in prison) only after a full trial by jury in a
court of law. The difficulty with this argument is that Brown received such a trial only
because he decided to flout the law; had he not chosen to do so and instead surrendered
voluntarily his union officership on the date section 504 became effective, he would have
suffered a deprivation without trial, because of his status as a member of the Communist
Party.
The Court's disposition of Brown suggests two possible interpretations. The first is that
the majority, as a matter of policy, simply allowed the respondent to raise an attainder chal-
lenge even though, as to him, a trial preceded punishment; it did so because, as applied to
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should not second guess the judgment of the legislature in establishing
disqualificatory classifications is to ignore the mandate of the bill of
attainder clauses themselves, which require courts to intervene when
legislatures usurp the functions of judges and juries.
other persons who did not wish to commit violations of the law, section 504 imposed a
sanction without a hearing. This is not an uncommon technique; indeed, it forms the corner-
stone of overbreadth claims, in which a plaintiff argues not that a statute infringes his First
Amendment rights, but rather that it may be administered so as to impinge upon the rights
of some other hypothetical individual. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613-15
(1973) (recognizing that application of overbreadth analysis requires a departure from tradi-
tional rules of standing and stating such an analysis is permissible only when a law is sub-
stantially overbroad). Although the Court in Brown specifically disclaimed any theory that a
statute must also be overbroad before it can attaint, see note 798 supra, this disclaimer does
not also signify a refusal to make the same departure from the strict rules of standing as is
made in overbreadth analysis.
A second interpretation of the result in Brown is even more expansive. It is premised on
the thesis that the majority concluded the punishment being inflicted without trial in the
case of the respondent was not the sentence rendered by the federal district court, but rather
the very establishment of a compulsory choice requiring either surrender of one's union
officership or retention of it, a course of conduct carrying with it the possibility of a criminal
prosecution. Chief Justice Warren's opinion is unclear on this subject; he would appear to
construe the sanction imposed by section 504 as the disqualification from union office rather
than the creation of a Hobson's choice for incumbent union officials. See United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965). Indeed, if this second interpretation is accepted it might
lead to problems with the judicial trial aspect of the bill of attainder doctrine itself. A
number of decisions have rejected attainder challenges to criminal laws on the theory that
punishment for a crime follows a full judicial trial. See notes 637-642 and accompanying
text supra. Under the second interpretation of the result in Brown, the position taken in
those cases might have to be reconsidered. All criminal laws, by their very nature, impose a
choice: either a person foregoes committing the criminalized course of conduct or he does
not, thereby subjecting himself to a potential prosecution by the government.
The proposed second reading of Brown would necessitate the conclusion that the state,
by its very act of compelling persons to make such a choice, is inflicting punishment without
trial. This is a radical conclusion. While it certainly may be argued that, where a deprivation
is inflicted first and an opportunity to test the validity of that deprivation is only accorded
after the fact, such a procedure does not afford those affected the full safeguards of ajudicial
trial, see notes 643-654 and accompanying text supra, this is quite different from arguing
that a law mandating the selection of either the option of inaction or that of action coupled
with potential criminal liability after a full adjudication in a court of law constitutes punish-
ment without trial. Only one commentator has even remotely intimated that the general
proposition supported by this second reading of Brown has merit. See Punishment, supra
note 14, at 255. In this author's opinion, the first and narrower interpretation of Brown is the
optimal one; the second reading would unduly fetter the power of legislatures to enact any
criminal laws. It should be noted the problems raised in this footnote arise only if one as-
sumes that Archie Brown had at least the opportunity to lodge constitutional objections to
both his indictment and his prosecution for violation of section 504. This assumption would
appear to be correct. See Brown v. United States, 334 F.2d 488, 492 (9th Cir. 1964). Had
Brown not been allowed such an opportunity, a legitimate question might be raised as to
whether or not he was granted an adequate trial at all, at least for the purposes of the bill of
attainder doctrine. For a further consideration of this problem, see notes 1062-1112 and
accompanying text infra.
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C. "Upon a Designated Person or Class of Persons"
Two major specificity problems were created by the majority opin-
ion in United States v. Brown.9 The first of these can be dealt with
summarily because it is premised upon a simple misapprehension of
the nature and scope of the constitutional prohibitions against bills of
attainder. In his discussion of parliamentary bills of attainder, Chief
Justice Warren claimed that they were a device used for dealing with
persons who had attempted or threatened to attempt overthrow of the
government. 991 Later, he distinguished between section 504 of the La-
bor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959992 and a typi-
cal conflict-of-interest statute by pointing out that the latter inflicted no
deprivation upon members of a political group deemed dangerous to
national security.99 3 The net effect of these statements was to create
unnecessary doubt concerning whether the attainder proscriptions ap-
ply against legislation penalizing those who are not political dissidents.
One commentator, in attempting to distinguish "classification," as that
term is used in the context of equal protection analysis, from "specific-
ity," as that term is used in the context of the attainder doctrine, 994 has
990. 381 U.S. 437 (1965). See notes 728-766 and accompanying text supra.
991. Id. at 441.
992. 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1970). See note 720 supra.
993. 381 U.S. at 453-54. See notes 961-962 and accompanying text supra.
994. See Needfor Clarfication, supra note 12, at 234-37. The author of that comment
identifies another ground for distinguishing classification from specificity other than the one
referred to in the text. He says:
In many classification problems, the class is created by the statute and has no
meaningful significance or existence as a class or identifiable group outside the
context of the particular statute. Thus, should Congress make it illegal to leave the
country to evade the draft, it would create a class of persons-those who are eligi-
ble for the draft and who would leave the country for the illegal purpose-who
would have no identity as a class but for the statute. A bill of attainder, on the
other hand, inflicts its punishment on a class of persons who have group identity
independent of the particular statute, as did the Communist Party members who
were barred from union office by the statute invalidated in Brown.
Id. at 235 (emphasis in original).
This purported distinction is illusory. A number of enactments struck down as attain-
ders operated against groups of persons identifiable as a class only because the statute being
challenged so identified them. Thus, in Putty v. United States, 220 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 821 (1955), see notes 629-636 and accompanying text supra, the legislation
being questioned created the class of all felons whose convictions were based on informa-
tions filed by Guamanian prosecutors between August 1, 1950 and August 27, 1954. Simi-
larly, in Steinberg v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 590 (Ct. Cl. 1958). see notes 462-467 and
accompanying text supra, the statute being attacked created the utterly novel class of all
retired employees who asserted their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
in response to questions by judges, grand juries or legislative investigating committees con-
cerning their former governmental service. Again, in Jones v. Slick, 56 So. 2d 459 (Fla.
1952), an ordinance enacted by the city council of North Miami Beach requiring the fining,
imprisonment or dismissal of any municipal official deemed to be disobeying a council or-
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understandably derived from Brown the following proposition:
Bills of attainder in England were frequently products of po-
litical turmoil and unrest. Their victims were usually individuals
who posed a threat to the security of the crown or to established
political alliances in Parliament. English acts of attainder which
identified their victims on some basis other than name generally
did this by describing the adherence of the attainted to a person
or persons engaged in activities deemed treasonable. This sug-
gests that the specificity barred by the bill of attainder clause is
identification in a statute of individuals because of their member-
ship in groups or association with other individuals engaged in
unpopular political activities.995
The problem with this thesis is that it ignores history. A number of
parliamentary bills of attainder or bills of pains and penalties inflicted
deprivations not upon members of political minorities but upon mem-
bers of communities that allegedly tolerated voting fraud,996 or those
who married issue of the king without his consent997 or those who ena-
bled political prisoners to escape from royal jails, regardless of whether
they were adherents to the cause for which such a prisoner had been
incarcerated, or because they were common criminals doing a job for
der and judged guilty of disobedience by a two-thirds vote of the members of the council
was struck down as an attainder, even though the class created lacked independent signifi-
cance apart from the statute. See id. at 461-62. The decisions of the United States Supreme
Court only underscore the point. In Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867), see
notes 54-70 and accompanying text supra, the challenged provisions of the state constitution
inflicted deprivations upon the class of all persons who refused to execute an expurgatory
oath; included in that class were groupings of independent significance (ex-Confederates
and their sympathizers) and a collection of others who could or would not subscribe to the
oath. See notes 587-588 and accompanying text supra. The heterogeneous class thus created
had no meaningful existence apart from the provision of the state constitution in question.
Similarly, in the Brown case itself, the class of those affected by section 504 did not consist
of members of the Communist Party per se. Rather, it consisted of all those Party members
who occupied or sought to occupy union offices and of certain felons possessing a similar
position or entertaining a similar desire. The artificiality of this class was heightened by the
retrospectivity requirement, which also barred ex-Communists and those felons whose con-
victions or whose sentences ended at a certain date. See note 729 supra. When the full class
description contained in section 504 is considered, it becomes thoroughly absurd to allege
that the grouping created by that statute had an independent identity. In fact, the class cre-
ated by section 504 is one that would not even exist butfor the statute itself. Thus, the
proposed distinction advocated by the commentator quoted earlier is a fictive one, which is
not substantiated by either the decisions of the United States Supreme Court or those ren-
dered by lower state and federal courts.
995. Needfor Clarification, supra note 12, at 235-36 (footnotes omitted).
996. See, e.g., 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 47, § 1; 26 STATS. U.K. 358 (1821); 22 Geo. 3, c. 31, § 1;
14 STATS. U.K. 188 (1782); 11 Geo. 3, c. 55 § 2; 11 STATS. U.K. 314 (1771). For quotations
from and descriptions of these bills, see note 11 supra.
997. 28 Hen. 8, c. 18; 2 STATS. U.K. 261 (1536). See note 27 supra.
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money.998 A similar situation is presented by a consideration of Ameri-
can attainder decisions. While all five rulings of the United States
Supreme Court that have invalidated challenged enactments on attain-
der grounds involved laws directed against political factions,999 not un-
til Brown did the Court intimate that the prohibitions against
attainders apply only to enactments entailing partisan political oppres-
sion. Indeed, in cases concerning attainder challenges to apolitical leg-
islation, like that involved in Dent v. West Virginia, "Hawker v. New
Yorkt °° 1 or DeVeau v. Braisted,1 002 the United States Supreme Court
relied on no spurious distinction between attempts to attaint those who
engage in "unpopular political activities" and those who do not, but
instead relied on the genuine dichotomy between regulation and pun-
ishment. A glance at lower federal and state court decisions rendered
since 1867 serves to emphasize this point. Of the nineteen"°°3 decisions
invalidating various enactments as bills of attainder, eight' °  involved
998. See, e.g., 9 Geo. 1, c. 15; 5 STATS. U.K. 448 (1722). See note 29 supra.
999. Three of those rulings involved enactments directed primarily against ex-Confed-
erates and Confederate sympathizers. See Pierce v. Carskadon, $3 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234
(1872), see notes 438-439, 444 and accompanying text supra; Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 333 (1867), see notes 71-81 and accompanying text supra; Cummings v. Missouri, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867), see notes 54-70 and accompanying text supra. The fourth in-
volved a statute penalizing three named persons deemed by Congress to be subversives. See
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), see notes 180-197 and accompanying text
supra. The Brown case itself involved a statute which, at least in part, was directed against
members of the Communist Party. See note 729 supra.
1000. 129 U.S. 114 (1889). See notes 541-548 and accompanying text supra.
1001. 170 U.S. 189 (1898). See notes 551-563 and accompanying text supra.
1002. 363 U.S. 144 (1960). See notes 565, 658-661 and accompanying text supra.
1003. See note 98 supra.
1004. See Putty v. United States, 220 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 821
(1955) (statute retroactively validating prosecutorial informations against defendants ac-
cused of committing a felony who were subsequently convicted; see notes 629-636 and ac-
companying text supra); Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914). rev'don other grounds,
242 U.S. 468 (1917) (law mandating vasectomies for idiots, drunkards, drug fiends, epilep-
tics, syphilitics, moral degenerates and those convicted twice of felonies; see notes 458-461
and accompanying text supra); In re Yung Sing Hee, 36 F. 437 (C.C.D. Ore. 1888) (legisla-
tion construed to bar citizens of Chinese extraction who left the country for any reason from
ever returning; see notes 485-490 and accompanying text supra); Steinberg v. United States,
163 F. Supp. 590 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (enactment terminating the annuity of a retired federal em-
ployee refusing to answer the questions put to him by a judge, grand jury or legislative
investigating committee about his former governmental service; see notes 462-466 and ac-
companying text supra); Jones v. Slick, 56 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1952) (ordinance requiring pun-
ishment of municipal officials who fail to obey orders of the city council; see note 994
supra); McNealy v. Gregory, 13 Fla. 417 (1870) (constitutional amendment retroactively
invalidating all promissory notes, deeds or bills of sale given in exchange for slaves, see
notes 108-114 and accompanying text supra); Commonwealth v. Jones, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 725
(1874) (anti-duelling expurgatory oath exacted from public officials). Opinion to the House
of Representatives, 80 R.I. 281, 96 A.2d 623 (1953) (proposed law disqualifying relatives of
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legislation directed against apolitical categories of individuals, such as
criminals, citizens of Chinese extraction, duellists or relatives of incum-
bent municipal officials. Thus, both the commentator quoted above
and Chief Justice Warren in Brown misconstrue the nature of the pro-
scription against bills of attainder when they claim that it applies only
to legislative acts directed against unpopular or dangerous political
factions.
The second aspect of the specificity problem raised by Brown is
far more significant. As noted earlier, 1005 specificity as an element of
the definition of a bill of attainder became problematic largely as a
result of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Communist
Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board.1II 6 In
that case, Justice Frankfurter, speaking for a majority of the Court
found that the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950107 did not
attaint because it failed to designate the Communist Party by name.
Instead, the enactment referred only to "Communist-action" and
"Communist-front" organizations, as defined by Congress. °° 8 The ef-
fect of the decision in Brown on the ruling in the Communist Party case
is difficult to ascertain. On the one hand, Chief Justice Warren noted
the language in the latter case stipulating that section three of the 1950
act, which defines "Communist-action" organizations,'0° 9 constituted
rule-making rather than specification'01 0 because the Communist Party
fit within the definition of a "Communist-action" organization by vir-
tue of the conduct in which it engaged and which it could abandon. On
the other hand, he also noted that Justice Black, in his dissent, had
vigorously rejected this thesis.10 11 The Chief Justice proceeded to cite
the Communist Party case in support of the proposition that if a law
disables members of an organization designated by name without any
hearing, it is, in all likelihood, a bill of attainder.10 12 On the basis of
this citation, the majority opinion in Brown was able to characterize
elected officials or agency heads from holding any appointive municipal office during the
elected term of the official or the designated tenure of the agency head; see note 565 supra).
1005. See notes 611-614 and accompanying text supra.
1006. 367 U.S. 1 (1961). See notes 366-372, 611-622 and accompanying text supra.
1007. 64 Stat. 987, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-850 (1950) (repealed in part 1968). For a detailed
description of this act, see notes 612-618 and accompanying text supra.
1008. 367 U.S. at 86. See note 614 and accompanying text supra.
1009. For a paraphrasing of this definition, see note 615 and accompanying text supra.
1010. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 451 (1965).
1011. Id. (citing Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 146
(1961) (Black, J., dissenting)).
1012. Id. at 451-52 (citing Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367
U.S. 1, 86-87 (1961)).
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section 504 without any difficulty; it attainted because, by its very
terms, it inflicted deprivations upon those belonging to a specific entity,
the Communist Party.10 1 3 Thus, the majority in Brown appeared to ac-
cept the narrow thesis about specificity set forth by Justice Frankfurter
in the Court's earlier decision.
Nevertheless, in Part IV of his opinion in Brown, Chief Justice
Warren included language susceptible to a less limiting construction. In
response to the contention that the statute depriving Communists of
union officerships, unlike the legislation involved in United States v.
Lovett,10 1 4 singled out no person by name, the Chief Justice replied:
It is of course true that § 504 does not contain the words "Archie
Brown," and that it inflicts its deprivation upon more than three
people. However, the decisions of this Court, as well as the his-
torical background of the Bill of Attainder Clause, make it crys-
tal clear that these are distinctions without a difference. It was
not uncommon for English acts of attainder to inflict their depri-
vations upon relatively large groups of people, sometimes by de-
scription rather than name. Moreover, the statutes voided in
Cummings and Garland were of this nature. We cannot agree
that the fact that § 504 inflicts its deprivation upon the member-
ship of the Communist Party rather than upon a list of named
individuals takes it out of the category of bills of attainder.'01 5
Not only does this passage emphasize the point that statutory language
describing rather than naming its victims can attaint, but it also refers
to the decisions of Cummings v. Missouri10 16 and Exparte Garland,
0 1 7
rulings which contained no limiting language on the subject of specific-
ity. These two factors support the construction that the majority in
Brown did not merely reiterate without criticism the specificity doc-
trine announced four years earlier by Justice Frankfurter in the Com-
1013. Id. at 452. Of course, the citation to the Communist Party case at this juncture
raises another problem. The Court in that earlier case linked specificity with the fact that the
organizations affected by the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 were not being sin-
gled out irrevocably because of the past conduct of their constituents, but could, at all times,
remove themselves unilaterally from the unfavorable classification created by the statute.
See notes 614, 620-621 and accompanying text supra. But Brown teaches that any attempt
to exempt a particular piece of legislation from the constitutional proscriptions against bills
of attainder because of its lack of retributive effect will not be permitted. See notes 757-765
and accompanying text supra. Thus, to the extent that the specificity doctrine of the Commu-
nist Party case rests upon the prospectivity/retrospectivity distinction, it may well have been
undermined by the Court's ruling in Brown. Nevertheless, no subsequent judicial decision
has considered this aspect of the Brown case with respect to the problem of specificity, so
this suggested interpretation of that case is purely speculative.
1014. 328 U.S. 303 (1946). See notes 180-198 and accompanying text supra.
1015. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 461 (1965) (footnotes omitted).
1016. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867). See notes 54-70 and accompanying text supra.
1017. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867). See notes 71-81 and accompanying text supra.
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munist Party case; rather, the Court indicated a willingness to return to
a more flexible, less particularized concept of specificity, one which in-
corporates a recognition that the victim of an attainder could be identi-
fied by name, by reference to his affiliation with another person or
organization, or by reference to either the acts he had committed or was
likely to commit or to the beliefs he had advocated or would be likely
to advocate. On the other hand, the entire point of this excursus by
Chief Justice Warren is that identification by reference to membership
in a named organization constitutes a sufficient description. It could be
argued that he was merely advancing the theory that if the challenged
enactment did not designate its victims by name, then it had to refer
specifically to the appellation of the entity with which they were affili-
ated. This second construction would entail the conclusion that Brown
did indeed follow the doctrine of the Communist Party case.
A year later, in a dictum in the case of South Carolina v.
Katzenbach,018 the Court seemed to endorse the latter construction of
the language in Brown when it stated that the bill of attainder clauses
could not be invoked by states but were intended "only as protections
for individual persons and private groups, those who are particularly
vulnerable to nonjudicial determinations of guilt."' 0 19 Consequently, a
number of post-Brown decisions rendered by state and lower federal
courts have relied, in whole or in part, on specificity grounds to reject'
attainder challenges. Thus, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that a federal law requiring the revocation of the
license of any agricultural commodities dealer who goes bankrupt and
wins subsequent court approval of a reorganization plan 0 20 did not
attaint because, inter alia, it did "not name or describe [the] petititoners
or any group to which they belong."10 21 Similarly, a California district
court of appeal upheld a statute suspending the license of any driver
who refuses to submit to a sobriety test 0 22 because, inter alia, the stat-
ute did "not apply to a certain individual nor to a narrowly defined
1018. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
1019. Id. at 324.
1020. 7 U.S.C. § 499h(b) (1976).
1021. Zwick v. Freeman, 373 F.2d 110, 119 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835 (1967).
Accord, George Steinberg & Son, Inc. v. Butz, 491 F.2d 988, 994 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 830 (1975). Cf. United States v. Ilacqua, 562 F.2d 399, 404-05 (6th Cir. 1977) (challenge
to 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976), authorizing imposition of an enhanced sentence against danger-
ous special offenders; held, statute does not attaint because it singles out no individual for
punishment, but rather operates as a prohibition of general application).
1022. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353 (West 1975).
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group, but to all licensed drivers."'1° 3 An identical thesis was advanced
by the Washington Supreme Court, which rejected the contention that
a state law mandating the suspension of the licenses of all motorists
deemed habitual traffic offenders 10 24 could constitute a bill of attainder
by remarking that "the act does not single out any individual or easily
ascertainable members of a group, as the act applies to all users of the
highways who come within the ambit of the definition of an habitual
traffic offender."' 0125 Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court con-
cluded that an enactment requiring uninsured motorists involved in an
accident to post bond or forfeit their licenses 0 26 did not attaint because
it punished no specified group. 102 7 That court relied in part on its prior
affirmance of a decision that had dismissed an attainder challenge to a
statute stipulating that no records maintained by the State's Workmen's
Compensation Division would be open to inspection or duplication by
any organization intending to sell the information contained there-
in, 10 28 by noting that the plaintiff had not been singled out for depriva-
tion because the statute applied to all similarly situated information-
gathering firms. 10 29 Most recently, the Kansas Supreme Court rejected
the argument that the state's criminal law prohibiting forcible sod-
omy' 01 attainted any group of individuals because, inter alia, that law
identified no persons who were subject to punishment.'0 3 1 In light of
these decisions, one might legitimately wonder what degree of specific-
ity is needed before a legislative act will be struck down as a bill of
attainder.
1023. Westmoreland v. Chapman, 268 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5, 74 Cal. Rptr. 363, 366 (1968)
(emphasis in original). See notes 697-709 and accompanying text supra.
1024. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.65.050 (West Supp. 1977).
1025. State v. Scheffel, 82 Wash. 2d 872, 881, 514 P.2d 1052,1058 (1973). See notes 719,
720 supra.
1026. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-25(a), (b) (West 1973).
1027. Williams v. Sills, 55 N.J. 178, 186, 260 A.2d 505, 509 (1970).
1028. 1966 N.J. Laws, ch. 164.
1029. Accident Index Bureau, Inc. v. Male, 95 N.J.Super. 39, 49, 229 A.2d 812, 817
(1967), affidper curiam, 51 N.J. 107, 237 A.2d 880 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 530
(1968). This decision was also cited as controlling in the case of Oueilhe v. Lovell, 560 P.2d
1348, 1350 (Nev. 1977) (attainder challenge to a Las Vegas ordinance prohibiting the estab-
lishment of or advertising for a business that promotes wrestling matches between members
of the opposite sex; held, the challenged enactment did not attaint because it did not purport
to single out the appellant by name).
1030. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3506 (1974).
1031. State v. Thompson, 221 Kan. 165, 173, 558 P.2d 1079, 1085 (1976). See also
Marter v. State, 224 Ga. 569, 570-71, 163 S.E.2d 702, 704 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1123
(1968) (upheld GA. CODE § 26-7101 (1963) (repealed 1968), barring the acts of "rogues and
vagabonds," specifically, being present in a place where one has no right to be, with intent to
steal; held, statute does not assess any penalty against "rogues and vagabonds as generally
known and defined.")
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The answer is provided by Blawis v. Bolin.132 That case involved
a challenge to the Communist Control Act of 19541033 and its Arizonan
counterpart. 10 34 The federal act contained findings that the Communist
Party was an "instrumentality of a conspiracy" to overthrow the gov-
ernment and thus constituted a "clear present and continuing danger to
the security of the United States."'' 0 31 In addition to stipulating that
members of the Communist Party would be subject to the provisions
and penalties of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,1036 the
1954 statute contained the following language:
The Communist Party of the United States, or any succes-
sors of such party regardless of the assumed name, whose object
or purpose is to overthrow the Government of the United States
...by force or violence, are not entitled to any of the rights,
privileges, and immunities attendant upon legal bodies created
under the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States or any po-
litical subdivision thereof; and whatever rights, privileges, and
immunities which have heretofore been granted to said party or
any subsidiary organization ... or any political subdivision
thereof, are terminated .... 1037
The fact that the statute imposed disabilities on the Communist Party
by name was sufficient to ensure that it would be subject to repeated
attainder challenges. 0 3 But although two of the three major cases con-
struing this provision prior to 1973 did involve such challenges, no
court had ever passed upon the question of whether this section of the
Communist Control Act of 1954 was a bill of attainder.
10 39
1032. 358 F. Supp. 349 (D. Ariz. 1973).
1033. 50 U.S.C. §§ 841-844 (1970).
1034. A=Iz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-205, 16-206 (Supp. 1972-73) (amended 1975).
1035. 50 U.S.C. § 841 (1970). This section, construed in conjunction with the Smith Act
(18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1976); see notes 638-639 and accompanying text supra), has been held not
to be a bill of attainder. United States v. Silverman, 132 F. Supp. 820, 832 (D. Conn. 1955).
1036. 50 U.S.C. § 843(a) (1970).
1037. Id. § 842.
1038. In fact, a number of commentators had suggested that the act might be invali-
dated as an attainder. See EMERSON, supra note 638, at 150; Bounds of Speciication, supra
note 45, at 361; Note, The Communist ControlAct of 1954, 64 YALE L.J. 712, 722-26 (1955).
1039. In one of these decisions, Salwen v. Rees, 16 N.J. 216, 108 A.2d 265 (1954), the
New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a lower court ruling that a county clerk could rely on the
act to deny Communists a place on the ballot. The high court, in its per curiam opinion,
simply stated that the Communist Control Act was generally constitutional. Id. at 218, 108
A.2d at 266. The case of In re Claim of Albertson, 8 N.Y.2d 77, 168 N.E.2d 242, 202
N.Y.S.2d 5 (1960), presented a more difficult question. There, the state had terminated the
liability of the Communist Party for tax assessments under New York's unemployment in-
surance program. See N.Y. LAB. LAw § 571 (McKinney 1973). An indirect effect of this act
was to increase the Party's tax rate under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§
3301-3308 (1961), from one percent to three percent. The New York Court of Appeals, ap-
plying the Communist Control Act, stated that while paying state unemployment insurance
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In Blawls, the plaintiffs, prior to the 1972 general election, gath-
ered signed petitions to establish the Communist Party of Arizona and
presented them to various county recorders for certification pursuant to
state law.10 40 The state refused to certify the Party, relying on the lan-
guage of both the federal act and its state analogue.' 4 The federal
district court in Blawis noted that these laws, unlike the Subversive
tax is no "privilege," the mere fact of payment accords the payor the status of an employer
and that status was a benefit of which the Communist Party could be deprived. 8 N.Y.2d at
83, 168 N.E.2d at 244, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 8. The state court also held that the federal act did
not attaint, relying on the findings by Congress that the Communist Party was an instrumen-
tality of subversion that had to be regulated. Id. at 84-85, 168 N.E.2d at 244,202 N.Y.S.2d at
9. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed. Communist Party v. Catherwood,
367 U.S. 389, 395 (1961). It did not reach any constitutional issues, but simply held that the
language of the federal act did not require the expansive interpretation of the terms "privi-
lege" or "immunity" that had been advanced by the New York court. Id. at 393. The last
case in this series was Mitchell v. Donovan. There, various candidates nominated by the
Communist Party to run in the 1968 national elections instituted a suit to compel Minneso-
tan officials to place their names on the ballot in that state. A three-judge district court noted
the possibility that the Communist Control Act (which the state officials had relied on)
might be classifiable as a bill of attainder, but in view of the urgent relief requested, it
declined to consider that issue. Mitchell v. Donovan, 290 F. Supp. 642, 645 (D. Minn. 1968).
Nevertheless, it enjoined state officials from denying Communists a place on the ballot,
finding a discernible injury to the petitioners if they were excluded and none to the state if
they were not. Id. at 645-46. After the elections (in which the Party received all of 415 votes
from the state of Minnesota), a second suit was lodged, requesting a declaratory judgment
that the Communist Control Act, as applied by the state, was invalid. A three-judge district
court dismissed this complaint, claiming no present case or controversy existed since there
was no showing that the state would enforce the act in the future as it had done in the past.
Mitchell v. Donovan, 300 F. Supp. 1145, 1150 (D. Minn. 1969). The petitioners appealed to
the United States Supreme Court, basing their appeal on 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970), which
authorizes direct appeals from the granting or denial of interlocutory or permanent injunc-
tions by three-judge district courts. The Court, however, dismissed the appeal, pointing out
that the petitioners had been denied a declaratory judgment, not an injunction. Mitchell v.
Donovan, 398 U.S. 427, 430-31 (1969). Nevertheless, it remanded the case to the three-judge
district court so that that court could issue a fresh order, which could then be appealed to the
Eighth Circuit. Id. at 431-32. On remand, the suit was again dismissed, Mitchell v. Dono-
van, No. 3-68-Civ.-256 (D. Minn., July 28, 1970), but apparently no appeal was ever
pursued.
1040. 358 F. Supp. at 350-51. The state statutes requiring certification may be located in
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-202 to 16-204 (Supp. 1972-73) (amended 1975).
1041. The respondents relied principally on the Arizonan statutes and secondarily on
the federal act in case the state laws were deemed pre-empted under the supremacy clause.
358 F. Supp. at 351 n.2. Although there is a split of authority, the majority of courts have
held that federal law is exclusively controlling in this area. Compare McSurely v. Ratliff,
282 F. Supp. 848, 851 (E.D. Ky. 1967), appeal dismissed, 390 U.S. 412 (1968); State v. Jen-
kins, 236 La. 300, 303, 107 So. 2d 648, 649 (1958) (both finding pre-emption) with State v.
Diez, 97 So. 2d 105, 108 (Fla. 1957) (finding no pre-emption). At this juncture, the procedu-
ral history of Blawis should be noted. The petitioners had originall sought and failed to
receive an injunction against the state officials prior to the 1972 general election. On appeal,
the United States Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions that District Judge
Copple make a determination on the prayer for a declaratory judgment. Brockington v.
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Activities Control Act of 1950, had as their stated purpose the exclusion
of the Communist Party from the political process. District Judge Cop-
pie noted the language in the Communist Party case' °42 indicating any
attempt by a legislature to outlaw the Party by name would constitute a
bill of attainder" 3 and found the Arizona laws did exactly that be-
cause they terminated "[flundamental political rights of a stated
class."' 44 The judge specifically predicated his conclusion that the
state legislation attainted on the fact that it "is a punishment of a
named group upon a legislative finding of guilt."' 5 This same analysis
was incorporated by reference in that portion of the court's opinion
invalidating the 1954 federal act.' Blawis clearly indicates that after
Brown the constitutional proscriptions against attainders apply only to
statutes penalizing named individuals or entities. If the victims of the
bill are not designated by name, then it is not likely to be classified as
an attainder.
A legitimate question remains as to whether the purview of the
constitutional bans against attainders should be so narrowly circum-
scribed. Defining the specificity component of a bill of attainder in a
restrictive fashion perpetuates the doctrine that Justice Field in Cum-
mings v. Missouri1 47 abjured: that the proscriptions of article one, sec-
tions nine and ten should not be undermined by an unwavering judicial
insistence upon a particular format for bills of attainder because "[i]f
the inhibition can be evaded by the form of the enactment, its insertion
in the fundamental law was a vain and futile proceeding." '' °4 The im-
port of the approach implicit in Blawis and Brown is that the attainder
clauses are virtually dead letters of constitutional law because the legis-
lature can avoid the proscriptions contained in them by carefully draft-
ing its enactments. Such an approach, in effect, undoes what
Cummings accomplished because it places a renewed emphasis on the
very formalities that Justice Field and his colleagues decried.
At this point it may be asked whether the specificity requirement
should even be a component of the attainder doctrine. As indicated
Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43-44 (1969). It is the decision on remand which is referred to in the
text.
1042. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 84-85 (1961).
This language was also quoted approvingly in United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 451
(1965).
1043. 358 F. Supp. at 353.
1044. Id. at 354.
1045. Id.
1046. Id. at 356-57.
1047. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
1048. Id. at 325. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
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earlier, 1° 49 the Court in Cummings never announced such a require-
ment, and there exists no valid reason to suggest that it should have
done otherwise. But to say that the specificity element serves no legiti-
mate definitional purposes is not to say that it serves no purposes what-
soever. Courts may wish to take into account the specificity of a
challenged enactment for two reasons. First, if a statute affects so many
persons that it appears to be universal in its application within a given
context, e.g., a law imposing a general tax on earned income, or a law
requiring all persons to obtain a license before operating a motor vehi-
cle or a law requiring all citizens who return from abroad to submit to
an inspection by customs agents, this should not mean that it cannot,
ipsofacto, be a bill of attainder. It would, however, constitute proba-
tive, though by no means decisive, evidence on which a court could rely
in concluding that a challenged enactment is regulatory rather than pu-
nitive. It is readily apparent how the use of specificity analysis in this
context differs from the way it is curently being used by the courts.
Under the proposed approach, lack of specificity per se would not pre-
clude any finding of an attainder; instead, it would be merely one fac-
tor among many in the judicial calculus utilized to ascertain whether a
law was enacted for the purpose of punishment." 50
A second reason for considering specificity is its usefulness in
resolving the issue of standing to sue. This assertion can best be illus-
trated by a consideration of the implications of Hockett v. Administra-
tor of Veterans Affairs.1°51 Joyce Hockett, a black woman, had served
in the United States Army from February 9, 1970 until December 1,
1972 when she was discharged under "other than honorable condi-
tions."' 1 52 On February 12, 1973, she had applied for a nursing position
in a veterans' hospital located in Cleveland, Ohio, but her application
was denied, allegedly because of the nature of her military dis-
charge.10 53 Consequently, she brought an action under the amended
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 0 54 and an executive order barring
1049. See notes 604-607 and accompanying text supra.
1050. It should be noted that this approach is not identical to the one that Chief Justice
Warren appeared to advance in the initial portion of Part III of his opinion in United States
v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). See notes 953-959 and accompanying text supra. The model
proposed would only make specificity a criterion rather than the criterion for determining
whether or not a law punishes.
1051. 385 F. Supp. 1106 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
1052. Id. at 1107.
1053. Id. at 1107-08.
1054. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. V 1975).
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discrimination in federal employment, 0 5 5 alleging that the Veterans
Administration was guilty of racial bias in hiring. The administration
claimed that it had no record of any application filed by Hockett1
0 56
The district court accepted the veracity of this contention, and found
that this precluded any possibility of standing to sue under section
737(c) of the Civil Rights Act.'0 57 The court also stated that Hockett
lacked standing to raise her alternative claim, namely, that the hiring
practices of the Veterans Administration, as reflected in its internal
rules and regulations, constituted a bill of attainder. In reaching such a
conclusion, it relied on the bipartite test established by the United
States Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing Service Organi-
zations, Inc. v. Camp.0'5 8 The elements of that test are (1) whether the
plaintiff can allege that the challenged governmental action caused him
injury in fact, economic or otherwise, and (2) whether the interest he
seeks to protect arguably falls within the zone of interests protected by
either the statute or the constitutional guarantee in question. 0 59 The
district court ruled that Hockett had suffered no injury in fact because
of her failure to file a written job application.
10 60
Assuming that the Data Processing test is still the governing stan-
dard in resolving a standing issue,10 6 ' specificity will play an important
1055. Executive Order No. 11590,36 Fed. Reg. 7831 (April 23, 1971), amending Execu-
tive Order No. 11478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12985 (Aug. 8, 1969).
1056. 385 F. Supp. at 1108-09.
1057. The district court concluded that section 717(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. V
1975), applied only to applicants for employment. See 385 F. Supp. at 1112.
1058. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
1059. Id. at 152-53.
1060. 385 F. Supp. at 1113.
1061. There is little question that the Data Processing test would apply in attainder
cases. There is some question, however, about the current nature of that test in light of
subsequent rulings of the United States Supreme Court. Thus, the injury in fact can be both
indirect and aesthetic in nature so long as it is an injury rather than merely an interest in
lodging a particular lawsuit. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 683-89 (1973);
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,738-41 (1972). Moreover, standing to sue can exist even
where the interests allegedly infringed are solely statutory creations so that no injury in fact
would exist without the presence of a particular law establishing some new legal right.
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 n.2 (1974); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,
617 n.3 (1973). In contrast to these expansive interpretations, however, other language in
opinions of the Court has implied a more restrictive concept of the injury in fact rule. Thus,
the injury alleged must not only be present, O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. at 495-96, but it
must also be concrete, Ze., more than a mere generalized grievance. Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-21 (1974), United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166, 177-78 (1974). More recently, the United States Supreme Court has held that not every
allegation of injury in fact will suffice for standing purposes; only those wherein a plaintiff
can claim that but for the action of the defendant, there was a substantial probability that he
would have received a particular benefit will be accepted by courts. See Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975). But it is unclear whether this new refinement applies in cases other
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role in that analysis. If a challenged enactment is unspecific to the ex-
tent that it either is not clear whether it inflicts an injury on a particular
plaintiff or is not apparent whether the interest that the plaintiff claims
is being infringed falls within the class of those protected by the
prohibitions against bills of attainder, then the plaintiffs suit must be
dismissed for lack of standing to sue. Again, specificity analysis in this
context is used in a fashion distinctive from the way it is used in Brown
and Blawis. The analysis is not made in order to support a finding that
a given statute does not attaint; rather, it is made in order to support a
finding that a given plaintiff should not be allowed to raise an attainder
challenge in a court of law.
The two uses of specificity analysis mentioned here are tangential,
but at least they are legitimate purposes to which such analysis may be
put. Certainly courts should not ignore a specificity problem where it
exists, but to accord it decisive importance is to prevent the proscrip-
tions contained in article one, sections nine and ten of the Constitution
from serving as a meaningful check on legislative usurpations of judi-
cial functions.
VI. Supreme Court Decisions After Brown
A. Collateral Constitutional Challenges: Two Rulings
In 1950, in the case of American Communications Association v.
Douds,1°62 three justices"°63 of the United States Supreme Court held
that section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act 10 64 was not a bill of attainder.
That provision withdrew the jurisdiction of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board from unions whose officers declined to execute oaths disaf-
firming membership in a group advocating or advocacy of forcible
overthrow of the government and disavowing affiliation with the Com-
munist Party. Because of the impracticability of enforcing this oath re-
quirement,1 065 it was replaced in 1959 by section 504 of the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,' °66 which, inter alia,
than those which, like Warth, involve alleged instances of exclusionary zoning. For recent
overviews of standing requirements, see Note, Warth v. Seldin: The Substantial Probabifty
Test, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 485, 491-501 (1976); Note, Recent Standing Cases and a
Possible Alternative Approach, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 213, 217-18, 222-27 (1975).
1062. 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See notes 349-359 and accompanying text supra.
1063. The three were Chief Justice Vinson, Justices Burton and Reed. See note 354 and
accompanying text supra.
1064. 61 Stat. 146, 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (1947) (superseded 1959). See note 352 and ac-
companying text supra.
1065. See note 786 supra.
1066. 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1970). See note 729 supra.
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barred Communists from serving as union officers. In 1965, the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Brown, 0 67 held that this re-
placement provision was an unconstitutional bill of attainder. State-
ments in the Brown case 0 68 led many commentators to conclude that
the precedential validity of Douds was questionable, to say the
least. 1069
The stage was thus set for the Supreme Court's ruling in Dennis v.
United States,10 70 decided one year after Brown. That litigation in-
volved the convictions of fourteen persons found guilty of conspiring to
obtain fraudulently the services of the National Labor Relations Board
on behalf of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Work-
ers by executing falsely the oath required by former section 9(h) be-
tween August, 1949 and February, 1955.1071 At the time the affidavits
were signed, all the officers in question remained members of or affili-
ated with the Communist Party.' 72 Since section 9(h) lacked a penalty
provision of its own, 10 73 the convictions were based on indictments
charging violations of the general federal conspiracy statute.10 74 These
indictments were returned in 1956. After a decade of appeals and one
retrial, 0 75 six of the fourteen persons convicted finally petitioned the
1067. 381 U.S. 437 (1965). See notes 728-766 and accompanying text supra.
1068. See notes 911-917 and accompanying text supra.
1069. See notes 918-920 and accompanying text supra.
1070. 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
1071. Id. at 858-59. The government alleged that the union and the Communist Party
had formulated a concerted plan to deceive the National Labor Relations Board. See id. at
859, 866 n.12.
1072. Id. at 859. A number of the union officers in question nominally resigned from
the Party, but in fact remained closely "affiliated" with it. Id. at 859 n.3. "Affiliation" in the
context of section 9(h) had been previously construed by the Court to be satisfied by proof of
"a close working alliance or association between [the defendant] and the organization, to-
gether with a mutual understanding or recognition that the organization can rely and de-
pend upon him to cooperate with it, and to work for its benefit." Killian v. United States,
368 U.S. 231, 255 (1961).
1073. See note 352 supra.
1074. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976):
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any man-
ner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.
The majority held that a conspiracy to file false statements fit within the conspiracy-to-
defraud clause of this statute. 384 U.S. at 864.
1075. The district court in this case had rejected a motion to dismiss the indictment and
ordered the case to trial. United States v. Pezzati, 160 F. Supp. 787, 792 (D. Colo. 1958).
After that trial resulted in a conviction, an appeal was taken and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the judgments on the ground that prejudicial hearsay
had been erroneously admitted in evidence. Dennis v. United States, 302 F.2d 5, 10 (10th
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Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. 0 76 One of the questions they
presented for consideration was whether or not former section 9(h) of
the Taft-Hartley Act was constitutional in light of the then-recent rul-
ing in the Brown case. Justice Fortas' majority opinion 107 7 refused to
even reach the issue of the constitutionality of section 9(h). He noted
that this was not a case in which the petitioners had flouted the law out
of necessity; rather, they were indicted for a "cynical and fraudulent"
conspiracy to circumvent the statute.10 7 8 Relying primarily on two cases
decided in 1938, in which the Court had upheld the convictions of per-
sons who had made false statements to secure benefits to which they
were not entitled under certain federal relief acts, 107 9 the majority con-
cluded that:
The governing principle is that a claim of unconstitutionality will
not be heard to excuse a voluntary, deliberate and calculated
course of fraud and deceit. One who elects such a course as a
means of self-help may not escape the consequences by urging
that his conduct be excused because the statute which he sought
to evade is unconstitutional. This is a prosecution directed at pe-
titioners' fraud. It is not an action to enforce the statute claimed
to be unconstitutional.1
0 80
Cir. 1962). A retrial resulted in new convictions, and each petitioner was fined $2000 and
sentenced to three years in prison. This time, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment. Den-
nis v. United States, 346 F.2d 10, 21 (10th Cir. 1965).
1076. Three questions were presented on certorari: (1) whether the indictment stated the
offense of conspiracy to defraud the government, (2) the attainder issue discussed in the text
and (3) whether reversible error was committed when the trial court denied petitioners' mo-
tions for production of transcripts of the grand jury testimony of prosecution witnesses. 384
U.S. at 858. The first question was answered in the affirmative. See note 1074 supra. But the
third was decided so as to require reversal. See note 1083 infra.
1077. Justice Fortas was joined by Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Brennan, Clark,
Harlan, Stewart and White. Justices Black and Douglas dissented in part. See notes 1084-
1090 and accompanying text infra.
1078. 384 U.S. at 865.
1079. Id. at 866 (citing Kay v. United States, 303 U.S. 1, 6 (1938) (upheld conviction for
making false statements in connection with a request for funds under the provisions of the
Home Owners Loan Act of 1933); United States v. Kapp, 302 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1938) (up-
held conviction for making a false claim for money under the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1933)). Cf. United States v. Harding, 81 F.2d 563, 568 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (upheld conviction
for conspiracy to influence approval of a substituted water irrigation system plan to be
funded by the Federal Public Works Administration); Madden v. United States, 80 F.2d
672, 674 (1st Cir. 1935) (upheld conviction for forging a signature on an identity card used to
secure employment on a project funded under the National Industrial Recovery Act of
1933); Langer v. United States, 76 F.2d 817, 824-25 (8th Cir. 1935) (upheld conviction for
conspiracy to obstruct use of loans made by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation).
1080. 384 U.S. at 867. Justice Fortas' argument is ingenuous, to say the least. The only
way violations of section 9(h) could be punished was by prosecutions under Title eighteen of
the United States Code. Indeed, the National Labor Relations Board had no independent
jurisdiction to determine if an affidavit was, in fact, executed falsely. See note 786 supra. So
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Justice Fortas found it unnecessary to consider whether the petitioners
defrauded the government of a lawful function because, at the time
some of the allegedly fraudulent activity in question had occurred, the
ruling in Douds, which gave the governmental function involved the
Court's "fresh imprimatur," had just been rendered. 08' Therefore, he
stated that the petitioners had simply selected an inappropriate method
of challenging an official action that they thought was unconstitu-
tional.'082 Having thus concluded that they lacked standing to raise the
attainder issue, the Court reversed the petitioners' convictions on tech-
nical procedural grounds.'
0 83
Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, issued a cogent opinion,
concurring and dissenting in part. He pointed out that the govern-
ment's indictment itself charged fraudulent interference with a proper
governmental function' 0 84 and that, according to a number of prior de-
cisions,108 5 an essential element of the crime of defrauding the govern-
ment was proof of such an interference. 0 86 If section 9(h) was indeed a
bill of attainder, and Justice Black assumed that it was, 0 87 then no
these criminal prosecutions really did enforce section 9(h), in that they punished past law-
breakers and deterred future ones.
1081. Id. at 867. The alleged conspiracy was said to have commenced in June of 1949
and the first false affidavits were said to have been filed in August of that year. Douds was
announced on May 8, 1950, but various false oaths were executed by the defendants during
the five succeeding years. See id. at 865 n. 11.
1082. Id. at 867.
1083. The majority ruled that, in light of the policy promoting the proper administra-
tion of criminal justice (as signified by the passage of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b)
(1976), which requires the government to produce the prior statements of a witness whom it
called to testify on direct examination in court, with respect to all matters relating to that
testimony), the prosecution's concession that there was no need to preserve the secrecy of the
statements made by its witnesses before the grand jury in this case and the defendants' "par-
ticularized needs" (particularly the facts that the grand jury testimony occurred in 1956 and
that the trial testimony with which the defendants sought to compare it was taken in 1963),
the trial court erred in not compelling the government to furnish the defendants with the
grand jury testimony of its key witnesses for the prosecution. See 384 U.S. at 870-75.
1084. 384 U.S. at 876 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Douglas, J.).
1085. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 172 (1966); Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 66 (1942); Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924);
Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 479 (1909). See also Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the
United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 414-41, 455-58 (1959).
1086. 384 U.S. at 876. The majority opinion admitted as much. See id. at 861.
1087. Justice Black concluded that "the differences between § 9(h) and § 504 upon
which the Government relies are too slight, too insubstantial, and too vaporlike to justify the
conclusion that one section is a bill of attainder and the other is not." 384 U.S. at 881. In
fact, however, the differences were many and significant. See notes 905-910 and accompa-
nying text supra. The key factor was that the majority in Brown expressly repudiated the
logic announced in Douds. See notes 911-917 and accompanying text supra.
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legitimate function of the government was being interfered with. Thus,
he argued that the effect of the majority's decision was to enforce a bill
of attainder by indirect means:
Our government has not heretofore been thought of as one
which sends its citizens to prison without giving them a chance to
challenge validity [sic] of the laws which are the very foundation
upon which criminal charges against them rest. Yet ihe Court re-
fuses to allow petitioners to attack § 9(h) on the ground that "the
claimed invalidity of § 9(h) would be no defense to the crime of
conspiracy charged in this indictment. .. ." It is indeed a novel
doctrine if the unconstitutionality of a law which forms the very
nucleus of a criminal charge cannot be a defense to that charge.
Certainly the Court does not deny that violation of the § 9(h)
requirement for non-Communist oaths is an essential if not in-
deed the only ingredient of the crime for which the government
seeks to place petitioners in jail. The indictment properly charged
unlawful compliance with § 9(h) as an essential element, if in-
deed not the whole crime laid at petitioners' door. Congress has
passed no law which requires the Court to refuse to consider peti-
tioners' challenge to the constitutionality of § 9(h). Nor are there
any prior cases of this Court which require us today to tell citi-
zens that the courts of our land are not open for them to chal-
lenge bills of attainder under which they may be sent to prison.
The holding is solely and exclusively a new court-made
doctrine.,o 88
The 1938 decisions relied upon by the majority were said to support no
such doctrine because they involved fraudulent efforts by individuals
to obtain payments to which they had no legitimate entitlement. 08 9 But
Justice Black argued that if section 9(h) was unconstitutional, then by
filing false affidavits the petitioners obtained nothing more for their
union than that to which it was entitled, namely, the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board.10 90 Thus, Justice Black and Justice
Douglas concluded that the majority's decision placed the courts in the
anomalous position of enforcing bills of attainder.10 9 1
Three years later, the problem resurfaced in the case of Bryson v.
United States.10 92 There, the petitioner had been indicted in 1951 for
having falsely denied his affiliation with the Communist Party in an
affidavit filed pursuant to section 9(h).10 93 The substantive offense
charged in that indictment was not conspiracy but rather the knowing
1088. 384 U.S. at 877-78.
1089. Id. at 878.
1090. Id. at 878-79.
1091. See id. at 877.
1092. 396 U.S. 64 (1969).
1093. Id. at 67.
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and willful making of a false statement in connection with a matter
within the 'jurisdiction" of a federal agency, in violation of section
1001 of Title eighteen of the United States Code.1 194 Bryson was con-
victed in 1955 and, twelve years later, he brought a collateral proceed-
ing in federal district court requesting that his conviction be set aside
and that his parole be discharged. 0 9 5 The district court found, on the
basis of Brown, that the government had no right to ask the question to
which the petitioner responded falsely. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, claiming that the case was indis-
tinguishable from Dennis.10 96 Justice Harlan, writing for seven
members of the Supreme Court, agreed with the court of appeals. He
noted that none of the elements of proof required for petitioner's con-
viction depended on the validity of section 9(h). 10 97 The majority re-
jected the argument that if section 9(h) was unconstitutional, the false
statement made in feigned compliance with its requirements was not a
matter within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board,
by holding that "[a] statutory basis for an agency's request for informa-
tion provides jurisdiction enough to punish fraudulent statements
under § 1001."1098 Thus, regardless of whether Douds was valid prece-
dent, "[o]ur legal system provides methods for challenging the Govern-
ment's right to ask questions-lying is not one of them. A citizen may
decline to answer the question, or answer it honestly, but he cannot
with impunity knowingly and willfully answer with a falsehood."'1099
Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, dissented. They suggested that
the term "jurisdiction" as used in section 1001 should be construed re-
1094. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976):
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of
the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any
trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry,
shall be fimed not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
1095. The original conviction had been upheld on direct review. Bryson v. United
States, 238 F.2d 657, 665 (9th Cir.), rehearing denied, 243 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 817 (1957). A subsequent application for a reduction of the petitioner's
sentence (a $10,000 fine and five years in prison) had also been rejected. Bryson v. United
States, 265 F.2d 9, 14 (9th Cir.), cent. denied, 360 U.S. 919 (1959).
1096. United States v. Bryson, 403 F.2d 340, 340 (9th Cir. 1969). The district court's
opinion was unreported.
1097. 396 U.S. at 68-69. Justice Harlan was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Stewart and White.
1098. Id. at 71.
1099. Id. at 72.
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strictively. 00 Since there was no interference with a lawful function of
the National Labor Relations Board because section 9(h) was presuma-
bly an attainder in light of Brown, I 0"I there could be no jurisdiction for
the Board to administer that function."10 The dissenters concluded that
since section 9(h) was unconstitutional, the petitioner's union was enti-
tled to receive the services of the National Labor Relations Board with-
out having its officers first file an affidavit.1
0 3
These two decisions are disturbing, because they deny the defend-
ant in a criminal proceeding the opportunity to challenge collaterally
the constitutionality of the law that forms the "nucleus" of the indict-
ment. Presumably, all the justices in Dennis and Bryson would concur
that section 9(h) was a bill of attainder.' I" But because the petitioners
sought review of convictions for, respectively, conspiracy to violate sec-
tion 9(h) and the knowing and willful filing of a false affidavit as re-
quired by section 9(h), their ability to raise an attainder challenge was
terminated. As Justice Black pointed out, this is new court-made doc-
trine; no precedent mandated the solutions reached in Dennis and
Bryson.110 5 There was, however, contrary authority. In United States v.
1100. Id. at 74 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J.). The dissenters cited in
support of this conclusion the case of Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363, 367 (8th Cir.
1967), which held that lying to an FBI investigator was not "within the jurisdiction" of that
agency within the meaning of section 1001. The majority noted this case and said it refused
to either approve or disapprove of its holding. 396 U.S. at 71 n.10.
1101. Justice Douglas noted not only that the attainder decision in Douds represented
only the views of three justices, but also that, in all probability, the Court's decision in
Brown placed Douds within a "discredited regime" of decisions. 396 U.S. at 75-76.
1102. 396 U.S. at 74.
1103. Id. at 76.
1104. With the exception of Justice Fortas in Dennis, and Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Marshall in Bryson, the majorities in both those cases had either joined Chief Justice
Warren's opinion in Brown that discredited Douds or joined Justice White's dissent in
Brown, which had concluded that Douds was "obviously overruled." United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 464-65 (1965) (White, J., dissenting, joined by Clark, Harlan, and
Stewart, JJ.).
1105. Two state court decisions are the only ones that would appear to agree with the
rulings in Dennis and Bryson in the context of cases involving attainder claims. See State v.
Forichette, 279 Minn. 76, 80-81, 156 N.W.2d 93, 97-98 (1968) (challenge to regulations
adopted by the Civil Service Commission of Minneapolis, which barred Nazis, Communists,
anarchists and fascists from being considered for positions of public employment or from
retaining positions that they already occupied; held, one convicted of perjury because of
false statements made in an interview for a position of public employment could not raise a
collateral attainder challenge to the law giving rise to the proceedings in which the false
testimony was given); State v. Neal, 42 Mo. 119, 123-24 (1868) (challenge to test oath exacted
from voters; held, in a criminal proceeding against one who perjured himself by falsely
executing the oath, the perjury ordinance created a separate and distinct offense, and thus
the indictment for that offense need not set forth the underlying oath, which was irrelevant
in the case at bar).
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Kuzma, 10 6 which involved an indictment for conspiracy to violate the
Smith Act,'107 the federal district court rejected an attainder defense to
that indictment by pointing out that the defendants in that case would
be entitled to a full judicial trial at which all constitutional challenges
could be raised, including those based on article one, section nine of the
Constitution.' 0 It did so even though the substantive offense being
tried was one of conspiracy.' 0 9 Because full judicial trial on all issues
was available, there could be no attainder challenge.
The effect of Bryson and Dennis, however, is to limit the very
scope of such a trial so that no constitutional objection to the law that a
person is accused of conspiring to violate may be raised. In creating
such a limitation, the Supreme Court restricted the definition of the
"safeguards of a judicial trial," as that term is used within the context
of the attainder doctrine, by foreclosing judicial consideration of con-
stitutional issues in an entire class of cases. It thus becomes impossible
to reconcile this confining notion of due process developed in Bryson
and Dennis with the more expansive concept of that phrase that the bill
of attainder clauses were intended to preserve.
More importantly, however, these two cases provide legislatures
with a blueprint for drafting enforceable bills of attainder. After these
decisions, all the legislature need do is pass proscriptions, violations of
which are punishable through independent criminal statutes. Thereaf-
ter, regardless of whether the law containing those proscriptions is
deemed to be unconstitutional,'110 the proscriptions can still be en-
forced through prosecutions based on general criminal laws that do
1106. 141 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. Pa. 1954). See notes 637-641 and accompanying text supra.
1107. 18 U.S.C. § 2835 (1976). See note 638 supra.
1108. 141 F. Supp. at 94.
1109. The prosecution in Kuzma, like the one in Dennis, was based on an indictment
charging violation of the general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). See 141
F. Supp. at 92. For similar rulings in other Smith Act cases, see note 637 supra.
1110. Only two caveats are suggested by Dennis and Bryson. In the former case, Justice
Fortas suggested that it might be possible to distinguish situations "Where the constitutional-
ity of a statute is challenged by those who of necessity violate its provisions and seek relief in
the courts. . . ." Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 865 (1966). But he never provided
any further explication of that statement, so its exact meaning is, at present, indeterminable.
In Bryson, Justice Harlan remarked that the majority "had no need to decide. . .whether
jurisdiction would exist under § 1001 if at the time the request for information was made a
court had already authoritatively determined that the statutory basis was invalid. Cf. United
States v. Kapp, supra." Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 71 n.l1 (1970). But Kapp
involved false statements made in connection with receipt of payments for shipments of hogs
pursuant to provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31, and
the major provisions of that law had been held unconstitutional by the United States
Supreme Court in 1936, United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 74 (1936), two years before
Kapp was decided. See note 1079 supra. So the net effect of Justice Harlan's footnote seems
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not, in and of themselves, attaint. Thus the crucial error of Congress in
enacting the anti-Communist law invalidated in the Brown case was
that it incorporated penalty provisions within the text of the law it-
self."" Had section 504 been enforceable, as former section 9(h) had
been, by the independent provisions of Title eighteen of the United
States Code, Bryson and Dennis would permit a person to be convicted
of the substantive crime of conspiring to or fraudulently attempting to
violate the former provision. Of course, it could be argued that the
Court may not have been announcing a general principle but may have
merely desired to deny the petitioners in Bryson and Dennis the retro-
active benefits of Brown. But this argument can be countered by the
fact that Bryson has been followed by a number of decisions in con-
texts having nothing to do with either section 9(h) or attainder
claims." 2 Thus, these two cases do announce a general principle; un-
fortunately it is a principle that may be used to evade and undermine
the very safeguards supposedly furthered by the constitutional pro-
scriptions against bills of attainder.
B. The Nixon Case
1. The Case
The most recent disquisition of the United States Supreme Court
on the bill of attainder doctrine arose from the extraordinary series of
events concerning the disposition of the presidential papers of Richard
M. Nixon. Immediately after Nixon resigned as President on August 9,
1974, governmental archivists began packing the forty-two million
pages of documents and eight hundred and eighty tape recordings that
had accumulated during his second term of office for shipment to Cali-
fornia. These efforts were halted, however, when Leon Jaworski, the
Watergate Special Prosecutor, advised President Gerald Ford of his of-
fice's continuing need for those materials. 1' 3 At this time, counsel for
the White House solicited and received from the Attorney General an
to be that the timing of a judgment decreeing that the underlying "statutory basis" for a
prosecution under section 1001 is invalid will be unimportant.
1111. See note 729 supra.
1112. See United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77, 79-80 (1970) (false statements made to
the Internal Revenue Service in wagering tax forms); United States v. Protch, 481 F.2d 647,
648 (3d Cir. 1973) (false statement made to an Internal Revenue Service agent); United
States v. McCarthy, 422 F.2d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 1970) (failure to disclose receipt by union
officer of payments by an employer having union members on his work force); United States
v. Gomez-Londono, 422 F. Supp. 519, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (false declaration to a customs
agent).
1113. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 430-31 (1977).
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opinion that the documents and recordings in question were Nixon's
private property. Although this conclusion by the Attorney General
was purportedly based on "the almost unvaried understanding of all
three branches of Government since the beginning of the Repub-
lic," 11 14 he did note that public interest in these materials might justify
subjecting the ex-President's rights of ownership "to certain limitations
directly related to the character of the documents as records of govern-
ment activity." "'5 As a result of this opinion, the White House entered
into negotiations with Nixon's counsel regarding the future disposition
of these archival materials. These negotiations culminated in the so-
called "Nixon-Sampson Agreement," which was formally accepted by
Arthur Sampson, the Administrator of the General Services Adminis-
tration (GSA) on September 8, 1974. The agreement provided that all
"Presidential historical materials""1 6 compiled during Nixon's second
term of office would be placed on deposit pursuant to the Federal
Records Act.' 7 The GSA would then ship these records to a federal
facility located near Nixon's home in San Clemente, California. For
the succeeding three years (five years, in the case of the tapes), Nixon,
or those authorized by him, would have full access to those records and
could reproduce them as he wished. If any such materials were sought
by legal process, the GSA agreed to notify Nixon so that he could have
the opportunity to claim any privilege to which he was entitled. After
three years, he would be given carte blanche to remove and dispose of
any or all of the documentary materials. The tapes, however, were to be
given to the United States as of September 1, 1979, subject to the condi-
tions that Nixon could destroy as many of them as he wished after that
date, and that the government would effect the destruction of all tapes
that remained in existence on September 1, 1984 or at the time of
Nixon's death, whichever occurred first."' 8
Nevertheless, the Watergate Special Prosecutor refused to permit
implementation of the Nixon-Sampson Agreement. Therefore, on Oc-
1114. 43 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 1-2 (Sept. 6, 1974), quoted in Nixon v. Administrator of Gen.
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 540 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). For a discussion of the ownership
problem, see note 1187 infra.
1115. 43 Op. ATT'y GEN. 226 (Sept. 6, 1974), quoted in Nixon v. Administrator of Gen.
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 431 (1977).
1116. Defined as: "including books, correspondence, documents, papers, pamphlets,
works of art, models, pictures, photographs, plats, maps, films, motion pictures, sound re-
cordings and other objects or materials having historical or commemorative value." 44
U.S.C. § 2101 (1970).
1117. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 2107, 2108 (1970).
1118. For the text of this agreement, see Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107, 160-62
(D.D.C. 1975) (App. A).
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tober 17, 1974, a suit was lodged in a federal district court in the Dis-
trict of Columbia requesting that the court enforce its terms. This case
of Nixon v. Sampson"1 9 attracted various petitions for intervention.
Several of these petitions were granted and a number of persons and
groups, including Lillian Hellman, columnist Jack Anderson, and the
Reporters' Committee for the Freedom of the Press, were allowed to
participate in the lawsuit.' 120 Most of the intervenors sought access to
the Presidential papers under the Freedom of Information Act." 21 One
intervenor, Watergate Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski, claimed that
the Nixon-Sampson Agreement confficted with a separate pact entered
into between his office and President Ford on November 9, 1974,
whereby the former was guaranteed full access to the tapes and docu-
ments in question."22 The district court dismissed the argument that
the November 9th compact violated Nixon's right to be free from un-
reasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment by con-
cluding that the materials in question were not owned by Nixon but
were instead the property of the United States government." 23 The
court also noted, however, that among all these documents and tapes
were the personal papers and recordings of private conversations by
then-President Nixon, which it found to be protected by the Fourth
Amendment's guarantee of privacy." 24 Therefore, the court issued de-
1119. 389 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C. 1975).
1120. See id. at 114-15.
1121. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V 1975). See 389 F. Supp. at 116-17. Judge Richey's opin-
ion concluded that the presidential papers in question did not fit within the exemptions to
the coverage of this act provided by subsection (a)(4), and thus were the proper subject of
disclosure claims pursuant to subsection (a)(3). See 389 F. Supp. at 145-47.
1122. See 389 F. Supp. at 118. For the text of the November 9th agreement, see id. at
163-64 (App. B).
1123. See id. at 133-156. Judge Richey concluded that Nixon had no legitimate claim to
the documents in question for seven different reasons: (1) according to various prior deci-
sions, the papers of a public official were the property of the government, id. at 133-35; see
note 1187 infra; (2) in order to uphold his claim of possession, Nixon had to show that the
President was in a class apart from other public officials, and this he was unable to do, id. at
135-37; see Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1973); (3) acceptance of Nixon's
claim of possession would undermine the continuity of the Office of the Presidency, 389 F.
Supp. at 137-39; (4) no precedent supported Nixon's allegation of ownership, id. at 139-41;
see note 1187 infra; (5) the prior practices of former Presidents did not support his allega-
tion, id. at 141-43; (6) the Presidential Libraries Act of 1955, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 2107, 2108
(1970), provided no corroboration for his contention, 389 F. Supp. at 143-44; and (7) the
materials in question were subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975), 389 F. Supp. at 145-47. In light of these factors and his
conclusion that the November 9th agreement was not an impermissible general warrant, id.
at 154, Judge Richey found that searches made pursuant to that agreement could not violate
the Fourth Amendment, see id. at 155-56.
1124. 389 F. Supp. at 156-57.
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tailed guidelines for segregating these more intimate records from the
other official documents and for restricting prosecutorial access to the
former class of materials. These guidelines replaced earlier decrees that
had temporarily enjoined enforcement of the Nixon-Sampson Agree-
ment, enjoined disclosure by the government of the contents of the
presidential materials in custody and permitted Nixon, his counsel,
members of the Watergate Special Prosecutor's office and the grand
jury to gain access to these tapes and documents for specified
purposes.'1
25
While these events transpired in the courts, Congress had not been
inactive. On September 18, 1974, ten days after public announcement
of the Nixon-Sampson Agreement, a bill was introduced in the United
States Senate to abrogate that pact and provide for an alternative dis-
position of the materials in question. The House and Senate passed
differing versions of this proposed legislation and settled on a compro-
mise form in a joint conference. That compromise proposal was passed
by both houses of Congress on December 9, 1974, and was signed into
law by President Ford ten days later.1 26 The resultant enactment was
known as the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation
Act"2 7 (Records Act). Title II of that law established a National Study
Commission on Records and Documents of Federal Officials entrusted
with the task of recommending improved ways to maintain archival
collections of the papers of those who serve in public office. 
1 28
But Title I related exclusively to the Nixon Presidency. Section
101(a) of that title directed the Administrator of the GSA to ignore all
prior agreements and retain possession of and control over all taped
conversations by then-President Nixon or any other federal employee
occurring during the period between January 20, 1969, and August 9,
1974. 1129 Similarly, section 101(b) authorized the GSA to retain all doc-
uments and other "Presidential historical materials"' 1 30 accumulated
during that same period.' 1 3' Under section 102(a) of the Records Act,
none of these records could be destroyed except as may be provided by
1125. For the final guidelines issued by the court, see id. at 158. The earlier decrees had
been promulgated between October 21 and November 7, 1974, in connection with Judge
Richey's grant of temporary injunctive relief. For a summary of these decrees, see Nixon v.
Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 334-35 n.l 1 (D.D.C. 1976).
1126. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 433 (1977).
1127. Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695-98 (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 2107 note (1974)).
1128. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 433 (1977).
1129. See id. at 433-34.
1130. See note 1116 supra.
1131. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 434 (1977).
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law;' 132 according to subsection (b), they would be made available in
response to legal process but this availability was to be restricted by any
legitimate defenses or privileges that either the government or an indi-
vidual might raise.' 133 Section 102(c) ensured Nixon, or those desig-
nated by him, full access to the tapes and documents in custody upon
those terms and conditions announced by the Administrator of the
GSA under section 1031134 and, according to subsection (d), similar ac-
cess was granted to agencies and departments of the Executive
Branch. 135 Regulations promulgated pursuant to section 103 appeared
in the Federal Register in 1975.1136 Section 104 of Title I was another
matter; pursuant to subsection (a), the Administrator of the GSA was
authorized to establish regulations governing general public access to
the records and tapes in question. In doing so, he had to take into ac-
count seven specified factors, including the need to disclose the full
truth about the Watergate affair, the need to provide public access to
materials of "general historical significance" unrelated to Watergate
and the need to give Nixon sole custody of materials that did not fit
within either of these aforementioned categories. 137 Under subsec-
tion(b)(1), regulations developed in accordance with these directives
had to be submitted to both houses of Congress; they would take effect
within ninety legislative days unless either house adopted a resolution
disapproving them.1138 Three different sets of regulations had been de-
vised by the GSA pursuant to section 104; all of them had been voted





1136. See 40 Fed. Reg. 2669 (1975), codifed in 41 C.F.R. §§ 105-163 (1976).
1137. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 435 (1977). The other
factors were (a) the need to make the materials available for use in judicial proceedings, (b)
the need to protect national security by preventing access to sensitive documents, (c) the
need to protect individual rights to a fair trial and (d) the need to protect individual rights to
assert any applicable privilege.
In a more recent decision, the Supreme Court has held that the common-law right of
access to judicial records did not authorize release of the Watergate tapes from the custody
of a federal district court due to the fact that the existence of the Records Act provided an
"additional, unique element" because "Congress has created an administrative procedure
for processing and releasing to the public, on terms meeting with congressional approval, all
of petitioner's Presidential materials of historical interest; including recordings of the con-
versations at issue here." Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1306, 1315
(1978).
1138. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs. , 433 U.S. 425, 435 (1977).
1139. The Senate passed a resolution disapproving of the initial set. S. Res. 244, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. S15800-S15803 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1975). It also rejected
seven provisions of the second set submitted by the GSA. S. Res. 428, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
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Records Act,"' the district court for the District of Columbia was
vested with exclusive jurisdiction to try constitutional challenges to the
act itself, challenges to the validity of GSA regulations made in accord-
ance with it, disputed claims of title or custody and claims for renumer-
ation arising from a judgment by the court that the Records Act had
deprived an individual of private property without just compensation
(as was permitted by section 105()). 1141
On December 20, 1974, one day after the Records Act became law,
Nixon initiated a suit challenging its constitutionality and requesting
the convention of a three-judge district court. The United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that such a court could be
convened, because section 105(a) of the Records Act did not override
the independent provisions of Title twenty-eight of the United States
Code. 1142 It also stayed the injunctive order issued by the district court
in Nixon v. Sampson,1143 pending a decision by the three-judge court as
to whether the second suit under section 105(a) was to take priority
over other cases on the docket. 1144 On this last issue, the three-judge
court ruled in the affirmative and thus declined to request a dissolution
122 CONG. REc. S5240-S5291 (daily ed. April 8, 1976). The House disapproved six provi-
sions of the third set. H.R. Res. 1505, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). Subsequently, however,
the Administrator's fourth set of proposed regulations was approved and has become final.
See 42 Fed. Reg. 63626 (1977).
1140. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 435-36 (1977).
1141. See id. at 436.
1142. See Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d 430, 441-42 (D.C. Cir. 1975). This decision recon-
sidered (and upheld) the conclusion of an earlier ruling by a panel of the District of Colum-
bia Circuit that a three-judge court should be convened. Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d 427, 430
(D.C. Cir. 1975). The provisions in Title twenty-eight of the United States Code referred to
by the court of appeals, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-82, 2284 (1970), were revamped soon after this
case. Sections 2281 (permitting only a three-judge court to issue an interlocutory or perma-
nent injunction against enforcement of a state statute on grounds of unconstitutionality) and
2282 (same, with respect to acts of Congress) were repealed. Act of August 12, 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-381, §§ 1, 2, 90 Stat. 1119. Section 2284 was amended to permit the convention of a
three-judge court in challenges to state or federal legislative apportionment plans. Act of
August 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 3, 90 Stat. 1119.
1143. 389 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C. 1975). See note 1125 and accompanying text supra.
1144. See Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d 430,447-48 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The problem that the
court of appeals confronted was that its initial decision to grant a writ of mandamus order-
ing the convention of a three-judge court was filed at 11 a.m. on January 31, 1975, but Judge
Richey, who wrote the opinion in Nixon v. Sampson and who knew that the court of appeals
was likely to issue a writ, nevertheless filed his final opinion at 2 p.m. that same day. See id.
at 435. The court of appeals concluded that it would not deem this fact to be important,
because, under the Records Act, an expedited procedure had been established, and because,
in issuing a writ of mandamus, it had a "responsibility of protecting the affected litigant
from possible harm." Id. at 437.
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of the stay.' 145
Among Nixon's many constitutional objections to the Records
Act" 146 was the contention that it operated as a bill of pains and penal-
ties. He argued that, in the wake of the political turbulence following
the revelations about the Watergate affair, the disclosures during the
House Judiciary Committee's impeachment hearings, and the issuance
of President Ford's pardon, and in light of the evident frustration felt
by many members of Congress who believed the full truth about
Watergate and its ramifications was still being concealed from both
them and the public, the Records Act had been drafted and passed in
order to punish him for his alleged former malfeasances.1 47 Judge Mc-
Gowan, writing for the three-judge court, disagreed. He refused to infer
punitive motivations from the anger and frustration of congressmen
and claimed that the legislative record was barren of any evidence to
support such an inference." 48 In determining the nature of the inquiry
it had to make, the court indicated that it was necessary to apply the
punishment/regulation dichotomy;" 49 therefore, the court was com-
pelled to rely on some guidelines for ascertaining whether or not the
Records Act was punitive. Judge McGowan located two useful guide-
lines: the first was the language in FHemming v. Nestor"5 advising
courts to determine whether a disability is imposed upon an individual
in order to reach him rather'than his status or his activities; the second
was the statement in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez" 5' setting forth a
heptad of criteria for distinguishing punishment from regulation. Ap-
plying the former guideline, the court ruled that, on the basis of the
underlying legislative record, the purpose of Congress was not to pun-
ish Nixon but rather to regulate future safekeeping of archival mate-
rials." 52 Applying the latter guideline, the court determined that
control of official papers had never been traditionally associated with
punishment, that the Records Act incorporated no requirement of sci-
1145. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 333-34 n.10 (D.D.C.
1976).
1146. He also raised contentions concerning separation of powers, executive privilege,
the right of privacy and the First Amendment. These will not be discussed here. For consid-
erations of these issues by the three-judge court and the United States Supreme Court, see
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 335-71 (D.D.C. 1976), a/'d, 433
U.S. 425, 439-68 (1977).
1147. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 372 (D.D.C. 1976).
1148. Id.
1149. See id.
1150. 363 U.S. 603, 614 (1960). See note 506 and accompanying text supra.
1151. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). See note 515 and accompanying text supra.
1152. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 373 (D.D.C. 1976).
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enter, that in terms of Congress' regulatory purpose it had been drafted
as narrowly as possible and that the burden imposed upon Nixon was
not severe, unnecessary or merely punitive."15 3 This last assertion was
supported by citations to those sections of the act giving Nixon access
to the tapes and documents, ensuring him the opportunity to raise
claims of privilege in defense to efforts to gain control of specific
materials through legal process, providing that public access regula-
tions be formulated so as to take Nixon's interest in privacy into ac-
count and stipulating that all constitutional challenges and
compensatory claims would be given expedited treatment by the
courts.1 54 Thus, Judge McGowan concluded that because the depriva-
tion of control over an individual's own private papers was accompa-
nied by so many statutory safeguards, it could not be said to have been
inflicted with a punitive motivation and thus could not constitute an
attainder. "115
The United States Supreme Court affirmed this ruling. The rele-
vant portion of Justice Brennan's majority decision in Nixon v. Admin-
istrator of General Services' 156 began by carefully stating what the bill
of attainder clauses in the Constitution are not. They did not serve as
variants of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
invalidating every legislative act burdening some persons, but not
others who were similarly situated;" 57 nor did they prohibit enact-
ments directed against an individual or class merely because the
number of persons affected by such enactments could have been desig-
nated with a greater degree of generality.11 58 In short, the proscriptions
against bills of attainder do not limit "Congress to the choice of legis-
lating for the universe, or legislating only benefits, or not legislating at
all."" 59 Indeed, the Court stated that the Records Act was not auto-
matically a bill of attainder merely because it refers to Nixon by name.
While Title I of the Records Act dealt solely with Nixon's papers, Title
II created a commission charged with the duty of recommending ways
to preserve the records of all future federal officers. The chief reason
Title I referred to Nixon alone was that other collections of presidential
documents were already housed in functioning archives, whereas
1153. Id.
1154. See id. at 373-74. For discussion of the relevant provisions of the Records Act,
see notes 1129-1141 and accompanying text supra.
1155. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 374 (D.D.C. 1976).
1156. 433 U.S. 425 (1977). On that majority for this issue, see note 244 supra.
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Nixon's were not, and, had they been left in his custody, it was plausi-
ble that he might destroy them. 1 60 Consequently, Justice Brennan con-
cluded that Nixon has a "legitimate class of one.''
Having thus disposed of the issue of specificity, the Court went on
to consider the issue of punishment. Justice Brennan identified three
tests for determining punishment in the context of the bill of attainder
doctrine. The first consisted of the "ready checklist of deprivations and
disabilities so disproportionately severe and so inappropriate to
nonpunitive ends that they unquestionably have been held to fall"
within the constitutional proscriptions against attainders. 162 Among
these deprivations were those of death, banishment, incarceration, con-
fiscation of property and exclusion from employment.' 1 63 Justice Bren-
nan pointed out that Congress had imposed none of these forbidden
disabilities; even if the records and tapes were Nixon's private prop-
erty, ' 64 section 105 of the Records Act entitled him to seek just com-
pensation in the courts."
65
The second test of punishment arose from the deficiencies inherent
in the first. Since Congress could easily devise new deprivations un-
known at common law, the Court noted that it had often looked be-
yond the boundaries of historical experience and applied a
functional test of the existence of punishment analyzing whether
the law under challenge, viewed in terms of the type and severity
of the burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further non-
punitive purposes. . . Where such legitimate legislative purposes
do not appear, it is reasonable to conclude that punishment of
individuals disadvantaged by the enactment was the purpose of
the decisionmakers. 166
-
In this case, nonpunitive purposes were readily apparent. Congress
sought to: (a) avoid the possible destruction of records contemplated by
the Nixon-Sampson Agreement because those records were necessary
1160. Id. at 472.
1161. Id.
1162. Id. at 473.
1163. Id. at 473-74.
1164. Earlier in the opinion, the majority had said: "We see no reason to engage in the
debate whether appellant has legal title to the materials. . . . Such an inquiry is irrelevant
for present purposes because § 105(c) assures appellant ofjust compensation if his economic
interests are invaded, and, even if legal title is his, the materials are not thereby immune
from regulation." Id. at 445 n.8.
1165. Id. at 475.
1166. Id. at 475-76. In a footnote, Justice Brennan pointed out that "Brown left undis-
turbed the requirement that one who complains of being attainted must establish that the
legislature's action constituted punishment and not merely the legitimate regulation of con-
duct." Id. at 476 n.40.
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to complete the investigation of and prosecution for crimes arising from
the Watergate Affair and (b) ensure public access to those documents
of the Nixon Presidency that were of "general historical signifi-
cance."1167 In light of Congress' duty to further the fair administration
of justice, it had a legitimate purpose in preserving evidence relevant to
an ongoing criminal proceeding; similarly, it had a valid objective in
ensuring the competent and disinterested maintenance of "records of
historical value to our national heritage."
1168
The third test of punishment, derived directly from United States
v. Lovett, 1 69 is a judicial inquiry into whether or not the legislative
record evinced a motive to punish. Here the record was said to be de-
void of any such evidence. The relevant committee reports did not den-
igrate Nixon's character or condemn his behavior.'1 70 Indeed, when
Senator Sam Ervin, one of the Record Act's co-sponsors, had been con-
fronted with the contention that it attainted, he had retorted,
The bill does not contain a word to the effect that Mr. Nixon is
guilty of any violation of the law. It does not inflict any punish-
ment on him. So it has no more relation to a bill of attain-
der. . . . than my style of pulchritude is to be compared to that
of the Queen of Sheba." 7
The Court distinguished this situation from the one in Lovett, where
expressions of punitive motive by various members of Congress were
clearly recorded.1 72 In addition, Justice Brennan noted that many fea-
tures of the Records Act (most of which had been mentioned by Judge
McGowan in his opinion for the three-judge district court) 117 3 militated
against interpreting it as a penal enactment.''" Finally, the majority
dismissed Nixon's argument that Congress had less burdensome alter-
natives available to it, such as a civil suit in an appropriate court to
request an injunction against destruction of the documents and tapes in
question. Justice Brennan stated that this alternative was unfeasible for
1167. Id. at 476-77. Justice White concurred in the result reached by the majority on the
attainder challenge, but said that he would question the validity of the Records Act if the
rubric "general historical significance" could be used to withhold the return of purely pri-
vate letters and diaries written by Nixon. See id. at 487-91 (White, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
1168. Id. at 478.
1169. 328 U.S. 303 (1946). See notes 180-198 and accompanying text supra.
1170. See 433 U.S. at 479 (citing H.R. REP. No. 93-1507, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1974);
S. REP. No. 93-1181, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1974)).
1171. 120 CONG. Rac. 33959-60 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Ervin), quoted in 433 U.S. at
480.
1172. 433 U.S. at 480. See notes 186-189 and accompanying text supra.
1173. See note 1154 and accompanying text supra.
1174. 433 U.S. at 481.
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several reasons: not only would a full judicial inquiry into the ex-Presi-
dent's character and reliability be unduly intrusive, but also Nixon had
continued to insist adamantly that his private affairs were not subject to
judicial scrutiny." 75 Thus, the Court concluded that:
To be sure, if the record were unambiguously to demonstrate that
the Act represents the infliction of legislative punishment, the
fact that the judicial alternative poses its own difficulties would
be of no constitutional significance. But the record suggests the
contrary, and the unique choice that Congress faced buttresses
our conclusion that the Act cannot fairly be read to inflict legisla-
tive punishment as forbidden by the Constitution." 1
76
Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, accepted the majority's rejec-
tion of Nixon's attainder challenge but adopted a more cautious ap-
proach. The facts that the Records Act denied the ex-President the
custody over his own papers, that it subjected him to the burden of
prolonged litigation over the status of his own documents, that it con-
stituted an invasion of his privacy and that it exposed him to general
humiliation were all said to raise serious questions under the bill of
attainder clause. 11 7 But Justice Stevens stated that those questions
were not controlling in this case because he agreed Nixon was indeed a
legitimate class of one. Unlike any other President, he had resigned
from office and accepted a full pardon."1 78 Thus, "[s]ince these facts
provide a legitimate justification for the specificity of the statute, they
also avoid the conclusion that this otherwise nonpunitive statute is
made punitive by its specificity.""1
79
Chief Justice Burger's dissent raised some troubling points. After
noting how decisions like Cummings v. Missouri,' II United States v.
Lovett," 8' and United States v. Brown" 82 had revolutionized the bill
of attainder doctrine,"8 3 he claimed that Title I of the Records Act fell
within the proscription of article one, section nine of the Constitution
for several reasons. First, the act provided no procedural due process
safeguards by inflicting its deprivation without a hearing. The Chief
Justice noted that no standards were supplied to the GSA in order to
enable it to determine what is or is not of "general historical signifi-
1175. Id. at 483.
1176. Id.
1177. Id. at 484 (Stevens, J., concurring).
1178. Id. at 486.
1179. Id.
1180. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867). See notes 54-70 and accompanying text supra.
1181. 328 U.S. 303 (1946). See notes 180-198 and accompanying text supra.
1182. 381 U.S. 437 (1965). See notes 728-766 and accompanying text supra.
1183. 433 U.S. at 538 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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cance";" 8 4 nor were there any time limits placed on its deliberations in
formulating standards of its own.' 85 Moreover, Nixon was given no
opportunity to be heard in the decisionmaking process undertaken by
GSA officials and was thus burdened without any of the safeguards of
a judicial trial."186 Second, Chief Justice Burger pointed out that Title I
effected a substantial deprivation. Not only had presidential papers tra-
ditionally been deemed the private property of the former Chief Execu-
tive, ' 8 7 but also the Presidential Libraries Act of 19551188 conferred
vested rights upon an ex-Commander-in-Chief to have a presidential
library at the site of his choice. The effect of the Records Act was to
destroy Nixon's traditional right of ownership and to single him out for
exclusion from the coverage of the 1955 statute. 1 89 Third, the Chief
1184. Id. at 539 n.30.
1185. Id.
1186. Id.
1187. Id. at 539-40. There are three views on this subject. The first is expressed by the
Chief Justice. In support of this contention he cites Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). Yet in that case, Justice Story said that, notwithstanding the private
aspect of such papers, because of "the nature of the public service, or the character of the
documents, embracing historical, military, or diplomatic information, it may be the right,
and even the duty, of the government, to give them publicity, even against the will of the
writers." Id. at 347. A different view was advocated by Judge Richey in Nixon v. Sampson.
He said that "[i]t is a general principle of law that that which is generated, created, produced
or kept by a public official in the administration and performance of the powers and duties
of a public office belongs to the government and may not be considered the private property
of the official." Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107, 133 (D.D.C. 1975). He was able to cite
a number of decisions in support of this contention. See e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361, 380 (1912) ("Thus, in the case of public records and official documents made or
kept in the administration of public office, the fact of actual possession or of lawful custody
would not justify the officer in resisting inspection, even though the record was made by
himself and would supply the evidence of his criminal dereliction."); United States v. First
Trust Co., 251 F.2d 686, 687 (8th Cir. 1958) ("[Rlecords of a government official executed in
the discharge of his official duties . . . [are] public documents and ownership [is] in the
United States."); Coleman v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 865, 881 (1874) ("When-
ever a written record of the transactions of a public officer in his office, is a convenient and
appropriate mode of discharging the duties of his office, it is not only his right but his duty
to keep that memorial,. . . and when kept it becomes a public document-a public record
belonging to the office and not the officer, is the property of the state and not the citizen, and
is in no sense a private memorandum.") A compromise position appears to be advanced by
both the majority of the Supreme Court, see note 1164 supra, and the Attorney General, see
notes 1114-1115 and accompanying text supra, recognizing a private right of ownership, but
subjecting that right to government regulation in the public interest. Indeed, this compro-
mise very much resembles that advocated originally by Justice Story.
1188. Act of August 12, 1955, ch. 859, 69 Stat. 695, amended by Act of October 22, 1968,
PuB. L. No. 90-620, § 2, 82 Stat. 1287-89, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 2107, 2108 (1970).
1189. 433 U.S. at 540-41. The Chief Justice's characterization of the 1955 act is mislead-
ing. It does authorize the Administrator of the GSA to accept land and equipment offered as
a gift to the government for use in establishing a presidential library, 44 U.S.C. § 2108(a)
(1970), to cooperate with a university in setting up a presidential archive, id. § 2108(d), and
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Justice noted that after Brown, punishment need no longer be merely
retributive, but could also be preventive and deterrent;' 190 thus the ma-
jority opinion's vain search for a vindictive motive was largely irrele-
vant.1191 Fourth, Title I, unlike Title II of the Records Act, effectuated
no rule of general applicability but operated against a designated indi-
vidual. Chief Justice Burger contended that the fact that this individual
might constitute a legitimate class of one was irrelevant. As for the fac-
tors noted by Justice Stevens-Nixon's resignation and his acceptance
of a pardon-the Chief Justice remarked that if Congress intended to
punish him for these acts, then it had enacted an attainder.1 192 But if, as
Justice Stevens suggested, it had merely inflicted its deprivations upon
him because of his uniqueness, the act was still an attainder because
mere uniqueness does not justify the abrogation of vested rights."
1 93
Thus, Chief Justice Burger concluded, "[flor nearly 200 years this
Court has not viewed either a 'class' or a 'class of one' as 'legitimate'
under the Bill of Attainder Clause."''119
2. Analysis
The opinion of the three-judge district court in the Nixon case
presents few difficulties. Although that court made a notable but cur-
sory attempt to apply the definitions of punishment set forth in
Flemming and Kennedy, this digression was not the key feature of its
analysis. Rather, it relied primarily on the technique applied in the
Lovett case, namely, scrutiny of the legislative record in order to deter-
mine whether an enactment was passed for the purpose of punishment.
As Judge McGowan himself pointed out, 1195 Congress probably did
rely on the allegations of malfeasance levelled against Nixon in order
to justify its extraordinary treatment of him. This reliance could indi-
cate either a desire to penalize or a desire to regulate present and future
preservation of vital historical materials. Based on the legislative his-
tory of the Records Act, the three-judge court simply chose the latter
explanation.
to accept gifts or bequests for the purpose of establishing such an archive, id. § 2108(g). But
all these provisions stipulate that the Administrator may take such action !f he considers it
to be in the public interest. Thus, since the entire matter is left to the discretion of the chief
of the GSA, it is rather difficult to conclude that the statute creates any "vested rights."
1190. 433 U.S. at 541-42 (citing United States v. Brown, 381 US. 437, 458 (1965)).
1191. Id. at 542.
1192. Id. at 543.
1193. Id. at 544.
1194. Id. at 545.
1195. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 373 n.71 (D.D.C.
1976).
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The opinion of the United States Supreme Court is more trouble-
some in that it raises as many questions as it answers. Despite all the
disclaimers about the uniqueness of this case, the section of the major-
ity opinion dealing with bills of attainder offers a general analysis that
can, and undoubtedly will, be applied in other factual contexts. Justice
Brennan's opinion considers only two aspects of the attainder doctrine:
specificity and punishment. On the subject of specificity, the majority
opinion in Nixon clarifies a few areas left rather murky by Brown.
First, it indicated that merely because a statute operates against a
named individual does not mean that it must be denominated as a bill
of attainder. This holding rebuts any false conclusion that might have
been derived from Part III of Chief Justice Warren's opinion in
Brown,"196 in which he appeared to state that if a law is drafted with
too great a degree of specificity, it is presumptively penal. Indeed,
Nixon makes a key point in this respect: the definition of a bill of at-
tainder consists of four components and if a law embodies only one or
two of them, it simply cannot attaint. Second, the majority opinion re-
pudiated emphatically the suggestion first broached by Justice White in
his dissent in Brown:'11 that the concepts of overinclusiveness and un-
derinclusiveness,-developed in the context of equal protection analy-
sis-had been interpolated sub silentio into the bill of attainder
doctrine. Justice Brennan clearly indicated that the proscriptions
against attainders are not variants of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment; furthermore, he allayed any fears that might
have been raised by language in the Brown case when he declared that
a legislature is not restricted to enacting only those laws drafted at a
broad level of generality. When confronted with a problem susceptible
to a statutory resolution, Congress, if it wishes, can effectuate that reso-
lution in a piecemeal fashion. These are truisms, to be sure; but they
merited reiteration, especially in light of the often misleading critique
in which the dissent in Brown engaged. Nonetheless, Justice Brennan's
remark that Richard Nixon was a "legitimate class of one" is dis-
turbing; if the mere specificity of a statute will not cause it to be classi-
fied as an attainder, then the legitimacy of the legislative specification
would appear to be irrelevant. But if the fact that Nixon was suigeneris
is a key feature of the majority opinion, then a new element, namely,
the legitimacy of a classification vis-a-vis the subject being classified,
1196. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 451 (1965). See notes 946-969 and
accompanying text supra, for an explanation of the confusing aspects of Chief Justice War-
ren's discussion in Brown.
1197. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 463-64 (1965) (White, J., dissenting).
See notes 770-772 and accompanying text supra.
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has been added to the bill of attainder doctrine. Justice Stevens' con-
currence illustrates the problems arising with such an addition. He con-
cluded that Title I of the Records Act did inflict punishment; and had it
been directed against any other named person, Justice Stevens would
have invalidated it as an attainder. But solely because it imposed its
sanctions upon a unique person-a President who had resigned his of-
fice and accepted a pardon-it could not fall within the proscription of
article one, section nine. As a result, Nixon alone could be denied the
protections afforded by the bill of attainder clauses to which all other
persons are entitled.
There are several problems with this thesis. One is the concept of
uniqueness itself. Justice Stevens found Nixon to be vuigeneris because
of his resignation and pardon; Justice Brennan reached the same con-
clusion because he believed (or, at least, found a plausible basis for the
belief) that Nixon, unlike other former Presidents, could not be en-
trusted with the care and safekeeping of his own state papers. Thus,
conduct and character are the bases for determining who may consti-
tute a legitimate class of one; but if this is so, then all individuals may
be deemed unique, because their characters and many aspects of their
conduct differ from those of their fellow human beings. Therefore, any
time a legislature enacts a law imposing sanctions upon a named indi-
vidual, it is burdening the "legitimate class of one" to which that indi-
vidual belongs. One iiiterpretation of the majority opinion in Nixon is
that because the person being burdened constitutes the class itself, the
act of the legislature in singling him out for a deprivation cannot be
specification within the meaning of the bill of attainder doctrine. Of
course, if this is correct, then the Court in Nixon has completely rede-
fined the concept of specificity by excluding from the coverage of the
bill of attainder doctrine the very type of legislation against which it
was originally directed: laws burdening named persons.
The other major problem with Justice Brennan's "legitimate class
of one" remark is his choice of adjectives. For him, an individual con-
stitutes a legitimate class of one if that individual is unique. But uni-
queness is irrelevant to the bill of attainder doctrine and so is the
legitimacy of the legislative classification recognizing that uniqueness.
The problem in attainder analysis is not whether a given enactment
imposing a sanction incorporates a legitimate classification in order to
designate the victims of that sanction; rather, the problem is for what
purpose that enactment was passed. Thus the fact that the classification
consisting entirely of one person- Richard M. Nixon-is a legitimate
classificatory act because of its subject's uniqueness is simply not ger-
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mane; the legitimacy or illegitimacy of Congress' classification should
not be a defense to a bill of attainder challenge. As Chief Justice Burger
pointed out, legitimacy of classification is a conceptforeign to attainder
analysis. If Nixon stands for a contrary proposition, it has, in effect,
added a new component to the definition of an attainder. But such an
interpretation may be a misinterpretation of Justice Brennan's view-
point because he proceeded to state that even if the specificity element
were satisfied, there would still have to be a showing of punitive intent.
Thus perhaps his "legitimate class of one" remark should best be rele-
gated to the category of surplusage, in the hope that it will not be taken
seriously by succeeding courts.
On the subject of punishment, the majority opinion in Nixon
made a concerted effort to clarify this confused topic by presenting
three independent tests for determining whether a statute is or is not
punitive. The first of these tests consists of a list of those sanctions typi-
cally imposed by parliamentary bills of attainder; "[a] statutory enact-
ment that imposed any of those sanctions on named or identifiable
individuals would be immediately constitutionally suspect."' 198 This
may hold true in cases involving draconian penalties like death, impris-
onment or exile, but when a relatively milder sanction like confiscation
of property or denial of employment is confronted, problems arise.
Why should a law depriving identifiable individuals of private prop-
erty be "immediately constitutionally suspect"? True, it exacts a disa-
bility, but that fact, in and of itself, is meaningless, because the
legislature may have had a completely nonpunitive purpose for doing
so. The majority opinion errs by divorcing the nature of the sanction
from the motive for imposing it. Before a law can be invalidated as a
bill of attainder, a court needs to know not only what type of depriva-
tion was inflicted, but also why it was inflicted; the latter element is the
decisive one. Yet by establishing the severity of the sanction as an in-
dependent test of punishment, the majority opinion in Nixon creates a
criterion that completely excludes any account of the crucial issue of
legislative purpose. Here, too, however, there appears to be a discrep-
ancy between what Justice Brennan says and what he actually does. He
stated that imposition of certain harsh sanctions will cause a law to be
immediately "suspect." But merely because it is suspect does not neces-
sarily mean it will be abrogated; that ultimate step may require proof of
something more. Thus, what appears to be an independent test of pun-
ishment may be no more than one factor that must be coupled with
scrutiny of legislative motive. This conclusion is borne out by a consid-
1198. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 473 (1977).
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eration of Justice Brennan's application of this first test. If the severity
of the disability exacted is, in and of itself, a test of punishment, then
the Records Act should have been constitutionally suspect because it
effected a deprivation of what may well have been private property." 199
But Justice Brennan claimed to find no punitive sanction because of
the just compensation provision of section 105(c). The clear implication
is that inclusion of such a provision negated any colorable contention
about Congress' alleged motive to penalize. Thus, in practice, the sever-
ity-of-the-sanction test will require an analysis of legislative purpose.
The second test of punishment is a functional one. The Court
asked whether the law enacted, viewed in terms of the type of burden
imposed, could be said to further a nonpunitive objective. Among the
precedents cited in support of this test were Cummings v. Missouri,200
Hawker v. New York, 2°" United States v. Brown 20 2 and Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez 2 °3 Although the Court cited Kennedy, it made no
attempt to manipulate the seven criteria listed in that case. 1204 Instead,
Justice Brennan simply applied the regulation/punishment distinction.
1199. See note 1187 supra.
1200. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867). See notes 54-70 and accompanying text supra.
1201. 170 U.S. 189 (1898). See notes 551-563 and accompanying text supra.
1202. 381 U.S. 437 (1965). See notes 728-766 and accompanying text supra.
1203. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). See notes 509-515 and accompanying text supra.
1204. See id. at 168,69. See note 515 and accompanying text supra. This omission may
corroborate the thesis that the tests laid down in Kennedy are, in fact, unworkable. See notes
588-589 and accompanying text supra. Even the three-judge district court dealt with only
four of the seven criteria established in Kennedy. See note 1153 and accompanying text
supra. Indeed, the most conscientious attempt by a court to apply the Kennedy criteria
reveals the deficiencies inherent in those criteria. Atlas Roofing Co. N. Occupational Safety
& Health Review Comm'n, 518 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975), affd without considering thepoint,
430 U.S. 442 (1977), involved the issue of whether or not the civil penalty provisions of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 666(a)-(c) (1970), are really penal in na-
ture and thus call for the constitutional protections of the Sixth Amendment. Chief Judge
John R. Brown's opinion for the Fifth Circuit presented a lengthy analysis of the applicabil-
ity of the seven Kennedy criteria to the facts in this case. See 518 F.2d at 1000-1011. His
conclusion was that one factor (the presence of an affirmative disability or restraint) sup-
ported a finding of punishment, four (historical considerations, the scienter issue, whether or
not the sanctioned behavior was already deemed criminal and whether or not the sanction
itself is excessive) did not, one (promotion of retribution and deterrence) provided ammuni-
tion for both sides and one (whether or not there was a rationally assignable alternative
purpose) could not be applied because it would place the judiciary in the uncomfortable
position of second guessing the judgment of the legislature. But the basis for the court's
holding that the provisions of section 666 are not punitive was not any weighing of these
seven divergent factors but rather its finding that (a) Congress intended to effect civil sanc-
tions in this section and (b) the references to these sanctions as "civil" in the text of the
statute itself would be deemed conclusive. Id. at 1011. These findings are anomalous, to say
the least: if there was indeed conclusive evidence of congressional intent, then the court in
Atlas Roofing had no business analyzing these seven factors in the first place. See Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). Atlas Roofing is a graphic demonstration
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Assuming Congress might have had a nonpunitive regulatory purpose
in enacting the Records Act, he sought to corroborate that assumption
by examining the legislative history of the act. That examination
yielded two nonpenal congressional concerns: safeguarding materials
needed in an ongoing criminal prosecution and preserving documents
of historical importance. In carrying out this analysis, however, the
Court ignored the relevancy test of Cummings120 5 and the refinements
made upon it by Brown. 2 °6 It did not try to ascertain whether the
means used by Congress to effectuate its objectives were, in fact, inter-
nally consistent with those objectives; rather, it deemed its task accom-
plished as soon as it had identified the objectives in question and
assured itself that they were indeed legitimate. There was no effort to
discover if the terms of the Records Act were drafted in such a way as
to accomplish the purposes of preserving evidence and safeguarding
materials of public interest. This omission may signify either that the
Court deemed it self-evident that the provisions of the Records Act ful-
filled the nonpunitive legislative purposes in question, or that the
means-ends relevancy rule of Brown, which had been developed in a
case involving exclusion from an office, did not apply in this factual
context. Presumably, the former alternative is the more accurate one.
The third test of punishment is no test at all. It consists of the
technique used in United States v. Lovett, 12 17 namely, judicial scrutiny
of the legislative record to determine motive. This technique had al-
ready been used by the Court in connection with the second criterion,
the regulation/punishment distinction. But now Justice Brennan was
elevating this judicial tool into a full-fledged "test of punishment."
Having done so, it might be expected that Justice Brennan would not
only have engaged in a detailed scrutiny similar to that undertaken by
Justice Black in Lovett, but also that he would have defined the per-
missible scope of such scrutiny, something which was not done in
Lovett. 20 8 But Justice Brennan.did neither of those things. He cited
reports from the House and Senate and claimed to find that no com-
mittee member had cast aspersions upon Nixon. In addition, he cited
Sam Ervin's assurance that Congress had no wish to punish the former
President. Even assuming that such an assurance was entitled to deci-
sive weight, the Court nevertheless overlooked an important issue. As
of the conceptual confusion attendant to judicial efforts to apply the tests for punishment set
forth in Kennedy.
1205. See notes 531-539 and accompanying text supra.
1206. See notes 970-973 and accompanying text supra.
1207. 328 U.S. 303 (1946). See notes 180-198 and accompanying text supra.
1208. See notes 270-286 and accompanying text supra.
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Chief Justice Burger pointed out, the majority made no attempt to
gauge how Brown affects Lovett. The former case states punishment
may be retributive, deterrent or preventive and thus it is no longer suf-
ficient to say that the legislative record evinced no expressions of a pur-
pose to punish a certain person for past conduct. Perhaps Congress
enacted the Records Act not to penalize Nixon for his former misdeeds
but rather to deter future Chief Executives from committing improper
or illegal acts by use of the implicit threat that it might subject their
state papers to similar confiscation. By redefining the possible purposes
of punishment, Brown compels a wider scrutiny than that undertaken
in Lovett; yet the majority in Nixon completely ignored the legacy of
Brown, and instead contented itself with a cursory search for evidence
of retributive expressions only.
In applying this third test, however, Justice Brennan considered
two other aspects. One was the provisions of the Records Act itself;
here, he merely repeated the conclusions of the three-judge district
court.
12 0 9 The second aspect was his suggestion that one way of divin-
ing whether or not a legislature sought to punish was to inquire into the
existence of less burdensome alternatives by which it could have
achieved its objectives. In the Nixon case this approach proved un-
availing because a civil suit, the one other feasible alternative, was
found to be equally burdensome and highly impractical. Yet this sug-
gested approach in Nixon is a genuine innovation in the bill of attain-
der doctrine. Brown had indicated that courts should be willing to ask
whether the legislature could have achieved its goals by more internally
consistent means.'21" But not until Nixon had a court suggested that
punishment, within the meaning of the bill of attainder clauses, could
be inferred from a legislative failure to adopt less burdensome alterna-
tives.1 1' If the Court intends this technique to be applied persever-
1209. See note 1153 and accompanying text supra.
1210. See note 989 and accompanying text supra.
1211. The "less burdensome alternatives" or "less drastic means" test has been used by
the Supreme Court to invalidate a wide variety of legislation, especially laws that impinge
upon First Amendment freedoms or state enactments disrupting interstate commerce. See,
e.g., Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 376-78 (1976) (Mississippi ordi-
nance requiring reciprocal acceptance of its milk by other states as a condition to importa-
tion of milk from those states); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (Arizona
ordinance barring the shipment of uncrated local cantaloupes out of state); United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 (1967) (provision of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950
barring members of "Communist action" organizations from employment in defense facili-
ties; see note 613 supra); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 310 (1965) (Brennan, J.,
joined by Goldberg & Harlan, JJ., concurring) (law prohibiting the delivery of "Communist
political propaganda" through the mails unless the addressee so requests); Aptheker v. Sec-
retary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964) (provision of the Subversive Activities Control Act
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ingly, then it has, in effect, placed its imprimatur on the second
guessing of legislatures by judges. A committed implementation of the
less-burdensome-alternatives analysis in the context of attainder chal-
lenges may well prove to be the major development in this area of the
law since the decision in Cummings itself, provided, of course, that
enough judges are willing to make such a commitment.
1212
Thus, a close consideration of the Nixon case yields distinctly
mixed conclusions. On the one hand, the majority's analysis of the is-
sues of specificity and punishment is, in many respects, disappointingly
superficial and occasionally confused. On the other hand, dicta in this
opinion suggest a more expansive concept of the bill of attainder doc-
trine than any decision of the United States Supreme Court has hereto-
fore advocated.
Conclusion
The history of the bill of attainder doctrine during the past century
has been, with some notable exceptions, one of constant and consistent
retreat from the broad principles announced in Cummings v.
Missouri.1 21 3 Justice Field's opinion in that case offered an expansive
redefinition of the criteria for determining whether or not a law at-
of 1950 prohibiting members of "Communist action" organizations from receiving pass-
ports); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (Arkansas statute requiring teachers in
public schools to file annual affidavits listing all their affiliations); Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-55 (1951) (municipal ordinance barring the sale of pasteurized
milk unless it had been processed and bottled at an approved facility within a radius of five
miles from the central square of Madison, Wisconsin). See generally Struve, The Less-Re-
strictive-Alternative Princle and Economic Due Process, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1463, 1471-78
(1967); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 468-70 (1969).
1212. One should not, however, ignore the rather radical suggestions made by Justice
Stevens and Chief Justice Burger. The former intimated that invasion of privacy and humili-
ation may be punishment for the purposes of a bill of attainder. He made a similar sugges-
tion about the fact that Nixon would be "subjected to the burden of prolonged litigation
over the administration of the statute." Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,
484 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). No one else has ever suggested that merely because a
person affected by a law finds it necessary to sue in order to contest how that law is being
administered, he is thereby being punished; serious application of this thesis might lead to
the conclusion that most, if not all, legislation must be punitive. Chief Justice Burger, in
discussing the judicial trial aspect of the defimition of an attainder bemoaned the fact that
Nixon was not allowed to participate in the decisionmaking processes of the GSA. Id. at 539
n.30 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Heretofore, "safeguards of a judicial trial" had only referred
to the statutory provision of a trialtype hearing before any imposition of sanctions; accord-
ing to the Chief Justice, it must now encompass provision of an opportunity for one affected
by a law to participate in the administrative determination of how that law is to be enforced.
Again, this is an unprecedented extension of the bill of attainder doctrine; it is also an im-
practical one.
1213. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867). See notes 54-70 and accompanying text supra.
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taints. One would have expected that because of this very expansive-
ness, many legislative acts would be invalidated as attainders. For a
time this was true; of the twenty-three decisions since 18671214 that have
struck down laws pursuant to the proscriptions of article one, sections
nine and ten of the Constitution, twelve were rendered during the two
decades following Cummings. But since that initial surge of activity,
the bill of attainder clauses have remained largely dormant. In some
respects, this dormancy is undoubtedly attributable to the increased so-
phistication of legislative draftsmen. For the most part, however, the
responsibility for this inaction must be laid at the door of the courts. It
is the judges who have developed multifarious ways to avoid striking
down enactments as bills of attainder. By utilizing spurious distinc-
tions, 12 5 confusing two different constitutional prohibitions with one
another, 21 6 relying on the facile invocation of simplistic labels instead
of the hard task of judicial ratiocination, 2 1 7 extending key words and
phrases like "regulation"12 1 8 or "safeguards of a judicial trial 1219 to
the point of meaninglessness and, in general, ignoring the implications
of and often the explicit language in cases like Cummings, United States
v. Lovett12z° and United States v. Brown,122' judges have managed to
undermine this historical safeguard of the Constitution. Consequently,
a recent chronicle of the bill of attainder doctrine becomes little more
than a list of the various escape clauses that judges have engrafted onto
that doctrine. Indeed, often the most reliable escape clause has proven
to be the simple ipse dixit. An astonishing number of decisions have
rejected attainder challenges to various types of legislation without pro-
viding any meaningful rationale for doing so.1222
1214. See note 98 supra.
1215. Such as the distinctions between civil and criminal penalties and procedures, see
notes 295-338 and accompanying text supra, prospectivity and retrospectivity, see notes 339-
392, 897-921 and accompanying text supra, and rights and privileges, see notes 393-478 and
accompanying text supra.
1216. See notes 923-945 and accompanying text supra.
1217. Examples are those cases relying on the "deportation-is-not-punishment" label,
see notes 479-524 and accompanying text supra, and those cases finding purported exemp-
tions to the bill of attainder doctrine, see notes 865-896 and accompanying text supra.
1218. See notes 525-590, 946-989 and accompanying text supra.
1219. See notes 623-722, 1062-1112 and accompanying text suprz.
1220. 328 U.S. 303 (1946). See notes 180-198, 627 and accompanying text supra.
1221. 381 U.S. 437 (1965). See notes 728-766 and accompanying text supra.
1222. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 268 (1886) (law requiring armed militias to
be organized only with the approval of the governor); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 542
F.2d 166, 169 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 755 (1977) (federal statute providing for
confinement for contempt in the case of a witness who declines to testify before a grand jury
after having been granted use immunity); United States v. Lewis, 472 F.2d 252, 256 n.4 (3d
Cir. 1973) (jury selection plan for the Western District of Pennsylvania which barred from
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Why has this turn of events came about? To some extent, it may be
the result of judicial self-restraint, of a profound reluctance on the part
of judges to second guess the conclusions of legislatures. Or it may be
attributable to the inherent imprecision of many of the terms that com-
prise the definition of a bill of attainder. Yet, it certainly is not the
result of hesitancy on the part of legislatures to enact punitive laws.
Indeed, the bill of attainder doctrine should have proven most useful in
abrogating much of the anti-subversive legislation passed by state and
federal governments since World War II. Nevertheless, only three cases
utilized the proscriptions of article one, sections nine and ten to strike
down such laws and one of those was reversed on appeal.122 3 It may
jury service persons facing pending prosecutions for crimes punishable by more than one
year in prison); United States v. Gosciniak, 142 F.2d 240, 240 (7th Cir. 1944) (provisions of
the 1940 Selective Service and Training Act barring admission of certain evidence in draft
violation proceedings); United States v. McCarthy, 300 F. Supp. 716, 721 n.7 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), affd, 422 F.2d 160 (2d Cir.), appeal dismissed, 398 U.S. 946 (1970) (federal law re-
quiring union officer to disclose payments made to him by one employing union members);
MacQuarrie v. McLaughlin, 294 F. Supp. 176, 178 (D. Mass. 1967), a/I'd, 394 U.S. 456
(1968) (Massachusetts law revoking the licenses of uninsured motorists who are involved in
an accident and who fail to post a bond); American Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 110
F. Supp. 374, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (Federal Communications Commission order regulating
lottery programs on television and radio); United States v. Olson, 253 F.233, 234-35 (W.D.
Wash. 1917) (provisions of the Selective Service Act of 1917); Anderson v. Webb, 241 Ark.
233, 239, 406 S.W.2d 871, 874 (1966) (statute providing that fee tail may be dissolved by the
grantor and all remaindermen upon the death of the life tenant); Jones v. Ellis, 182 Ga. 380,
384, 185 S.E. 510, 512 (1936) (mandamus filed by a school district to compel, the county
board of education to pay its proportionate share of funds for education); Arciero v. Hager,
397 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Ky. 1965) (law making an adopted child the equivalent of the natural
child of the adopting parent for inheritance purposes and terminating its legal relationship
to its natural parent); McDonough v. Director of Patuxent Institution, 229 Md. 626, 629, 183
A.2d 368, 371 (1962) (state's Defective Delinquent Law providing for commitment of juve-
nile delinquents); Mosher v. Bay Circuit Judge, 108 Mich. 503, 505, 66 N.W. 384, 385 (1896)
(law permitting attachment to secure an unmatured claim); In re Platz, 60 Nev. 296, 309, 108
P.2d 858, 864 (1940) (law prohibiting an attorney who has had his license suspended from
practicing for the duration of that suspension); Kelley v. State Bar, 148 Okla. 282, 298, 298
P. 623, 624 (1931) (rule requiring all licensed attorneys to pay an annual fee to the state bar
or suffer a forfeiture of licenses); Thoren v. Builders' Bd., 533 P.2d 1388, 1390 (Ore. App.
1975) (state Builders' Licensing Act); Friedman v. American Sur. Co., 137 Tex. 149, 162, 151
S.W.2d 570, 577 (1941) (state unemployment act exacting a social security tax); State v.
Eisenberg, 48 Wis. 2d 364, 380, 180 N.W.2d 529, 537 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987
(197 1) (law requiring an attorney to pay due respect to courts and judges); Christie v. Lueth,
265 Wis. 326, 332, 61 N.W.2d 338, 341 (1953) (resolution setting up a special committee to
investigate the petitioner); In re King's Estate, 261 Wis. 266, 272, 52 N.W.2d 885, 888 (1952)
(statute which says realty may be added to the properties, the title of which may be adjudi-
cated in county courts if necessary to the settlement of an estate, as applied to the realty of a
married couple, one of whom killed his spouse and then committed suicide).
1223. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), see notes 728-766 and accompa-
nying text supra; Blawis v. Bolin, 358 F. Supp. 349 (D. Ariz. 1973), see notes 1032-1046 and
accompanying text supra; Thompson v. Wallin, 196 Misc. 686, 93 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1949), rev'd
sub noam. L'Hommedieu v. Board of Regents, 276 App. Div. 494, 95 N.Y.S.2d 443 (3d
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well be, as has been suggested, 1224 that courts consider the bill of attain-
der doctrine to be an outmoded device. Indeed, both before and after
its decision in Brown, the United States Supreme Court relied prima-
rily on other techniques, such as vagueness 1225 or overbreadth analy-
sis, 1226 to strike down anti-subversive or anti-Communist legislation.
But these alternative devices have their own limits: vagueness analysis
is of little use with a well-drafted statute and the scope of the over-
breadth doctrine has been sharply curtailed in recent years.
1227
Thus, it may well be appropriate to dust off the bill of attainder
clauses and put them to a renewed use whenever a legislature appears
to have arrogated to itself the functions of judge and jury. Putting these
clauses to such a use, however, will require the judiciary to interpret the
proscriptions contained therein in the more expansive manner sug-
gested by Cummings, Brown and Nixon v. Administrator of General
Services. 228 As Professor Zachariah Chafee has warned:
It is all very pleasant to say that the remedy for bad laws lies with
the people at the polls, but what Senators or Represenatives were
ever defeated because they ever voted for a sedition law? .... If
legislators are determined not to be guardians of the liberties of
the people and if judges refuse to interfere when legislators take
those liberties away, what is the use of putting guarantees of fun-
damental rights into the Constitution except, perhaps, to furnish
political orators with noble words to quote while they tell us
Americans to- thank God that we are not as other men are?
1229
The answer, of course, is that it is of no use at all.
Dep't), affd, 301 N.Y. 476, 95 N.E.2d 806 (1950), af/'d sub nom. Adler v. Board of Educ.,
342 U.S. 485 (1952), see notes 199-211 and accompanying text, supra.
1224. See note 988 supra.
1225. See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373-74 (1964) (expurgatory oath exacted
from the public employees of the state of Washington); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction,
368 U.S. 278, 286-87 (1961) (expurgatory oath extracted from the public employees of the
state of Florida).
1226. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 266 (1967) (federal law barring
members of "Communist action" organizations from employment in defense facilities);
Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 62 (1967) (expurgatory oath exacted from the public em-
ployees of the state of Maryland); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967)
(New York's Feinberg Law, see notes 203-204 and accompanying text supra); Elfbrandt v.
Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 17 (1966) (expurgatory oath exacted from the public employees of the
state of Arizona); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952) (expurgatory oath ex-
acted from the public employees of the state of Oklahoma).
1227. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613-15 (1973). See note 989 supra.
1228. 433 U.S. 425 (1977). See notes 1113-1212 and accompanying text supra.
1229. CHAFEE, supra note 7, at 161.
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